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This study discusses Syrian refugees’ migration trajectories and narratives, based 
on the fieldwork conducted among Syrian refugees in Turkey, Greece, and Germany 
as three major geo-political countries particularly concerning Syrian refugee 
communities. The research adopts a qualitative research map, using the Grounded 
Theory research approach, ethnography and semi-structured interview methods, in 
six cities and eight refugee protection centres and camps.  
The research findings obtained and generated during the field studies are evaluated 
and analysed using theoretical toolboxes derived from sociology and political 
science. Especially important are three theoretical frameworks: Power Relations, 
Digital Habitus, and Political and Social Subjectivities, through which I analysed the 
Syrian refugees’ practices of mobilities, migration routes, and perception of targeted 
countries in detail. These theoretical frameworks assist in understanding the 
implications and limitations of power relations in refugees’ lives, as well as refugees’ 
use of the internet and media and the influence of these uses on their refugee’s 
perceptions and desires while being in limbo in refugee camps. Also, the importance 
of varying capital forms and women refugee’s gender experiences in forced 
migration and displacement are foregrounded and evaluated. 
The research proposes a new methodological system that helps to understand 
contemporary colonialism while addressing current colonial and exploitation 
relations - Semi-Autonomous Colonialism. This system considers three mechanisms 
as (co)-operating drivers: Power relations as pushing and formative forces, 
Subjectivity as individuals’ agencies, actions, and representations within the scope 
of their own capacity and capital, and Digital Habitus as a new connecting interface, 
that assist in understanding refugees’ use of the internet and media and its influence 
of on the refugee's perception and desires. 
In the research, in which the active participation of individuals by consenting to the 
changing and digitalising systems is discussed, semi-autonomy stands out as a 
unique character. Contemporary colonialism appears in peoples' agenda even in the 
daily practices and decisions, particularly when they immigrate, establish a new life 
and become unseen actors in economic and social relationships. Consequently, 
Semi-Autonomous Colonialism is a model of modern colonialism in which the 
strategies and mechanisms of exploitation become invisible. 
Keywords: Migration, Forced Displacement, Syrian Refugees, Colonialism, 
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This empty space left above is to encourage readers to remember the observations, 
comments and thoughts they have about the feelings and experiences of refugees 
they have met in their life. The reason for this is the attempt to emphasise certain 
feelings that refugees experience due to external factors, which I have observed to 
be widespread, rather than only highlighting the experiences of the refugees I 
interviewed within the scope of my research. In particular, my attempt to highlight 
both the reader’s emotions as well as to portray the feelings of the refugees through 
the reader is to reveal the potential for empathy and partnership with the feelings 
and thoughts of Syrian refugees discussed in this study. Simultaneously, it is also 
about empowering both readers and participants to engage better in this research. 
1.1) Research Questions, Objectives and Aims 
Research Aims 
This research aims to show Syrian refugees’ changing perceptions and opinions on 
their mobility in three specific countries, Turkey, Greece, and Germany. This study 
deals with the Syrian Refugee Crisis and Migration by explicitly focusing on forcibly 
displaced Syrian refugees who lost their homes and are now living in insecurity and 
limbo. The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the mass migration of Syrian people are recent 
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social phenomena. Syrians now constitute the largest refugee population in the 
world. I study this research subject by using the lenses and methods of sociology 
and political science. Undoubtedly not all sociological facts are independent of their 
historical development. Hence, when considering the Syrian refugees' migration, I 
approach this socio-political phenomenon as an ongoing migration that emerged 
with the erupted conflicts in 2011 in Syria. 
Migration is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, people have been migrating 
for different reasons in every part of the world for thousands of years. Bearing in 
mind the historical mobility of humans, I examine the unique and novel conditions 
and developments of Syrian refugees living in refugee camps and camp setting 
places, especially within their migration trajectories. This contrasts with many studies 
with similar scopes, which approach more specific, narrower fields with micro 
perspectives. Through this approach, I aim to gain detailed insight into Syrian 
refugees’ migrations and situations with a broader perspective. Relatedly, this 
research aims to investigate the reasons and factors that migration phenomena 
occur chiefly from East to West, focusing on the particular case of Syrian refugees. 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
- Studying Syrian refugees’ perceptions, desires, and thoughts about others and 
particularly the West. This objective explores the formative social and political power 
relations over Syrian refugees’ status and conditions, as well as Syrian refugees’ 
opinions and thoughts about these power relations. 
- Exploring Syrian refugees’ engagement with media technologies and the internet 
within the boundaries of a new digital age and the environment of refugee camps 
where a new habitus appears. This objective delves into the influence and role of 
complex new media relations, such as social media, on Syrian refugees’ perceptions 
and desire. 
- Investigating Syrian refugees’ social, economic, and educational backgrounds and 
capital in relation to their practices and the realisation of their plans. This objective 
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mainly formulates the capacity and limits of Syrian refugees’ practices and mobilities, 
such as affordability of long-distance migration. 
- Discovering Syrian refugees’ transformation and empowerment of gender roles and 
norms prior to and during the migration. This objective scrutinises the impact and 
role of gender relations in migration and refugee-ness, as well as the importance of 
individual subjectivities. 
Research Questions 
I formulated my primary research question and sub-questions in light of these 
research objectives and sought answers during the research. I started to research 
the answers to the following research questions, especially after 2015, with the mass 
migration attempts of Syrian refugees to Europe and the focus of the world media 
on this issue. Although I formulate the first question as a primary research question, 
these research materials and findings also answer the subsequent research 
questions presented below.  
Primary Research Question: 
“Considering the influences of new media relations on perceptions and desires, why 
do Syrian refugees migrate long distances, taking more risks and investing more 
time and money to reach Europe despite finding a safe refuge in neighbouring 
countries, and what is the relationship of these migration movements to 
colonialism?” 
Secondary Research Questions: 
“When analysing the immigration of Syrian refugees to Europe as a structural 
benchmark, what novel and unique contemporary migration determinant elements 
are present in the specific case of Syrian refugees’ migration to Europe? How do 
these differ from other migration mobilities?” 
“Are these determinant elements fundamental to the individual cases, or are they 
part of a wider systemic formulation, such as new forms of colonialism and 
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The sociological and political science perspectives used in this study will be 
associated with the fact that new media tools and extensive internet use are a new 
phenomenon and one of the most significant components of daily life, especially for 
refugees staying in camps. In this context, especially for refugees and potential 
immigrants looking for a new settlement place, the effect of media content and usage 
on perceptions and desires will be evaluated with mass migrations of Syrian 
refugees as a new factor. In addition to a powerful contemporary instrument such as 
the new media technology, power relations as a broader basis will also be taken into 
account as a limiting or supportive element on legal, economic, political and social 
identities and individual mobility. Apart from these two elements, the media and 
power relations, the importance of refugees’ actions, decisions, and agencies will be 
emphasised to empower the refugees’ subjectivity and bring it to the foreground. 
These three essential perspectives will be thought of as complementary 
mechanisms of a wider system, and a more general analysis of the functionality of 
these three mechanisms will be examined. 
In order to explore a priori answers to stated research objectives and questions, I 
conducted fieldworks with Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees for more than five 
months in Turkey, Greece and Germany. The next section will introduce both the 
contextual and historical discussion in the field of refugee and migration studies and 
the Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees who participated in the fieldwork. 
1.2) The Contextual and Historical Framework of the Research Subjects 
1.2.1) An Introduction to Refugee Studies 
‘Migration, forced displacement and refugees’ are not new phenomena, neither 
terminologically nor phenomenologically. Studies concerning these concepts have 
attracted more attention, especially since the early twentieth century, and have been 
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included in states’ social and political agendas. However, the terms refugee, 
immigration, asylum seeker and displaced person have been defined in recent 
decades (Cohen, 1997; Kibreab, 1997). Throughout history, migration and refugees 
have existed due to socio-political persecution and violence, military conflicts, trade, 
colonialism, and economic relations (Chimni, 2009; 13). The most common causes 
of forced migration and displacement are violence and repression caused by 
external powers, such as precarious political, military, social, economic and recently 
climatic factors, colonisation and other factors (Chimni, ibid; 11).  
Nowadays, people are displaced mainly due to humanitarian reasons, such as 
oppression, violence, conflict, and natural reasons such as environmental pollution 
and natural disasters. According to the data shared by UNCHR, at least 79.5 million 
people in the world have been forcibly displaced, and 26 million of this population 
are considered as refugees (UNCHR, 2020). So, how are refugees and displaced 
people defined internationally? What kinds of elements and reasons determine the 
legal and humanitarian status of these people?  
The most commonly used definition for refugees is described by the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, which framed the term refugee as, “someone who is unable or unwilling 
to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion” (UNCHR, 2020; Shacknove, 1985; 274)1. Although refugee and 
immigrant may sometimes be used interchangeably (Goodman and Speer, 2007; 
165), there is a critical legal and social difference between these two terms. An 
immigrant is someone who consciously chooses to leave their country for a better 
life elsewhere. Immigrants can get information about where they want to go, learn 
the language and explore job opportunities before deciding to leave their country 
(Flahaux and De Hass, 2016; 5). In contrast, refugees are forced to leave their 
country because they are at risk of, or have experienced persecution, or cannot 
return to their home country and must seek safety in other countries (Hathaway, 
2005; Nyers, 2015). Yet, there is still no clear consensus on what the term refugee 
 
1 http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/1951-convention [last access date on 25.05.2021] 
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should or should not cover, which is problematic in terms of who the term should 
refer to.  
 
1.2.2) Historical Development of Refugee Studies in Politics and 
Academia 
The first international organisation to focus specifically on refugee work and all 
aspects of refugees’ life was the International Refugee Organization (IRO), founded 
in 1947. This institution was followed by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNCHR), which was established in 1950. Both institutions relied on the 
expansion and development of international relations and the institutionalisation of 
the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations (UN). Although IRO and 
UNCHR were the first humanitarian aid and assistance organisations to be formed 
as a result of global cooperation and collaboration between different nations and 
states, they were composed of structures designed to function within smaller 
geographic limits. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), for instance, established in 1943, was a structure that prioritised the 
millions of Europeans and people in surrounding countries displaced by World War 
II (Mallki, 1995; Black, 2001). 
Although these institutions were established after World War II, the legal framework 
for displaced people and refugees, mostly with the assistance and initiatives of 
national government policies, grew out of academic studies. In 1939, for example, a 
special issue of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences was 
essentially about refugees and related notions. Almost half of the articles in the 
special issue explored and defined ‘possible ways out’ as regards refugee issues 
(Black, 2001; 58). Holborn (1939), from his analysis on the decisions of the League 
of Nations and its policies, emphasised that displaced people, later referred to as 
refugees, may bring socio-economic benefits. Hence, it was believed that a more 
‘liberal’ and ‘tolerant’ immigration policy could be adopted by the United States. 
Alongside Holborn, Grattan (1939) and Ostrolenk (1939) also emphasised that there 
are many policies regarding economic benefits rather than humanitarian approaches 
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when concerning refugees (Black, 2001; 59). This situation can be acknowledged 
as an illustration of the intersection of government policies and academic studies on 
refugees with the legal and political decisions that began to be implemented at that 
time. 
This period was followed by the institutionalisation of national and international 
foundations specifically focused on refugees. Shortly after, studies and policies were 
drafted concerning people displaced by governments and academic studies. As a 
result, more comprehensive studies and policies have been developed regarding 
displaced people, mainly after World War II. While the issue of the displaced people 
and refugees has gained importance globally, the number of legal regulations 
increased, especially after the establishment of UNCHR, when more academic 
disciplines have paid attention to refugees. These attentions in academia have led 
to the formation of an extensive body of literature devoted to refugee studies. A great 
amount of research concerning refugees has been produced since the 
institutionalisation of refugee-oriented organisations, such as UNCHR. These 
academic studies have appeared in disciplinary journals and publications in various 
social science fields, including geography (Black, 1991), sociology (Hein, 1993), and 
anthropology (Malkii, 1995). Black (2001; 62) emphasizes that these studies have 
not necessarily cross-referenced to ensure an overview of the field. Instead, they 
have approached the studies of refugees as a review of the ‘art of the state’ that is 
somewhat problematic through the states’ policies. However, when refugee studies 
developed in the academic literature, the main point of interest was placed on the 
state policies towards refugees, such as national identity, citizenship, and asylum-
seeking, and not on ghettoization, integration, identity conflict and diaspora (Geddes 
and Scholten, 2016; 171-172).  
In the introduction to an editorial in an issue from 1988 of the Journal of Refugee 
Studies, it was specifically indicated that the term ‘refugee’ is an increasingly used 
term in popular discourse over the last century (Zetter, 1988). Zetter defined the term 
refugee as up-rootedness and exile (ibid; 1). It frequently supposes a dependence 
on humanitarian intervention and a rupture of ‘normal’ social, economic, and cultural 
relations (Black, 2001). There is still no comprehensive conceptualisation of 
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refugees, in terms of the theoretical framework to apply to any particular situation or 
person’s conditions, beyond the laws and law proposals relating to a refugee’s legal 
process. As Malkii (1995; 496) argues, from a more realistic perspective: “The term 
refugee has analytical usefulness, not as a label for special, generalizable ‘kind’ or 
‘type’ of person or situation, but only a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes 
within it a world of socio-economic statuses, personal histories, and psychological 
or spiritual situations.” 
Many studies relating to refugees have largely engaged with the notion of forced 
displacement as a common cause of refugee status (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003), 
and its potential impacts on institutions, local governments and international 
institutions (Icduygu, 2015). There have been studies on a wide range of topics 
related to refugees, including Syrian refugees, such as their health and nutrition 
(Ekmekci 2017; Bilukha et al. 2014), legal protection and status (Yanmyr, 2016) or 
their integration in host countries (İçduygu and Millet, 2016; Gericke et al. 2018). 
However, these studies mainly aim to improve the approach and programs 
implemented by UNCHR, WFP, WHO (Cherri, González and Delgado, 2016) and 
similar organisations. These studies cannot adequately explain the personal and 
collective tendencies, thoughts and perceptions of the refugees, although they are 
the main subjects of these studies.  
Over the last few decades, the refugee crisis, especially the Syrian crisis, has been 
one of the main topics in the discussions of conservative and nationalist parties in 
the media, news and everyday life (De Cleen et al. 2017; Gianfreda, 2018). Despite 
this, there is very little known about Syrian refugees’ perceptions, narratives, and 
motivations, whose mobility has increased gradually. There have been many 
essential studies concerning particularly Syrian refugees, such as their contribution 
and impact to the national economy (Esen and Binatlı, 2017), unemployment and 
labour market relations (Fakih and Ibrahim, 2016), integration difficulties (Bucken‐
Knapp, Fakih and Spehar, 2019), a new diasporic community (Ragab, Rahmeier and 
Siegel, 2017) and other domains. Still, why these people migrated or attempted to 
migrate to particular countries and what kind of motivations support their migrations 
continue to be inadequately researched in the related literature. Therefore, my 
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research focuses on understanding the Syrian refugees’ imagined future, 
perceptions, desires, and thoughts. Also, my research aims to contribute to the 
relevant literature on how these factors affect migration routes, migration motivation 
and actions. Thus, this research completes a deficiency in this field by presenting all 
the stages through which the perspectives of refugees went through three major 
migration routes, Turkey, Greece, and Germany. In doing so, ethnographic research 
methods are used to a great extent to grasp the thoughts, perception, desire or 
imaginations of refugees. 
1.2.3) A Brief Ahistorical Overview to the Syrian Civil War and the Role 
of External Forces 
The civil war, which continued at different scales in Syria from 2011 until today, gave 
its first sparks with uprisings in Arab countries, later named Arab Spring (Bhardwaj, 
2012; Lynch, 2013). The reasons that triggered these uprisings were mainly against 
the outcast long-serving leaders, such as Muammar Muhammad al-Gaddafi in Libya 
or Bashar al-Assad in Syria, who demanded changes in social, economic and 
political structures of life. These uprisings started in late 2010 and early 2011 left 
behind a spectacle of utterly devastating wreckage in some countries; in others, 
positive steps have been taken in the direction of demand and change. 
The protests against Bashar Assad, whose family had ruled Syria since the 1970s, 
became very violent as the uprisings were suppressed by extreme means of 
violence, which then led to a deadly civil war in the country. The supports of the 
opposition forces in Syria, especially by different states and international coalitions 
such as NATO, and the protests and subsequent armed resistance became one of 
the bloodiest and most destructive periods in the history of Syria.  
The armed conflicts in Syria were later widely proclaimed as a series of overlapping 
proxy wars between regional and world powers, mainly between the United States 
and Russia as well as between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Phillips and Valbjørn, 2018; 
415). The Assad regime has been openly supported militarily and politically, primarily 
by Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah forces (Antonyan, 2017; Sinkaya, 2021). 
Russia, the only foreign power that has openly and legally deployed its military 
assets in Syria since September 2015, sided with the Syrian government and carried 
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out an intense air campaign against the anti-government forces in Syria. Against the 
support of Russia and Iran to the Assad government, Syrian opposition forces also 
received financial, military, and logistical supports, especially from major Sunni 
countries, for example, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.  
After the harsh response of Assad’s government to the opposition forces, the failure 
of the weakened state institutions and the unprovided territorial security became the 
breeding ground for different terrorist groups, especially the Islamic State (IS) 
(Vikash and Singh, 2019; 381). The Kurdish people became the forces that waged 
an effective war against IS with the aid and support of international coalitions and 
states. Kurdish people succeeded in maintaining political and military stability in the 
first years of the civil war in North-East Syria, known as Rojava. Later they got 
involved in the war due to IS attacks and Turkey’s military interventions. The Syrian 
Democratic Forces of the Rojava administration have received military and logistic 
support from some NATO countries, principally from the US. Alongside these 
international forces, from the early stages of the war in Syria, other major European 
countries such as France and Britain provided political, military, and logistical 
support to the opposition in Syria and its associated rebel groups. Other than the 
forces fighting with the Assad government, the local or international forces that 
started to fight each other turned the Syrian territory into a war arena, causing over 
500,000 deaths and internally and externally displacement of more than 10 million 
from 2011 to 2020 (McIntyre, 2020; Krishnan et al. 2020). An international war in 
which countries such as Russia, the USA, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia were 
decisive and positioned in different groups took place within the borders of Syria. 
All interviews presented in this research were carried out mainly with forcibly 
displaced Syrian refugees due to the brutal war waged by these external forces and 
different terrorist groups in these refugees’ homes, villages and cities. It has turned 
into a fierce and enigmatic war that many interviewees had difficulty describing and 
did not know which countries support whom, what role and mission they are involved 
in the civil war in Syria, except to mention their names. In later chapters, these 
military, political and operational interventions, roles and missions of states and 
coalitions as a structural and theoretical framework will be referred to as power 
relations and actors. In this sense, power relations will be used to express the 
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institutional, military and political powers that have a transcendental influence and 
decisiveness on the agency of individuals who were the exact subjects of life in Syria. 
 
1.2.4) The Emergence of the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
The emergence of the Syrian refugee crisis is a consequence of the Syrian Civil War, 
which broke out due to tension between the Bashar al-Assad central government 
and many other opposition forces in the spring of 2011 in Syria. To be more precise, 
the beginning of the Syrian Civil War resulted from a violent government crackdown 
on public demonstrations in support of a group of teenagers who were arrested for 
anti-government graffiti in the town of Daraa. The conflict between protestors, 
opposition groups and the central government of Bashar al-Assad began on 15 
March 2011 with demonstrations, marches and protests. These protests were similar 
to protests and demonstrations carried out in other Arab countries, such as Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, which have subsequently been named the Arab Spring (see Bhardwaj, 
2012; Heydemann, 2013). To put it simply, protesters in Syria demanded the 
resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. Since the Assad family has been in the 
presidency in Syria for more than 40 years, Bashar Assad rejected the demand of 
protesters and opposition forces. In addition, as the majority of Assad’s supporters 
are Shia and the majority of the opposition forces are Sunni, the spark of conflicts 
ready to grow easily escalated (Pierret, 2014; 8). According to various sources, in 
April 2011, Bashar Assad’s Syrian Army started to quash protests by using 
disproportionate force across the country (HRW, 2011). In the following few months, 
heavily-armed conflicts between opposition military forces and the central 
government’s army took place, which turned into an armed rebellion which has 
lasted almost a decade. 
The conflict continued to displace people within the country and across the region 
(Ostrand, 2015; 256). As a result, the intense violence experienced by almost every 
individual Syrian in their daily lives forced them to leave their once secure homes to 
seek safety in the closest neighbouring countries across the region. By July 2018, 
more than 6.6 million Syrians were considered refugees, mostly in Turkey, Lebanon, 
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Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Iraq2. Another 6.7 million were driven from 
their homes but remain trapped inside the country and so are counted as internally 
displaced persons (IDP)3.These statistical numbers particularly grasp attention when 
comparing to the whole population of Syria, which was less than 17 million by the 
end of 20184. Considering the number of people forcibly displaced from their home, 
Azevedo, Inan and Yang (2016: 2) stated that the Syrian Refugee Crisis is the only 
recent period in history in which the world has faced and experienced such a large 
number of refugee groups only from a single country.  
1.2.5) A Brief Narrative of Syrian Refugees Since the Syrian Civil War 
A narrative of the contextual background to the extensive migration mobility in the 
countries where the field study was conducted, and of the recent developments 
concerning the Syrian refugees in these countries, may assist the reader to better 
understand the migration trajectories pursued in this research. 
As of March 2011, Syrians began to flee their homes and move out of Syria. In the 
beginning, displaced Syrians forcibly crossed the borders of neighbouring countries 
such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, particularly to save their lives. In the years 
2014-2015, there were already more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
Even by that time, some of these refugees who arrived in Turkey did not wish to stay 
and had already started to migrate to European countries. According to statistics that 
estimate the registered numbers, the number of Syrian refugees who entered 
Greece in the first six months of 2015 was more than 230,000 (Pursay, 2015). From 
there, Syrian refugees migrated to other European countries by different smuggling 
and irregular methods, primarily through Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, and Austria. 




coalition.html?query=Registered%20Syrian%20Refugees [last access date on 25.05.2021] 
3 https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/ [last access date on 25.05.2021] 




In the early years of the Syrian refugee crisis, regional or international governments 
did not have a proper legislative system to offer a lifeline because the unexpectedly 
high numbers of refugees, which reached millions, was a situation that neither 
neighbouring countries nor European countries wanted to handle alone. By 
responding to the Syrian refugee crisis, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel 
uttered the phrase that “Wir schaffen das” (We can do this!) which had a significant 
impact on the advancement of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Europe. Germany’s open 
border implementations towards mainly Syrian refugees had become a policy that 
other European countries did not confirm and follow. As a result, the German 
government had to take a step back in the face of the arriving refugees whose 
numbers reached hundreds of thousands in almost a year (Ostrand, 2015; Funk, 
2016). The fact that the EU legal frameworks and international law responded to the 
crisis and its collective opposition to the moderate and supportive approach of the 
German government to refugees led to the re-examination and revision of the 
decisions taken within the scope of the Dublin Regulation, which was signed in 
Dublin, Ireland on 15 June 1990. 
The Dublin Regulation (known as Dublin Convention) is an article of European Union 
(EU) legislation. This legislation determines which EU Member State is accountable 
for the asylum application examination submitted by refugees seeking international 
protection under the Geneva Convention. In other words, the first EU Member State, 
where refugees’ or asylum seekers’ fingerprints are collected, or an asylum 
application is lodged, is responsible for examining the asylum application. However, 
the Dublin Convention threatened to break down following the Syrian Refugee crisis 
after 2015, when the EU member states faced a high influx of refugees. Eventually, 
the European Court of Justice gave the right to EU member states to transfer 
refugees to the first EU country of entry by reaffirming the Dublin Regulation and 
declaring that it is still valid (Maani, 2018). 
After the European Court of Justice ruling, a decision process regarding Syrian 
refugees began mainly in the triangle of Turkey, Greece and Germany. As a result 
of ongoing negotiations since November 2015, the EU and Turkey reached an 
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agreement in March 20165. This agreement determined that Turkey keeps Syrian 
refugees in its territory, and the European Union shares the economic burden with 
Turkey (Rygiel, Baban and Ilcan, 2016). Consequently, the agreement made 
between the EU and Turkey alongside the Dublin Convention is of utmost 
importance for the three countries in which fieldwork was conducted. The steps 
taken under these agreements can be listed as follows: Turkey started to share the 
refugees’ economic expenditures with the EU, continued to accommodate Syrian 
refugees within its borders and began to increase control and oversight over irregular 
migration (Heck and Hess, 2017). Greece increased its border security and strived 
to stop the irregular influx. Besides, Greece started not to take official transactions 
and fingerprints of refugees who entered Greek borders irregularly. Germany and 
other EU countries have also begun to return refugees who have entered their 
country’s borders but who were fingerprinted and registered in another EU country. 
1.2.6) The Responses and Roles of Fieldwork Countries to the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis 
Turkey 
Turkey is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, maintaining 
the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention (Szałańska, 2017). However, 
after the uncontrolled and unexpected flow of Syrian refugees, Turkey has 
constituted legal and institutional reforms to create an effective national asylum 
system made following international standards. Turkey’s first-time asylum law, 
named the Foreigners and International Protection Act, was adopted by Parliament 
in April 2013 and entered into force in April 2014. Along with this law, the foundations 
of Turkey’s national asylum system and, in particular, the relationship with Syrian 
refugees were defined in the legal frame. The Turkish Directorate General of 
Migration Management (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü - DGMM)6 has been 
 
5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/# [last access date 
on 25.05.2021] 
6 The Directorate General for Migration Management has been established under the Ministry of Interior with 
a view to implement policies and strategies related to migration; ensure coordination between the related 
agencies and organizations in these matters; carry out the tasks and procedures related to foreigners’ entry into, 
stay in, exit and removal from Turkey, international protection, temporary protection and protection of victims 
of human trafficking (İçduygu and Diker, 2017; 16) 
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established in 2013. DGMM was authorised as the main body responsible for 
policymaking and procedures for all foreign nationals in the country (İçduygu and 
Diker, 2017; 16). Additionally, and more importantly, Turkey adopted the Temporary 
Protection Regulation in October 2014, which regulates the rights, obligations and 
procedures, particularly for those granted temporary protection in Turkey. Syrian 
refugees in Turkey are granted this status (Rygiel, Baban and Ilcan, 2016; 316). It is 
clear that this status granted by the Turkish government to Syrian refugees is inferior 
to the internationally accepted refugee status and rights. When considering Syria’s 
borders with Turkey, which is more than 900 kilometres, and the number of Syrian 
refugees residing in Turkey, so to speak, Turkey is second Syria for Syrians. When 
considering the distribution of Syrian refugees according to provinces in Turkey, we 
see that the greatest density of populations lies extending along the borders. As a 
matter of fact, 74.78% of the total population of the Kilis province consists of Syrians, 
as does 21.78% of the population of Gaziantep province, for example (DGMM, 
2020). 
Greece 
In terms of the research focus, instead of centring on Syrian refugees as a whole, 
those Syrian refugees who left Turkey to go to European countries were considered 
as the main sample group. Therefore, Greece, as the most widely used and adopted 
migration route for those Syrian refugees leaving Turkey with the intention of 
migrating to European countries, was preferred as the second fieldwork country. As 
declared by the UN Refugee Agency, approximately 860,000 refugees and migrants 
without travel documents had entered Greece by sea in 2015 (Spathara, 2018). The 
Greek islands became the main gateway to the European Union. Most refugees 
were men (45%), children (35%), and women (20%), mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq (Giannakopoulos and Anagnostopoulos, 2016; 1271). Jeanne Park (2015; 
1) stated that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has determined 
Europe as the most dangerous destination within the scope of irregular migration 
globally, and the Mediterranean and Aegean regions and seas are the world’s most 
dangerous border crossing points. Since 1993, more than 22,394 (United Against 
24 
 
Racism 2015) people are known to have died attempting to enter Europe. The actual 
figure is likely to be much higher (El-Enany, 2016; 13).  
Research has shown that (Geddes and Scholten, 2017; Fine, 2018; Diken and 
Laustsen, 2002), Greece has been functionalised as a transition country. The 
number of registered Syrian refugees in Greece is only 16% of the total Syrian 
refugee populations in the country (İçduygu and Millet, 2016; 214-215). 
Nevertheless, as Ismini A. Lamb (2016; 67) noted: “The Greek economic crisis has 
segued into the Greek refugee crisis. The two phenomena are linked in ways that 
highlight Greek relations with the rest of Europe and European relations with the 
Islamic world.” For this reason, Greece was not in a position to cope with the 
refugees in terms of integration and accommodation. This is a social fact that is 
known by the refugees using Greece as a transition country. Therefore, Greece’s 
laws and integration, asylum and support policies regarding refugees are not 
exclusively among the priorities of this study. Rather, I consider Greece as a gateway 
country for immigration, but not a place sought by refugees to apply for asylum.  
Germany 
Within this research framework, refugees who arrived in Germany have played the 
role of a control group of the study, particularly compared with the fieldwork in Turkey 
and Greece. In this sense, as one of the research’s focal points, a Western European 
country and the final destination of the largest Syrian refugee population in Europe, 
Germany was chosen as the final location of the fieldwork. Germany, apart from 
being one of the first world countries in terms of economy and high standards of 
living conditions (Munck, 2009), the 4th largest economy globally (Neuts, 2020), has 
also become one of the most preferred migration destinations. At the end of 2014, 
Germany became the country that provided protection and security to the greatest 
number of Syrian refugees in the European continent (Ostrand, 2015; 255). In the 
years following 2014, there was a significant increase in the number of Syrian 
refugees accepted by Germany. As of the end of 2017, the estimated number of 
Syrian refugees in Germany was more than 600,000. Since the beginning of the 
migration of Syrian refugees, the increase in Syrian refugee numbers has reached 
1200% in total over the years. The open border policy of Germany during 2015 
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became an aspiration for most Syrians. As Momin (2017; 66) stated, in 2015, 
Germany accepted around 326,900 Syrian refugees, and it was expected to 
welcome around 300,000 in 2016. Germany’s decision to open its borders to Syrian 
refugees came mainly in response to the refugee crisis in Europe. 
In the following sections, I examine and detail Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees as 
the chosen sample groups in this research.  
1.2.7) Syrian Arab and Kurdish Refugees in This Research 
When I began this study and discussed Syrian refugees as a research topic, I 
realised that these people are collectively referred to as Syrian refugees in the 
relevant literature. However, thanks to the interviews and ethnographies made 
during the fieldwork, I apprehended that these people's ethnic, religious, and gender 
differences are as effective and determining factors as their socio-economic class 
and capital forms. Therefore, I focus on the two primary ethnic groups that came out 
of this country. Consequently, in my research, ethnicity and cultural differences of 
Syrian refugees are taken into consideration. The reason for this is to understand 
how ethnicity, and the different cultural backgrounds it entails, affects the world view, 
images of the future, desires, and perceptions. In particular, I compare how ethnicity 
produces solidarity between specific ethnic groups during the migration, how it 
affects their migration experience and their vision of the places they want to go. By 
making two distinctions between Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees, I aim to 
contribute to the related literature. Thus, I briefly touch upon the history and socio-
political developments of Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees instead of only focusing 
on Syrian refugees as a whole. I will discuss what similarities and differences exist 
between these two different ethnic groups’ refugee experiences in detail in the 
fieldwork analysis chapters. While doing this, I will focus specifically on the 
relationships between solidarity and cooperation, sense of community and 




‘Arab’ is a cultural and linguistic term, which commonly refers to those who speak 
Arabic as their first language (Tamari, 2008; 1). Arabs, despite their variations and 
diversities, are united by culture and history (Hitti, 1996). However, socio-culturally 
and politically, the notion of Arab points to a particular religion, culture and 
geography rather than Arabic speakers. As a subject of widespread debate, there 
are essential elements that can differentiate between the concepts of language, 
ethnicity and nation and the dominant identity. For instance, not everyone who 
speaks Arabic is Arab, or not everyone who is a Muslim is Arab. The opposite of 
these proposals is also accurate. Additionally, although most Arabs are Muslim, 
there are also millions of Christian Arabs and hundreds of thousands of Jewish Arabs 
(Masters, 2004). This section discusses and presents Syrian Arabs as half of the 
sample group in this research. 
Ethnicity and religion are intertwined in Syria, as commonly in other countries. There 
are also non-sectarian, supra-ethnic and supra-religious political identities like 
Syrian nationalism, as Migliorino (2008) presents in relation to Syrian Armenians in 
Syria. The vast majority of these identities, such as Syrian Armenians, are in minority 
status in Syria (White, 2012). In this sense, by the term Syrian Arab, I draw the frame 
as a nation that is the majority in Syria rather than ethnic origin, even if they are of 
different religions and ethnic origins. The sections entitled with Syrian Arab frame in 
the following chapters are associated with Syrians who introduce her/himself as 
Syrian Arab and speak the Arabic language as a mother tongue. Although the Syrian 
Arabs interviewees might have ethnic or religious minority identities, they did not put 
it in the foreground. To clarify this better, all the refugees interviewed during fieldwork 
identified as Syrians, except those who introduced and identified as Kurdish. 
Additionally, unlike other fieldwork countries Greece and Germany, the social, legal 
and political situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey should be evaluated within the 
framework of historical and political relations between Turkey and Syria. The main 
reasons for this are as follows: the two countries have a shared religion, share their 
longest land borders, share common historical and political values, have similar 
cultural norms and values. None of these features are shared by the other fieldwork 
countries, Greece and Germany. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the 
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political relations of Turkey with Syria have been very hostile, especially the periods 
of 1921-1998. Both countries have criticised each other for different reasons. While 
it was for Syrian Arabs, “Turks have exploited us for 400 years”; for Turks, it was 
“The Arabs betrayed us, stabbed us in the back” (Aslan, 2008: 23). While Syria was 
an ‘enemy’ country for Turkey due to playing a host country for ‘terrorism’, making 
trouble on sharing water sources (Euphrates River) and encroaching on Turkey’s 
integrity in terms of geography; on the other hand, Turkey was an ‘enemy’ country 
for Syria due to not fairly sharing water sources, being a supporter of Western 
countries and claiming rights over Syria’s territory (referring to Hatay province) 
(Benek, 2016;172). In 1998, with the Adana Treaty between Turkey and Syria, the 
relationships between the two countries improved for a short time (1998-2011) 
(Benek, 2016). However, with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the relationship 
between the two countries became tense again. The period of twelve-years between 
1998-2011 was the only time in which there existed a positive relationship between 
Syria and Turkey. The relations between Turkey and Syria, especially in the last 
decade, has shown variabilities in very intensive and complicated manners. In the 
next section, I detail the historical, political and social relations regarding the Syrian 
Kurdish refugees. 
Syrian Kurds 
The majority of Kurdish people in the Middle East live in the historical Kurdistan 
region (Meintjes, 2017) which is split between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Even 
though there was no major unity among all these parts in history, nor was there any 
significant border or division among them. The apparent division in terms of borders 
came into force during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement7, which was agreed primarily between the British and French Empire in 
1916, Kurds were divided between four countries, each representing different 
cultures, concepts of nation, ethnicity, and government (Ottoway, 2015). It can be 
 
7   The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret agreement between the United Kingdom and the French Empire 
signed on 16 May 1916 for a share and control of the Middle East lands, to which Russia assented. While the 
main agreement on the territorial sharing was predominantly on the Anatolian region, the new border lines, 
which were determined beyond the borders of the Anatolian region, divided the Kurds into four different parts: 
Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria (see Fitzgerald, 1994; Danforth, 2015). 
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argued that particularly since the Sykes-Picot Agreement came into force, Kurdish 
communities in each country have been on the social and political agenda of these 
countries. Even though each countries’ responses to Kurdish questions have varied 
through different methods such as political or military interventions, Kurdish societies 
eventually have been known as one of the world’s largest nations without their own 
state (Gunes, 2019; 211; Gurses, 2014). 
The most prominent minority community in Syria is the Kurdish community, and it is 
the second largest ethnic group (Gambill, 2004; 3). Kurds in Syria are estimated to 
have an approximate population of 2.5 to 4 million, making up 10% of the country’s 
population8910. Concerning the socio-political conditions and existence of Kurdish 
people in Syria, the civil, political and cultural rights of Kurds have been 
controversial. Kerim Yildiz (2005; 91) summarizes it thus: “The Kurds resident in 
Syria have been described as a migrant population from Turkey and Iraq that has 
largely assimilated to Syrian Arab culture. In this way, the Syrian state portrays the 
Kurds as comprising a dispersed ethnic minority in Syria with no historical claim to 
the land. This portrayal highlights the effect of the Arabization policy that has been 
implemented both in Syria and other states with Arab populations.”  
Kurds in Syria have faced oppression and were confronted with particular 
assimilation politics ordained by the Syrian central government. Moreover, “legal 
Arabization policies”11 in the 1960s and 70s have caused reciprocatively many 
adverse socio-politic and socio-economic effects on the Kurds in relation to the 
Syrian central government and their policies (Tejel, 2009; 120) for a long time. These 
include revoking Kurds’ citizenship, confiscating their lands and handicapping 
access to public services such as education, health, and official employment and 
leading to biased redistribution of lands taken from Kurdish landowners (Yildiz, 
 
8 https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/iraq-population/ last access date on 25.05.2021 
9 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/turkey-population/ last access date on 25.05.2021 
10 https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/syria-s-kurds-struggle-
within-struggle last access date on 25.05.2021 
11 After the Al-Hasakah Census in 1962, the Arab Belt policy and associated land reforms started in the second 
part of the 1960s with the perceived threat of separatism from Kurds. The Syrian government has implemented 
the enforced disintegration of the Kurdish groups by parting the region with the relocation of many refugee 
Arabs from different countries in the Kurdish region. 
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2005), unrecognition of civil and political rights of Kurds (Bengio, 2014), neglect and 
disavowal of the existence of Kurds by the legal system (Tastekin, 2016). 
In his book, Benedict Anderson (1983; 6-7) discusses the concept of ‘Imagined 
Communities’ and portrays a nation as a socially or politically formed community, 
perceived by the people who imagine themselves as part of that nation. Relatedly, it 
can be asserted that such socio-political and economic maltreatment, hostile and 
assimilating policies implemented by the Syrian central government indirectly 
strengthen the socio-political relations, ties, solidarity and cooperation established 
among Kurds. Although they have not been living together officially and politically for 
more than 100 years within the same borderlines, Kurdish people have had 
transborder social, political and military associations and solidarity among 
themselves (Tejel, 2020; Arslan, 2019). Kurdish groups build an ‘imagined 
community’ among themselves as co-citizens of a country they do not own 
(Popplewell, 2017; Mahmod, 2016). 
When considering historical social and political relationships between Kurdish 
people from Syria and Turkey, it is worth mentioning that communities from these 
two regions share the same dialect of the Kurdish language -Kurmanji-, very similar 
culture and traditions, history, and values that kept a strong bond in between them 
(Tejel, 2009). However, the borderline drawn between Turkey and Syria has divided 
families and relatives in this region who kept passing the borders to maintain 
relationships. In the words of Dawn Chatty (2010; 233): “Wire mesh fencing, 
minefields, and air surveillance make it difficult for people to cross frontiers other 
than at official border crossings”. Kurdish people in these two regions have 
historically been able to preserve their kinship, trade, social and political relations. 
After the Syrian Civil War in 2011, when they were displaced and fled to Turkey, 
these maintained relationships have become a connection and assisting instruments 
for Syrian Kurdish refugees. Relatedly, I argue that kinship and imagined community 




1.2.8) Refugee Camps as Fieldwork Places and The Notion of Being in 
Limbo 
Here I explain the question of ‘why specifically refugee camps or camp setting places 
are chosen as fieldwork sites in this research?’ While answering this question to help 
readers to engage better with the research, I more stress on the notion of being in 
limbo as a metaphoric analogy to refugee camps. 
The refugee camp is a temporary facility provided by national or international 
authorities to provide emergency protection and assistance to people forced to flee 
due to conflict, violence and persecution (Diken, 2004). Refugee camps are normally 
not intended to provide permanent and sustainable solutions; rather, these places 
offer a ‘safe haven’ for refugees to receive medical treatment, food, shelter, and 
other basic services during emergencies (d’Orsi, 2015). Refugee camps are 
structurally and ontologically a living environment that embodies the metaphor of 
being in limbo. The main reason for this firstly is that the refugees staying in the 
camps are aware that they reside there temporarily. The spatial and temporal 
restrictions of camps are the part that structurally corresponds to being in limbo. 
Therefore, generally refugees staying in camps do not tend to get used to and settle 
in camps where they stay temporarily. This situation causes them continuously to 
think of leaving the camps as the main priority. On the one hand, refugees constantly 
face the reality of their past that caused them to become refugees; on the other, they 
seek opportunities and ways out to leave camps for their future,. This temporal 
fracture presents the feeling and experience of ontologically being in limbo on the 
past-future dilemma. 
Additionally, while commonly refugee camps provide security, the sense of security 
is fractured by the presence of bureaucratic and security staff and continuous 
surveillance in the camps. Hence, the ambivalence of space, the dilemma of past-
future perception and the sense of distrust and surveillance generate the feeling of 
being in limbo. These analyses and arguments are based on observations and 
experiences of ethnography during the fieldwork. There are currently studies on the 
intercorrelation of being a refugee, being in camps and being in limbo (Abdi, 2005; 
Hightower, 2015; Hoffman, 2012 see also: Boochani 2018a; 2018b). The 
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biographical work ‘No Friends, But the Mountains’ (2018) by Kurdish journalist and 
writer Behrouz Boochani, who was also a refugee and stayed in a refugee camp for 
many years, perfectly define the concept of being in limbo: “I have always despised 
waiting. Waiting is a mechanism of torture used in the dungeon of time.” The 
ambivalence of time and the past-future dilemma, waiting with the words of 
Boochani, are the determinant characters of being in limbo. 
The main epistemological focus of my research is on the Syrian refugees’ imagined 
future, thoughts, and perceptions about the places they want to go and the way these 
thoughts are formed and shaped. In this sense, the refugees staying in the camps 
are much more fragile, uncertain, and vulnerable than refugees who live in the city 
and get involved and socialise with at least a bit of daily life. During my ethnography 
in Greece, for instance, a young refugee staying in Lavrion described living in camps 
as follows: “Camps are a place that gives you a feeling like you will be leaving at any 
moment if possible. Thus, you can neither adopt it nor leave it whenever you want. 
It is a situation of being stuck in time and space.” The reason for choosing refugee 
camps or camp setting places as the fieldwork sites can be understood by the words 
of this young refugee. Refugee camps better fit for generating data and content 
particularly regarding my research questions. When people lose their possessions 
and are stuck in a restricted place temporarily, these people primarily prioritize their 
further mobilities. In such conditions and places, I essentially sought reasons and 
answers from these people about their images of the future, plans, desires, and 
thoughts. Thus, I found refugee camps more appropriate as a space to investigate 
the perspectives and interests that my research subject aims at and conceptualizes. 
In other words, I chose the camps to ensure that the epistemologically abstract 
content of the research was obtained in a more robust and more reliable way. 
1.3) Theories and Conceptual Perspectives of the Research 
One of the main distinguishing peculiarities of this research is that it obtains and 
generates data thanks to the sociological and political lenses I carried to the field 
with myself when I started doing fieldwork. With the guiding light of the fieldwork data 
and findings obtained and generated in the field, the research theories that enable 
processing the raw data embedded in the field throughout field notes, interviews and 
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observations used in this study, have been identified. As I will discuss in detail in the 
methodology section, doing fieldwork without theory and generating theory from the 
field (Strauss and Glaser, 1967; Gasson, 2004), which Grounded Theory suggests 
as an approach, has been adopted as a motto in this study. After embracing this 
motto, fieldwork findings and results pointed to three fundamental theoretical 
concepts that specifically determine the framework and boundaries of research 
objectives through categorisation and coding. These theoretical concepts are as 
follow: Power Relations, Digital Habitus and Socio-Political Subjectivities. Adopting 
these three theoretical approaches and evaluating fieldwork findings and results 
through these theories provides more detailed and broader assessments of the 
topics investigated concerning Syrian refugees. In addition, I gain a multi-layered 
analysis of research topics appraised through three different theoretical approaches, 
as well as arguing that these three theoretical approaches are intertwined 
mechanisms of a major system. In the following sections, we will focus on these 
three theoretical concepts gradually. While doing this, first of all, the intersection of 
these concepts with the research subject, refugee studies and migration, will be 
discussed and then it will be evaluated with a more detailed perspective. 
1.3.1) Power Relations  
“When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers!”  
African proverb  
1.3.1.1) As an Introduction to Power Relations 
In studies particularly where external forces and factors are determinants such as 
those on refugees and forced displacement, these external forces and drivers should 
be determined and defined precisely. Although I aimed to bring the subjectivity of 
the people participating in the study to the fore through their words, expressions, 
emotions, and circumstances, in the end, the main subject of powers that causes 
these people to become refugees is determined externally. In other words, the power 
relations are transcendental to the subjectivity of individuals, especially in the case 
of vulnerable groups such as refugees. These external drivers and forces are 
considered as pushing forces in refugee and migration studies (Kunz, 1973; 
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Richmond, 1993). Put otherwise, “drivers can be understood as forces leading to the 
inception of migration and the perpetuation of movement” (Van Hear, Bakewell and 
Long, 2017; 927). For example, one of the pushing forces focused on in the 
framework of this study for Syrian refugees is the destructive Syrian Civil War. These 
pushing forces continue in different fields even after Syrian citizens became 
refugees. Even being officially identified as a refugee is itself an example of pushing 
and exclusive power relations. The word refugee commonly refers to the deprivation 
of certain rights of individuals (Foster, 2007), the application of geographical 
limitations (Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016), and the narrowing of the ability to act socially, 
politically, and economically within the territory of a foreign country (Agnew, 1999). 
All these external, imposed forces can be considered within the framework of power 
relations. Power Relations, one of the first theoretical approaches adopted in this 
study, is used and appreciated as an answer to one of the research objectives: 
‘Studying Syrian refugees’ perceptions, desires, and thoughts about others and 
particularly the West’. 
I narrow down the boundaries of power relations in my research as follow: all 
structural, institutional, ideological, and characteristic external forces that have a 
radical and formative influence on Syrian refugees’ lives are different 
representations and manifestations of power relations. These formative and radical 
influences of power relations are varied: political, economic, juridical, social, cultural, 
aesthetic, and formative (Swartz, 2013; 83). The manifestations of power relations 
in these different spheres on Syrian refugees can be framed as forced displacement 
and uprootedness of them, loss of almost everything they had, elimination of their 
individual and societal identities and agencies. On the other hand, structural, 
institutional, intellectual, and characteristic power relations and representations also 
have positive connotations as pulling forces. In the case of Syrian refugees for 
instance, after the forced displacement and loss of possessions of Syrian refugees, 
the formative and directive pulling forces on their actions and practices, such as their 
imagined futures, desires, actions, are the other facets of these power relations. 
These pulling forces are especially manifested and observed in aspects of power 
relations in Syrian refugees’ perceptions and thoughts of possible migration 
destinations, desired lifestyle, and better living standards.  
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The concept of power is often used in an equivalent sense to the term authority. 
Authority frequently corresponds to the institutionalization of power and its legitimate 
perception by the social structure (Bevir, 1999). Foucault (1977; 93) indicated the 
intertwined concepts of power: “Power is not an institution, and not a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes 
to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” Even though they emerge 
in such distinct domains as politics, economy, social and military, the manifestations 
of power operate on the basis of multiple intersections and relationalities. Emerson 
(1962; 31) outlines the emergence of power relations: “A simple theory of power 
relations is developed in an effort to resolve some of the ambiguities surrounding 
power, authority, legitimacy, and power structures, through bringing them together 
in a coherent scheme.” Hence, power relations are associations in which one person, 
institution, ideology, state authority, or representative has formative powers over 
another in varying fields. Although the purposes and practices of power and 
relationships built concerning power are different, individuals and masses are the 
targets of these relationships. In individuals or masses, the formative power over 
one another is built through varying means, such as surveillance, control, 
manipulation, governance, and ultimately utility. 
Power relations as a theoretical framework is not a new phenomenon. Many studies 
discuss and relate to its function, foundation, relationality in several disciplines, 
mainly in social sciences, such as political science, history, and sociology. For 
instance, Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1979; 1983; 2004) discusses power relations 
in the form of a world-system theory as an approach in social analysis and as 
formative forces on social and political (Sorinel, 2010; 220). Eric Hobsbawm also 
considered power relations as a system in several works through historical analysis 
(1999; 2000). Besides, one of the prominent scholars in the field of power analysis, 
Michel Foucault, showed the structure and function of power in relation to key 
concepts, such as governmentality, medicine, knowledge, sexuality or religion 
(1961; 1963;1975; 1976). Alongside all these leading and well-known scholars, 
numerous studies have conceptualised the power relations with their diverse impacts 
and relations (Edwards, 2006; Emerson, 1962; Cohen, 1969). 
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Even though power relations are already widely and comprehensively discussed in 
varying literature, I argue that power relations as a theoretical concept are still not 
adequately addressed in media and internet-based digitality studies as recently 
developed fields. Further exploration of the fields between media and power 
relations, in particular, will make it possible to systematically address the internet-
based media tools and their effects from a macro perspective that have come to the 
fore in this study. Therefore, in addition to the areas where power relations are 
mentioned earlier, power relations and actors through media and digital lenses are 
discussed as a new field in the next section. 
1.3.1.2) Power Relations: Major Actors and Their Representations in 
Digital Relationalities 
The element I am engaged in with the subject of power relations is how subjects, as 
actors of power relations, constitute a change of formation on the masses’ 
perception, action, and apprehension. I consider the awareness and connection of 
Syrian refugees, especially through digital relations, as the main new e-territory. This 
is because power relations have transmuted into a new phase due to the relationality 
of it in the modern and digital era. The meaning I attribute to power relations in terms 
of structure, function and scope differs structurally and functionally from classical 
power relations. I consider it classical because I argue that power relationships 
transcend a unidirectional relationship, which refers to a relationship that has one 
side exposed to the consequences of the power implementation as passive and the 
other as its enforcer active. However, in our high-technological age, the recent media 
instruments have shifted unilateral interactions. These days, the individuals as users 
and consumers who were subjected to these power relations now can take a role as 
producer and content creator, which has displaced the classical power dynamics. In 
other words, new media instruments, such as internet-based social media platforms, 
not only transmit the content produced and controlled by the monopoly of power 
elites, media companies, and governments, but also create space for almost every 
single internet user/consumer to produce and circulate their own opinions, news and 
other media content. 
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In today’s liquid modern world, as Zygmunt Bauman (1999) describes, with the 
advent of internet-based media, governance, manipulation, surveillance, and 
eventually, control of perception, desire, and consumption began to change form in 
an unprecedented way. In this new form, the tracks and moves of daily life are 
mobile, highly optional and flexible; however, the smallest details of our daily lives 
are tracked, checked and recorded more closely and comprehensively than ever 
before (Bauman and Lyon, 2012; 6). As Didier Bigo (2008) highlights, such new and 
highly developed security systems operate by tracking, controlling, checking, and 
recording ‘everything that moves’, including products, information, capital, and 
humanity (Bauman and Lyon, ibid; 11). Therefore, surveillance, controlling, tracking 
and being aware of this everything that moves transcend the limitations of space and 
time. The system works at a distance and flows fluidly. I describe the new habits and 
power dynamics that this system has spread to almost every field of life and created 
as Digital Habitus, which will be the subject of the subsequent theoretical discussion. 
12 
Power relations frame a global network that operates either together or separately 
with the consideration of economic, political, humanitarian, and social benefits. 
Referring back to Foucault to formulate his analysis of power into power relations, 
as he frames: ‘it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in 
a particular society (1977; 93)’ and this conceptualization for power relations would 
be: ‘Power is not an institution, and not a structure… but it is the name that one 
attributes to complex and intertwined strategical relations in a particular society, state 
and finally in globe’. Zinkina et al. describe the new formation and complex relations 
in the globe as: “New technologies formed new material networks that gradually 
spanned the whole world, leading global connectivity to a new level. These networks 
were filled with new types of content, both material and non-material (2019; 229).” 
The developments in transportation and global connectivity directly intensified the 
relationships and the mobility of actors, goods, and information. The turning point 
 
12 Digital Habitus briefly is a conceptual term that indicates the presence and transference of social, 
emotional, political, economic, and financial lifestyle factors on online and internet-based platforms, 
interacting with and informing reality.  
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may be considered a modern technological revolution that brought profound and 
persistently changing and modificatory adjustments to almost all aspects of life. 
While formulating the boundaries of power relations, the representations in which 
these relations become visible and the masses are aware of primarily manifest 
through the subjects, then through identities, symbols, brands, and characters of the 
institutions, entities and structures. Therefore, power relations contain major actors 
to manifest themselves, to exemplify them in very determinative stratification: 
politicians such as presidents, bureaucrats, party leaders in political domains; 
capitalists/capital owners such as big corporations like Walmart, Amazon, China 
Petroleum, and many other in economic domains; humanitarian structures and 
institutions such as Red Cross, United Nations, WHO and others in social 
environments. These power relation actors and structures usually have voice and 
power over masses of people, primarily within domestic borders and then globally. 
There are many other domains where power relations exist with different purposes: 
ideology, education, science, health, technology, media, and art industries. All these 
key domains and representations are most likely to cooperate or to be in relation to 
each other for various reasons. These actors are those people, institutions, 
representatives, and other similar agencies who are most likely to have prestige, 
popularity, recognition, wealth and, accordingly, power and voice in local and global 
relations. 
Michel Foucault’s works can be examined separately to understand how power 
relations structurally and functionally establish individual and social control, 
surveillance and administration through institutions and state bodies (1961; 
1963;1975; 1976). Each of his books may be said to constitute a case study of how 
power relations have conditioned, invested, and fabricated specific human 
experiences such as madness, discipline, punishment, and sexuality. In doing so, 
they have positively produced effects of truth in reality (Deacon, 2002; 90). 
Nevertheless, power relations or the concepts discussed while utilising power can 
often be perceived as abstract concepts. For example, all the structures we call 
institutions or state bodies are a neutral, ontologically. These structures are only a 
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tool, so that power can be applied. Those who actively exercise this power are the 
actors embodied in human forces. 
I emphasise that the representations embodied in these human forces are 
multiplying and changing, especially through digital media. To illustrate this, major 
actors may differ in varying fields, and they could easily be a social media 
influencer13, a politician14, a product brand15, a symbol of a company16, a country17, 
an ideology18 or a social media platform19. The principal reason for emphasising 
these characters, institutions, structures, and companies, even in abstract forms, is 
that the possibility that these representations are more concentrated, intertwined, 
communicated, and complexed with each other. This means an incredible increase 
in the speed of spreading a thought, ideology, advertisement, campaign, 
propaganda and thus the power of influence over thoughts, perceptions, and desires. 
While creating this theoretical framework, the essential function and meaning 
attributed to power relations are that these characters and structures’ capability to 
influence others is primarily through digital representations. I argue that for such 
formations of power relations, we are at a reasonably new stage in understanding 
the intended use of these digital tools by the users and the scope of impact they are 
exposed to while using them. There are already many studies on the correlation 
between media and power relations. For example, the impact of social media use on 
individual and social decision making (Diga and Kelleher, 2009); the power of public 
relations in media (Cho, 2006); media and power (Curran, 2002). There are also 
many studies such as media texts and the (re)construction of power relations 
 
13 As an example, Cristiano Ronaldo has 245 million followers on Instagram. Every single social media 
content that Ronaldo shares has a potential formative power that emerges in the digital fields of 245 million 
people. This digital system and logic have the same function for the samples stated below. 
14 As an example, former United States of America President Barack Obama has more than 125 million 
followers on Twitter. 
15 As an example, Apple company, when searched on Google search engine the word ‘Apple company’, 
3,850,000,000 results come out in 0.98 seconds. This is an example for e-territory. 
16 As an example, Mercedes or McDonald’s, which the symbols of these companies are well known 
worldwide. 
17 As an example, France receives more than 80 million visitors each year, 
https://www.movehub.com/blog/popular-countries-map/ last access date on 25.05.2021 
18 As an example, liberalism or conservatism which people perceive and interpret such abstract forms through 
lifestyles or discourses.  
19 As an example, Facebook has 1.69 billion users worldwide, which means Facebook as a company has 
access to 1.69 billion people directly with their data where they can interact.  
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(Risberg, Tienari and Vaara, 2003). In addition to these, more fundamental studies 
such as the use of media tools as an ideological device of the state (Althusser, 1970), 
the transformation of the media into a tool of manipulation (Chomsky, 1988; 1997), 
the relationship between media, simulation and reality (Baudrillard, 1994) are also 
known. Although these studies deal with power and media relations separately, they 
do not particularly address the formation of new actors as a new habitus created 
through media devices. 
The relation of the power relation with/in digital realms to my research is that when 
it becomes easier to imagine, empathize, desire, to be enthusiastic about a place, 
lifestyle, wealth, living standards, then it becomes a ‘pulling’ factor in migration and 
mobilities. Power relations play a role in these intertwined and interactive relations 
of people. The more apparency of the major actors in daily life habits through mainly 
media means has shifted people's plans, imaginations, and perception concerning 
others, including people, society, product, state, state and lifestyle. The reason for 
this is more about the advanced technology in transportation, accessibility to 
information, and accelerated mobility. When people have more means to realise their 
dreams, desires and plans, they use them. This is particularly valid in the case of 
immigrants and refugees. 
Long-term lives in refugee camps can be outlined as being in limbo, as I will 
elaborate in my discussions on the selection of camp sites in the methodology 
section. As Abdi (2005; 2) put it: “… encampment and protracted refugee situations 
leave thousands of men, women, and children living in limbo, resulting in wasted 
human capacity and deprivations of human dignity.” All the authorities that prohibit, 
restrict, control the exit of refugees from the camp areas, and issue temporary ID 
cards can be shown as examples of power relations. For instance, within the scope 
of power relations, I will examine the statements of refugees staying in the camps 
that European countries are better in all aspects of life, as well as their thoughts and 
perceptions that support these words, and the images, histories, politics, economies, 
which constitute these perceptions. Also, I will discuss the relations of refugees who 
did not have work permits, passports, legal permissions and had to live in camps, 
with regard to external formative forces through discussions of power relations. As 
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opposed to the identification of wars, ignorance, uncivilised or undeveloped societies 
with Eastern countries (meaning mainly Middle East countries), I will discuss the 
correlations between the civilised, developed, modernised and educated ideas 
identified with Western countries (representing primarily Western European 
countries) within the context of power relations. 
As the main subject of the next section, I explain and discuss the most visible daily 
life practices of refugees that were media and internet usage among refugees in the 
fieldwork areas where these power relations circumscribed, within the scope of 
Digital Habitus theory. 
1.3.2) Digital Habitus 
‘We become what we behold. We shape our tools, 
and thereafter our tools shape us.’ 
Marshall McLuhan 
During fieldwork, the central theme that ethnography allowed me to conceptualise 
was a new habitus created by the refugees’ limited and controlled lives within the 
camp and camp settings. The daily habits and routines produced by this habitus can 
be observed mainly in camps and in areas where uncertainty and protracted lives 
are in question. The most salient and obvious of these habits and routines is the use 
of social media and other internet platforms where refugees spend time, especially 
on smartphones, tablets, and computers. These new habitus and media usages, 
which I have observed saliently and tangibly, especially in the camps, are included 
in this study as Digital Habitus referring to a new theoretical concept. As another 
critical theory of this research, Digital Habitus is conceptualised and developed to 
respond to another research objective: Exploring Syrian refugees’ engagement with 
media technologies and the internet within the boundaries of a new digital age and 
the environment of refugee camps where a new habitus appears’. In the following 
section, I develop the theory of Digital Habitus first through the discussions on 
digitality, then a comparison of the Habitus theory with the Digital Habitus, and finally, 




1.3.2.1) Digitality: Intertwinement of the Real with Simulation 
Bourdieu clarifies the difference between habit and habitus in a footnote to Outline 
of a Theory of Practice (1977: 218, note 47) and explains: “One of the reasons for 
the use of the term habitus is the wish to set aside the common conception of habit 
as a mechanical assembly or preformed programme, as Hegel does when in the 
Phenomenology of Mind, he speaks of ‘habit as dexterity’”. Habit is more than just a 
mechanical assembly or a pre-formed program, it is more decisive both in an 
abstract and concrete sense, the socialities built by behaviour, action, thought 
stimulus-response reflexes. As Nick Crossley wrote in his work on the notions of 
habit and habitus: “…habitus implies a flexible disposition which, though pre-
reflective, remains commensurate with purposive action and in no way precludes 
intelligence, understanding, strategy or knowledge on the part of the actor” (2013; 
139). Common daily acts of almost all the refugees I beheld in the camp sites 
prompted me to detail the habitus of camp setting places. The common peculiarity 
of these habits was about the behaviours performed through images, information 
and sounds simulated on the phone screens, which were carried out over the phone, 
which were held still while the fingers moved. Put simply, the refugees were using 
the phone and computers between 250 minutes and 400 minutes every day, 4 to 7 
hours on average, while it was measured that the average daily social media usage 
of internet users worldwide increased from 90 minutes in 2012 to 145 minutes as of 
202020. Thus, the digital relationships on which these habits are carried out appear 
as a new facet and interface of life that regulates, influences, and shapes the 
interactions and perceptions of people, and, so to speak, becomes obligatory and 
addictive.  
Digital Habitus is an attempt to understand the new field and aspect of life that is 
shaped and expanded on the common behaviours and habits of billions of people 
around the world. What then, is the digital that defines the new borderlines of our 
time? The digital in the broadest sense refers to any piece of technology that 
connects people and machines or information. It re-configures people’s relationships 
 




with each other, with the digital and with data. Marshall McLuhan (1964; 90-92), in 
his pathfinder work in media studies, Understanding Media, states that “All 
technologies are extensions of our physical and nervous systems to increase power 
and speed… as limitless, interactive and multi-sensory”. Elaborating on McLuhan’s 
approach and definition that technologies are an extension of our physical presence, 
the tools we use both metaphorically and literally have become our extensions. For 
instance, wheels extend our feet, telephones extend our voice, televisions extend 
our eyes and ears, computers extend our brain, and nowadays a combination of 
most of these in the form of internet media, in general, extends our central nervous 
system (Bobbitt, 2011; 2).  
Digitality, which is also being referred to as digitalism, connotes the condition of living 
in a digital culture. Digitality as a term and concept has been described by numerous 
scholars as “the new realism” (Bowen and Giannini, 2014; 324; Hassan, 2020). 
Jonathan Bowen and Tula Giannini (2014) evaluate digitality or digitalism as “an 
inevitable progression from real to digital” which is “increasingly a force that is 
unstoppable, irresistible… so that which can be digital will be digital” (ibid; 328; 
Bluma, 2016; 10). The term is derived from the book of Nicholas Negroponte entitled 
‘Being Digital’ (1995), which is considered in relation to modernity and post-
modernity (Hassan, 2020). To comprehend the novelty that this concept indicates 
and the process it corresponds to in our daily life, we can consider the following 
statistics concerning the growth of digitalism: almost 5 billion videos are watched on 
YouTube every day (Agarwal et al. 2017; 586). As of May 2019, more than 500 hours 
of video were uploaded to YouTube every minute. There are, on average, 8 billion 
video views daily from 500 million users on Facebook21 (McNamee, 2020). Google 
averages nearly 3 billion searches per day (Arora, McKee and Stuckler, 2019; 338). 
Every day around 500 million tweets are tweeted on Twitter (Güngör, Erdem and 
Doğru, 2019; 898). Growing wearable technology and mobile trends have led to the 
prediction that there will be 28.5 billion networked devices and connections by 
202222. According to statistics on a website that shares technology-focused 
 
21 https://sproutsocial.com/insights/facebook-stats-for-marketers/  [last access date on 25.05.2021] 
22 https://sysgen.ca/three-facts-internet/ [last access date on 25.05.2021] 
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information, around 35 billion IoT devices will be installed around the world by 
202123. 
The statistical information above is, so to speak, incomprehensibly complex and 
contains excessively difficult data to comprehend. These data, in fact, explain the 
interactions performed on digital platforms as a joint action of hundreds of millions 
or even billions of internet users every day in statistical linguistics. Hence, what does 
this new space, where billions of people are simultaneously and mutually related, 
correspond to in the life of active internet users, us? How have these digital 
relationships, that are independent of this physical contact but feel as real as 
physical contact, spread over our lives, and how have they developed? More 
importantly, how has it created new economies, power relations, societies, 
subjectivity, and habitus at such an unprecedented pace? 
A wide range of studies has been conducted on the emergence, development and 
spread of media in various disciplines. These studies have reached various 
conclusions, such as that the media is a medium between economics and 
governmentality (Phelan, 2014; Castro, 2016); that the information disseminated 
through media has an ideological and manipulative function (Carpentier, 2011); that 
those tools are used to produce media content, such as culture and entertainment; 
that creates a new economic industry, politics, and relationalities (Straubhaar, 
LaRose and Davenport, 2013; Hassan, 2020). Each study has built very successful 
and explanatory approaches regarding the economic, social, political, ideological, 
and governmental relations experienced in-during its period. Despite this, the studies 
on the internet-based media remain incapable of establishing its relationship with a 
macro and functioning system, particularly considering the transformation of digital 
relationships that surround us as spider networks that have spread to almost every 
area of life. The sociability and habits created by this new high-tech digital age have 
reached an important stage, and the devices used in everyday life are somehow 
determinant in the digital environment. The transformation of all these developments 
and devices that operate together into a new structure, I argue, goes beyond the 
 
23 Internet of Things (IoT) developed as a concept approximately 20 years ago and has been now trending 
around the world day by day. Basically, these numbers refer to various types of devices, machines, and 
sensors, including smartphones and computers that exist everywhere in our modern and technological world. 
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scope of most studies in related literature. The postmodern semiotic theory of 
hyperreality was coined by the French sociologist Jean Baudrillard’s guiding work in 
Simulacra and Simulation (Pavlik-Malone, 2019; 35). Baudrillard described 
hyperreality as “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (1994; 
1). Thus, Baudrillard’s notions of hyperreality, hyperspace, simulacrum, reality and 
virtuality concerning the ambiguous domain between reality and fiction can be used 
as a reference to interpret the new meanings and relationships generated by today’s 
digital relationships. In other words, the non-use value reality has replaced reality, 
and the masses, on the other hand, are experiencing this internalised simulation and 
reality process more passively in a fictionalised reality. In this non-use value reality 
or internalised simulation, it is vital to understand that those who have control over 
media tools and their content use them for their own political, economic or social 
benefits. In this context, the ideology of the media is identified with the ideology of 
the interest groups served by the information it produces. We can reformulate Karl 
Marx’s statement formulated for economics and superstructures: “The class which 
has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time 
over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas 
of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx; 1968; 21)”; 
The class which has the means of media production at its disposal, has control at 
the same time over the means of mental production! 
Baudrillard expressed that: “The whole of the human being, his [sic] biological, 
muscular, animal physicality has been transferred to mechanical prostheses. Not 
even our brain has remained within us but is now floating in the countless Hertzian 
waves and networks surrounding us. This is by no means science fiction but merely 
the generalisation of McLuhan’s theory about the extension of man [sic]” (Baudrillard 
1989, 114; cited in Gözen, 2020; 52). In his early works, Baudrillard started to form 
the theory of simulation (1968; 1970), in which he argued that societies started to 
experience severe deterioration due to advancing modern and media technologies. 
In the context of this argument, Baudrillard declared the disruption of the subject, 
political economy, meaning, reality and social formations of existing societies 
(Gözen, ibid), mainly through the structural and epistemological relations to digitality. 
Baudrillard’s arguments are understandable in his explanations of knowledge and 
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the digitisation of knowledge. He had observed precisely that transformation from 
the tactile to the digital was a primary fact about the contemporary world. 
I define the current high-level of digitality as a recently developing and pioneering 
mechanism, especially in the economic and political fields, and I argue? that there 
are new relationships, industries and socialities designed around digitality, which 
have both structural and epistemological functions. Despite this, in this study, I focus 
particularly on the impact of these structures and epistemology on daily life relations 
and perceptions of people. I identify this situation as a significant subject because I 
argue these new relationships have created a new habitus. This habitus has a 
decisive power and role. Also, I argue that even though the term digital habitus has 
been emphasized in various studies, the meaning I attribute to digital habitus with a 
more comprehensive conceptualisation is emphasized for the first time in academic 
literature. I refer to the notion of habitus as an origin for the conceptualisation of 
digital habitus. The following section provides an introduction to and a discussion of 
the notion of habitus as a foundation for digital habitus, specifically in reference to 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.  
1.3.2.2) A Brief Comparative Discussion of Habitus and Digital Habitus 
Habitus signifies the deeply ingrained habits, skills, dispositions, and logic of 
practices that we have throughout our life experiences (Bourdieu, 1980, 1982). In 
Stan Houston’s words, “habitus is literally embodied within the physical presentation, 
movement and gesture” (2002; 162). Bourdieu described habitus as a property of 
social agents, whether individuals, groups, or institutions, that are comprised of a 
“structured and structuring structure” (1994: 170). The structured feature implies 
one’s past and present conditions: family upbringing, educational backgrounds, and 
social environments. The structuring structure is more about forming one’s present 
and future capacity, practices and works. In this context, the structure by itself 
depicts an array in which it constructs a system containing the formations of one’s 
life. In other words, the structure is not random or un-patterned (Grenfell, 2014; 51), 
but it is in order and harmony. Bourdieu in his further works referred to the concept 
of structure and stated: “the structure embodies a disposition system that generates 
perceptions, appreciations and practices” (Bourdieu; 1990: 53; Grenfell; ibid; 51). 
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Habitus means sociality that social agencies internalise as schemes of perception, 
feeling, thinking, and acting (Bourdieu, 1982; 37-38). According to this, habitus is the 
internal structure that structures all social practices of social agencies, from daily life 
to politics, from cultural tastes to speaking style (Bourdieu, 1980). The objective 
conditions of existence that each individual internalises in her/his own body during 
her/his socialisation process constitute the permanent and transferable habitus for 
that individual (Bourdieu, 1983; 113).  In this sense, when applying the theoretical 
construction of Bourdieu’s sociological concept in the digital field with similar 
methodological patterns and tools to determine the limits and capacity of digital 
habitus, I can betoken the following arguments.  
Firstly, digital habitus is the structure that the individual builds with her/his consent 
or obligation, which they are a part of, and digital relations constitute almost all social 
practices on the digital networks. To be more precise, these digital relationships in 
networks operate and process on or in conjunction with the Internet. Thus, the new 
societal and social boundaries that individuals personalise as patterns of perception, 
feeling, thinking, and practising with/in digital settings determine the digital habitus. 
To define more precisely, Digital Habitus designates the presence and transference 
of altering domains of the social, political, economic, and financial set of 
circumstance elements on internet-based platforms, communicating with and 
informing the reality. Secondly, digital habitus is a new setting that enables almost 
everyone to practice in accordance with social, economic, political, and individual 
resources that support and empower people on the basis of Internet connectivity.  
Thanks to habitus, the individual’s actions become mutually recognised and familiar 
with the social sphere in which they are located. For example, in the first year of 
primary school, children learn new rules of behaviour in the classroom, the way of 
speaking and engaging in dialogue with the teacher. Still, once they learn and 
internalise classroom life’s objective conditions, these objective conditions become 
permanent in them as an internalised subjective structure. Then, in the following 
years in classes, this student habitus gains validity by reproducing itself in every 
context without question. Similarly, although the duration of use and association with 
any type of digital platform, relationalities, web-based interactions, digital habitus 
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occurs over a much shorter duration than a student’s first year of education and can 
vary from users to users. As a parallel example to the development of habitus in 
digital frames, a user who starts using Facebook usually spends time learning the 
ways of using all concepts, settings and rules that are generally written in the terms 
and conditions, which the user is asked to agree with at the beginning. This example 
applies to almost all other digital fields. For example, online banking, online 
education, social media platforms, websites, telecommunication networks, online 
shopping, and other e-fields. Every single one of them provides services through 
determined rules and regulations. These processes of encountering and 
engagement with this new digital habitus that operate through social, economic, 
education, health, administration, bureaucracy, entertainment, games draw the limits 
of potential habitus(es) appearing in our lives. 
What the section above shows, and this is Bourdieu’s point too, is that habitus is 
constituted through time, upbringing, education, and disposition (Reay, 2004; 433). 
The formation of the habitus spreads over long periods in the time period when these 
elements are built and structured together. However, within the scope of this study, 
first habitat and then habitus formed within the boundaries of camp areas and 
conditions can easily re-formulate the refugee individual’s previous habitus 
elements. In this new habitat and habitus, the habits and routines of refugee 
individuals undergo structural change at an unexpected speed, even though 
refugees usually spend a few years in camps. This change is also stimulated by 
being in limbo. The formation of new habitus, which is accelerated by being in limbo 
and living in camp conditions, and then the change of the basic decisive elements of 
the habitus formation, such as the replacement of education by media and internet, 
reveals the development of digital habitus with all its bareness. 
I consider these new relationalities and interactions as a foundation for the digital 
habitus as a new system that transformed from the embodiment of habitus in 
physical presentation and movement to the digital embodiments of mainly social, 
economic, governmental and entertainment purposes. I argue that we live in a new 
habitus in which the internet connection is the new priority for both human use and 
mechanical operation of our times. Therefore, the understanding of the structures 
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and operation of digital habitus is very significant. The following section presents 
related discussions about the structure and operation of digital habitus, in which the 
reader can envision digital habitus more concretely. 
1.3.2.3) Media Content as an Extension of Our Physical and Nervous 
Systems: The Structure and Operation of Digital Habitus 
Digital networks surround almost every aspect of life. These networks either by 
cooperation or separately create structures and functionalities in life. Digital habitus 
is a new interface that intersects, inter-works and provides a complementary feature 
to these structures and functionalities in life. This new interface, which brings 
together the relationships, needs and services in different aspects of life, is digital 
habitus. As an interface, digital habitus is an up-to-date means that facilitates life, 
provides benefits and functionality, and generates meaning through the 
functionalities and services it offers. In the development of such broad relationships 
of the fastest growing industry and aspect of life, the operation of digital habitus is 
built on relationality, which Bourdieu also considers in his engagement with sociology 
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 2011). Bourdieu’s approach in sociology is 
relational (Schinkel, 2007; 707), but he does not focus on social relations, rather on 
social networks or an interactional order (Bottero, 2009; 399). Bourdieu’s 
interpretation of relationality is based on social interactions as a space of relations 
(Bourdieu 1985: 725). Considering Bourdieu’s understanding of relationality, the new 
digital structures interact, intersect, cooperate, and function within or upon each 
other, which is the digital relationality. Relationality as an approach can help in 
mapping the structure and fields of the digital habitus. 
Although it has interactive and relational qualities, digital habitus ontologically and 
structurally has a neutral nature. Let’s give an example based on a different analogy: 
a school building structurally is neutral, until lectures for educational and teaching 
purposes are delivered and utilised. Likewise, internet and media means have a 
neutral structure, especially in terms of infrastructures and hardware. The main 
component that makes this structure subjective and functional are media content 
and services. In this sense, the effect triggered by the content, which this digital 
system provides as its principal functionality, on its users is one of the objects of this 
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study. The main basis of my development of the digital habitus theory as a new 
phenomenon is to emphasize the common effects on users triggered by media 
content operating through this new system. 
Nevertheless, one of the distinct features of digital habitus is that digital fields are 
not passive. On the contrary, they have their aims, programs, duties to complete and 
function through, although there are multiple actors and structures varying in 
different areas and sectors and therefore have different purposes. To illustrate with 
an analogy, there have been two central communication and interaction forms 
among humans; first the material-based interactions and then for a few decades 
now, digital-based interactions (Jung and Stolterman, 2012). The first one frames 
the interactions with materials and tools, which, due to their nature, cannot have an 
aim but a function for being used and interacted with. For example, consider a car 
or a chair, which awaits there without its aim or purpose in a passive form. Digital-
based interactions are new invisible networks, platforms, and websites that have 
functions and purposes different from materials and tools. For instance, these 
networks, applications, and websites can send a notification to bring the user’s 
attention or analyse the user's online history to promote relevant advertisements or 
related content without asking for it. Digital habitus is not only a habitus that users 
establish among themselves, but also it is a new and mechanical social feature that 
did not exist before in our lives. This is the artificial intelligence (AI) of the material 
tools we use to communicate. 
Internet-based companies, such as Google or Facebook, have more information 
about individuals and societies than has ever been imagined in human history. All 
this information is data that internet users are constantly pouring out. This data is 
being supported by these companies’ systems that almost have no human 
supervision anymore. These systems with the most updated version of algorithms 
make better and better and better predictions about what we are going to do and 
actually about who we are. Tristan Harris, activist24 and computer scientist, 
explains25 that the Information Technologies (IT), software departments and 
 
24 https://www.humanetech.com/ last access date on 25.05.2021 
25 https://www.humanetech.com/the-social-dilemma last access date on 25.05.2021 
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engineers of these companies (Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc.) work on 
their systems with three principal goals. These goals are first the engagement goal, 
which is to drive up the usage of the internet users, to keep them scrolling their 
screens; then the growth goal, which is to keep the users coming back to the systems 
and indirectly convincing them to invite more people as friends to expand the 
systems; and finally, the advertising goals, which is  to manage all these happenings 
to gain economic profits, make money out of the users and benefit as much as 
possible economically. 
Digital content largely takes shape in the formations of texts, sounds, images, and 
the combination of these. However, the impact of this content achieves functionality 
and sense in more abstract extents as thought, emotion, desire, ideology, 
advertisement, which are aimed to be transmitted through these formations. I 
recognise this media content as a new power actor and relation due to the potential 
power it has. As an example, consider the programs shown on TV in the form of 
movies, commercials, clips, news; or social media content in the form of images, 
photographs, videos, personal or public posts; or Internet content in all specified 
formats. In this sense, the media content becomes an extension of the user’s 
feelings and thoughts which has potential effects on the other users who view this 
content. If we remember the most essential criterion that we take when defining 
power relations, ‘…the external forces that have a radical and formative influence on 
one another’, in this sense media content has the power of formative influence on 
others. We do not have the power to control the context or theme of broadcast 
content, although we have the capacity to personally monitor, prefer, or conversely 
eliminate or block, the channels and platforms on which media content is broadcast. 
Thus, media content is potentially an external force that can influence others. 
We will see how contexts, themes, and subjects, which I have defined as media 
content, have the power of influence in this study concerning Syrian refugees who 
are associated with and affected by this content. For example, we will see how a 
comment under content posted on Facebook, which is undeniably far from reality, 
has a radical effect on the perception and desire of a refugee staying in one of the 
camps in Greece. Furthermore, we will see what impact social media has on a young 
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refugee who succeeded in arriving in Germany, resulting in hundreds of other 
refugees staying in different countries contacting him on social media and requesting 
information. Finally, we will discuss the fact that another refugee staying at the camp 
in Turkey emphasises that access to the Internet is as essential as bread and water, 
and the relation between this essential need and camp and refugee conditions and 
how digital habitus develops correspondingly. Additionally, we will discuss how the 
interactions that digital habitus broadcasts, provides access and enables and 
influences individuals. This is a new digital interface that exceeds the limits of media 
propaganda, manipulation, and content control. 
Social and political subjectivity is the third theoretical perspective of this research. 
First, within the scope of the research subject, I correlate and discuss Syrian 
refugees with their mobility capacity, the capital they have, the importance of their 
gender norms and roles, the decisions they make and the actions they practice. The 
discussion of subjectivity indirectly highlights the potential dynamics of the decisions, 
actions, and practices we deal with individually as internet users and media content 
producers and consumers. Power relations and digital habitus are the first two 
mechanisms of a major system that shape and affect the decisions, actions and 
perceptions of individuals and masses, as we will examine in more detail in the 
chapters where fieldwork analyses are conveyed. I discuss the theory of political and 
social subjectivity as the third mechanism in the next section. 
1.3.3) Political and Social Subjectivities 
As the ego cogito, subjectivity is the consciousness 
that represents something, relates this representation back 
to itself, and so gathers with itself. 
Martin Heidegger 
As the third set of essential theories considered in this research, in this section I 
address the concepts of political and social subjectivities due to their inherent 
qualities in response to my doctoral research’s two fundamental objectives. These 
are firstly, ‘Syrian refugees’ social, economic, and educational backgrounds and 
capital in relation to their practices and the realisation of their plans’ and secondly, 
‘Syrian refugees’ transformation and empowerment of gender roles and norms in 
prior to and during the migration’. The answers sought to these two research points 
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aim to empower the refugees’ subjectivity and to note that the refugees’ subjectivities 
are not passive. In doing so, political and social subjectivities are presented as 
complementary mechanisms of power relations and digital habitus, namely the third 
mechanism of a major system. Thus, I first develop a discussion around the meaning 
and formation of subjectivity, and then how subjectivity is formed in my research, 
and finally, what political and social subjectivity means in a major system as a 
complementary mechanism of power relations and digital habitus. 
1.3.3.1) Subjectivity, Political Subjectivity, and the Subjectivity of 
Refugees 
The scope of subjectivity has been dealt with predominantly from philosophical and 
sociological perspectives. While the philosophical approach correlates subjectivity 
with the individual’s representation and existence, the sociological approach focuses 
on the social dimensions and relations of the individual’s agency and representation. 
The meaning attributed to subjectivity in this research can be grasped with a more 
interwoven and intricate perspective, especially in the context of Syrian refugees. 
Hence, the concept of subjectivity requires an interdisciplinary point of view when it 
comes to refugees. Therefore, first, I examine the function and meaning of 
subjectivity in this research through these philosophical and sociological 
approaches. Then, with a perspective that transcends the scope of the philosophical 
and sociological approaches, I explain political subjectivity by linking it with the 
refugees. 
Subjectivity, as a phenomenon has been at the core of many philosophical 
approaches that concern the subject’s position as a being (Henrich, 2003; Chiesa, 
2007; Zahavi, 2008). A subject means an individual who has conscious experiences 
such as subjective perspectives, feelings, and beliefs, which is commonly 
considered an entity (Metzinger, 2000). The innermost essence of subjectivity in 
philosophical debates, as Slavoj Zizek26 puts it, “...resides in a unique act of what 
Fichte baptised self-positing. Here, each subject is a point of absolute autonomy, 
 
26https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/the-fall-that-makes-us-like-god-part-i/ from the debate titled ‘The Fall 
That Makes Us Like God, Part I’ last access date on 25.05.2021 
Also see, Zizek, Slavoj (1999) The ticklish subject: The absent centre of political ontology. Verso. 
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which means that it cannot be reduced to a moment in the network of causes and 
effects.” Regarding the capacity, potentiality, and uniqueness of the subjectivity, 
Hannah Arendt also considered the subject’s positioning from a different angle by 
specifying the uniqueness and unexpectedness as follows: “It is in the nature of 
beginning that something new is started. This cannot be expected from whatever 
may have happened before. This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent 
in all beginnings. The fact that man is capable of action means the unexpected can 
be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable (1973; 
177-178).” In philosophical approaches, subjectivity is commonly considered as an 
entity. It can be argued that an entity has a representation, exclusivity, privilege, and 
positionality that is unique to it by its nature. Blackman et al. (2008; 7) address 
subjectivity through an individual’s distinctiveness and write: “The imperative for 
such a philosophical attempt at understanding subjectivity as maintaining its own 
distinctive, ‘non-derivative’ ontology is to be found in a moment of crisis”. Here a 
moment of crisis in an individual’s case may be formulated into the refugee-ness as 
a social crisis appearing in each refugee’s life. 
In addition to the philosophical approach, the sociological evaluation of the subject 
and subjectivity also draw attention to another central approach in social sciences 
(Blackman et al. 2008; 10). Subjectivity is generally a social relationship that arises 
through interactional perspectives (Domingues, 1995) in the society in which the 
individual lives and is inherently social. Jermier (2008; 468) noted that “Subjectivity 
is a sociological concept that refers to interior states of being experienced by human 
actors. These states can be shared or individuated and result from relations of 
power.” The human actor does not develop in a self-sufficient environment as stated 
in philosophical approaches, on the contrary, subjectivity develops with the 
interactions and relationships that occur in the world surrounding the individual 
(Domingues, 1995). This is a reciprocal relationship, as the continually changing 
culture, as well as other key structures such as economy, political and social 




Even though the notion of subjectivity has been widely theorised through 
philosophical and sociological perspectives, the notion of political subjectivity 
requires further explanation and discussion. Sadeq Rahimi reviews the relations 
between the political and subjectivity and states: “The notion of political subjectivity 
dramatically widens the scope of politicality to understand the subject itself as a 
political event,” and continues: “Politicality, in this sense, is not an added aspect of 
the subject, but indeed the mode of being of the subject, that is, precisely what the 
subject is” (2015; 8). The agency and more importantly, the political representation 
of the subject have even more significance in subaltern and post-colonial studies. 
To exemplify it in various research areas: Issues of female subjectivity and subaltern 
agency (Loomba, 1993), women’s empowerment and subaltern consciousness 
(Leve, 2007), ethnic nationalism and political subaltern identity (Cockell, 2000), 
political subjectivity of religious communities (Beshara, 2018) can be stated. 
While inextricable from sociological and philosophical approaches as the 
predominant methods, the political subjectivity considered in this study is at the same 
time transcendental, particularly in understanding refugees’ subjectivities. This is 
because, while refugee-ness is a given identity and status that organises refugees’ 
relationships in many aspects such as bureaucracy, economy, and sociality; at the 
same time, it is very political to act within the limits determined by this identity status 
while re-gaining the subjectivity. Following the rapid increase in the number of 
refugees and displaced communities worldwide in the past few decades, the form of 
subjectivity, especially the concepts of political subjectivity, has attracted particular 
attention in refugee and migration research. The number of studies in this field is 
increasing day by day. Considering the refugees as the subjected subjects, they 
have significantly narrowed and limited agencies and experience the encounters 
with bureaucracy (Åsa and Wikström, 2014), humanitarian borders (Kallio, Häkli and 
Pascucci, 2019), legal processes and documentation (Aberman, 2014), dangerous 
migration routes and fatal struggles (Fontanari, 2018). In my research, the 
subjectivity and agency of refugees have appeared on the agenda through the 
mobility, agency, actions and capabilities of Syrian refugees, which varied in Turkey, 
Greece and Germany. I consider the notion of agency in the case of Syrian refugees 
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as actors of their life who choose to act concerning their plans, desires, decisions, 
and gender relations. 
Bourdieu strongly objected the Rational Choice Theory when he explained his 
understanding of subject and actor. Rational choice theory suggests a set of 
guidelines that assist in understanding the economic and social behaviour of 
subjects concerning (Blume and Easley, 1982, 1984). Bourdieu, in discussions of 
habitus and field theory, particularly in the social field, considers not subjects or 
actors, but agents as determined by habitus and disposition (Bourdieu, 2020). He 
evaluates agents and states that they (agents) do not perpetually estimate and 
behave according to precise rational and economic principles. Instead, Bourdieu 
argues that (social) agents operate according to an inherent and certain practical 
logic, a practical sense and bodily dispositions (Hilgers and Mangez, 2014; 23). On 
the other hand, in this study, however, the arguments about subjectivity argue that 
although the individual's capital forms and gender for instance, are particularly in 
mind as determinants, the decisions, actions, and practices of the subject are not 
solely determined by the subject's dispositions and by habitus. 
In the following section, I indicate the reflection of the fieldwork regarding Syrian 
refugees’ performed subjectivities in conformity with their socio-economic 
background and gender empowerments. I particularly offer the social subjectivity 
notion in this regard alongside political subjectivity. 
1.3.3.2) Political and Social Subjectivity of Syrians: Refugee-ness as a 
New Agency 
A wide variety of academic research has already been conducted on the correlations 
of migration and economics, social and educational status (Van Hear, 2014; Erel, 
2010; Gosnell and Abrams, 2011). The intersection of the main emphasis of these 
studies and the argument concerning political subjectivity that I discuss in this 
chapter is that various forms of capital in reference to Bourdieu (1986) are among 
the main determining dynamics on the actions, capabilities, and practices of 
individuals. This is also accurate for Syrian refugees who strive to realise their 
political subjectivity through migration mobilities in parallel with their thoughts, 
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decisions, desires, plans and imaginations. If we formulate: More substantial social, 
economic and cultural capital and upbringing patterns strengthen and enable 
individuals to act upon and practice more comprehensively in different ways of taking 
action; whereas less and weaker capital prevents and disables individuals in their 
practices. 
In addition to the various forms of refugees’ capital, gender empowerment and 
transformation play a critical role in the discussion of political subjectivity (Gibson-
Graham, 2020; Aretxaga, 2021). Krause and Schramm in their work (2011; 115) 
particularly focus on the empowerment of subjectivity through the lenses of gender 
relations and diasporic minority communities’ agencies. They write: “The analytical 
concept of political subjectivity helps to understand how people relate to governance 
and authorities. It denotes how a single person, or a group of actors is brought into 
a position to stake claims, to have a voice, and to be recognizable by authorities.” In 
the last decades, when the number of women’s studies started to increase, the 
importance of gender in migration studies also accelerated. Studies were conducted 
on both positive and negative aspects of being a woman in international mobility, 
illegal immigration and refugee-ness (Pedraza, 1991; Boyd and Grieco, 2003; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo and Cranford, 2006). The main point where most of the studies 
on the gender and migration relationship and particularly in gender transformation in 
Syrian refugees before and during migration intersect is essentially on men’s 
experiences where women’s perspective on the issue is neglected. However, apart 
from the challenges of being a woman in the scope of gender relations, it is also a 
question of how gender roles and hierarchies affect the migration possibilities of 
women and men at every stage of the migration process and produce different 
migration results (Boyd and Grieco, 2003; 28). The control and oppression of women 
came onto the agenda of fieldwork studies primarily as a consequence of the 
patriarchy and male-dominant mentality. That is, particularly in the more collective 
communities, male dominance and patriarchy can be more influential and 
penetrating, particularly as a restrictive reason to prevent women’s subjectivity and 
agency (Allen, 2009; 341, 359). Therefore, while setting and clarifying the borders of 
gender dynamics in the political subjectivity of Syrian refugees, we can reach the 
following formulation: As the social pressure on women negatively exposed to 
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gender roles decreases, their subjectivity becomes more visible in individual 
encouragement, empowerment, and public relations. In this sense, the part where 
political subjectivity intersects chiefly with gender debates and concerns Syrian 
women refugees can be discussed by the fact that female refugees whose 
subjectivity has become more strengthened, have a voice, are recognised by the 
authorities and are more visible in their collective communities. The evaluated 
fieldwork findings in Turkey, compared with the conclusions from fieldwork in Greece 
and Germany from gender perspectives, will detail this argument. 
In addition to political subjectivity, I refer to the notion of social subjectivity that should 
be taken into account especially in the case of Syrian refugees. The subjectivity and 
individual agency of a refugee can and often is different from how they are perceived 
by their host communities. This gap between subjectivity and perception causes 
ambivalence and potential conflict in the representation of the individual. In many 
cases the host perception informs the individual’s subjectivity and dictates their 
agency. This situation surfaces in ambivalence and reluctance to share the personal 
identity, status, and imaginings of the future - all of which are challenged. By social 
subjectivity I mean the subjectivity created by displaying performance in accordance 
with social anticipations in the host country, through newly appropriated social 
traditions, norms, and roles of people of a particular race, religion, or ethnicity. 
Forced displacement and the subsequent wearing down and loss of the possessed 
material and moral values make it difficult for refugees to adapt to the given 
identities, which naturally creates a subjectivity problem. In this sense, social 
subjectivity for refugees requires a process of re-construction of their 
representations, agency, and of regaining their voice. The public opinion and image 
of a refugee who seeks a safe place and escapes from a destructive force such as 
war draws the portrait of a helpless and poor individual. Thus, a refugee might find 
her/himself in a new situation of subjectivity. Either a refugee recounts the life story 
expected and demanded of her/him over and over again or s/he has a personal 
conflict in these encounters to reconstruct her/his identity, representation and 
subjectivity against what is expected and demanded. I call this personal conflict 
process imposed by others, social subjectivity.  
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In the context of both political and social subjectivity debate, fieldwork findings and 
results will be evaluated primarily by the participants’ capital, activism and 
capabilities, and lastly, by their gender roles. To illustrate, the compulsion of 
refugees staying in the Kahramanmaraş Temporary Protection Center 
(Kahramanmaraş Geçici Koruma Merkezi - KTPC) in Turkey to stay in the camp as 
a result of their lack of capital, will be discussed through the lens of subjectivity. In 
addition, the empowerment of refugee women staying in camps in Greece and taking 
social, legal, and educational responsibilities, thereby becoming much more visible 
in the public sphere, will detail the gender-related aspects of subjectivity. Finally, we 
will address the political and social subjectivity of a medical doctor refugee 
participant who immigrated to Germany but cannot perform her profession solely 
because of her refugee status, and how this situation affected the social, economic, 
and cultural respectability and agency of this refugee. 
1.3.4) The Theoretical Hypothesis of the Research: Semi-Autonomous 
Colonialism 
Nowadays, we live in a global capitalist, modern and technological era where minds 
are more valuable than bodily forces. Intellectual power began to become more 
specific and important in the domain that has emerged as a result of mechanisation 
and technology replacing the body power. Also, we are faced with intertwined and 
complex systems parallel to increasing new means and systems mainly accelerated 
by technological developments. Thus, I argue that sociological and political 
conceptualisations cannot adequately explain this new era’s formation and 
development phase by looking through the lenses of current theories. A new 
intellectual toolbox is needed to understand the transformation in recent history by 
the central power axes, and those historically hold colonial sovereignty, power, and 
ascertainment. As a young scholar, I see in the current transformation of the existing 
power centres adorned with global capitalist, modern and technological tools are 
now improved into a system that can bring together the best minds, intellects, and 
qualifications of the world with the perception, desire, and consent it can create in 
individuals. The current method of collecting these good intellects and qualified 
people together is to offer opportunities, generate higher living standards, become a 
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place where desires can be realised and be attractive. These living standards, 
opportunities and desires apply to both economic, social, and political areas. 
The forced displacement and subsequent migration trajectories of Syrian refugees 
are a powerful example for understanding the course and motivations of people in 
building a new life when they are faced with external pushing forces. In particular, 
mass migration mobilities and dispositions provide robust suggestions and data 
about the perceptions and desires of people in general, especially to those who 
perform such movements. The narratives and circumstances of the changing 
perceptions, desires and thoughts of Syrian refugees during migration is considered 
as a basis for sculpting a larger system that also includes Syrian refugees’ 
immigration and mobility. In this sense, the theoretical frames discussed in the above 
sections are considered as the foundation of this more comprehensive system. To 
be more precise, when considering power relations as external forces, digital habitus 
as a new interface and means, and subjectivity as decisions made and practices 
carried out by individuals, these mechanisms as a whole manifest a model of a 
system. This system is Semi-Autonomous Colonialism. The main reason why I call 
this system colonialism is that I observe that this system, in particular, has similar 
foundations and connections to the establishment and operating patterns of 
historical colonialism. I categorise these similarities within the four main features of 
the classical colonial system from its establishment to its consequences. These are 
political and legal domination over an alien society (Merry, 1991; Craven, 2012), 
economic relations and political dependence (Santos, 1970; Fieldhouse, 1999), 
exploitation relations (Spangen et all. 2015; Marchal, 2017), and cultural and ethnic 
or racial inequalities (Samson, 2003, 2013, 2020; Shin, 2011; Weiner, 2014). Within 
the scope of these four basic features, I re-formulate these fundamental attributes of 
classical colonialism into an up-to-date system. This reformulation manifests to the 
reader, in particular, how colonialism as a system, so to speak, as the contemporary 
and widely encompassing version of colonialism has the functioning and structure.  
The migration movements of Syrian refugees were triggered first by the pushing 
force, chiefly by the Syrian Civil War, but later their migration directions and extents 
were determined by the pulling forces, by the idea, perception, and desire of better 
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life standards. Thus, the parties and actors of both pushing and pulling forces, which 
I have emphasised in power relations theoretical discussion, also serve us to better 
understand the semi-autonomous character of current colonial relationships. When 
colonialism was at its strongest as a system, there was a mobility of exploitation and 
profit. This mobility was more predominantly managed, controlled, and administered 
by the powerful side of this system, by the colonisers. The mobility created by this 
exploitation and profit is still happening in similar actions today. Based on these 
research arguments, my argument is that these movements continue within the 
framework of the semi-autonomous decisions and practices of the parties. The most 
striking difference about this system is that this system achieves its ends semi-
autonomously, unlike all previous versions.  
Nevertheless, when considering invisible movements triggered by pulling forces 
instead of pushing forces that usually bring the movement’s problem onto the socio-
political agenda, individual or mass migrations, for instance, are almost exclusively 
triggered by pulling forces and tend to increase day by day. Moreover, when 
compared with forced migration, this less visible or less problematic individual/mass 
immigration, for instance, economically benefits the host countries. The formulation 
of the semi-autonomous colonial system, which is currently operative and practical, 
directly reveals the long-term migration tendencies of Syrian refugees, the patterns 
and motives of their migration directions, reasons for migrating and behaviour. In 
other words, semi-autonomous colonialism is of great importance and assistance in 
understanding the occurrence of movements such as brain drain or qualified 
immigration and the socio-political and economic background of these movements, 
as well as a new viewpoint on the invisible economic contribution of these people to 
their host countries. 
The semi-autonomous colonial system is the government of historical colonial 
powers’ identities, political, social and economic powers, the prestige that they have 
built during the colonial period to generate surplus-value through this triangular 
mechanism and function this system through the others. In my research, Syrian 
refugees and their next generations, who will be born and integrated into the host 
countries’ systems, are just examples of others. Despite their forthcoming integration 
61 
 
through culture, education and orientation, they will always be considered ‘other,’ as 
cogs which reinforce this surplus formulation. The most prominent and differentiating 
feature of this system is that it has semi-autonomous parts. The semi-autonomous 
character of this system is the responsibility of individuals and masses for their 
choices and actions based on the formation of their consent, perceptions, and 
desires.  
The forces that are another part of this system and that benefit from this system, 
generating surplus value and developing new instruments, are not the main ones 
wholly responsible for the operation of this system, but only are the parties that profits 
from this system. The other party is the side that generates the surplus value and 
keeps the system enduring and in constant growth. In other words, the consent and 
desires generated by largely digital habitus, which I see as a new tool and theoretical 
framework, and the practice of these desires and thoughts are carried out by 
individuals or masses with their own will and initiative. Considering Syrian refugees 
migrating to European countries, even though they were forcibly displaced by 
external forces, such as war and political instability, they carry out such dangerous 
and risky migrations by relying on their own decisions and capital. Here, rather than 
regarding Syrian refugees as entirely dependent victims by taking their agencies 
away, I embrace an approach that maintains, strengthens, and highlights the 
subjectivity of Syrian refugees, which connects their representation back to them. 
This is strongly associated with the semi-autonomy of the contemporary world.  
1.4) Outline of the Following Chapters 
In the next, that is, Chapter 2, I present the Methodological Framework of the 
Research. Although I engaged with particular perspectives and concepts in a 
theoretical sense prior to undertaking the research, I preferred not to approach the 
field with a theoretical presupposition, as Grounded Theory’s theoretical proposition 
suggests (Strauss and Glaser, 1967). Instead, I chose to form a theoretical 
hypothesis as a result of the comparison, categorisation and analysis of the data I 
obtained and generated during the fieldwork. In Chapter 2, I extensively discuss the 
qualitative research methods (Berg, 2008) that determine the methodological and 
epistemological limits and approach of this research. Subsequently, I examine 
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Grounded Theory as preparation for fieldwork, the challenges faced, and especially 
as a decisive systematic methodology. In this chapter, I will answer the questions of 
why semi-structured interviews, participant observation and ethnography were 
preferred as data collection methods. 
After the Methodological Framework of the Research chapter, within the scope of 
Chapter 3, I present to the readers the findings and related discussions obtained and 
generated through the methodological and epistemological approaches of Grounded 
Theory in the first fieldwork site, KTPC, in Turkey. In doing this, I first discuss the 
ethnographic and interview analyses with the Syrian Arab refugees at the 
Kahramanmaraş Temporary Protection Centre (KTPC). While discussing these 
analyses, I structurally follow the focal points of the research. Firstly, these focal 
points are the perception of participants regarding the others; then, their internet and 
media use; then, their varying forms of capital, such as economic or cultural, and 
finally, female participants’ subjectivities in the frame of gender discussions. The 
second part of Chapter 5 includes the analysis of interviews and ethnographies with 
Syrian Kurdish refugees in Diyarbakır and Mardin. Also, structurally I follow the focal 
points of the research as mentioned about Syrian Arab refugees. At the end of this 
chapter, I make a comparative analysis of the findings concerning Syrian Arab and 
Kurdish refugees in Turkey. 
In Chapter 4, the fieldwork analysis, discussions, and findings in Greece are 
presented to the readers as the second stage of the field research. Firstly, I deal with 
the ethnography and interviews conducted in the Sounio camp in Sounio town, 
where Syrian Arab refugees resided. Later in the second part of the chapter, I 
discuss the research’s focal points within the scope of the information obtained and 
generated in the Lavrio camp in the city of Lavrio [also known as Laurium], where 
the field study was conducted with Syrian Kurdish refugees. In the last part, I present 
the similarities and differences to the readers in a comparative manner regarding 
these two different fieldwork sites and sample groups, as touched upon in 3rd 
Chapter.  
As the last fieldwork research, Chapter 5 offers the interviews and ethnography 
conducted in Berlin, Germany. In this context, I present the findings and results that 
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I obtained in 5 different refugee accommodation centres in Berlin according to the 
research focal points. Hence,  I bring up the discussions in parallel with the findings 
of Syrian Arab refugees first. In the second part of the chapter, I then evaluate the 
findings with respect to Syrian Kurdish refugees. Finally, I also make a comparison 
of the two sample groups. 
Chapter 6 is the section where I discuss the theoretical concepts that are pointed 
out by the data and the conclusions reached in these three different fieldwork sites. 
I re-touch upon the digital habitus theory. Then, I formulate the theory of Semi-
Autonomous Colonialism in light of the concepts of power relations, digital habitus 
and subjectivity, as a new macro system proposal. In this chapter, I discuss first of 
all why I relate this system to colonialism. In elaborating this argument, I specifically 
provide a comparative case of the four phases that classical colonialism gradually 
followed in the establishment process and their counterparts in the semi-
autonomous colonial system. These four steps are briefly discussed as political and 
legal domination, then economic relations and political dependence, then 
exploitation relations, and finally, cultural and ethnic or racial inequalities. After these 
comparative analyses and discussions, I explain what semi-autonomous colonialism 
implies, especially in the context of Syrian refugees. 






2) CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting! 
Michel Foucault 
This chapter explains the methodological perspectives and approaches of the 
research. First, I address Grounded Theory as the approach used in the research. 
Then, I detail the relationship between theory, epistemology, and qualitative 
research. Later, I discuss the methodological techniques, semi-structured interviews 
and participant observations, which are preferred in this study, together with the 
reasons for choosing these. I also present in table form the demographic 
characteristics of the 52 interviewees who were collaborated with specifically in this 
research and explain the desired criteria. In the last two sections, I also discuss the 
difficulties faced during fieldwork and I present my motivations, experiences and 
positionality as a researcher. 
 
2.1) Grounded Theory 
Everything is data! 
Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser 
In social sciences, the methodological approaches used by researchers have the 
most fundamental and decisive importance in understanding societal and social 
phenomena of the research subjects (Oakley, 1998). The theoretical development 
and foundations of a methodological technique are the main tools that guide a 
reliable conclusion on the suitability of the research to the subject, obtaining the data 
and the feasibility and practicality of the research (Kothari, 2004). Grounded Theory 
as a systematic approach was used in this research for its qualities, such as 
involvement in data collection and analysis (Lawrence and Tar, 2013) and 
construction of analytic codes and categories from data (Thornberg and Charmaz, 
2014).  
Grounded Theory is a qualitative methodological research concept developed in the 
field of behavioural sciences by sociologists Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser in 
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the 1960s and is especially used in social anthropology. Grounded Theory has 
become one of the most dominant methods used by qualitative researchers over 
time (Thomas and James, 2006; 767-768). This research method suggests that the 
field should be considered as the main element that generates theory, rather than 
using the field to test theory (Charmaz and Mitchell, 2001; Charmaz and Belgrave, 
2007). Despite this, one of the common critical perceptions about Grounded Theory 
is that this approach is a theory without theory. However, Grounded Theory offers 
perspectives and methods about theory formation as a systematic procedure. It aims 
to approach field data with an analytical perspective and reach theoretical 
generalizations in light of the generated and gathered data. Grounded Theory is 
inherent to the field and expects researchers to use these research methods to 
explore potential theories most connected to the research subjects (Strauss and 
Glaser, 1967; Kurt, 2017; 20). 
American Sociologist Charles Wright Mills’ ‘The Sociological Imagination’ (1959) is 
an engaging theory. Mills suggests that we can engage with social phenomena for 
a better understanding if we study them from the perspective of the interactions 
between three dimensions, which are individual biographies, history, and social 
structure (Covan, 2010; 59). Grounded Theory is based on the principle of perpetual 
comparison of the data collected during the field study by considering the 
uniqueness of the field and supporting it with theoretical discussions. In order not to 
reduce and simplify the observed facts and subjects and to not interpret them with 
existing theories in the literature, it is necessary to disengage from the perspectives 
of these theories.  
In the following section, I examine the methodological techniques used in Grounded 
Theory and its feasibility in my research. 
2.1.1) The Functionality of Grounded Theory in My Fieldwork 
In the field study, the Grounded Theory method takes place in four gradual steps. 
These can be formulated as follows: First, to analyse the data by comparing them 
systematically; second, to identify and categorise the similarities and differences that 
arise among these analyses; third, to determine the boundaries of a possible 
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theoretical frame and to relate the resulting categories to these theoretical limits, and 
finally, to develop the theory that the data points to (Strauss and Corbin, 1994; 274; 
Locke, 2003; 100). As a result of the implementation of this process, a developed 
systematic approach is formed. Likewise, this developed systematic approach has 
a transparent operation through the techniques such as making constant 
comparisons and dissociating the similarities and differences in generated data with 
coding and the creation of categories. Following the steps of making constant 
comparisons, disassociating similarities and differences in data and finally deriving 
new meanings from the data, enables the possible formation of themes and theories 
along with the data generated based on fieldwork, rather than testing the previously 
determined theoretical approaches (Conrad, 1978; 102-103). In other words, the 
theory emerges from the social phenomenon itself, which is inherent to the data 
(Kurt, 2017; 25).  
So, what is the benefit of using these methods recommended by Grounded Theory 
for the researcher? The essential answer to this question is that we can say it allows 
the data obtained from the field to be analysed critically. The step that enables critical 
analysis for the research is that the researcher can put a more objective distance 
between herself/himself and the field during the constant comparison and theoretical 
sampling processes. A researcher, by applying these steps, can potentially add 
flexibility to the research subject, get rid of personal prejudices towards the subject 
and field, and enable the field data to guide herself/himself instead of approaching 
the field with a theoretical frame. In that case, how did these Grounded Theory 
methodological approaches, which I discussed theoretically and functionally, 
correspond in my fieldwork? 
I approached the fieldwork with the categorical and conceptual titles and theoretical 
limitations that I had previously identified, mainly related to colonialism and historical 
migration forms and methods concerning colonialism. However, most of these 
categories and concepts have transformed and developed during fieldwork and 
formed new ideas and categories. While I pre-determined notions and concepts in 
mind which aimed to correlate field data on colonial history and its East-West 
historical contrast, I apprehended that I should give more weight to media studies, 
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gender debates and subjectivity formations among refugees. Besides, in the 
beginning, when I started to do the field study, I considered Syrian Refugees as the 
sample group as a whole regardless of their ethnic or religious background, just one 
nation who have been forcibly displaced. However, only two weeks of field 
experience and observation demonstrated that I should re-formulate my sample 
group to contain broader refugees’ perspectives by considering the ethnic origins of 
Syrian refugees that affect their relations with world views, gender roles, politics, and 
sense of belongings in communities. The maturation process of these field 
experiences and observations suggested re-formulating the sample groups. To 
illustrate this, the intersection points that arose in the notes I took at the end of each 
interview and each day, in my daily observations, writings of the field and 
identifications of common issues that remain in my mind from the interviews, have 
directed me to an updated research theme.  
In long-term studies such as doctoral research in social sciences, a blurry field may 
occur between the researcher’s personal life and his/her identity and research 
contents. These blurry and overlapping daily life practices and experiences have had 
a function that often nourishes, supports, and helps my research personally. To 
exemplify that, regarding the field research techniques, a few of my daily life habits 
in my personal life have had a positive impact in ways of analysing and re-encoding 
research data. For example, the yoga and meditation practices I was doing before 
going to bed at the end of the day helped me to remember and interpret the data 
during the research. Particularly, the remembering meditation was very beneficial. 
Because the remembering meditation is based on chronologically re-enacting and 
recalling daily practices such as my daily actions, conversations, and interactions. 
During my field studies, I continued to practice this meditation as one of my daily 
routines, mainly for my mind and body health rather than because it can be used as 
a field research method. However, after a while, thanks to this meditation technique, 
I realised that I am often not aware of subtle and crucial details while observing or 
interviewing in the daytime. The extra notes I wrote down about the field research 
after the awareness that occurred after these meditations have helped my research. 
Although my personal daily habits and actions are not a common research method 
and technique, the methodological strategies, such as categorisation, constant 
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comparison, and deriving new meaning, recommended by Grounded Theory 
towards the field research and obtained data, was very useful.  
2.2) Theory, Epistemology, Methods and Qualitative Research  
The formation of knowledge in natural sciences is constructed through evident, 
correlated, and repetitive patterns between things, events, and objects (Schutz, 
1962; Golinski, 2008; Longino, 2020). The rules and assumptions about these 
procedures are considered comprehensively universal (Blaikie, 2007). In social 
sciences, unlike in the natural sciences, universal validity of rules and relations 
cannot be specified (Campbell, 1988). The reason for this is not that valid information 
cannot be produced in social sciences, as in natural sciences, or that the objects, 
subjects and topics it investigates act in an irregular, non-repetitive or irrational 
manner. Evidence, relationships, repetitive patterns and the process of producing 
knowledge between the things, events and objects in the social sciences are also 
considered (Blaikie, 2007; 111). Though, the ways in which the natural sciences and 
social sciences obtain knowledge differ from each other. This separation goes 
through the theory and method process.  
The research aims to gather new information that makes a good contribution to the 
body of knowledge (Stinson, 1995). Therefore, the formation of the theory takes 
place through the research process. Tavallaei and Talib (2010; 570) state the 
importance of theory thus: “In qualitative inquiry process, the role of theory in the 
field of social science and where it situates in the research framework has always 
created a challenge for the researchers”. Considering the statement of Tavallaei and 
Talib, therefore Grounded Theory was adopted in this study. I deemed the Grounded 
Theory approach as suitable, not only to evade challenges that might be faced but 
also to highlight the originality and importance of fieldwork and to create new room 
for theories that field data could potentially suggest. At the same time, since this 
study investigates social phenomena concerning Syrian refugees, such as their 
perception, desires, mobilities and conception of migration, the theory to be 
recommended by field study data has become a priority. Therefore, I give room for 
the fieldwork process and its findings to conceptualise the extent and importance of 
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theory in research.  Though, in this case, the methods used in the field study gain 
importance. 
According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1987; 22) : “it is possible to interpret 
methodology as a demarcation criterion between the scientific approaches to obtain 
knowledge and non-scientific forms of search.” Moreover, methodology specifies ‘a 
general frame and approach to studying research topic’; on the other hand, method 
refers to ‘a specific research path that is the best way to practice through’ (Silverman, 
1993; 1). Therefore, the consistency of the research scope and the information 
generated by the research are based on certain methodological themes and 
theoretical principles. This is necessary for conducted research to obtain and 
generate reliable and valid data. It is more appropriate to address an approach and 
method formed during the study and whose suitability is influenced by the study’s 
nature. As Bryman (1984; 76) stated, it is important to emphasize that the method 
chosen to carry out the research should be appropriate for the epistemological 
scope, the sensitivity of research’s nature, and the research subject. 
The considerations of research methods and techniques in the social sciences also 
are most fundamentally concerned with the definition of ontology, epistemology, and 
human nature (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; 492). Many social science scholars 
specify the importance of the methods adopted to carry out the research and state 
that the method should fit the epistemological focus, the research subject and the 
field (Bryman, 1984; 76; Bhattacherjee, 2012; Newing, 2010). Epistemology is about 
the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge. Epistemology is concerned with ways of 
learning and knowing about the world and focuses on issues such as how we can 
learn about reality (Ormston et al. 2014; 6). Goertz and Mahoney (2012; 206) discuss 
the nature of epistemology comparatively in quantitative and qualitative research 
methods and express the following: “In quantitative approaches, the challenges of 
knowledge generation are closely linked to ‘error’. The whole field of statistics is 
concerned with producing valid knowledge in a context in which error is present. By 
contrast, in the qualitative tradition, the challenges of knowledge generation are 
linked to ‘fuzziness’, understood in the sense that cases might have partial degrees 
of membership in conceptual sets.” The existence of epistemology within the scope 
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of error and fuzziness is related to the existence and importance of knowledge in 
scientific methods. For example, although the problem of error and fuzziness may 
seem like very similar concepts to each other, the difference between these two 
concepts explains the relationship between the two main research approaches with 
knowledge. While natural sciences and quantitative methods give priority to the 
repeatability and testability of information and the reproducibility of the same result, 
in social sciences, more weight is given to the epistemological consequences of 
knowledge as an ontological claim (ibid).  
In this sense, the qualitative method gains importance in direct relation to both theory 
and epistemology. So, ‘What is the qualitative method?’ Ambert, Adler and Detzner 
(1995; 881) indicated the functionality and practicality of the qualitative methods: 
“The qualitative method deals with research processes as well as with structural 
issues. In doing so, the main motivation of the study is to discover rather than 
verification of the hypothesis.” In comparison to quantitative research, qualitative 
research methods are undisputedly more attentive in clarifying their hypothesis, 
particularly in the field of refugees. Both Miller and Rasco (2004) and Bracken (2001) 
are very clear in summarizing their methodological approaches on refugee studies 
by stressing the idea that the reader of the conducted field research results is 
directed and led to more in-depth discussions in comparison to some more common 
approaches to qualitative studies. Schweitzer and Steel (2008; 9) pointed out such 
specific qualitative research methods for studies conducted with refugees such as 
narrative analysis (Bamberg, 2012), consensual qualitative research (Hill et al. 
2005), and the grounded theory (Lawrence et al. 2013). The use of qualitative 
research approaches is important to adequately interpret the refugees’ conditions 
and also might provide a deep understanding of the ‘full richness and complexity’ of 
the refugee experience (Schweitzer and Steel, 2008; 8). Moreover, as Liamputtong 
(2007) and Schweitzer (2008; 9) indicated,‘the methodologies used precisely get 
hold of the participants’ experiences and perspectives, specifically in those situations 





2.3) Preparation for Fieldwork and Reasons for Fieldwork Countries 
Approximately one year after I started my doctorate, I began to complete the 
necessary preparations to implement the fieldwork of my research. I detail this 
preparatory process below. In addition, I justify why Turkey, Greece and Germany 
are chosen as fieldwork sites. The most essential of these preparations started with 
the ethics permission from the University of Exeter ethics committee. Since my 
research includes people, especially refugees as a group in vulnerable positions, I 
went through a detailed process of justification and explication of the following crucial 
phases: What methods will be used in the research; how I will approach the 
interviewees; and how I will manage these methods and approaches by following 
the no-harm rule (Hernández et al. 2013) and gaining the consent of the participants 
(Speer and Stokoe, 2014). Later, the semi-structured face-to-face interview 
questions used in the fieldwork were prepared in English and then translated into 
Arabic and Kurdish.  
While I obtained the ethics permission from the university, I applied for the necessary 
official permission and bureaucratic papers from the Directorate General of Migration 
Management (DGMM) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidencies 
(AFAD - Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı) in Turkey. When I had permission 
to conduct my research at the Kahramanmaras Temporary Protection Center (KTCP 
- Kahramanmaraş Geçici Koruma Merkezi) in Turkey, I spent a total of three weeks 
in the camp, starting at the end of September 2018. Since it was not officially possible 
for me to stay in the KTCP, I had only been in the camp between working hours 8 
am and 5 pm. Since mainly Turkmen and Arab Syrian refugees resided in the KTCP, 
I interviewed Syrian Kurdish refugees in Diyarbakır and Mardin for about two weeks 
from mid-October. I used the snowball method for the interviews. 
The fundamental reasons for choosing Turkey as the first fieldwork site country are 
as follows: Turkey is the country hosting the highest number of Syrian refugees in 
the world, with a population of 3,671,761 Syrian refugees in total27. Turkey is one of 
Syria’s neighbouring countries. The land border between these two countries is 
 
27 https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 last access on 05.06.2021 
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about 911 kilometres. One of the main reasons why the largest number of Syrian 
refugees are in Turkey is this geographical proximity. Therefore, considering the fact 
of immigration to neighbouring countries as a general tendency in cases of forced 
displacement (Ibáñez, 2014), I decided to do the first phase of the fieldwork with 
Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition to these, I have identified Turkey as the first 
field site for the mass of Syrian refugees migrating from the east to the west since 
this study aims to show the changing perceptions and opinions of Syrian refugees 
on the move in different countries. 
I started the second phase of the fieldwork in Greece in early November 2018. It took 
me a few days to establish my own contacts and network, since none of my previous 
official applications for entry to the camps in Greece were answered. To do this, I 
specifically contacted the Kurdish Association in Athens and got permission to visit 
the Lavrion camp. As of November 5th, I started to stay in the Lavrion camp in the 
city of Lavrion. Since the refugees in this camp were Kurdish from different countries, 
I conducted part of my fieldwork about the Syrian Kurdish refugees in there. While I 
stayed in Lavrion camp, I got permission from the Sounio camp administration to 
carry out the research in the Sounio camp, which is located about half an hour away 
from Lavrion. There were many ethnically different refugees from many countries in 
the Sounio camp. I interviewed Syrian Arab refugees in this camp. I spent the whole 
of November in these two camps and used the snowball method to find the 
interviewees. 
The reason for selecting Greece as the second fieldwork country is due to its 
geopolitical location in one of the most used migration intersections throughout 
history (King and Christou, 2010; Godin and Donà, 2020). Since the beginning of the 
Syrian Civil War, Greece is one of the countries with the most critical importance in 
terms of determining politics and geography, especially among Syrian refugees 
migrating to European countries (Crawley et al. 2016). Also, though the numbers of 
migrants and refugees fleeing to Greece are still relatively high, Greece is not a 
country where refugees, including Syrians, go to settle and seek asylum. Rather, 
Greece has become a transition country used especially to reach Western European 
countries with higher living and economic standards, such as Germany, France and 
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Sweden. Therefore, Greece, where Syrian refugees were generally stuck for months 
after leaving Turkey, is preferred as the second site of fieldwork country.  
After two months of intense fieldwork, I had a break from my fieldwork for about three 
months and returned to Exeter to organise the data I obtained. During this period, I 
collected the necessary documents to apply for the permits required to enter the 
refugee protection centres in Berlin for the last phase of the fieldwork. I got my 
permission before going to Germany. I went to Berlin at the end of March 2019 and 
started fieldwork at that time. I conducted interviews in more than five different 
refugee protection centres in Berlin. As Syrian refugees did not remain in separate 
accommodation according to their ethnic background, as in Greece or as it was the 
case partly in Turkey, I went to different protection centres to conduct ethnography 
and interviews with both ethnic groups from Syria. I also used the snowball method 
for my interviews in Berlin.  
In Europe, Germany has been the country where Syrian refugees migrated the most 
and applied for asylum since the beginning of the civil war in Syria. By the end of 
2016, the total number of Syrian refugees in Germany reached 637,845. Additionally, 
in 2015 when the Syrian refugees' immigration reached its peak, there were more 
than more than 890,000 asylum applicants in Germany, mainly consisting of Syrian 
refugees28. The main reason for this is the policies implemented by Germany against 
mass refugee immigration particularly observed after 2014. Also, Germany is a 
country with a pulling effect in the migration literature due to the highest level of 
economic development in the world, and therefore high living standards and 
opportunities (Steinmann and Ulrich, 2013). Following the fieldwork carried out in 
Turkey and Greece, Germany, which is determinant in the migration destination 
preferences of Syrian refugees, was chosen as the third fieldwork country. The 
preference of these countries as field study sites is elaborated and explained in more 
detail in fieldwork analysis chapters. 
 
28https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1221/umfrage/anzahl-der-auslaender-in-deutschland-nach-
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Table 1. Demonstrates the profiles of Syrian refugees in three different countries. 
As can be seen in Table.1, I use 52 in-depth and face-to-face interviews as data in 
this study. While doing this, I paid great attention to certain demographic 
characteristics and the follow-up of these characteristics in every fieldwork country. 
These demographic features are criteria that can affect social and individual 
perceptions and thoughts such as ethnicity, gender, age, educational status, and 
marital status. First, one of the most decisive criteria in determining the sample group 
was the determination of Syrian Arab and Kurdish in order to reveal that Syrian 
refugees are a diverse community, especially as regards essential sociological 
differences such as ethnicity and culture. The main reason for me to do this was to 
reveal what role ethnicity and cultural differences have in forcibly displaced 
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communities. Therefore, I came to the conclusion that it would be suitable to 
consider the two most prominent and majority groups of Syrian society in 
comparison. For example, the separation in perception and social relations between 
the Kurdish refugees and Syrian Arab refugees came onto the agenda in diaspora 
relationships, imagined community perception, solidarity, and political imagination, 
which can be considered as an argument justifying the preference of ethnicity in the 
sample group. 
Second, the gender criterion is about seeking to understand the importance of 
gender roles in worldview, mobility, social change and actions of refugees and 
forming a comparison among these. In order to understand the transformation and 
decisiveness of the gender roles and norms, notably in individual and social 
movements such as migration and refugee-ness, it is an essential criterion to 
consider gender difference (McDowell, 1992). Third, since the sample group was 
Syrian refugees, I emphasised the age factor to understand the determinants that 
age and age-related experiences can play and find meaning by comparing these 
variables (Kaur, 2013). For example, while I observed that young refugees between 
the ages of 18-28 were more interested and knowledgeable about internet and social 
media devices, I noted that refugees between the ages of 40-50 had more limited 
relations with these devices. 
The fourth basic demographic criterion sought in the field study was the education 
status of participants. The reason for this is to explain better how education plays a 
role in the migration route and migration motivation in social movements in which 
variables can be highly diversified. To illustrate, interviewees’ educational 
background remaining in the KTCP in Turkey was relatively lower than interviewees 
in Greece and Germany. Such comparisons in specific criteria such as education 
serve to readers to fathom out that among the refugees, those with higher education 
levels are more likely to migrate further distances. The last demographic criterion 
sought in sample group was the marital status of the interviewees. This is to better 
comprehend the correlation between group migration, such as with family members, 
and individual migration in dangerous situations, which can be encountered 
especially in illegal migration. In other words, it is a criterion for a comparison 
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between the responsibility and anxiety that individuals can take in individual 
migrations and levels of responsibility and anxiety of displaced persons with family 
members. For example, Syrian refugees, who migrated to Greece and from there to 
Germany, were mostly young and single and young, which can offer an argument 
that for long-distance illegal migrations, individual migration is the predominant case. 
Although I have had more than 70 face-to-face interviews, I discuss and highlight 
only 52 of them. I explain the reason for this in section 2.7, titled fieldwork challenges. 
Considering that each interview is an in-depth interview of at least one hour and the 
average transcription of one hour interview is considered to be more than 20 pages, 
I made a transcription of approximately 1000 pages. Since I conducted the research 
alone and without any financial support, the number of people interviewed may be 
paucity. 
2.5) The Semi-Structured Interview 
An interview as a research technique is a conversation for collecting information 
(Drever, 2006). In other words, interviewing is a central method of collecting data 
mainly in qualitative studies to direct the interviewer(s) in responding to a particular 
research question (Stuckey, 2013; 56). Frequently, a research interview requires, at 
least, an interviewer who leads the conversation process and asks or guides 
questions, and at least an interviewer who answers and deals with directed 
questions. In studies conducted with qualitative research methods in social sciences, 
three principal interview methods are considered. These are structured, semi-
structured and unstructured interviews (Qu and Dumay, 2011; Mason, 1996). A well-
organized and flexible research technique for more in-depth questions and 
discussions, the interview has a better understanding of the research context and 
focus on the research subject (Darke, 1998; 275; Cavaye, 1996). This is a 
substantially explorative reciprocal conversation between the participant and the 
researcher. As Adams shows, conducted conversationally with one respondent at a 
time, the semi‐structured interview (SSI) employs a blend of closed‐ and open‐ended 
questions, often accompanied by follow‐up why or how questions (2015; 492). The 
most preferred way to conduct semi-structured interviews are face-to-face interviews 
(David Silverman, 2011). Jason Orne, Bell, and Raboin (2015) specified that the 
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face-to-face interview method is the best suitable technique for all types of 
interviews.  
In socio-political studies, the perspective and position of the researcher and how 
active the researcher participates in the research are very important factors (Rose, 
1997). Linda McDowell (1992; 409), for example, wrote that “we must recognize and 
take account of our own position, as well as that of our research participants, and 
write this into our research practice”. This is because of the scope of the political 
ideas and theoretical base of the research. Additionally, the primary purpose of the 
researchers can be easily manipulated and misled by the interviewees. (Blum-Kulka 
and Weizman, 2003;110). Jennifer Mason (1996; 36) also stressed that “it is more 
accurate and reliable to speak of ‘generating’ data than ‘collecting’ data, definitely 
because the majority of qualitative studies would deny the ‘idea that a researcher 
can be an entirely neutral ‘collector’ of information about the social world”. Therefore, 
field research is a creative and formative process in which the process itself can 
teach the researcher new perspectives and experiences to redirect the study, thus 
Mason names this generating data rather than collecting.  
One of the other inherent advantages of the semi-structured interview technique is 
that the critical points of the discussion between the researcher and the participants 
through mutual comments are broadening the interview framework with open-ended 
questions and comments. The open-ended form of questions empowers the 
participant to interpret the question with a broad sense and in parallel, the participant 
can contribute as much detailed information as they wish (Turner, 2010; 4). 
Additionally, the power dynamics between the researcher and the participant of the 
research is considered to be balanced and well-adjusted in the sense of interactional 
benefit and efficiency regarding both preventing the harm of each other and 
contributing the content of the work mutually. In this sense, the preference for 
qualitative research methods provoked me as a researcher to consider the cultural 
and gender sensitivities of interviewees. The utmost attention I have paid to these 
sensitivities has provided me with the opportunity to manage the answers to the 
questions I asked and to give more room for follow-up why or how questions thanks 
to the flexibility of the semi-structured interview method. In interviews with individuals 
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in vulnerable groups such as refugees, making them feel that their subjectivity and 
opinions are important creates ground for the participants to be empowered during 
the interviews. In this sense, I was careful not to interrupt the voices of the 
participants in all the interviews held in the camps and paid attention to highlight their 
answers and emphasize that what they said is important and valuable. One of the 
main determining factors that allowed me to practice these was undeniably the semi-
structured interview technique. 
I organized the interview questions under four different headings. The first of these 
headings is the section coded as power relations in the research, which aims to 
understand the Syrian refugees' perceptions of the world, the countries they want to 
go to, and their thoughts about other societies and communities as the other. The 
questions gathered under the second heading are the part that aims to understand 
the media and internet relations in the habitus that Syrian refugees reconstructed 
and were exposed to in camp conditions. Especially thanks to the data I obtained 
from this section, I developed the conceptualisation of Digital Habitus. The questions 
in the third part are specifically about the social, economic, and cultural capital of the 
interviewees. The questions asked in this framework were especially directed to 
investigate how refugees mobilities such as migration are affected. In this context, 
the results indicated by the data obtained have helped to determine the boundaries 
of the subjectivity discussion specifically. The final section was prepared and aimed 
to understand the subjectivity of female Syrian refugees and their relationship with 
gender roles, responsibilities and actions. The data I obtained through the questions 
in this section helped me to ground the relationship between the subjectivity debate 
and gender.  
2.6) Ethnography and Participant Observation 
Although ethnography was used in this research as one of the main methods, I find 
it accurate to state here that I used ethnography as a methodological approach 
rather than ethnography being a discipline. I chose to use ethnography in this study 
by using it in a narrow frame, in particular, practising its main technique, that of 
participatory observation. The reason for this is that ethnography as a discipline 
examines and investigates cultures, interactions, and relationships by analysing, 
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particularly comparing them. However, in this research, I adopted ethnography to 
understand certain concepts better, to make sense of and elaborate the 
development of phenomena within the framework of my own research focus. As I 
discuss in the Grounded Theory section, I attach more importance to the functional 
and practical aspects of ethnography. As Tim Ingold (2014; 383) states in his paper, 
“…to attribute ‘ethnographicness’ to encounters with those among whom we carry 
on our research, or more generally to fieldwork, is to undermine both the ontological 
commitment and the educational purpose of anthropology as a discipline, and of its 
principal way of working—namely participant observation.” Therefore, I believe that 
it is more reasonable to emphasize the engaged principle of ethnography and to give 
details about the methodological method of participatory observation. 
So, what is observation, how is it applied, and how appropriate is it in this 
research?  Marshall and Rossman (1989; 79) described observation as “the 
systematic description of events, behaviours, and artifacts in the social setting 
chosen for study”. Furthermore, Schensul and LeCompte (1999; 91) introduced the 
concept of participant observation as “the process of learning through exposure to 
or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the researcher 
setting”. Participant observations create an angle for the researcher to define 
existing situations using the five senses, ensuring a ‘written photograph’ of the 
situation under research (Kawulich, 2005; 3). Participant observation based on 
regular and systematic attendance in the field research also sets regular reports and 
analysis, which can be seen as a piece of the full puzzle at the end of fieldwork. 
Observation is an unobtrusive method with a wide perspective and instrument 
through numerous impromptu natural techniques. For instance, listening to daily life 
conversations, observing social events and structure, being part of the community 
sense, recording the social and human interactions can be listed as daily life 
techniques. 
Moreover, participant observation is about knowing more about others, being aware 
of the propensity to feel culture shock and to make mistakes, not being biased about 
social cohesion, being an attentive observer and a good listener (DeWalt and 
DeWalt, 1998). This research approach reminds researchers of the criterion by 
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which the researcher should consider her/his position and refers to the standard of 
objectivity. In this sense, participatory observation can also be defined as not losing 
objectivity while being part of the community and social reality but observing others’ 
behaviour and activities. Stocking (1983; 101) classified participant observation as 
an ethnographic research method of data collection into three stages: participation, 
observation, and interrogation. Each stage follows different parts of data collection 
and deals with various meanings that establish the different layers of the data.  
During ethnographic study, the relationships established with the sample group in 
which the research is conducted can originate by forming unpredictable new 
connections and networks with the participants during the fieldwork. I found these 
unforeseen and natural experiences such as events, activities, and situations very 
useful in my own work. To illustrate, while I was in KTCP, there was a wedding 
organised among Syrian refugees in the camp, and I was invited to the celebration. 
Since I know the traditional dances of the region, I could keep pace with them while 
they were dancing. Simply being able to participate in traditional dances opened a 
channel to be accepted by almost all the interviewees. Another instance is from 
Lavrio refugee camp: One of the refugees’ mother passed away during my visit to 
the camp, and suddenly other refugees gathered for condolence, which has certain 
rituals to follow. I was already familiar with such rituals of funerals from my cultural 
experiences, and I took place in praying and other practices in the organised 
condolence. Taking place next to refugees during such cultural practices afterwards 
created a base for many refugees to engage with me more freely and openly.   
While I noted daily life relationships and habits that can be seen and observed with 
sense organs thanks to ethnography, I was more able to investigate abstract 
phenomena such as emotion, thought, desire and perception thanks to the 
interviews. I focused especially on the daily routines of refugees in the camps, which 
later allowed me to create common categories among different fieldwork sites. These 
categories can be exemplified as observable fields such as media relationships, 
gender roles, economic status, consumption and others. To indicate more, I also 
observed the strong relations of participants with their phones and social media 
platforms; the fact that all married male interviewees attended the interviews alone 
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and, on the contrary, that all married female interviewees came to interviews with 
their children or a companion; and the division of work and roles between male and 
female refugees in the camps. At the same time, I observed common points in the 
daily conversations, such as the initial reactions of the interviewees who learned that 
I came from England, asking how I was able to go to England, questioning the 
refugee conditions and laws there. 
Also, it needs to be stressed here for clarification that the narratives, anecdotes, and 
experiences I witnessed, noted, and observed about the refugees I interviewed were 
ethnographically presented at the beginning of each chapter in a formulation that 
gives clues about the content of the discussions to be held in that chapter. The 
personal experiences of the interviewees about migration and becoming a refugee, 
the hardships they encountered, the states of being in limbo in the camps have been 
the main elements that I ethnographically engaged and presented. Due to the 
subject of the research theme, which is mainly related to the imaginations, 
perceptions, plans and experiences of the refugees, it was preferred not to include 
the campsites and conditions in which they lived in detail. Although the detailed 
description of the camp conditions and physical limitations they live in may indirectly 
give traces of how their perceptions, dreams, and desires may be shaped and 
influenced, the migration trajectories and narratives of interviewee refugees are kept 
in the foreground in this study. 
 
2.7) Challenges Faced While Conducting the Fieldwork 
The use of the interview technique may in fact be more beneficial after the first few 
interviews than the theoretical preparations for the fieldwork. I have conducted more 
than 70 face-to-face interviews in total, and I use 52 of them in this research. The 
reason for this was the problem and uneasiness refugees had about recording the 
interviews with the recording device during the interviews. Even though their consent 
was requested before the interviews, several participants changed their minds at the 
end. In addition, some of the interviewees who gave approvals before starting the 
interview, as a result of their discontent with their responses at the end of the 
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interview or their uneasiness about the questions asked, asked me to delete all the 
recordings and withdrew their consent. 
The general profiles of the interviewees are given in Table 1 in detail according to 
the fieldwork countries and their ethnic background, gender, age, and education. I 
conducted more than 25 interviews in Turkey, in KTCP, Diyarbakır and Mardin. 
However, I use 19 of them in the research. The main challenges that I faced in 
Turkey during the fieldwork can be summarized as follows: First of all, my sensitivity, 
care and self-regulation against the do-no-harm rules were overpowering and 
unbalanced, since the KTCP was my first fieldwork experience, and I was working 
with refugees for the first time. Also, I had to redesign interview questions, the 
duration of interview, the length and number of questions after the first few 
interviews. Due to the limited time allowed to enter the camp, my observations and 
ethnography were not satisfactory. In addition to these, since the societal character 
in terms of gender roles among Syrian Arab refugees were more pronounced in a 
patriarchal form, the Syrian Arab women refugees usually had someone - husband, 
cousin, brother, relative, friend etc - accompanying them in during the interviews, 
which negatively influenced the nature of the in-depth of the interviews. In addition 
to this, it can be added that the conducted interviews in Diyarbakır and Mardin did 
not take place in the camps, and the participatory observation and ethnography were 
unsatisfactory due to the distracting public environment and the arrangement of 
interview places. 
I had conducted more than 25 interviews in total in the Lavrion and Sounio camps in 
Greece, but I only use 17 of them, due to very similar reasons stated about the 
fieldwork in Turkey. Thanks to the experience I gained in Turkey, I conducted field 
studies in Greece in a more capable, concentrated, controlled and adapted manner. 
However, the network and social circle I used while obtaining the necessary 
permissions to enter the camps was quite time-consuming. The main problems I 
have experienced during my research in the Lavrion and Sounio camps are as 
follows: Since Kurdish refugees staying in the Lavrion camp are a group that is highly 
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politicised29 and trying to comply with certain organisational living standards, my 
adaptation in and acceptance by the refugee community was compelling. Since I 
was not allowed to stay in the Sounio camp and was only enter and exit during 
working hours - 10 am to 5 pm -, since visual documentation was not allowed - 
photography or video - the observation and ethnography were challenging. In many 
cases, Syrian Arab female interviewees needed to have their husbands or father’s 
permission to participate in the research and they had to be accompanied during the 
interviews in the Sounio camp. 
I had more than 20 interviews in total in Berlin, but I only use 15 of these interviews 
in my work. The main problems I had while conducting the fieldwork in Berlin were 
the difficulties that I had in finding sufficient, willing interviewees to include in the 
research due to the low capacity of the refugee protection centre. In addition, the 
feeling of insufficient ethnographic and participatory observation can be stated for 
reasons such as the limited entrance and exit hours to the protection centres in Berlin 
since I was not allowed to stay in these centres. Also, since Berlin is such a large 
city, commuting between the protection centres was challenging. In general, public 
spaces, such as cafes and restaurants were requested by the interviewees for the 
meetings and interviews. Hence, the presence of distracting external factors in the 
interviews was onerous during the meetings. 
 
2.8) My Positionality as a Researcher in the Field of Migration and Refugees  
The next chapters are fieldwork chapters in which I have elaborated and discussed 
the main arguments of this study. Therefore, before moving on to the fieldwork 
chapters, I briefly share individual life-story in this section, which may answer the 
question of, what are the experiences and motivations? from which this study has 
been personally nurtured. 
My early memories about displacement, exile or uprooted people are about the 
Kurdish peasants, who were forcibly displaced and moved to our neighbourhood in 
 
29 In the section where the interviews at the Lavrion camp are discussed, I explain the politicisation of the 
Kurdish people in more detail. 
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the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in 1998-99. The cause for the displacement of Kurdish 
peasants was the combat between the Turkish state and the Kurdish revolt in the 
early 1980s. Turkish Armed Forces forcibly displaced Kurdish rural communities in 
the 1980s and 1990s, specifically to battle the Kurdish armed forces, principally the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). According to different statistical figures, the 
internally displaced population (IDPs) reached approximately 3 million people during 
this period (see Ayata and Yükseker, 2005; Müller and Linzey, 2007). During this 
period, I first encountered IDP children in my neighbourhood, who would later 
become my classmates. The statements I can remember about my friends from this 
childhood period describing their situation are: “we lost our homes and will never be 
able to go back”. At that time, although I could not fully grasp what it meant to lose 
the home or never to be able to go back again, these words have been among my 
childhood memories that I could never forget.  
In the following years, I came across the immigration forms carried out for various 
reasons. For instance, during my bachelor’s degree years, some of my foreign 
classmates and professors, were African immigrants working as street sellers, and 
Afghani or Pakistani workers in shops. These people were not legally refugees, yet 
I observed that long-distance immigration, adaptation and integration problems, 
cultural conflicts could be experienced by different statuses, such as exchange 
students, foreign academics, illegal migrants, and worker immigrants. 
My experiences with Syrian refugees, in particular, were with Syrian Kurdish 
communities that migrated to Diyarbakır in 2013 and 2014. Hoşhîn, Berîvan, 
Gülîstan, Rizgar, Mîzgîn are several of my friends from that times that I can 
remember easily. They are all Syrian Kurds. Most of them were either studying or 
working in places provided by pro-Kurdish local municipalities in Diyarbakır. In their 
stories, the general theme was about their homes as well, which were no longer 
nearby, and it was uncertain whether they could go back ever again. My first 
emotional understanding of the concept of the home, where it was left behind, albeit 
with a different identity, was in 2014-2015, when I started studying in the United 
States of America. When I first learned the concept of homesickness, for instance, I 
immediately remembered Berîvan and Gülîstan. Then, only then, I understood that 
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their long-politicised statements expressing their uncontrollable anger with political 
arguments surely corresponded to homesickness as a feeling and emotion. I still 
remember the questions some of these friends asked me very clearly, especially 
about how they can go abroad. They were telling me that “you succeeded to go 
Europe, please help us… give us some advice… guide us...” They had stated their 
unwillingness to stay in Turkey or to back to Syria and the war; rather, they wished 
to go somewhere better to continue their education and career. Hoşhîn and Berîvan 
currently live in Germany. They told me long ago that Rizgar made it to France and 
Mîzgîn to the Netherlands. All of them went to these countries via the back of a lorry, 
illegally. In addition to all these, in early September 2015, when I started my master’s 
degree in England, I read the news about 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi, whose lifeless 
body washed ashore in Turkey. The first thing I felt was the anger it aroused in me, 
both emotionally and politically, and the curiosity I had trouble giving meaning to. So 
to speak, a description that can best express a search that was triggered by the 
death of Aylan Kurdi and guided by my anger and curiosity may be the subject of 
this doctoral research. 
During the year I spent in the United States of America and then my master's and 
doctoral studies in England, I had the chance to observe how both the governmental 
systems and societies of these most immigrated countries approach immigrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers and foreigners in general. In addition to the xenophobic 
and discriminative attitudes, discourses and actions that I personally encountered, I 
noticed that there were differences between the lives that immigrants, refugees or 
asylum seekers in these countries have in comparison with what they imagined, 
expected, or hoped for before migrating. However, on the other hand, when I 
returned from the United States or England to Turkey in 2015 and following years, 
many people I knew or met before approached me not as a subject but as an object 
that has succeeded in going to these countries. The questions that they were 
constantly asking me about these countries, notably as if they were endeavouring to 
confirm that the fact that these countries are better, brought my attention to the 
historical East-West, or Orientalism-Occidentalism equations.  Afterwards, I 
remember long conversations with my professors from my master’s degree about 
the new colonialism, exploitation, and the West as a simulation by relating to the 
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Syrian Refugee Crisis. I considered myself to be in an in-between position from 
which I could comprehend both sides in the east-west or oriental-occidental 
equation. On the one hand, I experienced and witnessed the Western life desired by 
the majority of refugees [at least in my research]. On the other, I could clearly 
understand the reasons and motivations of those people who asked me lots of 
questions about migrating or going to these countries. Therefore, I began to engage 
better with essential readings related to concepts of Orientalism, Occidentalism, 
Eurocentrism, and Colonialism. Without knowing exactly what I was searching for, I 
studied these notions concerning migration, displacement, refugees, or immigrants.  
I should point out that my personal backgrounds turned into an advantage during the 
research and made it easier to carry out. I am a Kurdish person from Turkey and can 
speak Kurdish. Therefore, in my determination of two different ethnic groups as the 
research subjects, Syrian Arab and Kurdish, my background played a functional and 
helpful role. For instance, during the fieldwork, all Syrian Kurdish refugees, who 
learned that I am Kurdish, did not hesitate to be interviewed by me. Also, being able 
to speak Kurdish eliminated the need for an interpreter in interviews. In addition to 
that, me coming from a common Muslim habitus helped me to engage with Syrian 





3) CHAPTER 3 
FIELDWORK IN TURKEY: Appearance of External Forces: Power Relations 
While discussing the fieldwork in the analysis sections, I essentially evaluate it within 
two different sets. These sets distinguish between Syrian Arab refugees and Syrian 
Kurdish refugees. The reason I prefer such a path as a scheme, is that it will help 
the reader to follow the Syrian refugees’ experiences through two different ethnic 
groups from the same nation more clearly and explicitly, and to draw a framework to 
follow the structure of the chapter more easily. 
This chapter primarily begins with the arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey and the 
socio-politics related to this, mainly to remind the reader of the substrates concerning 
refugees in Turkey. After discussing the socio-political background, it continues with 
the section where I formulate Syrian refugees’ perceptions about the others and 
about their futures. In this section, I analyse the views of Syrian refugees on Turkey 
and Turkish societies by linking them with power relations and their actors. In the 
following, I explain what the digital habitus conceptualisation corresponds to in the 
field study in the context of Internet and media relations of Syrian Arab refugees 
staying in the camp. Later, it continues with why Syrian Arab refugees stayed in the 
Kahramanmaraş Temporary Protection Centre (hereafter KTPC), which sets a 
foundation for understanding the importance of socio-economic capital and gender 
norms regarding subjectivity limits. Finally, I evaluate the experiences, changes, and 
transformations of Syrian female Arab refugees in KTPC, especially within the 
subjectivity frame. 
3.1) Arrival of Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Turkey’s Policy Towards 
Refugees 
Research data at end of 2020 shows that globally more than 80 million people were 
forced to leave their homes, 1% of the global population (UNCHR, 2020). These 
people were forced to leave their homes and continue to live elsewhere, mostly by 
factors depending on environmental issues related to climate change, socio-political 
conflicts, persecutions, and severe human rights violations (Sirkeci et al. 2017; 129). 
It seems apparent that in Turkey as in many other countries, national and 
international migration both legally and illegally has become more observable and 
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evident, politically notable, and much more controversial than ever before (ibid; 214). 
The Syrian Civil War has appeared due to the influences of other 
revolutions/conflicts in Arab countries, called by many scholars the Arab Spring 
(Bhardwaj, 2012: 5), and has had a horrific human cost. In November 2011, as a 
result of the civil war reaching the Turkish border in the northern areas of Syria, 
about 7,000 Syrian refugees crossed the Turkish border. In November 2014, Turkey 
was providing a secure place as a host country to more than 1.5 million refugees 
(Akgunduz et al. 2018). By December 2018, the official number of Syrians in Turkey 
reached more than 3.6 million. However, including unregistered migrants, the 
estimated number of Syrians in Turkey is more than 4 million (Republic of Turkey 
Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management -DGMM)30. 
The consequences of Turkey’s open-door policy and Turkey as a host neighbouring 
country for more than 4 million ‘temporary protected Syrian refugees’ as of the year-
2018 (DGMM, 2019), were presumably unpredictable. Turkey implemented an ‘open 
door’ policy for Syrian refugees during the period from 2011, when the devastating 
civil war broke out in Syria, to 2016 (Koca, 2015; Bayir and Aksu, 2020). This policy 
describes the laws and policies regarding the reception and accommodation of 
refugees across the country. From the moment of the outbreak of the Syrian refugee 
crisis at the beginning of 2011, Turkey has followed their open-door policy towards 
the unexpected humanitarian crisis of Syrians and has allowed every Syrian citizen 
who wants to pass the border to enter the country. Even thoughvarious research 
stated that the established refugee camps in several provinces in Turkey near the 
Syrian border and the praise received by these camps in national and international 
media played an encouraging role for more Syrians to flee to Turkey (Yıldız and 
Uzgören, 2016; Memisoglu and Ilgit, 2017); the fact that as the neighbouring 
countries with the longest shared borderline, Syrians fled from a devastating war en 
masse to Turkey due to the convenience of the geography rather than the quality of 
the camps. As a result of the policies implemented by Turkey and continued political 
instability in Syria, which acted as a pushing force, there was a regular increase in 
the number of Syrians entering the country starting in 2011. As of 2021, temporary 
 
30https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 last access on 31.05.2021 
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protected Syrian refugees are present in all of the 81 provinces of Turkey31 with the 
3,670,717 Syrians.  
The legal status of the Syrian refugees in Turkey constitutes one of the most 
discussed and controversial dimensions of the issue. There have been controversial 
and confusing discussions due the legal and social definitions of refugee, asylum 
seeker and ‘temporary protected refugee’ [Geçici Koruma in Turkish] in terms of 
specific identity created for Syrians. A refugee has been identified by UNCHR as: 
“A refugee who is owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Refugee Convention, 
1951: Article 1(A)(2). 
The fundamental basis of the refugee legislation relating to the status of refugees in 
the Turkish constitution was formed by the 1951 Geneva Convention. Turkey was 
party to this agreement by the criterion of ‘geographical restriction’, which states:  
“Turkey maintains the provisions of the declaration, made in Geneva on 28 July 
1951, according to which it applies the Convention only to persons who have 
become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe” (Refugee Convention, 
1951: Article 1(B)).  
Therefore, while Syrians were not eligible for refugee status, Turkey has passed new 
legislation and circulars in favour of Syrians and applied ‘special regulations’ (Kap, 
2014; 32) and defined the ‘temporary protected refugee’ in favour of Syrian refugees, 
which is framed as:  
“Temporary protection is a sui generis status for asylum seekers who are not eligible 
for Convention refugee status but are nonetheless compelled to leave their country 
 
31https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 last access on 31.05.2021 
90 
 
to which they cannot return and are seeking ‘urgent and temporary’ asylum in Turkey 
in the context of a mass population movement” (Dalkıran, 2016; 3).32  
In other words, temporary protection is the protection status established by the 
‘Temporary Protection Regulation’ dated 22 October 2014. According to this 
regulation, the status is applied to foreigners who: – were forced to leave their 
country; – cannot return to the country they left; – arrived at or crossed Turkish 
borders en masse or individually; – will not have their international protection needs 
adjudicated under an individual procedure (Turkey, Refugee Rights, 2017). Also, 
according to the policies of Turkey regarding refugees, those who flee to Turkey from 
outside of the European countries, can only be recognized as a ‘temporary protected 
refugee’ in Turkey. These people are conditional refugees who shall be allowed to 
reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country (Dalkıran, 2016; 
3). Therefore, those Syrians who migrated to Turkey, are not refugees but temporary 
protected refugees (Gokalp Aras et al. 2015, 2018). Those Syrian refugees who fall 
under the law of temporary protection, have temporary rights of asylum and 
permission for a reasonable length of stay in Turkey33, until they are accepted as 
refugees by a third country (Gokalp Aras et al. 2018). In other words, temporary 
protection is the protection status recognised for those Syrian nationals as well as 
refugees and stateless persons from Syria who arrived in Turkey individually or en 
masse.34 
Turkey’s response and efforts regarding the Syrian refugees since the war broke out 
in Syria have been intense and relatively successful. With the lead of the Disaster 
and Emergency Management Presidency (hereafter AFAD - Afet ve Acil Durum 
Yönetimi Başkanlığı), international institutions, NGOs, and governments have 
participated in the solution process of the Syrian crisis in Turkey both financially and 





ss%20population%20movement last access on 31.05.2021 
33 However, in the re-regulated policies related to the status of temporary protected refugees, still do not 
specify the exact duration of for a reasonable length of stay in Turkey, which is very vague and differs 
according to individual cases. 
34 https://www.mhd.org.tr/images/yayinlar/MHM-2.pdf last access on 05.06.2021 
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centres in 10 different provinces coordinated and controlled by AFAD. These 
protection centres were home to over 233,000 Syrians. There were 10 tent and 12 
container camps in the following provinces: Adana, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay, 
Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, Osmaniye, and Şanlıurfa. A total of 31,860 
tents and reinforced concrete partitions, and 30,898 containers were available for 
the use of Syrian refugees who fled their country and came to Turkey (AFAD, 2017; 
Inan and Korgavus, 2017). However, based on the recent data and research results, 
Turkey’s recent politics of sending Syrians back to reclaimed areas has had efficient 
outcomes. At the end of 2018, more than 220,000 Syrians were sent to and located 
in safe areas in Syria in which Turkey and some coalition forces, such as France, 
America and Germany, ensure protection and security. In relation to the numbers of 
returned Syrians, the number of Syrians living in camps has reduced accordingly. 
According to the recent numbers shared by Directorate General of Migration 
Management in 2019, 143,049 Syrian refugees stay in 13 temporary protection 
centres located in 8 cities, and 9 protection centres were shut. Those who returned 
to Syria were mostly refugees who lived in the camps which were shut down last 
year. Even if none of the data specifies the ethnic background of Syrians who stay 
in refugee camps, the fieldwork interviews and ethnography in KTPC have revealed 
that majority of inhabitants in camps are Syrian Arabs and Turkmens. The main 
reason for this, which will be detailed further in the section on Kurdish refugees in 
Turkey, is that since the Kurdish question has been raised in Turkey, Kurds in other 
regions such as Syria, Iraq and Iran prefer not to have any official relations with 
Turkish government. 
It is very challenging to make robust predictions of possible developments regarding 
Syrian refugees in the near future, particularly when considering the facts that the 
ambiguity of the Syrian Civil War and the Syrian refugees who already settled in 
Turkey. In the next section, Syrian refugees’ opinions about Turkey and Turkish 





3.2) The Embodiment of Being in Limbo: Syrian Arab Refugees in Turkey 
3.2.1) Syrian Arab Refugees Opinions about Turkey: There are good and 
bad people, like everywhere! 
Official definitions, figures, institutional organizations such as UNCHR, temporary 
protection, refugee convention, the Turkish state, NGOs and other relevant 
determinants actors and entities are external factors that affect and determine the 
presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey. These structures and their relationships, 
which are discussed in section 1.3.1 on Power relations, and whose limits are drawn 
as formative power, can be considered as the actors and factors that determine the 
lives and future of the Syrian refugees. Notably, in the period when the civil war has 
been experienced intensely, so to speak, when saving their life was the most 
important issue, the open-border policy of Turkey as a neighbouring country for 
Syrian refugees was seen as a saviour.  This was expressed by Syrian refugees in 
the interviews. Additionally, historical similarities and common memories of Syria 
and Turkey regarding religion, common cultural and traditional features, language 
resemblance between Arabic and Turkish, and particularly between Arabs and 
Turks, have created a strong bond (Benek; 2016). 
In this sense, in the first years of their arrival in Turkey, the fact of saving their lives 
from the war, alongside the services and aid provided by Turkey and other 
international entities, have considerably influenced Syrian refugees’ perception and 
perspectives about Turkey. However, in the following years, Syrian refugees’ 
perceptions and thoughts began to change, as they considered their future in 
European countries better, due to the dramatic increase in the Syrians refugee 
population, alongside the condescending, xenophobic, and discriminatory 
approaches and discourses of Turkish society towards the Syrians (Yitmen and 
Verkuyten, 2018; Kavaklı, 2018). The quotes35 from my interviews show that Syrian 
refugees’ opinions about Turkey and Turkish society were very emphatic and 
affirmative at the beginning of their resettlement. Despite this, over time, the 
 
35 I consciously prefer to use quotations from more than one interviewee at the same time in sections where 
fieldwork analysis is presented. The reason for this is to be able to convey the words and thoughts of all the 




uncertainty of their future and the difficulties they faced, such as challenges in 
integration and in obtaining an official status, caused their opinions to begin to 
change. The following three different interviewees’ answers to the following question 
help us understand the issue from the ground in relation to the power relations and 
actors that influence their lives: “If you express your opinions about Turkey before 
coming and after being here [Turkey], what would you like to say?  
“I knew things about Turkey, like religion, Ataturk, cuisine culture, TV series, many other 
things. Of course, after coming here, we learned that there are many common things, like 
culture, language [specifies several common words in between Turkish and Arabic]. We 
have been here for more than 5 years, we could not establish a proper life, we want to go 
somewhere else, try in there. But Turkish people are nice, there are good and bad ones, like 
everywhere [smiles].” [Interview 1, 38 years old, mother of 3, KTPC, 01.10.2018] 
“There was always a relation between Turkey and Syria. When Turkey accepted millions of 
Syrians, I understood that there is a religion brotherhood in between our countries... Turkey 
is good, we appreciate for everything, but we want to go to Germany now. There is no job, 
we are still in the camps, you know, we have to start a life again, here in the camps we 
cannot. We see our relatives in Germany, they have better life in there and at least they 
have better documents. Here we do know what kind of status we have [smiles].” [Interview 
4, 34 years old, mother of 4, KTPC, 02.10. 2018] 
“Of course, I knew things about Turkish culture and religion, we are neighbours [smiles]. I 
learned more about it after coming here. Turkey is more advanced and less religious; I 
sometimes criticize that to be honest. Why do Turkish people not experience and practice 
the religion as we do? I do not want to say something bad, there are good and bad people.” 
[Interview 5, 42 years old, former teacher, KTPC, 05.10. 2018] 
One of the common issues, particularly I observed and felt during the interviews was 
that when interviewees made a judgment in a negative or critical sense about 
Turkey, there was an obvious timidity as if they were refraining from something36. As 
soon as they stated any criticism about Turkey, interviewees often followed a similar 
structure that in a manner the criticism can put out of the sight by asserting this 
sentence: ‘There are good and bad people, like everywhere!’ The interviewees’ 
general opinions and perceptions about Turkey were related to social and cultural 
knowledge, such as both countries’ similar history, cuisine, religion, politics, 
alongside the media channels as TV series and programs. Besides these, those 
 
36 This timidity was expressed by interviewees more clearly in the interviews held in Greece and Germany, 
which will be detailed in Greece and Germany fieldwork chapters. 
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interviewees expressed that they wish to leave Turkey, which almost all of them 
stated in their answers to different questions, citing as reasons legal and future 
uncertainties, the difficulty or failure of establishing a long-term life in Turkey, and 
the attractiveness of better life conditions somewhere else, mainly where their 
relatives have gone.  
The gender differences of the interviewees had a feature that could also identify 
common themes and emphasis in their responses. Woman Arab interviewees 
[interviews 1, 2, 3, 4 and 19] specifically expressed their opinions about Turkey 
through the TV series, kitchen and food programs, social representation of women 
[ex. scarf] as common themes. On the other hand, male interviewees [interviews 5 
to 8 and 18] generally preferred to indicate their opinions through themes such as 
politics, common history, religious brotherhood, well-known politicians such as 
Atatürk or Erdoğan. In fact, this is one of the main arguments emphasized in studies 
on gender roles and determination in the Middle East (Tucker, 1998). As Rabo 
(1996; 155) stated in her work, state authority develops with the formation of gender 
roles while structuring the private and public sphere and gender roles and 
performances, especially in Syria, are determined in these two areas.  
The points that I would like to highlight in this section are how these interviewees 
define the structures, authorities, countries or societies that are effective in their 
lives. It is related to their knowledge of Turkey and especially how the content of 
information is formed, shaped, affected by gender, and how these structures and 
actors, as power relations, are manifested in their lives. For example, if these 
interviewees were interviewed once more after a few years, what the interviewees 
would say and how they would take positions would obviously change. This is 
because the effects of individual experiences, the policies they are exposed to, and 
the societies’ impact on individuals’ perceptions are externally determinative. 
However, the fact that what these interviewees knew about Turkey before fleeing to 
Turkey was more influenced by media, history, and similar culture, confirms the 





3.2.2) Turkey as an Intermediate Western Country for Syrians 
While examining increasing migration movements in their study in 2009, Benson and 
O'Reilly name these movements, particularly as lifestyle migration. This form of 
migration records an emerging field of research in migration, mainly framing people 
with relatively better economic capital that empower them for part-time or full-time, 
permanent, or temporary migration to other countries (2009; 621; 2014). This 
migration phenomenon differs from other migration research subjects as more 
studied and investigated forms of migration, such as labour or refugee migrations. 
In recent decades, these research topics have amplified into a research field of 
inquiry that generated its corpus of literature (Benson and O’Reilly, 2014; 1). 
Those Syrian refugees who did not want to stay in Turkey or would migrate to 
European countries if they had opportunities, were not only motivated by of 
inadequate living conditions of Turkey. They also stated that they wished to migrate 
because of the desire and possibility of a better life which they might live elsewhere. 
In other words, the pushing or pulling migration forces were not about the conditions 
that they could have in Turkey. The interview notes I mentioned below explain this 
better. 
 “Turkey is kind of European countries, I mean the law system, bureaucracy, working 
conditions, economy. My relatives and friends in Europe tell me the similarities and 
differences in between Turkey and European countries. I believe there are not so many 
differences. The main difference for me is how I feel here, which I am not happy. What I see 
about my relatives, friends in Europe shows me more freedom. Here, the culture, religion 
and the community do not allow to have this freedom. That’s why I want to leave.” [Interview 
4, 33 years old, mother of 6, KTPC, 29.10.2018] 
“To be honest I wanted to go to European countries many times but then I realized being in 
Turkey is also good, pretty close to my home country, if we can return one day it would be 
easy. Most importantly there are many similarities between Turkey and Syria. Turkey is like 
an intermediate country for me, kind of European and kind of Syrian. Also, I do not want to 
change my life radically, like from oppression, war, restriction in Syria and then full of 
freedom in Europe. I want to stay in Turkey because it is in between. [Interview 8, 20 years 
old, the only single interviewee, KTPC, 09.10.2018] 
The point to be considered in the words of these interviewees is that the main factors 
that triggered them to want to leave from Turkey may be assessed as an abstract 
concept in the form of a better life and the desire to live more freely. Several 
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interviewees expressed it as freedom [interviews 4, 6 and 8] and several of them as 
having a life in contrast of Syria [interviews 5,7 and 18]. A ‘better way of living’ as a 
concept and expectation (see Benson and Osbaldiston, 2014), which we will 
encounter in the following sections as well, is one of the main points that should be 
considered in detail. We should investigate in-depth the perceptions and thoughts of 
those Syrian Arab refugees who consider the conditions in Turkey are equivalent to 
conditions in Europe, although they have not been in any European country. To 
explain better, it can be argued that the diversifying and new life aspects experienced 
in relation to living standards and conditions, legal system, infrastructure, 
governmentality, and secularity that refugees experience in Turkey, indirectly 
encourage them to imagine and wish to migrate somewhere else, where they think 
that they have/find a better life (see Benson and O’Reilly, 2016a and 2016b). Turkey 
is defined by the interviewees as an intermediate version of a European country. As 
such, it offers a taster of conditions further west and so indirectly strengthens the 
refugees’ perceptions concerning the possibility of a better life elsewhere. In order 
to better understand this argument, I asked the interviewees ‘What can you say 
about Turkey if you compare with your home country?’ The answers to the question 
in fact provide many details about the perceptions of Syrian Arab refugees who fled 
to Turkey and wished to go to Europe from Turkey, which we can understand in 
terms of a three-step migration. 
“The religion, culture, family relations are almost the same. But there are obvious differences 
like development of living standards, modernization, daily life means/instruments that people 
can reach, education and other things different in Turkey than Syria. I mean here is like in 
Europe. [Father of 3 children, 42 years old, KTPC, 4.10.2018] 
 “Turkey is also a Muslim country; this is the same. History of these countries is the same 
too, like Ottoman times. But Turkey after Ottoman followed a different way, like European 
countries. Also, there are many things different, like language, human rights. Level of living 
standards and things that people can buy. Also, women in Turkey are different than Syrians, 
they are more like Western women. [40 years old, farmer KTPC, 5.10.2018] 
On the issues that refugees thought differentiate Syria from Turkey, they frequently 
expressed ‘westernised, European, modern, advanced’ notions for Turkey, which 
says a lot about how they perceive and experience Turkey. Likewise, their answers 
to the questions I asked about the differences between Syria and European 
countries similarly expressed common features such as ‘better economy, more 
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modern, less traditional, better human rights, more advanced’. The information that 
this three-step comparison between Syria, Turkey and European countries [as a 
general concept of West] provides the reader with is that even though the Syrian 
Arab refugees think there are common and similar features between Turkey and the 
European countries, their desires to go to the West/Europe were always more 
dominant and prominent. I explicate and evaluate this desire and the will to go as 
follows: ‘They came from Syria to Turkey, and they have accessed or witnessed 
certain living standards. However, staying in Turkey in the long term, especially for 
those staying in the refugee camps, does not assure enough sense of security to 
establish a new future’. The reason they can imagine and think about this assurance 
in European countries is derives from what they have been told by their 
acquaintances, especially those who have gone to European countries, as well as 
their family ties, which reflect that these European countries have more stable 
political, economic, military, and social lives.  
One of the questions I asked in order to dig into this situation better was “How do 
you make yourself sure that you will have a better life when you go to European 
countries?” Their answers to the question were as follows:  
“Because there is no war and death. When did you hear people were killing each other in 
Europe, you tell me? I check the news and the internet every day, and I do not see any 
conflict instead positive developments like better technology, economy and welfare!” 
[Interview 6, 40 years old, father of 3, KTPC, 05.10.2018] 
“I check how Syrians’ life in different countries and European countries seem the best one 
for Syrian people. Also, there is clearly a level and quality of life attained in there, especially 
away from wars and deaths.” [Interview 8, 20 years old, bachelor’s in economics, KTPC, 
9.10.2018] 
The answers and reasons given by the participants contain very reasonable 
justifications for a better life model. I do not dispute their opinions. Instead, I follow 
the migration route and journey of Syrian refugees in three countries, asking almost 
the same updated questions. I bring the answers participants provided, and the data 
generated through ethnography in three different countries together at the end of the 
research, which shows the differing and changing opinions. However, when 
assessing the field data within the scope of Turkey, Syrian Arab refugees consider 
Turkey as a good place of refuge, at least during the period of the field research.  
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When considering the Syrian refugee population, Turkey is the country where the 
Syrians migrated the most and still reside. While stating this, we should keep in mind 
the legally restricting sanctions on any potential further migration and mobilities of 
Syrians, obstacles on their free travels – even within the country -, the convenience 
of Turkey as the neighbouring country which stimulated more migration, and besides 
all these, that the proportion of the population that is economically capable of 
migrating corresponds to a small proportion of the total population. While this chapter 
shows that Turkey's intervention in Syria and its humanitarian approaches towards 
Syrian refugees were well-received, on the other hand, it raises the question: Why 
does the West [Europe] as historically ruling, dominating and pioneering power on 
human rights, which has written the laws and regulations accordingly and imposed 
these laws on the rest of the world as the universal law (Samson, 2020), remain 
inadequate on the Syrian refugee crisis to take enough responsibility? 
In the next section, I discuss the field and interview notes of the participants, who 
stated that they especially want to go to Europe, on the daily life practices concerning 
the media and internet usage. I investigate the data and observations conducted 
about new internet platforms such as social media and how the concept of better 
respecting European countries is shaped and strengthened within the participants’ 
internet usages. I also mention how the idea and theory of digital habitus evolved in 
this section. 
3.2.3) The Use of Media and the Internet among Syrian Arab Refugees in 
KTPC 
One of the main pillars and arguments of this research is to understand the 
formation, development and change of perception/conception and thoughts of Syrian 
refugees about the others, and relatedly, especially I formulate that through Syrian 
refugees’ migration, mobility, and future imaginations. 
According to various sources, as of January 2021, 4.66 billion people were using the 
internet, which increased by 316 million (7.3%) new users from last year during the 
same period (Sica et al. 2021; 1)37. Smartphones, or other portable devices such as 
 
37 https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/ last access on 31.05.2021 
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tablets or smartwatches, have become the most significant way of accessing the 
internet globally, since mobile internet users account for 91 per cent of total internet 
users38. The participants and the refugees in KTPC, in general, are just a very small 
sample of the global group represented by these numbers.  
I argue that refugees staying in the camps perceive and engage with the information, 
images, dreams, and manipulations conveyed by the internet tools more deeply and 
intensely. This is because of the conditions of the camps that I have defined before 
as being in limbo, and due to the situations cause refugees to consider and prioritize 
the reconstruction of their future. Additionally, while doing all these, they live in a 
spatially restricted environment and sociality (see Öktem, 2020; Maitland and Xu, 
2015). As I have emphasized in my previous discussions on the concept of habitus, 
it is surrounded and developed by time, upbringing, dispositions, and education 
(Bourdieu, 1982; Reay, 2004). The impact of the limited physical environment of 
refugee camps on refugees' lives and perceptions, a significant amount of time spent 
on the Internet, and newly built dispositions all together naturally builds a new 
habitus for refugees in the camp setting places. Among such new habitus, the most 
obvious and the most effective one as far as I could observe is the digital habitus. 
In the interviews held at KTPC, the average duration of internet and phone usage of 
the interviewees corresponded to a period varying between 4 and 6 hours39. 
Everyone I spoke to in KTPC stated that they have smartphones with which they can 
connect to the internet. Some interviewees also stated that they own tablets or 
laptops. Each interviewee stated that they use at least two different social media 
platforms. The most preferred platforms were specified as Facebook, Instagram and 
TikTok. Apart from these, all interviewees emphasized that they use messaging 
applications such as WhatsApp and Messenger. They added that these platforms 




ulation last access on 31.05.2021 
39 According to statistics, people spend an average of 3 hours and 15 minutes on their phones in 2020 with a 
rapid increase of 30% from just two years prior. In 2018, it was less than 3 hours. However, it should be noted 
that this research was conducted at the end of 2018, the data I have expressed should be evaluated within that 
period. Because in 2018, the duration of internet and phone usage in the global sense has changed significantly 
compared to 2020-2021, which can be considered valid for refugees as well. 
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platforms comprised most of the time they spent on the Internet. It was stated that 
there was no problem with Internet access and that the KTPC central administration 
provided free Wi-Fi access to refugees staying in the camp. So, in other words, there 
was uninterrupted internet access, as in many places of the contemporary world. 
In one of my talks with officials, the vice-manager of the KTPC my question regarding 
what kind of services the camp provides to the refugees, using the following 
statements which reveals his opinion on refugees’ relations with the internet: 
“As you can see, this is a living space, we provide the most basic needs, such as security, 
water, food, electricity, sewage, shelter, and health services... Ah, and also, we provide free 
internet access, this is one of the most vital services [smiles]. Let me tell you why it is vital: 
Sometimes, when there is a problem with the electricity transformer, some section [a 
neighbourhood in KTPC] may remain without electricity or there may be a water problem. 
But one of the issues we are most sensitive to is not interrupting internet access. Internet is 
something like breathing for refugees in camps! They can stay without water or electricity, 
but never without the internet, they will destroy this place [smiles]... Also, we usually get in 
contact with refugees through the internet too, like doing an announcement on Facebook, 
you know what I mean.” [Field note, KTPC, 06.10.2018] 
These words of the KTPC officer confirm how the internet as a facility is of vital 
importance in refugees’ life, which has been clearly confirmed by almost every single 
participant in the camps. One of the most fundamental observations was that age 
ranges and gender were factors affecting refugees’ use and relationships with the 
phone and the internet. As of 2019, half of the online users worldwide were aged 
between 18 and 34 years (Clement, 2020).  As the Internet of Things (IoT) has 
diversified, – the smartphone is one of the most common ones – access is easier, 
the rate of internet usage increases, and the average age of the internet users 
decreases. One particularly obvious observation was that families used phone apps 
and internet content, such as video, to keep their children entertained, busy, and 
playing. Here is the note of my conversation with one of the three mothers of three 
children about this situation: 
“When I was a child, we were always wondering about each other’s house while playing 
games with our friends on the street in our neighbourhood, like wondering what kind of 
house, furniture and things the friends’ families have. We used to visit each other and play 
games at home... In the camp, this has disappeared now, our children's games are now 
independent of homes, furniture, and curiosity. Their only request is to play and spend time 
on the phones, on the internet. We are also guilty, actually, how many times I told my 
husband that when children cry, do not give the phone to their hands to silence them. Now 
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when they cry if we do not give the phone or show the video they want, they cry more and 
more... No more outside playing games, they are playing games on the phone in their heads. 
I do not know if this is good or bad, God help us! [Interview 1, KTPC, 01.10.2018] 
When we think of the concept of digital habitus, it would be more realistic to think of 
it as a habitus that started to build and surround us more and more every day while 
interacting with the media rather than as something already completed. The anxiety 
this participant as a mother feels about her children, the new socialities she strives 
to make sense of, and the habitus built by these socialities are now in the life of 
children who grow up with the phone and the Internet, although it may seem 
unfamiliar to this mother. Moreover, this is digital habitus as an inherent feature in 
the life of particularly Generation Z, children of today who have almost no memories 
of not having the internet; however, digital habitus as an actuality is being shaped 
and grown in the life of this mother. 
It should be noted here that the degree of appearance of digital habitus and the 
development of its determinants are not the same for everyone, for every age and 
gender groups. The childhood years and sociability that this mother describes from 
her own life and the habitus of children growing up in an area such as a camp – 
where all houses are the same, and restrictive external factors are apparent – are of 
course not the same. The main points emphasised by this chapter and the 
interviewees are the essence of Internet relations in our lives as an almost inevitable 
advanced tool. Digital habitus corresponds as a developing field, particularly as an 
inherent and embedded field and reality in the lives of generations known as the 
millennials or Generation Z (see Desai and Lele, 2017). To formulate this argument 
better, the new developments that we call changes and progress among today's 
generations are one of the most fundamental keystones that build future generations’ 
lives. Digital habitus, which we observe to be still developing and growing today, will 
be an indispensable and core foundation of people in the near future, when just 
modestly considering todays’ elements and instruments. Therefore, I 
uncomplicatedly observed how the relations of refugees with the internet and how 
these relations affect their perceptions, especially in limited areas such as refugee 
camps and when time is abundant. These observable effects on refugees' 
perceptions were the main trigger that I later transformed into a theoretical concept 
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as digital habitus, which is one of the most defining and distinct characteristics of our 
modern and technological era. 
In the next section, the socio-economic and educational demography of the refugees 
staying in KTPC will be specified and I will discuss why such forms of capital play 
essential roles in this study as a foundation to the concept of subjectivity. 
3.2.4) The Decisiveness of Capital Forms in Refugees’ Life in Camps 
The capacity to act and take steps in accordance with the choices and thoughts that 
I have emphasised within the framework of the subjectivity discussions in 1.3.3 
sections is directly related to the different forms of capital of individuals. In this 
section, I draw the attention of the reader to the refugees staying in the KTPC, why 
they stay in the camps, and the refugee groups' demographic characteristics staying 
in the camps. Demonstrating how refugees’ economic, social and cultural capital 
affects the realities of their lives assists readers to understand the significance of the 
relationships between enabled or empowered subjectivity and capital. In addition, 
the ability and capacity of individuals to act and practice within the boundaries of 
their capital forms and thoughts nourish us in explaining the determinant factors of 
the refugees' subjectivity, as emphasised in the discussions of subjectivity. 
I conducted face-to-face interviews with 10 Syrian Arab refugees at the KTPC and 
almost all interviewees described themselves as economically poor and as having 
lost their assets. All the interviewees stated that they came from regions with smaller 
populations, that they had a self-sufficient life in rural areas, but they had to leave 
everything they had because of the destructive effect of the war. Correspondingly, 
they clearly demonstrated that they did not have enough ‘money’ as the main reason 
for their stay in the camp. They also stated that if they ever have enough income or 
money to be economically self-sufficient, they will leave the KTPC and rent an 
apartment in the city and they want to be more involved in social life. 
Demographically, the average age of my interviewees in the KTPC was 36, they 
were all married and had children, except one 20-year-old young man. Education 
status was primary school or secondary school, except one who had a bachelor’s 
degree. All my female interviewees were housewives, and all the male interviewees 
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were working part-time or unemployed. So those who stayed in the camp were 
mostly families. The words of the interviewees I cite below show the direct 
relationship between economic capital and camps, mobility and living standards.  
“…Why would someone who has money, who can rent a house, buy two pieces of bread 
and eat in that house, stay in a place like a camp? We are one of those who do not have 
money... Now I am working, saving money, hopefully, we'll get out of here as soon as 
possible. Then we will work harder, save more money and, God willing, we will go to 
Sweden, where my wife's uncles live…” [Interview 5, 42 years old, former teacher, 
04.10.2018] 
“… There are not many young people here, they can find a job somehow, they can stay at 
home together in a crowded way. But there are not many options for poor families like us 
outside the camps... I said that if I had the opportunity, I would go to Germany with my 
relatives, it is not something that will happen if I do not work and save money and create it 
myself, this is the truth of life…” [Interview 7, Father of 2, 42 years old, plumber, 09.10.2018] 
The situation that the interviewees emphasise as a factor that determines the living 
standards and prevents their mobility is economic capital. As Van Hear (2014; 100) 
points out regarding this: “The capacity to mobilise those – economic or network-
based – resources is largely determined by socioeconomic background or class, 
which, drawing on Bourdieu, can be conceived in terms of the disposal of different 
amounts and forms of capital – economic, social, cultural, symbolic...” To remember 
Bourdieu’s understanding of different forms of capital: 
“Firstly, economic capital, in various kinds; secondly, cultural capital or better, 
informational capital, again in various kinds; and thirdly two forms of capital that are 
very strongly correlated, social capital, which consists of resources based on 
connections and group membership, and symbolic capital, which is the form the 
different types of capital take once they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” 
(Bourdieu, 1987:4). 
The forms of capital that Bourdieu formulated through relational sociology (Bourdieu, 
2020; Dépelteau, 2018) are understood more clearly when the Syrian refugees 
remaining in the KTPC are examined as follows: Participants’ economic capital was 
poor, cultural capital was not very developed depending on their educational, 
occupational, and economic conditions. Their limit of their social capital was defined 
by the traditional life in more rural areas within the scope of the determination of 
economic and cultural capital. Although the refugees staying in KTPC were aware 
of the international resettlement of refugees in a third country, which was carried out 
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with the lead of the UNCHR, they evaluated their qualifications, in other words, their 
social capital was not enough for this. The words of the 20-year-old interviewee 
pointed to this issue by stating the following:  
“As I said before, we could not go to Germany because of money issues. Many of our 
relatives are gone, maybe they were lucky too. We have applied for the UN resettlement 
and now we are waiting for results. But the other day I read it on Facebook, people say ‘why 
should a strong and rich country accept a refugee with no education and no qualification into 
their own country?’ That is, those countries decide who to select and take. Let’s be honest, 
if I were them [those countries], I would not choose people like us in this camp, since there 
is neither education nor culture.” [Interview 8, KTPC, 09.10.2018] 
The words of this interviewee emphasise that, apart from noting that the lack of 
economic capital influences their mobility, the lack of social and cultural capital is not 
enough for re-placement in the third country. In its official statements40, UNHCR 
states that the most vulnerable people will be given priority rather than criteria such 
as education, profession, the economy in the process of replacing them in the third 
country, although the concept of vulnerability is subjective and open to interpretation. 
The comment of the interviewee about the information he learned from Facebook 
draws attention to the importance of forms of capital such as education, social status, 
and profession, even though the reliability of the information is open to discussion. 
Considering all these factors and effects, the capital forms that circumscribe the 
capacity of a refugee staying in the KTPC to leave the camp, integrate with social 
life, go to another country in their plans or dreams, in other words, limit their 
subjectivity, are very determinant. Consequently, based on what these interviewees 
indicated as well as the ethnography conducted at KTPC, economic capital becomes 
the most fundamental criterion for realising an economically costly movement such 
as migration. In addition, social and cultural capital are decisive in their future 
imaginations, decisions and ultimately their actions. In addition, patriarchal gender 
relations based on gender roles and norms, in which traditional and religious 
teachings are determinant, were also one of the main characters of the KTPC. 
Therefore, I formulate this situation as another important factor we should consider 
 
40 https://www.unhcr.org/tr/ucuncu-ulkeye-yerlestirme last access on 05.06.2021 
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when dealing with the subjectivity debate and the questioning of gender norms and 
roles in the next section. 
3.2.5) Gender Transformation of Syrian Arab Female Refugees: Being 
Women and Refugees and Mother are the Worst Thing to Happen 
One of the most central ethnographic observations that Grounded Theory as a 
research method assisted me to formulate in the fieldwork and brought forth was the 
transformation and change that both Syrian Arab and Kurdish women refugees 
experienced through the refugee and immigration process. This section mainly uses 
interviews with Syrian Arab women refugees in KTPC. Although I carried out 
ethnography, my observations of refugee women were very limited due to the 
reflection of the dominant gender roles in social and daily domains. The reason for 
this was that women were not very visible in social and public spaces, since usually 
they were in their own container houses as a more private living space. In this sense, 
the main gender matters that the fieldwork and interviews point to concern women 
living in a collective community, being subjected to the common gender roles and 
norms of the community, and also gender roles and responsibilities externally 
generated by the refugee position and camp conditions. 
At the KTPC, all of my female interviewees were married, and all had children 
ranging from 3 to 6. They were all housewives. Educational level varied between no 
education and secondary school. All the interviewees defined themselves as 
Muslims and religious. None of them had work experience, except one who worked 
as a midwife nurse for a short period. In other words, all the interviewees were 
economically dependent on their husbands. Family relationships were prominently 
limited by patriarchal roles and norms. While their husbands were working with jobs 
outside the home [in Syria] or camps [in Turkey], they were responsible for 
housework. For instance, taking care of the children and housework were the 
women’s responsibility as wife or mother. As far as I observed, I can state that the 
main reason why women were not seen in the public sphere was gender roles 
prevailing within these social, religious, cultural, and economic boundaries. The 
words of a 32-year-old interviewee, mother of 3 children, may assist to explain better:  
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“I can imagine that it is very challenging to get used to life in Germany. I know from my 
relatives who live there. Despite this, I want to leave here because there is always a third 
eye that puts me in a situation that I am struggling… My neighbour, she is very religious and 
tells me all these things that I have to do, I have to accept as wife, mother, daughter. But 
she does not see that we are vulnerable here, we already have to accept many things 
compulsorily because of what we have had in the last years. She does not see as women 
we already struggle a lot… I just want to get away from eyes that check and control on me. 
When my relatives in Europe say that they feel much free and stronger because there are 
not many Syrians, then I want to go there.” [Interview 2, KTPC, 02.10.2018] 
The words of this interviewee highlight an issue that will be emphasized in the 
Greece and Germany field research chapters as well. This issue is related to the 
gender-based pressures produced by the collective community and to the positions 
of women who are exposed to these pressures in refugee camps. Other female 
interviewees also emphasized similar gender-based pressures in different manners. 
This is mainly due to this being a community that originated in the countryside and 
continued to practice dominantly patriarchal religious teachings and gender roles. I 
should mention here that I want to draw a frame about a Muslim Syrian refugee 
community in KTPC that its roots are constructed and shaped by Muslim habitus, 
rather than a very radical religious community. In describing the correlation between 
religious values and gender relations in KTPC, I want to emphasize the dominant 
gender roles and norms in the community. 
Apart from the issue that I have emphasized and stated that the character of the 
collective community has a negative impact on gender roles, the gender-based 
division of labour and the extra responsibilities put on women in camp conditions 
should be essentially considered as other gender-based troubles in KTPC. Beside 
the challenge of these roles and responsibilities, the public role and representations 
of Turkish women in society in Turkey can be elaborated as a factor that caused 
female interviewees to question their own values and traditions. Below notes from 
the interviews indicate these two situations.  
“Turkish women are a bit different, like… how to say, they have more freedom in society. 
But this is not good sometimes, girls are freer, and they can forget their responsibilities, 
which is not good. For example, they get married late… Though I can't say it's better in our 
culture but… I do not know. I do not want my daughters to have same life as mine, they 
should be stronger.” [Interview 3, Mother of 4, 34 years old, KTPC, 02.10. 2018] 
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“Life in here is very difficult especially for us [meaning women-mothers]. We have to do 
everything by ourselves. In Syria, my husband was going to work, earning money, taking 
care of us. But here he is home all the time and does not help with anything, so when I ask 
him to help me, he gets angry… I hardly find some time for myself to think all these things 
happened [means Syrian War], we ended up here, lost everything, do not know what 
tomorrow will bring… Being women and refugees and mother are the worst thing to happen, 
I do not know how to explain.” [Interview 19, Mother of 4, 38 years old, 31.10.2018] 
These two interviewees’ statements are very summarising for framing the general 
issues that arise due to gender issues in refugee camps. The words of the mother 
of 4 children points out the refugee camps’ daily life practices as the roles and 
responsibilities shared in the home between man and woman as wife and husband. 
However, what she points at is that they do not live in a house anymore, it is a camp 
and also husband does not work as he used to do back in their place. This is the 
point where gender norms are being questioned by the interviewee. Additionally, her 
words reveal the extra work to be done in the camp that keeps her very busy, that 
even prevents her from the understanding and realisation from her point of view as 
an individual. The other interviewee indicates the confusion that is caused or sparked 
by the encounter of different gender roles and representations in the society, 
particularly by giving her understanding of Turkish and Syrian women roles as a 
comparative case. Even though her words were critical, I could easily sense her 
confusion in her expression that she evaluates new gender representations through 
the future projections of her daughters as she wants them to be stronger.  
There were gender roles and norms questionings and confusions that were 
manifested by obvious factors such as the difficulties the refugee women in the 
camps faced, the new gender roles they encountered, the social pressure they were 
subjected to. These questionings and confusions will appear in more transforming 
and practised forms, especially in Greece and Germany. For this reason, the gender-
centred issues emphasized by female interviewees in KTPC can be thought of as 
the subjectivity mobilized by the Syrian refugee women against these pressures in 
Greece and Germany. I argue that this transforming and practised gender relations 
should be evaluated as subjectivity of the refugee woman. The social appearances 
of refugee women, their questioning of the dominant gender codes and the roles 
they think are wrong, and the decisions and steps they take, the new practices to 
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change the norm are the characteristics of their predominantly empowered 
subjectivity. This section provides the basis for an introduction to the transformation 
of Syrian women refugees’ gender roles and norms, which this research has adopted 
as an objective concerning the subjectivity discussions. In other gender discussion 
sections, readers will understand how the challenges faced by women refugees 
discussed in this section trigger an alteration in gender codes for Syrian women 
refugees with similar backgrounds. 
In the next section, the field study with Syrian Kurdish refugees in predominantly 
Kurdish cities Diyarbakır and Mardin will be presented. 
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3.3) The Imagined Community: Syrian Kurdish Refugees in Diyarbakır and 
Mardin 
While two gendarmes were holding both my arms to take me out of the temporary protection 
centre with the order of a nationalistic senior captain, who was shouting “There are no Kurds, 
we are living in Turkey, this is the land of Turks. You can speak about Kurds back in England 
but not here!” It was afternoon when the sun was shining in all its warmth over the reinforced 
concrete camp. My translator, Ali, in his own words, ‘an assimilated Kurdish man’, 
accompanied to me with an embarrassed face while the gendarmes pushing me out of the 
camp area surrounded by wire-mesh walls. Once, while chatting about Syrian Kurds staying 
at the protection centre, I remembered the advice my translator gave me.  
“Baris, my friend, do you want me to get in trouble? Even talking about Kurds in this area is 
a reason to be kicked out from here…  There are some families in the camp, they are 
Kurdish, but they would not say this to you because they are even afraid of reminding 
themselves. You know how things work in this country, being Kurdish is a burden, it is 
naturally political my friend. Kurdish refugees already knew about this, that is why they are 
not in refugee camps. I heard many times from these families that their relatives are mainly 
in Kurdish cities where they can speak the language, can be accepted by the other Kurdish 
people. Go there, go to your hometown (Diyarbakır). You will easily meet many of them.” 
[Field Notes, 14 October 2018] 
3.3.1) Seeking Power Relations in Perceptions and Thoughts on the 
Other: The Perceptions of Syrian Kurds about Turkey and West  
What I examine within the scope of this section is how the authority, power, and 
transformative influence of power relations and actors are perceived, interpreted, 
and acted upon accordingly, especially by Syrian Kurdish refugees. In this sense, 
the investigation of Syrian Kurdish refugees’ images, perceptions, and attitudes 
about the Kurdish question/Kurdish conflict, which has a long-standing history in 
Turkey, offers very detailed points about Turkey/the Turkish State and Syrian 
Kurdish refugees. In this context, we need to dig into the process of positionality, 
actuality, and subjectivity that Syrian refugees have taken about an ‘other’ – in this 
case Turkey – that can be a determinant in their lives. Operation Shield Euphrates 
that the Turkish State initiated in August 2016 to prevent the unification of the 
Kurdish regions between Menbic and Afrin Cantons and detract ISIS from its border 
heightened the political and military tensions between Turkey and Rojava. 
Subsequently, such military operations as Operation Olive Branch in January 2018, 
Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, and Operation Spring Shield in February 
2020, were launched at different times for varying purposes. These military 
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operations and, afterwards, political and institutional initiations in the regions by 
Turkey have compounded the unrest, insecurity, and uneasiness of Syrian Kurdish 
refugees living in Turkey (see Al-Hilu, 2019; Gürcan, 2019). 
In this section, the determinant power relations and actors in the relationship 
between Turkey and Syrian Kurds can be named primarily political and military 
domains. In order to better figure out the perceptions and thoughts of Syrian Kurdish 
refugees about Turkey prior to, during and after migration, I asked open ended 
interview questions, such as ‘What do you think about Turkey?’ Analysing the 
answer given to this question by the 26-year-old, sociology-studying, construction 
worker interviewee I quoted below will help us understand the relationship between 
Syrian Kurdish refugees and Turkey.  
“Turkey comes into being in the Kurdish people's life in two ways, which are mainly military 
and political interventions. Since my childhood, I have always heard the stories from our 
family elders that Turkey as a country, nation, state is kind of a bogeyman to be feared. The 
way I ended up here confirms such stories. I am talking about Kobane attacks, and Turkey’s 
support for ISIS against Kurds, closure of its borders to Kurds... Is there any Kurdish place 
Turkey has not attacked yet, you tell me? It repeatedly intervened to all Kurdistan regions. 
Even if Kurds go to the moon, Turkey finds excuses to interfere with. Tragicomic but this is 
how Kurds feel!” [Interview 11, Diyarbakır, 23.10.2018] 
The interviewee is from Kobane city in Syria and had expressed that he had to flee 
to Turkey illegally when ISIS attacked there with all its forces in 2015 (see 
Hinnebusch, 2015; Ciordia, 2018). Consequently, the interviewee stated that the 
reason he was in Turkey was due to Turkey's indirect support for ISIS and sealing 
the borders to Kurdish people. As can be understood from the interviewee's words, 
Turkey does not exactly correspond to a ‘safe haven’ where they can feel secure 
and protected. Besides this interviewee, other interviewees also indicated that being 
in Turkey as a refugee does not satisfy their need for security, on the contrary they 
associated being in Turkey with the feelings of anxiety, fear and insecurity. When 
considering this encounter within the scope of power relations, while the relations 
between the parties of power relations are commonly formed through more media, 
social, and public representations, this situation emerges between Turkey-Syrian 
Kurds more through military intervention and political pressures. One of the 
questions I formed during the interviews to understand this situation further was, 
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“How were your perceptions, attitude and positionality about Turkey formed, and 
through which instruments?” The words of the interviewee stated below are 
noteworthy to grasp the formation of the Syrian Kurds’ perceptions of Turkey:  
“Ever since I knew myself, I know about Turkey, but it is not because I want it. Turkey was 
more inherent in my life. I grew up in the villages just below the Mardin border. When I saw 
a warplane for the first time, I was 4-5 years old, excited, happy, you know I was a child after 
all. But when I asked my mom what it was, she started crying, all she said was ‘stay away 
from it’. Later I learned that her brother was martyred by a Turkish warplane bomb while 
fighting in the PKK side... Turkey comes into our lives, even if we do not want!” [Interview 
12, 20 years old, Bachelor student in law, Diyarbakır, 25.10.2018] 
“Normally, people follow their own country more on TV, internet, news, right? But since I 
was little, I remember that Turkish TV channels were also watched in our house, especially 
the news. Because even though we live in Syria, it was feared from Turkey. That is why my 
parents would follow Turkey's politics. Which I still think so, because people try to be 
cautious about what they are afraid of, is not it?” [Interview 13, 22 years old, Building worker, 
Diyarbakır, 26.10.2018] 
Interviewees pointed to the Turkish state’s policies and practices that exist, affect 
and put sanctions in their lives in a way even before the forced displacement. This 
situation is also a result and extension of the problems and conflicts that Kurdish 
people experienced while living in Turkey for many years. Nationalist policies that do 
not recognize or include ethnic differences caused the political and military tension 
and conflicts between Kurds and Turkey, and cross-border operations and joint 
political agreements with the Turkish governments and neighbouring countries have 
also become a problem for Kurds living in the surrounding countries, such as in Syria, 
as the interviewees indicated with their life stories. Solidarity and cooperation among 
Kurdish people, which I will discuss in the next section, in fact explains the concept 
of ‘imagined community’ that emerges after the common traumas, discrimination and 
marginalization among Kurds created by the historical political, social and military 
practices and which has strengthened day by day. In a bigger scale, Syrian Kurdish 
refugees’ perceptions and thoughts of the ‘other’, in particular about the West’ had 
a much more political and critical frame, especially when compared to Syrian Arab 
refugees. For example, many of the interviewees, when asked ‘what the concept of 
the west corresponds to, how they interpret it’, used a more rigid discourse to explain 
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their opinions. The two interviewees’ words I have cited below, used expressions 
with a historical, sociological and political framework in content:  
“If someone use the term ‘West’, I think of Europe. But nowadays west is more than Europe, 
like if we think America [United States] or Canada, they are also West. The original West, 
European countries are those occupant/invader countries, like Britain, France, Spain, the 
Netherlands.” [Interview 9, 25 years old, NGO worker, Diyarbakır, 16 October 2018] 
“The West is, you know, those wealthy, modern, technologically advanced countries, where 
life is easy, comfortable, many jobs out there. But I also know that they reached this point 
thanks to other countries, like you know France benefited from the wealth of Syria, or Britain 
controlled half of the world and got all those things!” [Interview 14, 32 years old, translator, 
Mardin, 27 October 2018] 
In the interviews held in Greece, in the questions I asked the interviewees about 
Greece, they indicated that Greece is not the west for them, they referred to Western 
European countries as the original West as the interviewee above stated. The term 
‘original’ that interviewee stated is noteworthy to delve into its historical and political 
roots. In order to do this, when I asked how his ideas about the west or the original 
west were formed, he particularly emphasized the characters of power relations in 
fundamental external terms such as media, history, global politics, military and 
economy. However, being exposed to a structure, power, representation to know or 
be aware of them was another common emphasis by many interviewees. It can be 
argued that the common emphasis on being exposed to external structures or 
representations may be related to the proliferation of global media tools, global 
macro politics and economics, and the reduction of individuals by such supra-
institutional structures, which have been gradually disabling active subjectivity. At 
the same time, it can be argued that increased awareness, interests, and easy 
access to information can lead to indirect passivation or loss of active subjectivity. 
The analogy established by a young 23-year-old female interviewee can be shown 
as an example of power relations, the power of external entities that dominate this 
active subjectivity:  
“Let me give you such an example: Do you think anyone here in Mardin does not know the 
Turkish government or Istanbul or Ankara? This is not about everyone wanting to know 
Istanbul or Ankara. Sometimes we are more exposed and thus we learn. People watch a TV 
series, and it is in Istanbul, and they learn about it! So, people in Mardin indirectly learn 
about Istanbul, right? It is the same, people in the world learn/know about the West from 
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movies, news, politics, and other things, indirectly or directly.” [Interview 15, Waitress, 
Mardin, 28 October 2018] 
Analysing the response given by the interviewee, it can be argued that the 
conception of people that how they learn and imagine the West was influenced by 
the role and functioning of the media. Additionally, the effects of the visual media 
productions, such as movies, television shows or series, and other related videos 
have played a crucial role in shaping the image and imagination of Syrian Kurdish 
refugees. Ann Marie Barry (1997, 2002) in her works, elaborates the brain functions, 
and how the function of brain relates to logical reasonings and feelings, and how it 
reacts to the visual world, in general. Barry explains that seeing and perceiving the 
world that surrounds us in visual forms through neurological information processing 
has stronger effects on the perception of long-term memory (p.92-94). Therefore, 
the interviewees commonly responded to ‘how their images and understandings of 
the West are formed’ by emphasizing the function of the media, the effect of the 
visual media, the representations of power actors and structures in media. 
In the following section, I discuss the solidarity, cooperation and close relationship 
among Kurds from Turkey and Syria, which the reader can consider in relation to the 
concept of imagined community. 
3.3.2) Solidarity and Imagined Community: What makes Kurds a nation 
is not ethnicity, but the common experiences! 
In the recent history of the Kurds, within the boundaries of four different nation-states 
– Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria –, there have been social, political, economic and 
psychological experiences that were socially common or similar. The main reason 
for these associable experiences is that they have different ethnic, cultural, and 
social relations from the elements that constitute the dominant identity of the 
countries within which they live. In this sense, even though they are basically divided 
between the boundaries of four countries, they have created a transboundary 
community sense because of both their ethnicity and their shared experiences. We 
can express this transboundary sense with the words of Anderson (1991; 5): 
“Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the 
style in which they are imagined.... Finally, [the nation] is imagined as a community, 
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because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” 
Due to the reasons that constitute a sense of imagined community and the 
marginalizing policies of the countries that the Kurds live in, their positionality has 
also become dynamic. I recommend using the concept of trans-locational 
positionality to better imagine this dynamism. As Anthias (2002; 502) formulates this 
concept: “The concept of trans-locational positionality recognizes that issues of 
exclusion, political mobilization on the basis of collective identity and narrations of 
belonging and otherness cannot be addressed adequately unless they are located 
within other constructions of difference and identity, particularly around gender and 
class.” We can detail the trans-locational positionality argument that serves to think 
and understand the political relation of Kurds with the concept of imagined 
community through the actual solidarity and cooperation that took place among 
Turkish and Syrian Kurds in Diyarbakır and Mardin. 
In that sense, the trans-locational positionality argument that helps us better imagine 
and understand the political relationality of Kurds within the concept of imagined 
community can be exemplified and tested through the solidarity realised among 
Syrian Kurdish refugees and Turkish Kurdish community in Diyarbakır and Mardin. I 
mainly carried out the ethnography in these two cities by spending time in certain 
neighbourhoods and districts, such as Bağlar and Huzurevleri in Diyarbakır and 
Nusaybin and Kiziltepe in Mardin where more Syrian Kurdish refugees reside. To be 
able to grasp the daily interactions of Syrian Kurds with local Kurds, I visited many 
kıraathane (traditional coffee house) where mainly men go and socialize, and many 
slightly more gender-balanced coffee houses , and public places. In these places, I 
met with both local and Syrian Kurds and had conversations about the relationship 
between Syrian and local Kurds. The following stated thoughts are from both local 
and Syrian Kurds about each other: 
“Having a border in between [Turkey and Syria] does not make us separated or different. 
The other day there was a wedding, groom is from Derik [a Kurdish district in Rojava] and 
bride is from Lice [a district in Diyarbakır]. This shows how we are united.” [Waiter from 
Turkey, Baglar/ Diyarbakır, 21.10.2018] 
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“We Kurds always say that Kurds are one, united and together regardless the borders. I 
believe this situation [the displacement and migration of Kurds] proved that if there is no 
border between us, we live together peacefully and together as all the other nations do. 
[Kurd from Turkey, a shop owner, Huzurevleri/ Diyarbakır, 22.10.2018] 
“Actually, the question you ask, the issue of ‘how are Syrian and Turkish Kurds’ relationships’ 
is a question like asking Turks living in Ankara and Istanbul, how are the relationship 
between Turks from Ankara and Istanbul? Just as their relationships are, the relationship 
between Qamishli and Diyarbakır is like that. The only difference is they put a border 
between us by force!” [36-year-old from Syria, Kızıltepe/Mardin, 28.10.2018] 
“I think the main thing that makes Kurds a nation is not ethnicity, but the common painful 
experiences, oppressions, massacres they go through. Kurds are a people in the same 
geography, speaking the same language and having the same culture. At the time, the 
country where you are studying at university41, England and a few other European countries, 
after taking their interests from this region, decided to cut the geography where the Kurds 
live as if cutting a cake. Now we are trying to prove the truth that we Kurds are a nation in 
the world.” [33 years old from Syria, Nusaybin/Mardin, 29.10.2018] 
The main thing that the reader must understand from these words is that the Kurds 
are a good model and representation of the concepts of imagined community or 
trans-locational positionality that we use in attempting to conceptualize the 
solidarities among them. The most emphasized issue is, first, the fact that it is larger 
Kurdish geography divided by borders, and then that Kurds have had similar 
experiences within different boundaries. The interviews I made on these topics 
contained confirming and similar highlights. Common positive concepts emphasized 
in my observations and daily conversations with locals as well were also emphasized 
the Syrian Kurdish interviewees. For example, togetherness, one nation, solidarity, 
and same language are the most highlighted ones. 
When I asked about how common feelings and expressions correspond in practical 
terms, how they feel solidarity, and how they were accommodated by locals, several 
key points were stated. It was stated that these were provisions, clothing, basic 
household goods and financial aids provided to them. It was also noted that these 
solidarities and assistances were carried out under the leadership of metropolitan 
municipalities and local institutions, especially under the administration of the pro-
 
41 The participant refers to my explanation about the research that I introduced myself before the 
conversation. He pointed out the Sykes-Picot Agreement by mentioning the England and other European 
countries that cut the Kurdish geography. 
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Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP). It was also 
stressed that when searching for an apartment to rent and looking for jobs, the local 
people helped them, and they sometimes ignore official documents and permits to 
make it easy for them. The interviewee’s words I quoted below express his views on 
the Kurdish cities and the local people: 
“Turkey is modern country, economically strong and well-developed, and has a great history, 
but these are valid if you are a Turkish! Look at Diyarbakır, it is one of the major cities in 
Turkey, but there is no economic investment by the government, that is why local people go 
to other cities to earn money. But despite this, I feel appreciative to our people, they shared 
what they have and helped us.” [Interview 14, Lawyer-translator, Mardin, 27 October 2018] 
I will review once again the solidarity established by the Kurds among themselves, 
especially in the axis of a small camp community established by the Kurds who were 
displaced from different countries in the Lavrion camp in Greece. In the next section, 
I discuss the internet and social media usages of Syrian Kurdish refugees.  
3.3.3) Syrian Kurdish Refugees’ Media and Internet Use: Images makes 
me happy and excited, then I remember them more clearly. 
All interviewees stated that they own a smartphone, tablet, or laptop and that they 
connect to the internet every day with one or more of these tools. They emphasized 
that the reason for using the internet is primarily access to social media accounts, 
then communication with family and relatives, and then access to daily news, and 
other reasons. However, since all interviewees were working in different jobs for a 
large part of the week, they stated that they use their social media or related internet 
tools, mainly during the evening hours. However, the answer of an interviewee, 26 
years old, a construction worker and master’s degree student to the question: ‘How 
much time do you spend with media and internet tools a day?’ is noteworthy:  
“Media is a very comprehensive concept; I think you should state what you mean more 
clearly [smiles]. For example, aren't they the advertisements we see on TV, newspapers, 
radio and even street media billboards? If we consider all of these, I think we spend more 
than 6-7 hours a day with these media tools. But if you are just referring to websites and 
social media that we connect to via phone, I probably spend 2-3 hours in a day.” [Interview 
10, Diyarbakır, 20.10.2018] 
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What this interviewee indicates about the concept of media and the variety of its 
tools is of great importance. Although my question was principally about phone and 
internet tools, in fact the duration of time spent on media changes drastically when 
we include classical media tools. When I clarified to the interviewer that what I mean 
by media was particularly the interrelation between the effect, manipulation, 
advertising of an image, sound, idea, lifestyle, especially via image-based, video, 
text, audio forms, and users/audiences, he replied:  
“So, let me tell you about my daily routine that I usually have when going to college: When I 
leave the house, I usually see advertising brochures in the building. I see ads on billboards 
at the minibus station. I see news or advertisements on the small TV screen in the minibus. 
I check the news on the phone in the minibus, or my messages, notifications, social media 
accounts. I see music clips on televisions in the faculty canteen. In the same way, I return 
home. In the evening I look at the TV, the movie, or the discussion show. Now you calculate 
how much time I spend or am exposed? [smiles]” [Interview 10, Diyarbakır, 20.10.2018] 
Considering the comprehensiveness of media content and tools that the interviewee 
has pointed out, in fact, we need to think about circumstances such as continuous 
advertising, being in communication everywhere, connectedness, which are one of 
the most basic features of daily life in the modern technological age. Although the 
interviewee emphasizes the existence of media tools in his life that he encounters 
during his daily routine, in fact, in the scope of this research, I am specifically 
interested in the relationship between the users and media tools, which operate over 
the internet and platforms that run through the consent and preferences of 
individuals. The main difference of these platforms, namely video-sharing or 
personalized online applications such as social media platforms, search engines, 
YouTube, is that these platforms appeal to users’ interests and attract more attention 
through content related to these interests. In addition, these platforms have their own 
independent operating systems, goals, and objectives that work especially through 
the consent of users, such as the notifications that we encounter tens-hundreds of 
times every day. In this sense, the digital content that the user restricts and 
determines through his own preferences and interests find more provisions in the 
user’s perception, thoughts, and desires. The answers given to the question ‘What 
are the most persistent contents generally in your mind after using the internet?’ 
gives hints as to what this digital content might be:  
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“An interesting question… For example, I looked at Instagram and Facebook before the 
interview today, let me tell you what I remember about them: I remembered a video shared 
by a friend, a photo shared by a page I follow. Also, I do not know if it happens to you, 
sometimes something crosses my mind and the first ad that I encountered on the internet is 
related to this thing in my mind as if there is an internet-connected to our mind. [smiles].” 
[Interview 14, 32 years old, single, translator, Mardin, 27.10.2018] 
“Most social media is based on photos and videos, so what remains in my mind is images, 
either someone’s photo or video. But I do not remember all of them, of course, the more 
remaining in my mind... I guess when it is something that makes me happy, excited or what 
I want to do, I remember these images more clearly.” [interview 17, 21 years old, female, 
babysitter, Mardin, 29.10.2018] 
The common content emphasized by both interviewees was the content based on 
images in either photo or video form. In addition to the words of the interviewees, 
the general observations that I obtained as a result of looking at the timeline contents 
in their social media accounts were to confirm what the interviewees stated. In other 
words, the main contents on social media platforms were more image-based as 
photo and video. To illustrate the image-based platforms, all interviewees had 
Facebook and Instagram accounts as well as other social media platforms such as 
TikTok, Pinterest. All interviewees reported that they used YouTube frequently. The 
contents that I commonly observed in the timelines of the interviewers’ Facebook 
and Instagram accounts were the profile pictures and videos of their friends and the 
pages they follow or like, in which all content could be coded as ‘positive’. What I 
mean by positive content is the content that includes smiles, or gets compliments, 
likes, thumbs and appreciations as a response from other users. The reason I 
emphasize this is that besides seeing content based on users’ preferences and 
interests, the social media accounts they use are functional or the most preferred 
way of using, which is based on positive content sharing and gaining more 
compliments, likes and appreciations. 
Therefore, digital habitus, which develops, diversifies, and grows especially through 
social media platforms as one of the most used internet tools, is supported and 
shaped by positive content included media posts. Another consequence of this 
situation is, in the words of one of the interviewees, “when something makes me 
happy and excited or I want to do, I remember these images more clearly”, this is a 
digital structure of the social media that generates or corresponds to desires. All my 
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interviewees stated that they had family members, relatives or friends who had 
migrated to different countries in Europe, and they also stated that they were in 
contact with these people, especially through social media. In other words, this 
positive content in the form of photos or videos that these interviewees see in their 
social media accounts are also the content shared by people they know in Europe. 
I will discuss it in more detail in the following sections, the posts that these 
acquaintances do in the forms of photo, video or text are very impressive and 
influential on refugees who wish to migrate.  
The points that I underlined in the scope of interviews held in KTPC and later in 
Diyarbakır and Mardin regarding the media and internet means show the importance 
and functionality of these tools in refugees’ daily lives life practices. These 
discussions on media and the internet that I have presented will focus on media 
content rather than its functionality, especially in the context of the Greek and 
German fieldwork sites. Media content will show readers how they affect the 
interviewees’ desires, perceptions, and actions. The next section introduces the 
subjectivity discussion of research concerning the demographics and capital of 
participants. 
3.3.4) Political Fear Replacing Socio-Economic and Cultural Capital: 
“What If I Get Caught?” 
One of the most prominent differences between Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees 
was the ways and processes of migration of these two different ethnic groups. 
Particularly since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, the people who were forcibly 
displaced were primarily Syrian Arab areas such as Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs, and 
Deir-Ez-Zor42. Ethnic groups that were found to be the majority in these regions were 
primarily Arabs and then differentiated ethnic groups (Kennedy, 2006), such as 
Turkman, Kurdish, Druze, and others43. The violence and destructive effects of the 
Syrian Civil War, which started in March 2011, until the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria) period, which declared its independence in Syria in June 2014, were not 
 
42 https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/maps/ last accessed 31.05.2021 




seen in the Kurdish regions, such as Qamishli, Al-Hasakah, Afrin, Kobane. However, 
after the ISIS’s attacks on the Kurdish region, Syrian Kurds have seen and predicted 
the arrival of the war violence, and they slowly sent their family members to other 
safe places in Rojava or to Turkey. In addition, families who wanted to avoid 
mandatory military service (Al-Jabassini, 2017; 104), which started with the inclusion 
of the Kurdish forces in the Syrian War, preferred to send their young children out of 
Syria (Danish Immigration Service, 2015; 16-17). It should be noted here once again 
that it is very difficult to give the statistical equivalent of these in numbers that how 
many Syrian Kurds have crossed the Turkish borders before or after the violence 
erupted in the region. In this section, the demographic information of the sample 
group is given that consists of those who preferred to settle in Kurdish cities coming 
to Turkey particularly after 2014. In this sense, it would not be a correct comparison 
to generalize the demography represented by this sample group or to compare it 
with Syrian Arab refugees staying in KTPC. Despite this rather, it is essential to 
understand the migration route and tendencies of Kurdish refugees in Greece and 
Germany.  
The interviews held in Diyarbakır and Mardin were selected and reached using the 
snowball sampling method. The average age of the 9 interviewees was 25 years old. 
All interviewees were single. Although I aimed to reach married participants, some 
families did not accept my request for security reasons, and some rejected the 
interviews for other reasons. Therefore, I was only able to reach a certain network 
with a certain age range. The education status of the interviewees was 2 master’s 
degrees, 5 bachelor’s degrees and 2 high school graduates. All interviewees were 
working in different professional areas, such as NGO worker, construction workers, 
babysitter, painter, translator, and waitress. 5 interviewees defined the economic 
situation as medium and above, while 4 stated as middle or lower class. All the 
interviewees were staying either with family members they came with or alone in 
apartments they rented. 
Such a demographic profile provides the reader with the following information: Syrian 
Kurdish refugees in Diyarbakır and Mardin were able to economically cover 
expenses such as housing and daily expenses, and even though partially, they were 
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able to meet their social and education expenses themselves. In addition, thanks to 
social solidarity networks with local Kurdish groups, it was easier for them to find 
jobs. Therefore, the significant limitation of economic capital on migration and social 
mobility, as was seen among Syrian Arabs in KTPC, becoming there the most 
fundamental factor when making future plans, was not the main determinant factor 
for interviewees in Diyarbakır and Mardin. The capabilities and possibilities provided 
by economic capital have been replaced by more political concerns and restrictions 
caused by these concerns. These concerns were mainly stated by interviewees as 
follows: The prejudice of the Turkish state about  Kurdish people, its nationalist 
policies, and Turkey’s restrictive policies on Syrian refugees even within its borders. 
Here is what interviewees stated in relation to these subjects: 
“I have been in Diyarbakır for about 3 years, and I set up a life order here. I work, I have 
friends, I speak the same language as the people here. I previously stayed in Izmir 
[metropolitan city in the western extremity of Anatolia] for 3 months and had quite a hard 
time. I could not find a job. I was discriminated against while searching for a house. I could 
not communicate with the local people. I have been thinking of going to my relatives in 
Sweden since the last year, but I am still afraid to go there illegally. What if I get caught, I 
am both Kurdish and Syrian, do you understand?” [Interview 9, 25 years old, NGO worker, 
Diyarbakır, 16.10.2018] 
“I am doing a master's degree here, waiting for my school to finish, then I think about going 
to Germany. To be honest I am afraid of getting caught. This is a very serious decision for 
me because I came here illegally...  It [crossing the border illegally] took two hours, even 
that was so scary! A migration that may potentially last for months and even years, after my 
4 years of life here, is very scary to me.” [Interview 17, 33 years old, artist, Mardin, 
29.10.2018] 
Both interviewees planned to leave Turkey and to go to European countries. 
However, the main reason why they did not realise this was the uncertainty of the 
illegal migration process, the possibility that the journey could take a long time, as 
well as political fears of being caught. At the same time, the solidarity that the 
interviewees established with the local people, the integration they carried out and 
the life order they established were other reasons why they did not implement these 
plans. Still, they had no economic, socio-cultural, or educational capital concerns as 
a reason for not being eligible or capable to migrate, in contrast to the vital reasons 
of Syrian Arab refugees staying in KTPC. In this sense, the points that Bourdieu 
emphasized regarding the determination and limitation of the capital forms, which I 
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formulated as the disempowerment of subjectivity related to Syrian Arabs in KTPC, 
were not valid for Syrian Kurds. However, political fears, the difficulty of migration, 
their reluctance to give up the social groups they are integrated with and the life they 
establish can be thought of as a different constraint for subjectivity, instead of 
economic and cultural capital. 
The following section is about the gender, refugee, and migration discussions with 
Kurdish female interviewees on the axis of interviews and observations. 
3.3.5) Gender Transformation of Syrian Arab Female Refugees: “A 
Revolution Does Not Happen Like This!” 
In Google searches made with the keywords Kurdish-Woman, politically and 
ideologically ‘a progressive movement’ emerges in the first images, websites, or 
news sources that the user comes across44. The main reason for this is that the 
Kurdish women in Kurdish societies, particularly in North and East Syria [known as 
Rojava] have drawn a highly prominent charisma by improving their social standing 
in the social, political, and military fields. Especially in the period of political and 
military instability and war in Syria, various Kurdish political and armed movements 
gained global recognition and legitimacy in the struggles against ISIS in the region 
where Kurds live. For instance, the Women’s Protection Units (Kurdish, Yekîneyên 
Parastina Jinê; YPJ) and the women’s military wing of the PKK, Yekîneyên Jinên 
Azad ên Star (YJA-Star), within the Kurdish societies have challenged traditional 
gender roles (see Düzgün, 2016; Open, 2013). This socio-political acquisition gave 
Kurdish women a changing and promising progressive attitude, political awareness 
and positionality towards gender and traditional patriarchy, even if Syrian female 
Kurdish interviewees in this research did not take part specifically in these political, 
military or social structures (see Al-Ali and Tas, 2018). In this sense, the Syrian 
female Kurdish refugees that I present in this chapter were highly aware, interested 
and connected in these progressive movements and structures from a political and 
gender perspective. The reason I highlight this is to help the reader recognise what 
the political and ideological expressions emphasized by the interviewees correspond 
 
44https://www.google.com/search?q=kurdish+woman&oq=kurdish+woman&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j35i39j46i3
95j0i395l2j69i60j69i61j69i60.1257j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 last access on 05.06.2021 
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to, where they are influenced and nurtured while doing the gender-based discussion 
of refugee and migration below. 
All the female interviewees were single, employed, and stated that they were not 
religious. I used Kurmanji [Kurdish] as a common language in all the interviews and 
this situation eliminated the need for translator/interpreter. In all my interviews, the 
Kurdish female interviewees came alone, unlike Syrian female Arab refugees in 
KTPC where someone accompanied them during the interviews in order not to be 
alone with a male researcher. In this sense, a feminist attitude with an ideological 
and social awareness was the subject of Kurdish female interviewees, which was 
also the case in Greece and Germany. To further elaborate this, we can analyse in 
more detail the answers given by two young refugee women, one 21 years old and 
one 23 years old, to the questions I asked about their migration experiences and 
reasons:  
“I came alone about 3 years ago. My mother was opposed, but my father supported me 
because he wanted me to get a good education and become an independent woman... I 
know my father’s support for me is a political attitude, he is actually quite patriarchal, but he 
remained so long among our female friends at ‘our party’ that he supports me as a woman 
even though he does not know why [smiles]. Now I am working, continuing my education, 
standing on my own feet.” [Interview 15, Waitress, single, Mardin, 28.10.2018] 
“My brother and cousin had arrived here before I came. When I came, I stayed with them 
for the first few months. But then I rented an apartment alone. All my family opposed my 
decision. But I do not have to pick up after my brother, tidy up the home alone, prepare his 
meal just because I am a woman. ‘Our party’, with which they fought for its purposes, 
honestly preaches exactly the opposite. They say women will make the Kurds’ revolution, 
but then they still wait for the woman to prepare dinner at home. A revolution does not 
happen like this!” [Interview 16, Babysitter, single, Mardin, 28.10.2018] 
The common point that the two interviewees emphasized was the structure they 
pointed to as ‘our party’. When I asked what they mean by this, they pointed out the 
PKK and the women’s organizations associated with it. Both interviewees were 
aware of the ideological approach and expectations of these structures to women, 
and this was very influential in their engagement with gender. The examples that the 
father of the first interviewee supported her but his mother confronted her as a 
woman, and the other interviewee was going against the anticipation of gender roles 
between her brother and herself illustrate these interviewees’ perspectives and 
attitudes about gender roles. The fact that the circumstances of working 
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experiences, living with friends of their choice rather than family members, and their 
awareness of gender norms show their empowered subjectivity and put it into 
practice. Kurdish women, particularly in Rojava, after recent conflicts and 
achievements, have attracted attention in many fields, such as cinema (Koçer, 
2014), literature (Muhamad, 2018), art (Schäfers, 2018) and other domains. In this 
sense, many studies that can be a reference to the subjectivity and gender 
discussion in relation to Kurdish women have already been conducted (see Düzgün, 
2016; Bengio, 2016; Tank, 2017). In addition to these, the statements of another 
interviewee about the relationality of being a refugee and being a woman, the 
difficulty and awareness of being a refugee woman are worth noting: 
“Being a refugee is hard at the very beginning. Being a woman refugee is doubling this 
difficulty. Knowing that we come from Syria, some men try to offer help and approach in a 
way that as if we need help at any moment just because we are refugees. But I understand 
their intentions immediately, they are not in good faith... It is as if being a Syrian woman is 
identified with being religious, head-scarfed, not being modern. So sometimes I have to 
justify myself, why do I not have a scarf, why do not I seem religious?” [Interview 14, 32 
years old, single, Diyarbakır, 27.10.2018] 
The experiences of this interviewee about being a refugee woman correspond to the 
discussions I formulated and presented as social subjectivity in the literature review 
section. Let’s recall how I defined this concept: ‘It is the subjectivity created by 
displaying performance in accordance with the anticipations of other people that 
have been shaped or reappeared about the social norms, roles, traditions of people 
in a particular race, religion or region’. What is expected from being a Syrian and, 
moreover, from a Syrian refugee woman, and to impose on them the expected 
performances are essentially the generated social subjectivity that Syrian or Syrian 
refugee woman have to respond. However, this social subjectivity of refugee women 




3.4) Comparison of the Results Relating to Syrian Arab and Kurdish 
Participants in Turkey 
This research elaborately argues that Syrian refugees are not homogenous as an 
ethnic or religious group, and they should be attentively elaborated according to their 
diverse backgrounds, particularly when it comes to understanding people’s 
perceptions, thoughts, imaginations and evaluation of others. Based on the fieldwork 
in Turkey presented through the sections on Syrian Arabs and Kurdish refugees, I 
bring a brief comparison of the fieldwork results in this section, particularly by 
emphasizing their similarities and differences. While emphasizing these similarities 
and differences, I prefer to go through an assessment focused on four different 
research scopes. First of all, on the axis of their thoughts and perceptions about 
another, namely about Turkey and the West; then on the axis of media usage and 
relations with media tools within the developing digital habitus concept; then on the 
axis of their demographic stories in relation to their capital; and finally, on the axis of 
gender roles, norms and transformation. 
3.4.1) A Comparison as a Basis for Understanding Power Relations and 
Actors in the Scope of Perceptions and Thoughts about the Other  
The emphasis so far on Power relations and actors, here in this section, is being 
presented through Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees’ perceptions, thoughts and 
images primarily about the Turkish Government and society, and then about the 
West to better grasp the formation of perceptions about the ‘Others’. Firstly, the 
opinions of these two ethnically different refugee groups towards Turkey were both 
jointly intersected and differentiated. However, in the thoughts of these two groups, 
differences are more prominent than similarities. To list them briefly, while Syrian 
Arab interviewees have positively emphasized that Turkey is strong, modern, 
advanced, and westernised; Syrian Kurds, with a more political and ideological 
perspective and discourse, have pointed out that in a military and political sense that 
Turkey is a repressive, nationalist and interventionist country. In addition, while 
Syrian Arabs were quite pleased and happy with Turkey’s roles in the Syrian War, 
with the open-border policy for Syrian refugees and as a host country; Syrian Kurds 
were very critical and unsatisfied particularly due to Turkey’s interventionist politics 
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and military operations in Rojava region against Kurds which were mainly started 
after 2015. 
Moreover, on the one hand, Syrian Arabs noted positive thoughts about Turkish 
society on religious brotherhood and common history over the Ottoman Empire 
discourses; they at the same time, made more open-ended comments in general 
about Turkish society – there are good and bad people, like everywhere – as if 
avoiding stressing negative opinions. Syrian Kurds were very positive, especially 
from the perspective of solidarity, benevolence, and the imagined community 
established with local Kurdish communities in the predominantly Kurdish cities of 
Diyarbakır and Mardin. However, regarding Turkish society, they were critical and 
distanced due to the mainly nationalist and irreconcilable policies towards the 
Turkish Kurdish people. The views of these two groups about the concept of the 
West and European countries also differed from each other. While Syrian Arabs 
expressed their positive opinions about the secular, liberal, modern, development 
aspects of the west; Syrian Kurds have been critical of the west historically, politically 
and sociologically through an ideological point of view, and emphasized those 
countries’ invasive, capitalist, and expansionist policies. 
There are similar patterns in these groups’ answers; both groups have stated that 
Turkish society approaches Syrian refugees through an underrating perspective, 
which creates superior and inferior relationships. These two groups’ answers have 
been very similar in regard to questions that strive to detail the formation, 
development and process of their perceptions about both Turkey, the West and 
European countries. Both groups emphasized, in particular, the role of the media in 
their lives, the images of these countries’ representations in media as modern, 
secular, economically well-developed and socially well-off. Therefore, the countries 
they wanted to go to in terms of future aspirations, long-term settlement places, and 
desired lifestyles were very similar in both groups. In addition, it turned out that both 
groups wish to go to European countries, such as Germany, Sweden, Netherland, 
and others where their relatives or families already live, especially if they have the 
opportunity, conditions, and capital.  
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3.4.2) A Comparison as a Basis for Understanding Digital Habitus 
through the Intensified Relationship with Media Devices and the Internet 
In this section, I introduce the comparisons of media use, the connection with media 
tools and the interaction with social media platforms, applications and the internet of 
Syrian Arabs staying in KTPC and Syrian Kurdish refugees living in Kurdish cities. 
While the similar and different attitudes and usage patterns of these two groups in 
these comparisons are highlighted, readers are advised to consider these 
relationships with media and internet as ‘a new formation of habitus’. 
First of all, with the data provided by ethnography and interviews, Syrian Arabs had 
more free time due to staying in the camp, but as a result of their living in a restricted 
area, the time they spent on the internet and social media platforms was very 
intensive. It has been noted that this use corresponds to a time period varying 
between 4 and 6 hours on average. However, it was observed that the duration of 
media and internet usage was less among Syrian Kurdish refugees due to living in 
cities, employment, and the continuation of their education. It was stated by the 
interviewees that this usage varied between 2 and 4 hours. As one of the main 
reasons for this difference in usage, the average age of interviewees can be 
considered as a factor. The average age of Syrian Arabs in the KTPC was 36. 
However, Syrian Kurdish interviewees’ average age was 25. While Syrian Arabs 
refugees’ media and internet usage durations and relations differed between female 
and male interviewees, this variation was not noticed among Syrian Kurdish 
refugees. I discussed in more detail the reasons for this situation in the sections on 
gender roles and norms. The noteworthy point of this observation is that Syrian Arab 
women refugees had less time and worse conditions due to the responsibilities of 
being a mother and a housewife in camp conditions. On the other hand, all Syrian 
Kurdish interviewees were single and all-female interviewees were working. Thus, I 
cannot make a comparison between female Arab and Kurdish interviewees. 
As I highlighted above, the variety of social media platforms among Syrian Kurdish 
refugees was more comprehensive because of the age difference between these 
two groups because as it is almost a fact that young people tend to use social media 
platforms more than other age groups. The most used platforms in both groups were 
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observed to be Facebook and Instagram. In addition, the basic reasons for the two 
groups to engage with media tools and the internet and social media platforms were 
stated as staying in touch with their families, friends, and relatives, being aware of 
each other and informing and following each other.  
On the axis of these similarities and differences, as we users who begin to spend 
almost one-fourth of a day with these media tools in a day, I conceptualize these 
new relationships and practices with which we relate, create meanings, shape our 
lives and are being influenced by, as digital habitus as a new field. The reader is 
encouraged to think and discuss this concept, which will come up against media, 
content and internet usage discussions in the following chapters, with this 
perspective. 
3.4.3) A Comparison as a Basis for Understanding Subjectivity through 
Socio-Economic and Educational Capital 
Here is a brief comparison of the demographic characteristics of the interviewees, 
as well as their economic and educational situation; While Syrian Arab interviewees’ 
educational backgrounds were 5 secondary, 3 high school certificates and 2 no 
education; Syrian Kurdish refugees’ education were 2 high school certificates, 5 
bachelor’s degrees and 2 master’s degrees. All Syrian Arab refugees defined their 
economic status as poor, need help economically, and stated that they had a self-
sufficient life while living in Syria, and that they came from more rural areas with 
religious upbringings. On the other hand, Syrian Kurdish interviewees stated that 
their economic conditions were averagely close to the middle class; they were living 
with their families in cities before migrating to Turkey; their families generally have a 
good economic situation; and indicated that they received economic support from 
their families when they decided to move to Turkey. While all Syrian Arab 
interviewees were married and had children except one, all Syrian Kurdish 
interviewees were single.  
I discussed the relation of social, economic, educational, and cultural capital with 
subjectivity, especially with references to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. We can better 
understand this case, especially from these two different ethnic refugee groups, that 
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different forms of capital can determine the practices, actions, mobility, and capacity 
of the individual as a fundamental factor. Syrian Arab interviewees emphasized that 
insufficient economic capital was the most determinant reason for their stay in the 
camp, as well as the most determining reason for their inability to go to countries 
such as Germany and Sweden where their relatives, family and friends migrated and 
settled. Whereas Syrian Kurdish interviewees stated that they consider migrating to 
European countries when they have opportunities, conditions, and suitable times. 
However, the main reasons why they did do this were political fear, the difficulty of 
the reintegration process, the long duration of the migration process rather than any 
economic inadequacy, which were reasons that we could define in terms of with 
social and cultural capital. 
The similarity between these two groups is that they emphasized the different forms 
of capital that caused them not to go where they want to go, even though these forms 
of capital differed. The main difference is that their capital forms and amounts are 
effective on their movements, mobilities and potential migration initiatives. However, 
although I, as a researcher, approached both groups from a certain distance and 
observed their actions, thoughts, and plans, I can say that the inadequacy of 
economic capital in the life of Syrian Arab refugees in the KTPC had much more 
decisive importance. While stating this, I do not disregard vital importance of the 
political fear, and insecurity concerns that Syrian Kurdish refugees had in Turkey. I 
state that economic deficiency and incapability are much more visible and 
determinant if it is to point out which forms of capital are more decisive on pricey 
mobilities such as illegal immigration. 
The main points that the reader should understand from this comparison are as 
follows: Migration is a mobility form that requires a certain capability and amount in 
economic terms. Therefore, it is much more difficult for those who lack economic 
capital to realize this mobility. When we consider the general populations that are 
already displaced in the world, we can say that the segment that can travel long 
distances and meet their expenses is the economically middle and upper-class 
members, socially more educated and status-rich people. Large divisions of the 
remaining displaced communities migrate to and settle in neighbouring countries. 
Only if we remember the Syrian refugees’ population in neighbouring countries, there 
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are more than 3.6 million in Turkey, more than 1.5 million in Lebanon, more than 660 
thousand in Jordan, around 250 thousand in Iraq; whereas the whole Syrian refugee 
population in Europe is less than 1 million. 
The reader should connect that socio-economic, educational and cultural capital is 
of fundamental importance for refugees directly related to subjectivity. In addition, it 
should be comprehended that, refugees are already surrounded by the legal, social, 
economic, and politic boundaries and the disempowerment of their subjectivities is 
further increased when they lack these forms of capital. Therefore, in the lack of 
capital, it is much more difficult for them to obtain or regain their social and political 
subjectivities. 
3.4.4) A Comparison as a Basis for Understanding Subjectivity through 
Gender Roles, Norms and Transformation 
One of the most prominent pillars of this research is that the gender transformations 
of both Arab and Kurdish Syrian female refugees are more potent, visible, and 
reflected in practice. The reader is encouraged to associate this discussion and the 
transformation process with female refugees’ subjectivities, and to interpret gender 
roles, norms and changes that are strengthened and prominent. Since the fieldwork 
in Turkey was the first phase of this research, it would not be very accurate to 
compare gender codes, roles, transformation of Syrian female refugees as we do 
not know their subjectivities in gender relations before the displacement. Although 
we do not know female interviewees gender subjectivities in Syria, in the analysis 
made on the basis of their own words voiced by the female interviewees in the 
interviews, a discussion through social and political subjectivities can be presented 
since their gender features have become prominent, changing and visible. 
In fact, the discussions and analysis made in this section will become clearer when 
compared with the next field study. Nevertheless, we can compare the main points 
that Syrian Arab and Kurdish interviewees made and emphasize the similarities and 
differences; While female Arab interviewees expressed the difficulties that they faced 
in fulfilling the expectations created by deteriorated responsibility in camp conditions, 
they pointed out the traditional, cultural roles that collective groups and socialities 
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regenerated. It is underlined by the interviewees that being a mother, being a 
housewife, being a refugee and living in camp conditions are one of the worst 
combinations that can be experienced. Whereas female Kurdish refugees answered 
the questions more consciously about gender, as a result of the ‘progressive Kurdish 
women’s movements’ they were exposed to politically and socially or preferably 
taking parts. Female Kurdish interviewees emphasized the patriarchal aspect of 
gender codes and the negative impact of traditional and cultural roles on gender 
norms in their lives. Female Arab interviewees also stressed the negative effects of 
collective groups and social relations on them as well as the public representation of 
women in Turkey they encounter that caused inner questioning about gender roles, 
and complaints about the inability of traditional husband and wife roles to meet their 
needs in camp conditions. On the other hand, female Kurdish interviewees pointed 
to patriarchal roles in their family relationships, conflicts and disagreements between 
the political missions assigned to women and the roles they are expected to perform, 
and to the empowerments brought about by their economic freedom and, as they 
call it ‘standing on their own feet’. In this sense, the reader should see that there are 
gender questionings and actions in the two groups, which are in different degrees 
and with different discourses. Migration and displacement have a double impact on 
women, part of which is questioning gender roles and norms. Thus, it is 
recommended to establish a direct link between gender questionings and actions 





4) CHAPTER 4 
FIELDWORK IN GREECE: The Evolving Digital Habitus in Standby and 
Transition 
“I and my friend came to Turkey together, experiencing the danger of drowning in the Tigris 
River between Cizre [a Kurdish town in Şırnak province in Turkey] and Qamishli [a Kurdish 
city in Rojava]. We not only escaped from the war, and also from our families who were 
against us going to Turkey. But we did, with broken hearts and tears for a long time… We 
usually worked illegally, in a café, restaurant, as a carrier in fruit markets, days and nights 
in Diyarbakır. We planned to save money to pay smugglers who could help us to cross 
Greece. We worked with all efforts. After several months of working, we finally saved enough 
money to go to Bodrum, and then Akyarlar village [on the Aegean coast], illegally. Illegally 
means that no documents to legally be in Turkey and means the fear of being caught by 
security forces while travelling by bus. Luckily, we arrived in Bodrum, the beautiful city with 
thousands of tourists who came from countries where we wanted to go. My friend told me ‘I 
promise you; we will come back to this town and stay in 5-stars hotels one day.’  
“It took us a few days to arrange things with smugglers. We set the day and time for 
departure. Two days before, my father’s cousin found us. My father’s cousin asked me to 
go back with him because since I left my family two of my brothers [younger 17 and 19 years] 
had participated in the Kurdish armed protection forces in Qamishli. My mom and younger 
sister [14 years] were alone and needed to be taken care of. I had to decide; either to go 
with my friend to freedom and a new start or to go back to my family… Eventually, I could 
not do it, my friend decided to go alone and then he left. He had these excited and confused 
feelings when I saw him for the last time; on the way to a new start and leaving me behind 
who accompanied him since we left home.  
“Two days later I heard that my friend could not make it. With him, 17 more people drowned 
that day! There are a phrase Kurdish people use, ‘Freedom has a price!’ Since then, I 
question, why did we want to go to Europe? What did it offer for us? We create an image 
and then we convince ourselves to believe in this image!” [Field notes, Diyarbakır, 
15.10.2018] 
This is a story of a young female Syrian Kurdish refugee (21 years) and her friend 
(24 years) who sacrificed many things in their lives. I met her as an interviewee while 
doing fieldwork in Diyarbakır. She did not allow me to record and did not answer my 
interview questions, rather she wanted to tell her personal story, during which she 
minimally permitted me to take notes. Most of the interviewees in question in the 
following sections have gone through a similar process. I listened to the stories of 
the siblings, the uncles, the children of some of the interviewees who drowned while 
trying to cross the sea. If the 24-year-old Kurdish guy in the story mentioned above 
did not drown, he might have been one of the interviewees whose words I present 
133 
 
in the following sections. In a way, we will seek answers to the questions in the story 
o ‘Why did we want to go to Europe? What did it offer for us? 
This chapter is about those refugees who had or created prospects and conditions 
to leave Turkey and migrate to Greece. In this section, I present a similar structure 
to the previous section, with discussions on the perception of Syrian refugees, media 
use, forms of capital, and gender transformations. Readers will be able to better 
understand the results and findings of fieldwork conducted in KTPC and Kurdish 
cities in Turkey, particularly after reading the fieldwork discussions in the Greece 
chapter. In addition, readers will see in which areas the findings and results of these 
two different field studies are compatible or different from each other. The fieldwork 
in Greece serves the reader to follow the long-term migration process in which Syrian 
refugees are in transit and limbo before reaching their main destination within the 
three-step migration trajectory. The discussions of being in limbo and migration 
provide detailed answers and insights into how the lives, perceptions and imagined 
futures of Syrian refugees are affected by this process. With discussions based on 
fieldwork in Greece, the reader witnesses how Syrian refugees’ perceptions, 
thoughts, and desires change in the country where different social, legal and political 
processes operate. In this chapter, first, it is discussed that Greece functions as a 
transit country on the migration path of refugees. This discussion explains to the 
reader why immigrants and refugees do not choose to stay in Greece. In the 
continuation, on the axis of ethnography and interviews, a similar scheme and 
structure are followed. First, I introduce and discuss Syrian Arab refugees staying in 
the Sounio camp and Syrian Kurdish refugees staying in the Lavrion camp in the 
second half. Finally, at the end of the chapter, a comparison of all presented sections 
between these two sample groups is provided. 
4.1) Temporary Communities in Transition: Greece as a Pending Place 
One of the most striking features during the fieldwork in Greece was that the 
refugees did not choose to stay in Greece and instead continued to endure the 
difficult migration process, although they had managed to reach the European 
borders. In this sense, despite their arrival in Greece, the refugees who applied for 
asylum or preferred to settle in there constituted the smallest part of the total refugee 
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population, even though in the last few years there has been a continuous increase 
in asylum applications45. The main reason for this increase can be considered as a 
consequence of the EU-Turkey deal signed in 2016 and strengthened border 
controls as well as negative amendments to the asylum and refugee policies and 
laws of destination countries. In other words, Greece has been the main transition 
passage for hundreds of thousands of refugees (Papadopoulou, 2004; Schuster, 
2011), in the last decade particularly for Syrian refugees (Park, 2015). 
Understanding the reasons for this situation explains to us the process of migration 
between the origin and destination country; what these two different points mean on 
both the East-West axis; and also explains that the place implied and denoted by 
the concept of the West has different dimensions beyond being simply a 
geographical place. The geopolitical location of Greece plays a crucial role in 
choosing it as a transition country into Europe (Dokos, 2016; 48). The proximity of 
the Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea to Turkish territory may be counted as one of 
the most convenient reasons for migration to Greece as a first destination country 
from Turkey.  
When considering Syrian refugees in this scope, it is possible to make a comparison 
as follows: In terms of financial costs and hardship, crossing the border from Turkey 
to Greece is both more expensive and more difficult than crossing the border 
between Syria and Turkey. As the main argument in support of this statement, we 
can show that every year thousands of migrants and refugees die on immigration 
routes to reach Europe. In this sense, when we make use of statistics: they show 
that more than 3,100 refugees died in 201746, as of September 2018 more than 
1,500 refugees and migrants have died47, as of October 2019 more than 1000 have 
 
45 https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/statistics/ 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179 last accessed 31.05.2021 
46https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/06/576223035/more-than-3-100-migrants-died-crossing-
mediterranean-in-2017?t=1573131757385 last accessed 31.05.2021 
47https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/03/migrant-death-rate-mediterranean-rises-despite-fewer-
crossings/ last accessed 31.05.2021 
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died or gone missing48, and since the year 2000 the number is approximately 33,000 
people49. 
All interviewees in Greece indicated that they were aware of the dangers they can 
encounter while trying to cross the Turkey-Greece borders with illegal methods. I 
aim to precisely understand the dynamic that emerges in the dilemma between these 
refugees being aware of the risks they may face and taking action despite 
everything. Moreover, I aim to understand the push-pull factors that may cause death 
risk while taking action accordingly. For these purposes, Greece has a very crucial 
location and function within this research. The discussions in the following sections 
comprise the community relations, which we can call transition as the time between 
the migration start and endpoint, and which is limited by the daily relations 
experienced in it, but which we can evaluate as temporary. When we formulate it 
differently; the continuity that refugees experience both time and space-wise until 
they arrive at their intended destination country, this change of movement and places 
can be conceptualised as ‘temporary communities in transition’. I argue that this 
concept should be explored through an interdisciplinary approach. The specificity of 
this concept may have been already partly studied by a few similar concepts, such 
as the Social Solidarity (Nyers, 2008; Baldwin, 2019 (1910)), Cooperation among 
the Excluded (Belloni, 2016), and Part-time Integration and Adaptation (Feldman, 
2007; Alencar, 2018). Commonly, these different notions and perspectives point out 
a shared process of collaboration and help amongst refugees. However, although I 
believe that the temporary communities in transition as a concept already covers this 
collaboration and help amongst refugees, it should also be addressed in the 
refugees’ relations with time and place, integration and adaptation processes, and 
temporary community relations. What defines these refugees as temporary and in 
transition exclusively rather than by other research concepts, as an example, can be 
further explored with refugees temporarily residing in Greece. In particular, the many 
diverse ethnic, national, and religious groups that stayed at the Sounio camp were 
establishing a pattern among themselves on a more specific basis. This specific 
 
48 https://www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-2-october-2019/ last accessed 31.05.2021 
49https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/06/576223035/more-than-3-100-migrants-died-crossing-
mediterranean-in-2017?t=1573131757385 last accessed 31.05.2021 
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basis was that they could make identification of themselves in each other. In other 
words, regardless of their name, gender, religion and nation, the refugee as a status 
without an identity assisted to create a relationship and sociality that they knew they 
were in the temporary and in a transition process. Moreover, the main point that 
differentiates these relationships and interactions between Syrian refugees from 
individual immigration can be addressed as the similarity of their recent past 
experiences and their familiarity with each other’s future imaginations. In collective 
mass migration processes, the concept of temporary communities in transition can 
be further investigated. 
It can be argued that similar community relationships may potentially emerge more 
in collective mass migrations, which has the potential to transform into the diaspora, 
especially due to a large number of refugee masses and the existence of common 
social values and characters. In the Syrian refugee context, the diasporic relations 
have already started in the places to which they have migrated in masses. This has 
been an interesting point of scholars especially in Turkey (Sirkeci, 2016), Germany 
(Ragab et al. 2017, Jordan (Achilli, 2015) and Lebanon (Tolia-Kelly, 2019). Although 
the temporary relationships in these transition processes have the potential to evolve 
into diasporic relations, the possibility of these relations to break and become 
discontinuous is also distinguished from diasporas. On the other hand, while 
diasporic relationships are more established and capable of evolution when 
community relations are more settled, temporary community relations in transition 
correspond to the process before a settled life. In other words, solidarity and 
cooperation in diasporic relationships are more grounded and require continuity and 
persistence, unlike the communities in transition. 
This brief introduction serves us as a preparation for further discussions, interviews, 
and ethnography. Contents discussed in this section will be pointed out and 





4.2) Dispersing Community: Syrian Arab Refugees in Sounio Camp:  
4.2.1) Power Relations and Opinions about the Other: “Is Greece a 
Western Country?” 
In all the interviews held in Greece, the first issue that came to the fore was that the 
refugees did not come to Greece permanently. In other words, no refugee, by 
reaching Greece, arrived where they wanted to go. Another key issue that emerged 
during the interviews was that they had passed the first and most dangerous stage 
they had to go through to go to destinations they wanted to go, namely Western 
European countries. So much so that, apart from knowing the place they have 
arrived was Greece, they had almost no knowledge of the country. Although they did 
not have any great expectations and plans regarding Greece, the interviewees 
stated that they had pictures and expectations formed in their perceptions naturally 
because they knew that Greece was a European country. However, although they 
did not have clear pictures and expectations in their perceptions, it turned out that 
they were not satisfied with the situation they encountered due to reasons such as 
not being involved in social life in Greece, staying in camps established mostly on 
the outskirts of the cities, and the valuable currency of the country. Besides, I believe 
that the economic crisis experienced in the early 2010s in Greece, the high 
unemployment rates and the refugee system and policies of the country caused 
disappointment and confusion for Syrian refugees. 
Therefore, shortly after the refugees took their first steps in the country, reasons 
such as the living conditions they faced, the reality of the isolated camps, and the 
uncertainty of their future caused the refugees to gradually become critical, reactive, 
and disappointed about the ‘glorious West’ in their deep down inside perception. The 
question highlighted in the title of this chapter ‘Is Greece a real Western country?’  
was a question many refugees stated that they asked themselves. The reason for 
this was not only ignoring the harsh actuality, and also not losing the motivation to 
move further and arrive where they desire and want. The following interview 
questions, ‘What can you say about Greece? What does Greece mean to you?’ 
aimed to grasp the image and understanding of Greece in the perception of Syrian 
refugees. The given answer to this question also indirectly expresses how the image 
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and perception of any power relations or actors, which has an important role in 
refugees’ life, is formed. 
“I don’t know many things about Greece to be honest. It is a country in Europe I know, they 
use Euro. It does not matter that this country is called Greece or anything else because I 
have nothing to do with it. I want to go to Germany and many of my relatives did the same, 
they came to Greece and went further.” [Interview 25, An engineer and mechanic, Sounio, 
14.11.2018] 
“I didn’t know anything; I just followed my family. I did what they said. If they said we were 
going to China, I would do [smiles]. But if you asked me about Germany, Sweden, or the 
Netherlands, I could tell you more things because I have many relatives and friends there. I 
saw and read lots about these countries on the internet. Greece is just like a country that we 
have to pass through.” [Interview 33, 28 years old, divorced, engineer, Sounio, 23.11.2018] 
These answers show that although Greece is a country where all interviewees had 
to migrate through, since they did not intend to stay, their interest in the country and 
therefore their knowledge was very limited. The emphasised words of the 
interviewee that ‘If you asked me about Germany, Sweden, or the Netherlands, I 
could tell you more things…’ explain that Greece does not take place among the 
countries that come across in her digital habitus, which have shaped her interests 
regarding the countries she knew. Then we understand that Greece is a stop on their 
transitional process, yet a place that they sometimes spend years waiting. To 
comprehend this situation in more depth, I asked: ‘Although you knew you will pass 
through Greece, didn’t you wonder what this country is like?’ The answer to the 
question explains better what I aim to express in the previous sentence.  
“I mean, we knew we would come to Greece, but since we didn't think to stay here, I didn't 
wonder at all. I also knew that since none of my relatives who had been here stayed here, 
they didn't say much about it, I just had to pass here. For example, I have to go through 
Serbia and Hungary to go to Germany, but I don't know anything about these countries 
either.” [Interview 33] 
The relatives mentioned by the interviewee also passed in transit in Greece. 
However, they did not stay there and did not specify anything about the country, 
which determined the interest and curiosity of those who used the same route. The 
expression I used that ‘they did not come across in their digital habitus’ is related to 
this point. If we assume that a refugee who migrated to Greece and stayed in the 
country and applied for asylum. If this refugee had shared images, ideas, and news 
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about Greece in her/his own digital habitus – rather than those who post content 
about and from camps, s/he would probably have indirect influences on the opinions 
of other refugees who came to Greece afterwards. 
Apart from the refugees’ personal interests or plans, external conditions also have a 
great effect on the refugees’ difficulty in adapting to or learning about the country. 
What Syrian refugees in Turkey knew about the country was also influenced and 
shaped by external factors, such as similar historical backgrounds, the same religion, 
and similar cultural values, and being the neighbouring country. However, this was 
not the case for Greece. Syrian refugees were very much a stranger to the Greek 
language and culture, did not share the same religious values, had almost no 
historically and politically close relationships, at least not stated by any of the 
interviewees. In addition to these, the impression the Greek government left on the 
refugees was also defective, as governmental services were limited and the 
representation was inadequate. The interviewees’ words quoted below express their 
opinions on this situation: 
“I don’t adapt here at all. I don’t want to stay here so why should I do that. I have been here 
more than a year already and I don’t know even one single Greek word. I want to save my 
energy for Sweden, there will be language education, integration programs, better conditions 
so here I am just on pending. [Interview 25, 31 years old, artist and building worker, Sounio, 
15.11.2018] 
“Actually, I considered a few times to learn basic Greek but there was no education. The 
Greek government doesn’t want to keep us here, so why should they teach us their 
language, right? They don’t want us to get in their life. They know that we want to go 
somewhere else. We want to leave as soon as possible; they want us to go too.  So how 
can I get used to here? [Interview 33, 28 years old, female, Sounio, 23.11.2018] 
The inability to adapt to Greece, which the interviewees underlined, can be also 
related to the refugee camps’ locations. Commonly, most refugees who crossed the 
borders from Turkey to Greece firstly arrived at the Greek islands located just a few 
kilometres from the Turkish coasts. Then, they were transported either to the camps 
on the islands or later by the Greek government to camps on the country's mainland. 
Most of these camps in Greece’s mainland were located slightly outside of cities and 
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in more isolated areas50. Therefore, during the pending time they spent in Greece, 
they were living in a more isolated way than social life. One of my ethnographic 
observations was that this adaptation process was progressing slowly and 
insufficiently. After forced displacement, it can be argued that refugees have 
experienced the disorientation and adaptation complications (Keyes and Kane, 
2004; 809) during their time in the camps due to the more in-depth issues caused 
by psychological traumas, loss of their loved ones, spatial change, and the difficulties 
of daily life (Papadopoulos, 2007; 301). 
Oishi (2010), addressing refugees’ disorientation and adaptation complications with 
a different formulation, explains the concept he defines as the ‘psychology of 
residential mobility’. Oishi discusses the term: “Residential mobility can be defined 
as the frequency with which individuals change their residence,” (p.6) and “the 
frequency of mobility also influences the adaptation to the place, social relations and 
the self” (p.7). When considering this concept for Syrian refugees in Greece, in fact, 
this disorientation and the situation that we can consider as alienation in the following 
processes is a process that starts after being forcibly displaced. Hence, besides 
determining factors and experiences they went through in Greece, such as lack of 
governmental social services and the close relationship that cannot be established 
with the reality of daily life with local people; the past happenings, memories, and 
experiences as refugees they confronted in Turkey are also decisive difficulties in 
their adaptation. 
Alongside the Syrian refugees’ prospective frequent mobilities in an insecure way, 
unable to adapt to settled life, the idea of migrating to another country in their 
thoughts and plans can create an unbalanced relationship between the refugee 
individual and her/his environment and sociality. I indicate the words of a refugee 
below who experienced the frequent change of locations, displacement, and 
therefore inability in the adaptation, which caused him to strengthen his defence 
mechanism. His words and experience may assist us in understanding what 
residential mobility corresponds to in Syrian refugees’ life. 
 
50https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1B64TAhuL46HGymRuNmiRaMhtsUs&ll=36.53768893880
6724%2C25.31861898198802&z=7 last access 31.05.2021 
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“While staying in Turkey, we were transferred to other camps a few times. This is a very 
tiring thing. I have met and encountered so many people, after a while, I gave up making 
friends because everything becomes temporary… I understood that I will move again and 
again, and I will have to make friends again. That’s why it is difficult to adapt each time. I 
have a quieter and calm time here [in Sounio]. I decided to live like this until I arrive in 
Sweden. Whenever I settle in a permanent place, then I will start to be more adaptable and 
social. I promised myself like that [smiles]. I know sounds awkward but believe me, it's better 
for mental health.” [Interview 34, 39 years old, father of 2, Sounio, 23.11.2018] 
Forced displacements or nondiscretionary mobilities, we can fathom out, intrinsically 
provoke a defence mechanism toward the situation. In the case of Syrian refugees, 
they were aware of their temporariness and because of the realities of not being 
fixed in one place, they experienced disorientation, difficulty in adaptation, and 
alienation as a further phase. Interviewee’s attitudes and behaviours such as not 
making friends, not managing to adapt, not socializing, as a defence and protection 
mechanism, explain this subject more clearly. If we remember the discussions of 
Syrian Kurdish refugees’ strong solidarity, rapid integration and cooperation they 
have established in Kurdish cities, and if we conceive of this group as a control 
group; we can argue the following: ‘Whenever two foreign groups meet, if the 
common language, culture, value and sense of community features arise among 
them, then a faster adaptation, integration and solidarity among them can occur’. 
When referring to different studies that support this argument, we can consider the 
adaptation process of Syrian Armenians after migrating to Armenia (Călin-Ştefan, 
2014; Thomas et al. 2020). In the scope of these examples, we can conclude that 
the most significant factors are a common language, religion, common supra-
identity, imagined community, common traumas, and experiences. 
In addition to these discussions, after the departure of the Syrian Arab refugees from 
Turkey, it is noteworthy to consider what they state about Turkey. During the 
fieldwork in Greece, when I asked their opinions about Turkey in general, I noted two 
common attitudes among Syrian Arab refugees. These were either they were very 
critical about Turkey by giving negative personal experiences, or they did not want 
to specify any ideas about it due to the concerns and fears they had, even though 
they were not in Turkey any longer. The words of the two interviewees mentioned 
below illustrate this situation more clearly: 
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“To be honest, there was no freedom when we were in refugee camps and the government 
tried to control us all the time because we became Erdogan’s political tool against Europe. 
Also, there was heavy surveillance on us. We didn’t feel free or safe because there were 
many stories that refugees easily can be sent back to Syria. [Interview 27, 31 years old, 
married, male, Sounio, 15.11.2018] 
“Once I gave an interview to a local newspaper about refugees. Even though I didn’t say 
very critical things about Turkey but just complained about something, a few days after police 
found me and asked account of it… I was almost being arrested for no reason. So how can 
I state my real opinions afterwards? Many people here can tell many critics about Turkey 
now because they have had enough of playing three monkeys!” [Interview 34, 39 years old, 
Sounio, 23.11.2018] 
What these interviewers stated was also expressed by other interviewees that they 
had psychologically severe fears such as being constantly observed, controlled, not 
feeling free, being sent back or arrested at any moment. When evaluating that the 
Syrian Arab refugees staying in KTPC perceived Turkey as a country or state in the 
form of a power actor playing a vital role in their life, all the positive statements they 
stated about Turkey had radically changed in Greece. In this sense, when 
considering the representations of countries as power relations and actors, we can 
claim that these representations are not stable and constant. Based on these 
discussions, I sought to answer the following question: ‘Why do the discourses 
change when they arrive in Greece?’ Based on research experience, I can argue 
that temporal positionality required such a survival strategy, so they took a more 
conserved position and would not create any social or political problems for 
themselves. However, in a more secure and distant place from Turkey, such as in 
Greece, the agencies of the refugees speak and come to the fore. Therefore, 
refugees’ statements about Turkey in Greece were more sensible. 
Thanks to the different field study countries of this research, readers can observe 
how the opinions, perceptions and interpretations of the sample groups coming from 
the same ethnic, national and cultural background shift gradually in different 
geographies, cultures and administrative understandings. In the next chapter, I 
discuss how Syrian Arab refugees’ media and internet usage became more intense 
when being in limbo. 
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4.2.2) Simulation and Provoking Desire: “The Swedish government 
provides a car, a house, a job if we go there!” 
One of the most notable points in the fieldwork conducted in Greece was the intense 
and frequent internet use of refugees in the camps. They stated that they have an 
average of more than 6 hours of internet usage per day, and while noting they do 
not include the phone calls they make in this usage. Here, the point that the reader 
specifically should pay attention to is that this media and internet usage time is more 
than the average usage time as well as that this usage takes place in the camps. In 
the previous chapters, the negative effect of the restricting and privative peculiarities 
of camp conditions on the daily interactive and sociality of life between individuals 
was mentioned. I argue that in these conditions, the impact and shaping severity of 
intense media usage on perceptions of refugees is more than the way non-refugees 
are exposed as internet users. In addition, it should be remembered that media 
functions as an extension of dreams, plans and perceptions through media and the 
internet for refugees in particular due to many fundamental factors, such as the 
incomplete fulfilment of physical and social needs and uncertain future plans. I have 
specifically touched upon this subject in the literature review, where the camps are 
explained structurally and functionally with the metaphor of being in limbo. All 
interviewees in the Sounio camp stated that they have devices such as 
smartphones, tablets, and laptops as media hardware which McLuhan (1964) 
defined as an extension of consciousness that media content can be provided 
through. 
In this regard, in the title of this section, I refer to Baudrillard’s concept of simulation. 
The reason for this is that I argue that digital representations, which substitute for 
reality during the time refugees spend by using the internet extensively in restricted 
physical spaces, particularly on social media platforms, design a version of the 
simulation. Baudrillard has defined the simulation as “the substitution of signs of the 
real for the real” (1981; 4) which is very revealing for the Syrian Arab refugees 
staying in the Sounio camp. In fact, the proposition of substitution of signs of the real 
is very descriptive to know the formative and constructive visual and contextual 
elements behind the migration motivations that refugees have to reach in order to 
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the possess the living standards and styles of life they imagine in the destination 
places. So, ‘what exactly does this substitution of signs of the real correspond to in 
refugees’ media and internet usage?’ 
It corresponds to the representations, such as images, information, internet content 
about the life that they think they will potentially live and experience when they arrive 
at the migration destination, which refugees interact with and in return that shapes 
their thinking and perception. In this sense, if we consider all these internet contents 
as a representation by generalizing, these representations form and portray the 
identities to signify the content of the representations. I apply the concept of identity 
in a simpler sense that the represented content builds an identity about the others, 
which can be a style of life, or the experiences an individual lives and has. For 
example, all content that can cause refugees to imagine life and people in Germany 
from afar, such as living means, transportation, urban design, a German man or a 
woman, are the identities that construct what a refugee can imagine about Germany. 
Most of these identity formations find their counterparts in a more positive and biased 
form, especially for refugees who are vulnerable and urgently in search of a new re-
settlement. Such relationships with the media have an indirect effect that generates 
desire in general (Öktem, 2020). Objects or in this case digital content that 
constitutes desire, due to the nature of desire, have a positive reference and 
connotation. I consider the concept of desire that was shaped, influenced and formed 
as a result of the media relations of refugees, in a Delezuean sense; Deleuze's 
approach to desire is much broader than other scholars and refers not only to 
humans but also to animals, objects and social institutions (Gao, 2013; 406). 
Deleuze argues that desire is not a psychic existence or absence, but an active and 
positive reality, a positive vital force (see Deleuze, 2004; Deleuze and Guattari, 
1996; Smith, 2011). The subject of media and production of desire has been an area 
of concern for academic studies for many years, especially during the last two 
decades when media studies have accelerated. For further discussion, related 
literature can be reviewed (see Coetzee, 1980; Helstein, 2003; Berger, 2017). 
If we consider this discussion in terms of the determinants of migration, which we 
previously expressed as pull and push factors, Syrian refugees have already been 
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displaced by push factors. In other words, the main factors that cause them to 
become a refugee can be coded as push factors. In this study, we specifically focus 
on the other factor, the pull factor. In this sense, linking back to the discussion of 
represented content and formed identities about the destination places, I argue that 
these identities, which are potentially deficient and biased built through social media 
and the internet positively, can be considered as pull factors. To paraphrase this, 
this internet content that forms, affects, and shapes all the positive thoughts and 
perceptions that Syrian refugees expressed about the places they want to go, can 
actually be interpreted as pull factors. This argument becomes more important, 
especially on the subject of Syrian refugees, because as they can be ‘users’ of the 
generated content, they also can be the ‘producers’ of the content. Therefore, the 
contents we encoded as pull factors were also reproduced by them and 
disseminated and circulated amongst themselves using social media and other 
communication tools. In short, as a result of my ethnography and interviews, I 
noticed that refugees tend to accept information about places they think is better in 
their minds without questioning it and being able to test its truth. The main reasons 
for this were to get rid of the unsatisfying and inadequate social and economic 
conditions in which they lived. 
Referring back to Baudrillard’s definition, this replacement of real and actuality by 
the substitutions of signs of the real gains meaning that refugees want to believe in 
what these particularly positive identities embodied in digital contents. In other 
words, the source or accuracy of the information that are the elements of pull factor 
begins to weaken, and rather Syrian refugees believed in what they want to believe 
in. So, at some point, they can start to be interested in only positive images and 
information as a conscious choice. To better comprehend these arguments, the 
following interviews notes stated by a young Syrian refugee to the question “What 
are your motivations for taking all these risks to migrate all the distances to arrive 
somewhere further than here?” gives many hints and grounded reasons to the point 
I express concerning simulation. 
“Basically, to have a better life! Despite my young age, I have faced so many difficulties in 
life and I believe I deserve a better one for the rest.” [Interview 26, 22 years old, male and 
single, Sounio, 15.11.2018] 
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Then I asked a buffer question to take the discussion further: “But how can you be 
very sure that you will have a better life in where you want to go?” 
“This is what I want to believe… Otherwise, there are hundreds of negative information about 
Germany on the internet, but I prefer to ignore them. And I'm more confident in the ideas I 
have about Germany already. I will go and experience personally if there is the other side of 
the coin…” 
I did not state any opinion to what he stated but after a pause, he continued: 
“Do you really think that I don’t know how difficult and challenging life in Germany can be? 
Believe me, I have read enough of the difficulties I might face when I go. For instance, I 
know how long the documentation and all the bureaucracy takes. I know the German 
language is compulsory… But what I remind myself every day is how happy I will be there. 
I don't want to depress myself in these very bad conditions [means camp], why should I do 
this to myself? Don’t I deserve to be happy at least in my dreams?”  
The point emphasised by the interviewee, in other words, as I mentioned above, is 
consciously ignoring the other side of the coin in which the main motivation for this 
is to take care of himself and to feel better under the bad conditions of camps. 
Considering this point from a psychological perspective, it is actually a defence 
mechanism created by the refugee to protect himself. It should also be considered 
that as well as the defence mechanism, it was also determinant that the potential 
difficulties in Germany are not life-threatening and relatively comfortable when 
comparing to the Syrian war in their home country. We can understand this 
psychology more clearly with the following words: 
 “You really think that people [refers to refugees] believe in all of these dreams, like The 
American Dream? No, they just want to make an image that might be possible for their 
future…Once one of the middle aged Syrian men told me that the Swedish government 
provides a car, a house, a job if we go there! Yes, exactly like this. I asked how he knows 
about this, and he answered: ‘on Facebook, in the comments of a post.’ I said that I do not 
have an idea, because why would I want to destroy the dream of someone? He knew that 
what he asked was not real nor correct but wanted to believe in that… Do you understand 
now? At least we have our dream, is it a fault to create such dreams which is the only thing 
we have left to treat ourselves nicely!” [Interview 26, Sounio, 15.11.2018] 
The reader can perceive the words of the interviewee as an insight to the feelings, 
way of thinking and imaginations of Syrian refugees through the interpretation of a 
young member of them. I explain the main reasons for this way of thinking, feelings, 
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and imaginations with two interrelated causations: first being a refugee and second 
correlatively living in limbo. If we follow the intensive use of media and the internet, 
which are more understandable and visible in terms of refugees, and thus the effects 
of these uses on perceptions over a more large-scale formulation: The interaction 
and exposure to an object, place, lifestyle or thought through more intense and 
frequent positive images, contents, and information, as a result, creates a positive 
perception in the user. Considering the findings of the field study of this research, I 
formulate discussed arguments simply with the digital habitus discussion that it can 
be argued that positive digital contents as images, photos, videos, and information 
are more dominant in the digital habitus of Syrian refugees staying in the camps. 
This argument can be interpreted as follows: Syrian refugees prefer to connect with 
positive characters among the digital content appearing on their digital habitus. 
4.2.3) The Role of Capital Forms: “Being able to arrive in Greece cost 
the price of a house in Syria!” 
After the forced displacement, the longer-term migration with individual-collective 
choices or further push factors becomes an economically costly movement, 
especially when it comes to intercontinental or international migrations (Sjaastad, 
1962; Van Hear et al.2012). In one of the interviews at the Sounio camp, the 
interviewee had stated that being able to arrive in Greece from Turkey with his family, 
cost them the price of their house in Syria. The main reason for this great economic 
expense is that the migrations are made illegally. In the case of Syrian Arab 
refugees, when they decide to migrate from Turkey to Greece, they needed to find 
and negotiate with smugglers. In many situations, the smugglers use this tragedy 
and human mobility as an economic opportunity and trade benefit, particularly when 
there is more demand for migration. Smugglers manage this demand accordingly by 
increasing the price, which is defined as the migration industry by Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen (2013).  
The main issue I want to draw attention to in this section is that although migration 
is costly mobility, there are refugees with a capital form that can afford it. In fact, it 
can be evaluated that illegal migration from Turkey to Greece, especially after the 
border controls compressed after the 2016 EU-Turkey deal, acted as a socio-
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economic filter among Syrian. This becomes clear particularly when we take into 
consideration this argument for Syrian Arab refugees staying at KTPC that refugees 
in KTPC had clearly defined their economic status as poor and in need of help. In 
contrast, Syrian Arab refugees staying in the Sounio camp indicated their economic 
conditions were good and their main worries in the migration process were not 
economic costs. In their own words, when I asked about their economic conditions, 
the following answers given by interviewees to summarize their economic capital: 
“When we were living back in Syria, I had 3 houses in the city, a house in the village, 2 cars 
and 2 shops in the city centre. Thank God, we had everything we need. Otherwise, we 
couldn’t make it until here.” [Interview 25, 50 years old, father of 3, Sounio, 14.11.2018] 
“Before I got married, my family’s economic situation was very good. We had whatever we 
needed. My husband’s family was also very wealthy, and my husband had many shops… 
But not anymore, all our money is gone... Migrating as a refugee makes everything double 
the price!” [Interview 30, Married, 25 years old, 19.11.2018] 
“I was okay, I had what I needed, a house, a truck, a bit of land in the village. Before I left 
Syria, I sold everything because I understood there will no future for us in Syria. The money 
I got from selling my home only took me here...” [Interview 36, 34 years old, no kids, Sounio, 
25.11.2018] 
Most of the other interviewees made similar statements to those of the interviewees 
quoted here. One of the common highlights was that they sold their assets in Syria 
and were able to afford their lives with the income they earned from there. I have 
also addressed the relationship between economic income and educational status, 
and therefore social status. The education level of the members of the families with 
good economic income and conditions is generally also higher (Stockfelt, 2016; 
Cheng and Kaplowitz, 2016).  
When we approach this subject from the Bourdieusian perspective, Sullivan (2001; 
893) interprets the correlation between economic capital and education as follows: 
“According to Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction, children from middle-class 
families are advantaged in gaining educational credentials due to their possession 
of cultural capital.” This argument for Syrian Arab interviewees staying at Sounio 
camp pointed out that the social and educational status of Syrian refugees was 
seemingly tied to their economic background. The more economically strong they 
were in the upper classes; their educational levels and social status were 
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correspondingly higher. In Sounio camp, among 9 interviewees, there were 5 
bachelors and above degrees, 3 high school diplomas and 1 secondary school 
diploma. However, when it came to the question of social status in correlation with 
their economic status, even those who had high school degrees described 
themselves as having prestigious jobs or respected positions in their communities. 
The relationship that the reader should establish with the Syrian Arab refugees 
staying in Sounio in the light of this demographic and socio-economic information 
should be as follows: When it comes to refugees’ subjectivity it can be analysed 
through capital forms as determining and strengthening factors, which empowered 
their decision to emigrate from Turkey to Greece, take an action in accordance, and 
to reach the destination countries they plan or dream of. 
In the next section, Syrian female Arab refugees in the Sounio camp are discussed 
in relation to their gender roles and norms, transformations, and changes. 
4.2.4) Empowerment of Female Refugees: “My husband feels weaker 
here because the administration supports women more!” 
Although there are more similarities among refugee camps in general in terms of 
structure and function, the geographical locations of the camps were also 
determinant in the research findings. Although the Syrians staying in refugee camps 
in Turkey, for instance, had uncertainties and anxieties about the future, they were 
more accustomed to the conditions they were in because of the long waiting periods 
(see Kirişci, 2014; İçduygu, 2015). However, Syrian refugees staying in camps in 
Greece essentially spent their time remembering that they used there as a transit 
country, planning to leave at any moment and attempting to go elsewhere, as well 
as being aware of the reality of no cultural affinities with local communities. 
In the basic comparison between these two countries, for refugees who were in 
standby mode in Greece, their daily practices turned into a more habitual, repetitive 
routine, focused on spending time until the standby mode was over. However, in 
Turkey, despite Syrian refugees staying in camps, at the same time, they were giving 
more importance to their adaptation and integration, job searching, and getting work 
permits. Alexandra Greene (2019; 735-736), in her study analysing the situation of 
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refugee women staying in a camp in Greece, emphasizes that women spend their 
routine work using media that women do not use much. Greene draws attention to 
the changes refugee women go through in their daily routines. I can verify this 
argument with a comparison of the fieldwork findings and results in Turkey and 
Greece. It was emphasized that refugee women staying in KTPC engaged in less 
media usage due to their gender-based work division and responsibilities.  
The increasing use of the internet and media by Syrian refugee women provides the 
reader with the following information: Refugee women in the Sounio camp enhanced 
their individual interests, personal development, and future dreams more powerfully. 
In other words, the more active activism and practices of women who are more 
conscious of gender roles, as one of the prominent factors in the subjectivity 
discussions, was one of the characteristics observed among the women in the 
Sounio camp. Although the annual reports prepared by the Women’s Refugee 
Commission (WRC) draw attention to the victimization of women and their exposure 
to unseen violence in their reports on Syrian refugee women; these reports also refer 
to the successes and transformation refugee women have gone through over the 
years and to their achievements in different fields, such as business and non-
governmental organizations. Besides, Freedman, Kivilcim and Baklacıoğlu (2017) 
approached the Syrian refugee crisis from a gender perspective and drew attention 
to the rights violations and challenges faced by women and LGBTI+ groups. On the 
other hand, they also refer to the changes and developments women went through 
by emphasizing their experiences in different countries. In this sense, in my 
interviews I noted the fundamental changes that occurred with refugee women in the 
Sounio camp in Greece, as follow: First, the pressure created by the demands and 
expectations of the collective community regarding Syrian Arab refugee women 
eased. Then, their gender awareness through gender-based training and seminars 
in the camps increased, such as sexual gender-based violence training (Botsi et al. 
2018), gender equality programs (Grabska, 2011) and sexual abuse and sex 
educations (Digidiki and Bhabha, 2018). Also, they became more aware of their legal 
rights, and the gender roles and responsibilities in their families loosened. Finally, 
thanks to the responsibilities given to women in the leadership of NGOs inside the 
Sounio camp, Syrian refugee women’s public visibility increased, and these 
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responsibilities and public visibility directly empowered them. The readers can 
understand these conclusions more clearly thanks to the answers given by the 
interviewees to the question: ‘How would you describe your experiences of being a 
refugee and woman in Turkey and Greece?’ 
“In Turkey, we lived in a neighbourhood, where mainly were Syrians. So we had to pay 
attention to what we were saying and what we were doing. Because there is such a 
perception that even if we are refugee, we should protect our values more and represent 
even better to others. That's why everybody seemed to control each other... We are with 
fewer Syrians here, we talk, we are friends, but nobody judges anyone or checks. There are 
some trainings only for women here, they constantly tell us how strong we are as women. 
My husband once told me that I have been more assertive and conversational ever since I 
started going to these seminars. I think this is a good thing [smiles]”. [Interview 33, 28 years 
old, mother of 2, 23.11.2018] 
“In Turkey, I couldn't defend myself, because our relatives were involving in our family 
relationships... But now I know my rights better. He would always be right in our discussions 
with my husband before, I would be quiet, but now I am talking too... I think the most obvious 
change is that my husband feels weaker here because the administration here supports 
women more, at least he says that.” [Interview 35, 20 years old, mother of 1, 24.11.2018] 
In the interviews I conducted in the Sounio camp, activities within the scope of 
‘empowerment of women’ were mentioned very often. In this sense, it can be stated 
that subjects such as increasing awareness regarding policies, women rights, sexual 
education and violence, gender relations and roles for Syrian refugee women were 
visibly influential in their lives in Sounio. The interviewee’s transfer of her husband’s 
words lays the groundwork for our following analysis: The migration process also 
deconstructs traditional gender roles where men feel vulnerable and threatened as 
they are disempowered because of their refugee status, and gender equality is more 
emphasised. 
In particular, it can be noted that increased gender awareness influenced domestic 
family gender roles, norms and dynamics, Syrian female Arab refugees felt stronger, 
more conscious and educated. On the axis of these discussions, while collective 
community pressures decreased, gender-based education and awareness 
increased, and this situation positively affected women’s self-representation, public 
visibility, and gender relations. In other words, while emphasizing the correlation 
between education and economic capital in the previous section, we can say that by 
adapting Bourdieu’s cultural capital analysis, works that support and strengthen 
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cultural capital such as seminars, workshops, and education have strengthened 
Syrian female Arab interviewees’ subjectivities. 
In the next section, fieldwork-based discussions on the Syrian Kurdish refugees 





4.3) Politicisation of Perception and Worldviews: Syrian Kurdish Refugees in 
Greece 
While the cold breeze coming from the Aegean Sea was caressing us on our faces, I was 
smoking a cigarette with Kurdish Syrian refugees on the cold stairs of a building. The camp 
was older than fifty years where tens of thousands of political prisoners and asylum seekers 
had been coming and passing through between East and West. The excitement and anxiety 
of the Kurdish father, who was sitting next to me and smoking cigarette one after another, 
was obvious. He was quiet and thinking of his wife who was giving birth inside a few meters 
behind us in the building. During the silence right before the birth, the harshness of the wind 
blowing on our faces had intensified even more and the rain started to drizzle slowly. Inside 
the building, one of the doors swiftly opened and they gave the news of the new-born baby. 
Everybody suddenly cheered up and hugged each other, and then giving hugs and kisses 
to father to congratulate him. The father accepted all the greetings and congratulations. As 
if he could hide the tears into the raindrops, the father began to cry lightly. Then with tears 
in his eyes, he sat exactly at the same spot on the stairs and started to speak: 
“Would we go to experience these things too? In the turmoil of the world, I have no idea 
where we have been thrown, what we have experienced... What will happen now? What am 
I going to tell the baby when the baby grows up? But even that baby is more fortunate and 
stronger than us, although he was just born. Because even if the baby cannot speak, cannot 
say who s/he is or what s/he wants, s/he will be recognized, taken as the interlocutor, and 
s/he will have an identity as soon as possible... Look at us; We can know how to talk, who 
we are and what we want, why we came here. But nobody hears, sees, pays attention to 
us. We are like a ghost as if we never existed...” 
When the father stopped talking, there was only silence and drizzling raindrops that came 
from the sea, where many of refugees had lost their lives while fleeing to safer places in 
their mind, where refugees in camps could not look directly due to the fear of as they might 
see the souls of the deceased. After the father gave up the weight of the patriarchy, he cried 
a little more and continued to speak while lighting another cigarette: 
 
“We now live in a world where babies have more rights and recognition than their parents... 
I am happy that my baby will have better conditions than us, but this life made a father 
jealous of his new-born baby. I am ashamed of myself!” [Field notes, Lavrion Refugee Camp, 
16.07.2019] 
During my fieldwork, I witnessed a wedding ceremony in KTPC, a baby born in 
Lavrion, and a refugee who lost her mother while staying in the camp. When I came 
across this father, whom I sat on the cold stair steps when the wife gave birth the 
next day in the camp's canteen. We chatted again. I asked him what exactly he 
meant by the words I quoted above. As he explains, since they are Syrian refugees, 
if any baby is born while staying in the camp, the UN officially recognizes the baby 




The father’s grievances and the final words that he said, “I am ashamed of myself”, 
in fact, are about the bureaucracy that they were obliged to deal with, and about the 
recognition of and interest shown to a new-born baby in a camp not being shown or 
provided to the parents of the baby. In other words, when considering the 
desperation of the father, his own subjectivity and representation were not 
recognized by any official institution. However, a new-born baby who cannot even 
represent the self, as the father described, can easily and much faster obtain the 
documents that those parents struggle to obtain. That was the dilemma which made 
the father say that he feels jealous of his new-born baby. 
4.3.1) Lavrion Refugee Camp: Realization of the Imagined Community in 
Wire Mesh Walls 
One of the main focuses of this research is to take into account Syrian refugees’ 
ethnic difference and to understand the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on 
perceptions and communities. Within the scope of fieldwork conducted in Turkey, 
the presented and discussed concept and perception of imagined community and 
solidarity among Kurdish people has appeared in the Lavrion camp in a much more 
visible, observable and practical form. In this chapter, I elaborate on the solidarities 
and imagined community debate among Kurds in an ideological perspective that 
emerges specifically from the structure and operation of the Lavrion camp. In doing 
so, I first present the information about the Lavrion camp in a descriptive manner 
and then discuss the association and relationships of the Kurdish refugees in this 
camp. 
Lavrion city is located in the southeast part of the Attica region in Greece, 
approximately 30-35 miles away from the Greek capital. Its convenient location, as 
a harbour city close to both Turkey and Bulgaria, and its geopolitical location within 
Greece makes it optimum. The Lavrion51 refugee camp was established 
approximately 60 years ago by the Greek government with the cooperation of the 
United Nations (UN) in the centre of the city, just next to the harbour. The camp has 
 
51 https://www.nytimes.com/1981/08/23/world/camp-in-greece-a-halfway-point-for-refugees.html last 
accessed on 31.05.2021 
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been in use since World War II52. At the time the camp was established, it was 
intended to host or be a shelter for refugees, mostly political, from the former USSR. 
However, in the meantime, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the high 
intensity of political conflicts between Kurdish people and Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Syria have changed the profile of refugees who stay in Lavrion camp. At the same 
time, the Lavrion camp turned into a centre for essentially political leftist groups 
escaped from Turkey in the 1980s and 90s53, and over time, the refugee associated 
with the PKK became dominant in the camp, and the camp served as an ideological 
training camp54. Later, there have been many other Kurdish refugees other than only 
political refugees, mainly due to the Syrian war started in 2011, which changed the 
profile of refugees staying in the Lavrion camp55. 
Until late 2017, the Greek government with the help of the UN had provided daily aid 
and assistance to refugees staying in the camp. After that date, mainly due to 
political pressure from Turkey on the Greek government, all government services 
and aid were terminated. Also, as came out in conversations with the owner of local 
shops surrounding the camp, the initiative of large companies that want to destroy 
the camp and demolish the camp buildings due to the economic and functional 
position of the location of the camp had impacts on the decision to remove the legal 
status of the camp. The Lavrion refugee camp became self-governed and self-
financed56 by the habitants of the camp through established committees for various 
everyday essential services. All those staying at the camp were Kurdish people from 
different countries, mainly from Turkey, those who escaped from the political 
persecutions, as they described. When asked about the situation of the camp to the 
person who introduced himself as in charge of the camp, he answered:  
“The camp has a capacity of approximately 350-400 people and has been controlled 
by the Kurdish movements for the past few years. Therefore, for those who want to 
 
52 https://www.fraterinternacional.org/en/greece-mission-visit-refugee-camp/ last accessed on 31.05.2021 
53 https://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/09/world/flow-of-turkish-refugees-a-strain-for-greece.html last accessed 
on 31.05.2021 
54https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/inside-kurdish-refugee-camp-run-its-residents-1798704513 last 
accessed on 31.05.2021 
55 https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2014/7/56ec1e638/crossing-to-safety-and-heartache.html last accessed 
on 31.05.2021 
56 http://www.kedistan.net/2018/03/07/lavrio-self-governed-camp-kurdish-exiles/ last accessed on 31.05.2021 
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stay in the camp, we have our own criteria, such as being Kurdish. The reason for 
this is both to protect our association and to use our limited resources effectively for 
our people. Some voluntary institutions help, both financially and with health and 
education services... This [camp] is a small Kurdistan for us, for the first time our 
people from four parts of Kurdistan live together.” [Field notes, Lavrion, 10.11.2018]  
During my ethnography in Lavrion camp, the solidarity and collectiveness of Kurds 
was the main observation, although the feelings of longings of loved ones, of being 
in exile, being a refugee and desperately looking for a way to leave Greece to go to 
destination countries were also observed. Togetherness, solidarity and collaboration 
of Kurdish people were clearly blossoming. However, in such a refugee camp in 
Greece which is very far from their home, many Kurdish refugees expressed that 
they feel at ‘home’, meaning being together with other Kurdish people.  
Although we have already discussed what the imagined community concept means 
to Kurds, the solidarity and togetherness of Kurds in the Lavrion camp were also 
closely related to the way the camp was governed and organized. Through the 
seminars, education and responsibilities organized by the camp administration and 
organization, the ideological principles and perspective of the PKK, the Kurdish 
armed political movement, became a part of the daily life of all refugees in the camp. 
This situation was predominantly determinant on refugees’ worldview, political 
attitude and perception of who came to the camp or was accepted because of only 
being Kurdish. Therefore, the concept of the imagined community that the Kurds 
envisioned came true in a way, supported by ideological doctrines. The Syrian 
Kurdish refugees’ opinions regarding being in Lavrion camp, whose words I quoted 
below, has a supportive feature regarding these arguments.  
“Here in the camp, everybody is a kind of relative to each other. It is the first time I am not 
afraid to loudly announce that I am proud to be a Kurdish person in public. It is a good 
example of a small Kurdistan for me, you can find four parts in one even though in a strange 
place [refers to refugee camp]. None of this was possible in Turkey.” [Interview 28, 24 years 
old, mother of 1, Lavrion, 17.11.2018] 
“I always had a dream of seeing my people from four parts living together. Now I feel like 
my dream became true… Here, I start the day with the anthem of the PKK, this is what has 




It can be argued that the PKK’s ideological doctrines were the political and social 
foundations of a practised and founded imagined community and solidarity, as we 
will see in the following discussions. As far as these interviewees indicated and I 
could ethnographically observe the daily routines, socialisation and solidarity of the 
refugees staying in the camp, the unity and solidarity of the Kurdish refugees was 
established on substantially a political ground. For example, the way refugees 
address each other in the camp was with the Kurdish word ‘heval’, which literally 
means friend in English but is used for the word comrade. Besides, the roles and 
responsibilities of women refugees in the administration of the camp stemmed from 
the Kurdish movements’ co-chairmanship political organization system, where one 
man and woman share the responsibility (see Van Bruinessen, 2016; Halhalli, 2018), 
which I will especially mention in the section where I will discuss Kurdish female 
refugees in gender. Everyday essential works in the camp were carried out by those 
selected among the camp residents. These divisions of responsibilities were 
performed in different committees such as education, health, food, bakery, cleaning, 
seminars, documentation, and others. One man and one woman had to take 
responsibility in each committee as the co-chairmanship system proposes. However, 
some female refugees uttered that they had to undertake multiple responsibilities 
and roles since the majority of those staying in the camp were men. Although the 
Kurds expressed their satisfaction with being together, they compared the 
experience with the identity and positions of Kurdish people in Turkey, as in the two 
interviewees’ statements above. As if, as well as going to the countries they want to 
go to, there was a feeling of satisfaction and comfort because of having left Turkey. 
This point has been discussed both in the theoretical background information given 
about Syrian refugees in the literature review and also in the Turkey chapter. It also 
shows the historical effects of political and military tension and conflict between 
Turkey and Kurdish people even though they were not in Turkey anymore. 
In the next section, I discuss the effects of the ideologically radical leftist and pro-
women political understanding in the Lavrion camp on the Syrian Kurdish refugees’ 
view of the world, their attitudes and perceptions about the western concept and the 
places they want to go. 
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4.3.2) Lavrion Camp as an Ideological Training Camp: Refugees’ 
Politicized Perceptions and Ideological Criticisms of the West 
In this section, I first touch upon the interviews conducted on Syrian Kurdish 
refugees’ perceptions and knowledge of the places they intend to go. Later, during 
their stay in Lavrion camp, I refer to a contradiction that emerged regarding the 
images and information about places they want to go due to the ideological 
perspectives and doctrines that either they were subjected to or with which they were 
voluntarily involved. In this context of contradiction, I consider the effects of the 
principles, perspectives, and ideology of a political and armed political entity (PKK) 
on the Syrian Kurdish refugees’ perceptions and worldview in the scope of power 
relations and actors. 
In addition to the face-to-face interviews conducted in the Lavrion camp, I observed 
that Syrian Kurdish refugees were affected by the seminars and trainings they 
participated in during their stay in the camp in the scope of the data I obtained during 
ethnography. Although all interviewees expressed themselves by involving Kurdish 
identities, they stated that they were actually influenced by the Kurdish political 
movements, but they were not really aware of the ideological formations of these 
movements in detail. In other words, interviewees were mostly not politicized and 
stated that they learned their Kurdishness as an identity more by being marginalized 
and excluded, mostly due to the state repression implemented upon them. 
However, I realised that the perspectives refugees learned in the camp, especially 
in the light of PKK ideology and doctrines, were influential in their perceptions and 
world views. To further elaborate this argument expressed above, one of the 
questions I asked in interviews was: ‘What does Kurdishness mean to you?’  The 
interviewees’ answers below, both single and under 30 years old, with bachelor’s 
degrees, are noteworthy.  
“Being Kurdish actually means being a nation, but unlike other nations, we don’t have an 
independent state. That’s why we learn to be Kurdish with the experiences of exclusion, 
assimilation and suppression implementations of the states we live in it. When a nation is 
stateless, it cannot learn its history and its culture. Kurdish people become separatist or 
terrorist in the eyes of states when they try to learn their history, culture, and language.” 
[Interview 20, Lavrion, 06.11.2018] 
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“Let me explain with an example: Imagine you meet someone, but they don’t ask you what 
your name is. They directly tell you that you are Kurdish. But if they don't tell me, I'm Kurdish, 
I’d identify myself by my name. That’s why I learn that I am Kurdish before identifying my 
name... I define Kurdish people as a nation that lives in the borders of states telling us that 
we are not Kurds, but Arab, Turk, Iranian.” [interview 32, Lavrion, 22.11.2018] 
The common point emphasized by these two interviewees is that Kurdishness is 
defined externally, that is, the dominant identity of the powerful party is being tried 
to be imposed on Kurds. Although the expressions of interviewees and the way of 
introducing themselves are directly associated with a robust political discourse, the 
habitus of these interviewees in Syria, their upbringing, environments, social 
relations, dominancy of PKK ideology have been decisive on their perception of 
Kurdish identities. The management and organization prevailing in the Lavrion 
refugee camp had an approach based on Kurdish identity. Therefore, the refugees 
who stayed in the camp had a chance to experience their Kurdishness apart from 
the identity of the dominant group imposed on them until they got there. The Lavrion 
camp, as a small community of the Kurdish people, so to speak, served as a camp 
where refugees were told to be Kurdish. Like other Kurdish people from other 
countries, Syrian Kurdish refugees were also able to perform their Kurdish identities, 
without seeing pressure, and in a way they imagined. However, the striking part here 
is that Syrian Kurdish refugees acknowledged their identity as Kurdish, especially 
with the ideologically dominant, radical political understanding, structure and living 
and apparently with their consent. So, ‘how did this happen? How has this radical 
political understanding and living taken place and performed?’ 
In a previous section, an interviewee said: “I start the day with the anthem of the 
PKK!”57 This ideological understanding and political living took place among 
refugees through such acts as: Starting the day with a political anthem, by 
addressing ‘comrade’ to each other as the common identity in communication with 
everyone staying in the camp, and by establishing committees for the everyday 
essential work in the camp and designating a female and a male representative in 
 
57 As far as I learned from the different refugees staying in the camp, when the Lavrion camp was an ideological 
training camp, the political marches were a part of the daily routine in a very organized and disciplined manner. 
Although the interviewee above emphasized, he starts his days with the anthem of the PKK; I did not come 
across these anthems sang collectively by refugees during my stay in the camp. 
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each committee to represent the co-chairmanship system. Moreover, it was 
performed periodically by giving seminars and trainings on topics such as Kurdistan 
history, women’s history and value, equality and democratic life, ecological life and 
modernity, as stated by many participants. Therefore, Kurdish identity, with more 
political discourse and perspective, was explained and taught to Kurdish refugees in 
the Lavrion camp. 
However, I also witnessed that these politicized teachings and worldviews could 
strikingly become confusing for Syrian refugees as regards where they wanted to 
go. In other words, for example, a Syrian Kurdish refugee who wanted to go to 
Germany started to have critical and sceptical thoughts about Germany due to these 
seminars, shared responsibilities and organizing ways. This example is particularly 
applicable to Western or European countries and concepts in general. The 
interviewees’ words quoted below become more understandable concerning the 
argument above.  
“… I always wanted to go to France, I don't know why, since I was a kid, I wanted to see 
France and Paris. But I learned at the seminars here that France is a very cruel country. 
They were very unfair to other nations; they killed many people. I don't like France anymore 
as I did before.” [Interview 22, 25 years old, teacher, Lavrion, 07.11.2018] 
“My opinions have changed a lot especially after arriving at our camp. Here my comrades 
have given me many courses on history, politics, and other things. Now I know that 
economically rich, strong and developed European countries actually created these living 
standards by exploiting and colonizing other third world countries.” [Interview 24, 26 years 
old, father of 1, Lavrion, 14.11.2018] 
The main emphasis in the words of these interviewees is that what they learned 
about the concepts they did not know in detail before was influential on what they 
knew. During my time in the camp, most of the refugees I socialized with expressed 
their opinions and reasons for the European countries they wanted to go to. 
Afterwards, they emphasized that they were questioning whether Western societies 
are really consumerist, capitalist and hegemonic as if they wanted to test it. The point 
that the reader should pay attention to here is that these expressions almost entirely 
have a political discourse and attitude. 
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The political change and transformation Syrian Kurdish refugees went through 
during their time in the Lavrion camp is actually a good example for the power 
relations and actor discussion. In that discussion, I had emphasized that power 
relations are a matter of power and influence that one entity, structure, person, 
character, or an ideology that has the formative effects in thought and perception of 
one another. In this sense, the transformative effect of the ideologies of Kurdish 
movements on Syrian Kurdish refugees’ thoughts, perceptions and political world 
views can also be considered as a formative effect.  
Nonetheless, I argue that power relations and actor’s forms, representations and 
influence have reached a new format via media and the internet in which I have 
emphasized in this study. Lavrion camp has a formative form of influence that can 
be observed to be effective and operates through signs and symbols, such as party 
flags, photos and pictures and representations of political characters, books of 
political characters, or training and seminars. I just intersect the digital habitus with 
power relations. Thus, I draw attention to the fact that these classical power relations 
and actors’ formative effects have begun to be digitalized as well as the digitalized 
communication, interaction and socialization relations.  
In the next part, I present the internet and media uses of Syrian Kurdish refugees 
who have started to have a political discourse and worldview. 
4.3.3) Reflections of Politicized Perceptions in the Digital Habitus: “I 
want to go to Italy because I can protest freely!” 
In the previous section, I explained that during their stay in the Lavrion camp, Syrian 
Kurdish refugees’ thoughts and perceptions about the places they wanted to go has 
started to change and became politically critical and sceptical. As they progress 
through their migration routes and transitions, they also become more experienced 
and informed about the challenges of arriving and living in Europe. I elaborated on 
the process of becoming politically critical and sceptical which caused them 
confusion regarding the place to migrate. In this section, I discuss Syrian Kurdish 
refugees’ media and internet usage. In doing so, I argue that despite the politicized 
perspectives that make them more critical and sceptical, the content in their digital 
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habitus still has a positive and aspirational impact as a pull factor in migration 
narratives. 
Similar to the internet and media usage of Syrian Arab refugees staying in the Sounio 
camp, the internet usage of Syrian Kurdish refugees staying in Lavrion camp was 
around 5-6 hours on average per day. Both groups had similar internet usage 
engagements and encounters since the digital content with which they were linked 
on the Internet was structurally positive. The platforms widely used in both groups 
were mostly mainstream and well-known social media platforms such as Facebook, 
Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. Previously the solidarity and Kurdishness as the 
supra-identity among Kurds was mentioned, thus, almost all refugee individuals who 
stayed in the Lavrion camp and left to other countries afterwards got in touch, 
connected, and socialised with each other through social media. It can be 
understood more clearly what I mean by the words of the young refugee, who was 
cheerful and had a sense of humour, stating that he stayed in the Lavrion camp for 
about 2 years:  
“When I stayed here [in camp] for a long time, I had the chance to meet the people coming 
and going. I've been friends with everyone. I have over 2000 friends on Facebook, most of 
them are comrades who came here and then left. Actually, nobody has 2000 friends when 
you think about it in real life, right? [smiles] Now there are comrades I know in 10 different 
countries in Europe, thanks to them, I have learned these countries well... When I first came 
to the camp, I had in mind to go to Sweden, but now I am thinking of going to Switzerland 
or Denmark, I saw that the comrades going there are happier and more peaceful, I mean I 
saw that on their social media accounts.” [Interview 20, 26 years old, Lavrion, 06.11.2018] 
We find the opportunity to verify the following arguments from the words of this 
interviewee: It is stated that the Lavrion camp was used temporarily in Greece and 
the intended places where the refugees who came there want to go are other 
European countries. At the same time, the Lavrion camp conditions and lifestyle 
created a strong relationship and communication between the refugees who stayed 
there. This relationship and communication also took place, especially in a digital 
space. However, one of the points I want to draw attention to in this regard is the 
relationality, connectedness, and the sense of awareness that digital communication 
creates in users indirectly. Communications or engagement with the social media 
content that take place in a digital environment is no longer up close and personal 
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among users. Rather, the way that the information shared by the users on their social 
media accounts as a public domain has changed the way other users perceive and 
associate with the shared information. It is a new communication model for a user 
who spends time, for example, on Facebook or Instagram to interpret the content, 
posts, and pictures he sees as communicating with the user who shares this content 
(Cho, 2013). The words of the interviewee can be a good example to better 
understand this new communication and engagement model: “... now I am thinking 
of going to Switzerland or Denmark, I saw that the comrades going there are happier 
and more peaceful, I mean I saw that on their social media accounts.” If we evaluate 
the words of this person, in particular, the social media content that he reads, 
encounters or sees can now be a source of information or reference to trust when 
he spends time on social media. 
Although the internet usage forms and platforms of Syrian Arabs and Kurdish 
refugees in Greece were similar, their interpretation of and interaction with the 
content were different from each other. The main difference was the change of 
content that reproduced their desires about the West, especially the countries they 
wanted to go to, evoked sympathy and invoked positive connotations in their 
perceptions. Several Syrian Kurdish interviewees in the Lavrion camp stated that 
their consideration and expectation with the countries they wanted to go to has been 
affected by their political worldview. For instance, it is noteworthy to analyse the 
following words of a refugee who was spending time on his phone in the canteen of 
the camp, and suddenly approached me and showed a video on his phone, on his 
Facebook account and said: 
“You were asking questions about the countries we wanted to go to recently, look how 
comrades do a demonstration in this video, they carry PKK flags, pennants, pictures... This 
is Italy. I want to go there because I want to do protests for our people, struggle and strive. 
I have never heard of any comrade who was detained because of any protests about 
Kurdistan or Kurdistan in Italy. I believe it is a comfortable place, I mean there is freedom of 
expression and freedom of protests.” [Field notes, Lavrion, 09.11.2018] 
The point emphasized by this participant in his words can be analysed as follows: A 
refugee seeking answers to his needs and expectations in the axis of politicised 
perception and political perspective can find positive contents in her/his digital 
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habitus. In other words, media contents emerging in digital habitus may differ in 
parallel with the user’s preferences, sensitivities, political preferences and 
expectations, but due to the structure of social media, the content that the user is 
interested in and encountered can potentially be positive. Let’s analyse this 
argument via a comparison: In the section where I discussed the media and internet 
usage of Syrian Arab refugees staying in Sounio camp, who saw a post in the 
comment section on Facebook saying that: ‘The Swedish government provides a 
car, a house, a job if we go there!’ We can say that this refugee may have greater 
economic expectations of the country he intends to immigrate to. Therefore, the 
content he takes notice of in his digital habitus can influence and determine his 
perception and interpretation of what he sees on the axis of his needs and 
expectations. On the other hand, the interviewee I mentioned above may prioritise 
the expectation of the country of destination to correspond ‘to act freely, to engage 
in political struggle, have the freedom of expression or protest’ in the axis of his 
political imaginations and expectations. These two examples explicate to the reader 
that the digital content that refugees engage with or pay attention to in their digital 
habitus, especially while staying in camps and planning to migrate to other countries, 
are related to the expectations and priorities of these refugees concerning the 
countries they want to go to. I am not implying that Kurdish refugees do not have 
economic concerns. Although these concerns were not primarily on their agenda 
and priorities in the interviews, they had concerns and expectations regarding 
economic gains in the countries they wanted to reach. Nevertheless, compared to 
Syrian Arab refugees, I can argue that Kurdish refugees are more sensitive and more 
activist to freedom issues due to pressure and displacement they experienced due 
to their Kurdish identity. 
In the next section, I demonstrate the socio-economic and educational backgrounds 
of Syrian Kurdish refugees concerning the subjectivity debate. 
4.3.4) Mobilizing Subjectivity with Capital: “Nobody can do anything 
without money, especially when going on a long journey illegally!” 
Understanding the demographic characteristics of the refugees I interviewed in the 
Lavrion camp provides a foundation for a better understanding of the demographic 
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characteristics of the interviewees held in Germany. The demonstrated social, 
economic, and educational backgrounds of Syrian Kurdish refugees in Turkey 
coincided with the demographics of refugees remaining in Lavrion camp in certain 
subjects. These were the interviewees’ average age and education levels. I 
conducted 9 interviewees and the average age of the interviewees was 26 years old. 
5 of them held undergraduate degrees and above, 3 were high school graduates 
and one was a secondary school graduate. 3 of these interviewees were single, 6 
were married and had between 1 and 3 children. 
Besides the similarities in the average age and educational capital of the Syrian 
Kurdish refugees in Turkey and Greece, their indicators of economic capitals 
displayed common features. The majority of the interviewees described themselves 
as middle- and upper-class in economic terms. However, they emphasized that the 
financial support required for immigration to Greece and the process they spent in 
the camp was provided by family members who migrated to Europe before them. 
Considering these demographic features, the subject that the reader should interpret 
is as follows: Their economic conditions, level of education and the matters of their 
family members’ immigration to European countries before them, are indicators of 
the economic, social, and cultural capital of the interviewees. This relationship 
explains to us once again the correlation between subjectivities and capital forms in 
the international migration process. One of the questions I asked during the 
interviews was: ‘What are the main circumstances that enable you to immigrate to 
Greece?’ We can analyse the answers of two young interviewees, one married and 
the other single, but almost the same age, regarding this question which aimed to 
grasp the importance of essential capital forms in international migration:  
“We have many relatives migrated to Europe. Our conversations with them and what we 
observed about them were very influential. But our migration experience is strictly related to 
our economic and educational situation.  The economical part is that we can cover our 
expenses during this process, which our families supported us a lot. The educational side is 
about the capacity and knowledge that enable us to be able to compare the conditions and 




“Unfortunately, nobody can do anything without money, especially when going on a long 
journey illegally. That is why money is definitely crucial. Thank God, we had some money 
and my family supported us, they still do.” [Interview 31, 34 years old, father of 2, 20.11.2018] 
Both interviewees indicate that the economy is the fundamental factor, that is, if we 
paraphrase, economic capital enabled them to migrate. However, it is also worth 
noting what this first interviewee pointed out about education which the reader might 
interpret as social and cultural capital. This interviewee assessed it as a condition 
that, thanks to education, allowed him to compare the countries in which he lives 
and intends to go. The question I asked below as a buffer question to the same 
interviewee and the answer given by the interviewee is helpful to detail this 
discussion. 
“When comparing yourself with your family, friend and relatives living in Turkey but who 
consider migrating somewhere else, how do you see the difference between your capacity 
to migrate and their incapability to migrate?” 
“It is an interesting question, because almost all my friends, my relatives who I know also 
want to go to Europe. But they’ve been there for years, either they can’t or don’t want to go, 
I don't know. I don’t deny that economy is very decisive for migrating, maybe they don’t have. 
For me, I could not get used to Turkey and did not want to live there... To be honest, most 
of my friends just say they want to go. They see the easy side of life in places on the internet, 
in movies, and they only focus on the beautiful side. But when it got serious, most of them 
didn’t know exactly where they wanted to go, why they wanted to go. That’s why I said 
education is also essential, to your previous question. For example, I studied law, so I looked 
at the refugee and asylum policies of the countries I want to go to, that’s what I mean by 
education.” [Interview 24, 26 years old, Lavrion, 14.11.2018] 
These interviewees’ words show us the importance of economic capital regarding 
the correlation between migration and subjectivity. It also addresses the function and 
impact of education as social and cultural capital. His opinions about his friends who 
only see the easy and beautiful side of life refer to the relationship of the internet as 
a determinant factor and an individual’s desires, images of the future and 
expectations. In other words, he emphasized that the information, images, and 
resources provided and displayed by digital habitus are more effective and preferred 
especially through their attractive, pulling, and positive aspects. The correlations and 
links made between these forms of capital and the subjectivities of the interviewees 
are very decisive and influential on migration. As a more general interpretation, I 
understand that subjectivities can be determined by the forms of capital, it is highly 
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correlated. Despite this, those refugees who attempted to migrate to Greece from 
Turkey and succeeded, no matter what the reasons are, I argue that they 
strengthened and practised their subjectivities somehow. In Lavrion, I met many 
refugees who lacked the demographic capacities I presented on average about 
Syrian refugees’ capital, but still managed to migrate. In other words, regardless of 
their economic, social or educational status, poor, uneducated, unemployed, lonely 
or with their family, many refugees migrated. The reason for this is that I principally 
discuss the general profile and background information of the data I have generated 
and obtained from the field study, due to the scope of the research and the variety 
and differences of the subjects on which it focuses. Otherwise, more diverse and 
detailed causes, elements and factors could be achieved significantly if further 
research is conducted, especially focusing on the socio-economic capital and 
subjectivity of refugees. 
The next section presents a discussion in the context of interviews with Syrian 
female Kurdish refugees and observations made on them. 
4.3.5) Gender Transformation and Subjectivity: “We will liberate women 
in the Middle East!” 
There have been many striking and attention-grabbing studies on refugee women 
remaining in refugee camps, for example, on the empowerment of refugee women 
through vocational training programs (Jabbar and Zaza, 2016), daily life 
responsibilities and self-representations (Culcasi, 2019; 471) and gender-oriented 
seminars and educations (Hajdukowski, Khanlou and Moussa, 2008). However, 
studies on the transformation and empowerment of refugee women on the grounds 
of ethnic origin and culture are still lacking. The political, military, and social 
empowerment of women in Kurdish societies has been under the spotlight of many 
different disciplines in recent history, for instance, Jineology as a new Kurdish 
women’s movement and ideology (Düzgün, 2016), Kurdish women fighters and their 
vital role in Rojava (Bengio, 2016), the media representation and coverage of 
Kurdish women (Toivanen and Baser, 2016). In face-to-face interviews with refugee 
women, my being ‘a male researcher’ was an obstacle in my meetings with Syrian 
Arab refugee women in both KTPC and Sounio camps, especially due to the 
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influence of social, cultural, and religious motifs and doctrines in their lives. However, 
as I have emphasized before in the interviews held in Diyarbakır and Mardin, all 
interviews with Syrian Kurdish refugee women took place in much more easy and 
comfortable conditions. I was also able to reach out to more interviewees. Even from 
this ethnographic observation alone, clues can be found regarding the gender 
representation and empowerment debate between the two groups. 
I interviewed a total of 5 Kurdish refugee women in the Lavrion camp. 4 of these 
interviewees were married and 1 was single, and all the married women had 1 or 2 
children. The average age of the interviewees was 26. Before discussing the impact 
of pro-gendered ideologies and teachings on these interviewees in the Lavrion 
camp, as stated in the previous chapters, we can consider their answers to the 
following question: ‘How would you explain the gender issue in your community?’ 
“I was ignorant about my gender, very traditional and conservative when I was a teenager. 
But when I met the Kurdish movement, it empowered me in many ways. When I was in 
Qamishli, I was co-chair in a local office… We will liberate women in the Middle East 
[smiles].” [Interview 21, 35 years old, lost her husband in the war, Lavrion, 06.11.2018] 
 “When someone talks about Rojava, the first thing that comes to mind is women’s struggle. 
I believe that summarizes the gender issue in Kurdish societies [smiles]. For me, the most 
liberated and empowered women in the Middle East are Kurdish women and politically and 
ideologically the strongest in the world.” [Interview 29, 30 years old, mother of 2, Lavrion, 
18.11.2018] 
“… I am a Yazidi woman; we [Yazidi communities] got our share from the attacks and 
massacres of the Islamic communities. But when we think of Kurdish women, they have an 
ideology that is independent of religion and more liberal... There is not even one Muslim 
community in the world that prioritizes women’s rights and movements as much as the 
Kurdish people do. This is only thanks to the Kurdish movement.” [Interview 28, 24 years 
old, Lavrion, 17.11. 2018] 
The common emphasis in these interviewees’ approaches and opinions to the 
gender subject and their association with Kurdish society is that they consider the 
gender movements from a political point of view. The emphasis on the fact that the 
first interviewee had a traditional and conservative background and later became co-
chairman of an institution thanks to the Kurdish political movement can be 
considered as an example of the relationship between gender empowerment and 
the Kurdish movement. Additionally, the second interviewee establishing a direct link 
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between Rojava and Kurdish women and the words of ‘the most liberated and 
empowered women in the Middle East’, show the politicized and taught perspective 
on gender. At the same time, as political empowerment and responsibility, the 
political imaginations and future visions of women interviewees involve a broader 
and more purposeful discourse, not just in the context of Kurdishness and the gender 
debate. Consider, for instance, their words: ‘We will liberate women in the Middle 
East’ or the stress on ;the empowerment of Kurdish women in Muslim communities.’ 
Although all interviewees had a certain level of gender awareness, their answers to 
the questions I asked about ‘whether the Lavrion camp had an impact on their lives, 
especially within the scope of the gender debate, and if so’, confirm the argument of 
the Lavrion as an ideological training camp. 
“Kurdish societies have become very important for women’s leadership, equality and 
struggle. The comrades in Lavrion also know it [Lavrion] is strategically important. During 
our stay here, we somehow take responsibility in committees and attend seminars. This 
responsibility increases the speaking and representation ability of female comrades at 
meetings. So, this is where women take responsibility and practice rather than just say they 
are important.” [Interview 32, 19 years old, single, migrated to Greece alone, Lavrion, 
22.11.2018] 
“We have female friends who stay as volunteers in the camp. These friends have visas, 
residence permits in different countries, but they stay here, just to train us and share their 
experiences with us. This is a very valuable thing. These trainings are also a situation that 
increases our awareness and responsibility as women.” [Interview 22, 25 years old, mother 
of 2, teacher, Lavrion, 07.11.2018] 
Both interviewees stated that they participated in the training and seminars given in 
the camp. These trainings and seminars were especially gender-oriented, women 
empowerment and ideologically gender-focused contents. For example, when I 
asked the interviewees what these trainings or seminars were, they said they had 
titles such as ‘Jineology, Women and Revolution, Women’s history’. Although they 
have content focused on raising awareness such as trainings and seminars, in fact, 
the practices that women participated in and took part in to organize their daily life 
needs during their stay in the camp were also very determinant. The subjectivity that 
develops and becomes stronger based on these roles is worth discussion. The 
practices required for the development and strengthening of agency can be 
explained by the fact that refugee women speak and represent themselves in the 
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committees they are included in, do the work they need to be done, and increase 
the visibility in the areas that we can describe as public space.  
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4.4.) Comparison of the Results Relating to Syrian Arab and Kurdish 
Participants in Greece 
After the fieldwork in Turkey, the fieldwork in Lavrion and Sounio refugee camps in 
Greece played a vital role in navigating and interlocking the continuity of the 
research. Particularly for a better understanding of changing perceptions, practices, 
and imaginations of Syrian refugees before going to the intended countries, the 
fieldwork in Greece demonstrates the broader perspective of the research focuses 
on the migration journey. In addition, the research draws a broad picture of Syrian 
refugees’ migration with pull and push factors alongside the individual inspirations, 
aspirations, and mobilities thanks to the gradual fieldwork. Greece geopolitically is 
on very significant location in a very considerable intersection of continents, cultures, 
and politics, which I name as ‘a gateway to Europe’, by meaning the Schengen area 
and European continent (Oikonomakis, 2018; Kalogeraki, 2018). In this sense, the 
time Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees spent in Greece, where they waited for a long 
time in pending mode before going to the country they intended to go to, should be 
addressed from certain perspectives. These perspectives can be formulated as 
refugees’ perceptions, different capital forms and refugees’ demographics, their use 
and engagement with media and internet, and finally, gender. In this section, I show 
the similarities and differences between the Syrian Arab refugees in the Sounio 
camp and the Syrian Kurdish refugees in the Lavrion camp in these four different 
basic perspectives. 
4.4.1) A Comparison of Politicized Perceptions and Unsatisfied 
Expectations about the West 
This section introduces a comparison of the perceptions, thoughts and imaginations 
of Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees who left Turkey and wanted to use Greece as 
a transit country, regarding the places they wish to arrive. In doing so, I first present 
the opinions of Syrian Arab refugees staying in the Sounio camp about Greece and 
then the countries they want to go to. Later, I follow the same structure for the 
Kurdish refugees staying in Lavrion. 
By linking the fieldwork done in Turkey, almost all Syrian Arabs refugees interviewed 
at the KTPC had very optimistic, hopeful and positive opinions about European 
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countries. For this purpose, they left Turkey and fled to Greece. The majority of Arab 
participants in the Sounio camp were still optimistic and hopeful regarding their 
imaginations and projections about the places where they wish to arrive, such as 
Germany, Sweden or Netherlands. However, Arab refugees started complaining and 
being pessimistic and critical due to the long waiting time they spent in Greece as 
well as the insufficiency of or dissatisfaction with the facilities and services offered 
by the Greek state. In addition, during their stay in the camps, they were unable to 
communicate with local people due to the lack of a common language and could not 
involve themselves in social life and complete their economic and social integration, 
which at the end provoked these complaints and critical attitudes. On the one hand, 
they knew that Greece was a Western and Schengen zone country, and their 
expectation was higher even if none of them had planned to settle there. On the 
other hand, they were still hopeful and positive regarding the further western 
countries. It was revealed that most images and ideas they had in mind regarding 
the Western societies and countries were not regarding Greece but more about 
further Western European countries. Regarding the formation of the future 
imaginations about those countries where they still strongly desire to go was 
primarily related to their family bonds as well as the usage of media and its (in)direct 
effect on their thoughts and desires. While for Syrian Arabs, these factors did not 
surface apparent differences regarding the notion and images of the Western 
countries and societies, Syrian Kurds have stressed politically very strong and critical 
opinions.  
Syrian Kurdish interviewees staying at Lavrion refugee camp were strongly 
ideologized and politicized either by choice or due to their being obliged by their 
surroundings. This change was reflected in their answers not only as regards their 
perception towards the Western countries but also the lifestyles in those countries, 
such as capitalistic, consumerist, individualist, or hegemonic. The main reason for 
this is that their worldviews and perspectives have begun to change and politicize 
as a result of their involvement in training and seminars during their stay in Lavrion 
camp. Daily life practised in the light of these training and seminars is predominantly 
linked to political Kurdish movements, namely the PKK, which maintain the leftist, 
anti-capitalist, and collective doctrines. As a result, their views on the countries they 
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were aiming to reach became politically critical and sceptical. However, like the 
Syrian Arab refugees, they continued to aim not to stay in Greece, but to reach the 
countries they had in mind. 
As a result of the abolition of the official status of the Lavrion camp, the help of the 
Greek state and international institutions was discontinued, which had an impact on 
the Kurdish refugees’ opinions about Greece. In addition, like the Arab refugees, 
Kurdish refugees also sought to go to countries with high standards and conditions 
in their visions, especially where the Kurdish diaspora is strong, such as Germany, 
Switzerland, and Sweden. The point to note here is that although similar changes 
and thoughts began to occur in both groups, the reasons that trigger these thoughts 
and changes are different. 
4.4.2) A Comparison of Media and Internet Use in Sounio and Lavrion 
Camps 
The most striking feature of the media and internet usage comparison of these two 
groups was that both groups had more than 5-6 hours of usage in a day. These 
usage rates are well above the average media usage rates. The social media 
platforms, websites, and applications that both groups spent time were similar. 
These were, in particular, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, WhatsApp, and Google. 
Within the scope of these similarities, the reasons for spending intense time on the 
internet in refugee camps can be stated as follows: Both groups spent a long time in 
the standby mode in Greece; they did not have official work permits; they did not 
know Greek to communicate with locals, and the locations of the camps did not 
provide opportunities to be included in the social life of the local people. If we 
compare the daily life practices of these two groups within the scope of the digital 
habitus debate, we can say that the digital habitus, which they have already started 
to build long years ago, was much more active, expanded, grown, and developed in 
Greece while being in the pending mood in the camps. 
I have discussed before the uncertainty of the future and being in limbo spatially for 
the concept of the refugee camps. By approaching the concept of being in limbo 
through the media and internet use of refugees in terms of time, we can discuss the 
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relation and exposure to active, intense, and continuous media content on the 
internet in trilogy time concepts: ‘past-present-future’. All the events and factors that 
caused Syrian refugees to end up in Greece were experienced in the past and can 
be named as mainly pushing power relations and actors. After their displacement, 
Syrian refugees, again looking for a long-term settlement, considered and imagined 
their resettlement destinations for their future, which can be considered as 
subjectivities that enable or unable them to do it. However, due to the limitation of 
the camps and the lack of social life in Greece where they were experiencing the 
present, I observed that they mainly experience and live their present time by actively 
and permanently associating with the media content that might potentially be their 
future. The intense engagement and association with the internet can be the digital 
habitus stage, where they constantly found themselves in their imaginations about 
the future. 
It was stated that both groups continued to communicate with other refugees they 
met, especially during their stay in camps, on digital platforms. In other words, while 
the interviewees continued to stay in the camps, they continued to stay in touch, 
communicate and follow each other over social media platforms with other refugees 
who reached the places they wanted to go. Therefore, most interviewees witnessed 
the lives of other refugees who had migrated and settled in many different countries 
in Europe from a distance. This has influenced the interviewees’ ideas about the 
places they want to go, as well as their desires. 
Apart from the similarities of these two groups, Syrian Kurdish refugees were 
especially influenced by ideology and political worldviews that were dominant in 
Lavrion camp and this situation was reflected in their internet usage. They started to 
interpret the media content they were related to on the internet in a more political 
way. Their political sensibilities were further activated and practised with the training 
and seminars they received. Therefore, they started to prefer countries, places and 





4.4.3) A Comparison of the Socio-Economic and Cultural Capital of 
Syrian Arab and Kurdish Refugees 
In this section, I present the comparison of the economic, social, and cultural capital 
of these two groups that enabled them to leave Turkey and flee to Greece. Although 
migration from Turkey to Greece has played a role in filtering the diversity of socio-
economic classes among Syrian refugees, when considering these groups within 
their demographics and profiles, it should be noted that there is no sample group 
with the same class or social status. Rather, I point out the intersection and common 
grounds of these sample groups. If we generalize to make a classification on the 
economic capitals of the two groups, I can state that the Syrian Kurds and Arabs 
who succeeded to arrive in Greece were mainly from the middle and upper classes. 
Another point that the two groups indicated about their economic situation was that 
their families living in the countries they intended to go to were supporting them 
economically. This point was stated by interviewees in the interviews held in 
Diyarbakır and Mardin, but the refugees staying in the KTPC camp did not mention 
this issue at all. 
In light of the data obtained as a result of fieldwork done in Turkey, I have stressed 
that Syrian Arabs in KTPC and Kurdish refugees in Kurdish cities had different social 
and cultural backgrounds, particularly when considering their educational 
achievements. However, the education degrees, their social status, and 
occupational groups of the two groups staying in the Lavrion and Sounio camp were 
similar. More than half of the interviewees in the Sounio camp had bachelors and 
above and the rest held either high school or secondary school degrees. The 
educational backgrounds of the interviewees at the Lavrion camp were almost the 
same. Based on these similarities in economic and educational capital, the following 
argument can be defended: It is highly probable that there is a correlation between 
the social and cultural capitals of two different groups that show similarities between 
their economic capital. 
For the similarities between social and cultural capitals, apart from the similarities of 
educational level, the thoughts, dreams and plans of the interviewees about the 
places they aspire to go can also be shown. Although Kurdish refugees critically 
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evaluate the historical and political developments in Western or European countries 
with a more ideological and political discourse, nevertheless, the countries they 
intended to go to and their willingness to go were similar to those of Syrian Arab 
refugees. This is mainly due to common experiences of being a refugee living in 
limbo and staying in refugee camps, as well as being held in Greece for a long time. 
At the same time, as the other reason, it can be said that the similarities of media 
usage and content have created common grounds for the places they want to go, 
which I discussed in the previous section. 
In addition to comparing the capital of these two groups, it can be emphasized that 
the similar and different aspects of the Lavrion and Sounio camps where the two 
groups stayed, was influential on the perceptions and thoughts of the interviewees. 
While the Sounio camp was supported and financed by the state and international 
institutions and NGOs, the Lavrion camp's official camp status was removed a few 
years ago. Therefore, the formation of Kurdish refugees more homogeneously in the 
Lavrion camp and the imagined community and solidarity was realized as a political 
imagination produced by this homogeneity. In contrast, no collective identity or 
solidarity formation could be observed since there were refugees from different 
ethnic and religious groups staying in the Sounio camp, such as Congolese, Iranian, 
Sudanese, Afghan, Iraqi or Syrian, rather than only one. Rather, it can be said that 
the Syrian refugee interviewees and other refugees in the Sounio camp were going 
through a calmer and quieter pending process as they did not plan to stay in Greece. 
4.4.4) A Comparison of Gender Subjectivity: Decreased Pressures, 
Increased Empowerment and Awareness  
One of the most important findings of the fieldwork conducted in Greece concerned 
the transformations and changes that Syrian women refugees experienced. Arab 
women interviewees staying in the Sounio camp firstly stated the decreased social 
pressures that they experienced due to the expectations and pressures triggered by 
the collective community in Turkey. It can be emphasized that the pressures that 
women refugees are subjected to who have started to be individualized or 
associated with smaller groups are beginning to decrease. Besides, it can be 
emphasized that the roles and expectations that others expect from refugees, which 
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I have discussed before with the concept of ‘social subjectivity’, do not need to be 
performed in small camp areas in Greece. Another reason for this is that the 
communication with the local people was limited, the contact was less, and the 
others who stayed in the camps were also refugees. Therefore, the roles and 
expectations assumed from being women and Syrian refugee decreased. Another 
important finding in the Sounio camp was the encouragement and empowerment of 
refugee women as a result of training, seminars and workshops organized by NGOs 
that focus on women. The women interviewees emphasized that these training and 
workshops had positive results from a gender perspective in their lives. At the same 
time, especially when compared with Syrian Arab refugee women staying in KTPC, 
it was observed that female refugees in the Sounio camp used the internet and 
media more intensely. The reason for this can be pointed out that Arab refugee 
women did not have many roles and expectations expected of them in Sounio, thus, 
they were able to spare time for themselves. 
Syrian Kurdish refugee women staying in the Lavrion camp stated that they had an 
empowered and encouraged process due to different motivations and factors. We 
can say that the first of these motivations is about the social and political position 
and value of women in the Kurdish communities. This social and political significance 
took place through pro-gender ideology-oriented training and seminars in the Lavrion 
camp, which were given for women-centred empowerment. During their stay in the 
camp, women’s self-representation and their public visibility in the roles shared by 
men and women increased in a very positive sense. In addition, women interviewees 
stated that the training and seminars they received were very influential in their lives 
and that their relations with Kurdishness as a political imagination were powerful. At 
the same time, they stated that these relationships bear responsibility, not only in 
terms of individual female status and representation but also in terms of women's 
liberation for larger purposes. The visibility of all their practices, roles and 





5) CHAPTER 5 
FIELDWORK IN GERMANY: Confronting Subjectivity: Decisions and Actions, 
No Further West to Migrate  
 
“In a dream separate, even contradictory, truths can 
be entwined. A thing may be two things at the same 
time. A table of wood and a sledge. A hook and a 
beak.” 
“The migrant is in several other ways an 'ideal' worker. 
He is eager to work overtime. He is willing to do shift 
work at night. He arrives politically innocent - that is to 
say without any proletarian experience. Those who 
apply for work at Citroen are often asked to show their 
tickets to prove that they have just arrived in France.” 
John Berger, The Seventh Man, 1975 
Sitting on the balcony of Hashim’s house, a man from Qamishli working in a refugee 
protection centre in Berlin as a translator and social worker, while smiling to his 
daughter, 3-year-old Celine, he turned to me and started to talk: 
“What’s going to be the destiny of this little angel [referring to his daughter-Celine]? Is she 
going to be a Kurd from Rojava or a German woman? I don’t mean only ethnically, and also 
culturally, historically, traditionally! Should I appreciate the German government for letting 
us in, or should I just be angry at all the other countries that didn’t even care about us? To 
me what Germany did is a humanitarian responsibility and a must-do a response to a 
humanitarian crisis, not a heroic response to the situation. But what other countries did was 
just to ignore people’s death. Instead of showing compliments to Germany, I think people 
should react to other countries.” 
After pausing, he continued to speak: “What will her [daughter Celine] future be like? Let me 
tell you: German people get old day by day. I mean, their new generations don’t reproduce 
enough and therefore cannot continue to do their country’s business and services. So, they 
[Germany] need more young workers, labourers, because there is a gap which needs to be 
filled in the workforces. Germans are rational and clever, you know, that’s why they see this 
gap too. What they did is to open borders for Syrians, mainly young people, like me, like my 
wife. So, in the end, they became a hero by helping us and kind of sorted out their near-
future needs. You also see how refugees are being forced into their integration programs in 
protection centres by mandatorily teaching their language, culture, and systems. They kind 
of forcibly do this because they did not want to have another closed community like a Turkish 
one... We [Syrians] will do the needed jobs soon. To be honest, it is a win-win negotiation, 
we needed a safe place and they needed human force... This is how I see my daughter’s 
future. She will live and work here but she will always remember that she is not originally 
from here, I mean she will be in between. This is the most effective way of disciplining 
immigrants, right?” [Field notes, Berlin, 05 April 2019] 
179 
 
It is attention-grabbing to notice the expressions and concerns expressed by Hashim 
regarding his daughter Celine, especially the demographic and economic 
developments in Germany and the refugee's situations in Germany concerning these 
factors. Hashim stated that he migrated to Germany with great hope and 
enthusiasm, but he revealed that he had a highly critical and sceptical perspective 
after his first year in Germany. Hashim’s statements give the reader a clue to the 
data to be discussed in this chapter.  
In this chapter, the experiences of the interviewees after their arrival in Germany will 
be discussed as well as their whole migration experiences in Turkey and Greece. 
Within the points Hashim emphasised, primarily refugee policies of Germany and 
Syrian refuges relationship are presented. In doing so, first, I address background 
information on Germany as a final destination country for Syrian refugees. In light of 
this information, it will be more understandable how Syrian refugees, who considered 
Germany as the final destination, were welcomed by Germany, and Germany’s 
implemented integration programs involving Syrian refugees. 
Following this, the discussions on Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees are presented 
in detail. Thus, a similar discussion structure as presented in Turkey and Greece 
chapters is followed. Firstly, Syrian Arab refugees’ words are given in addition to my 
fieldwork observations along the axis of the four main focal points of the research. 
Later, the same discussion structure is followed for the Syrian Kurdish refugees. In 
the last part of this chapter, again, the similarities and differences of these two 
groups are discussed in a comparative way. 
5.1) Germany as Final Destination Country: Background Information for Final 
Fieldwork 
Before discussing the fieldwork notes and interviews on the subject of Syrian Arab 
and Kurdish refugees, I will describe Germany’s recent developments on refugees 
to provide readers with a background to how Syrian refugees were accommodated 
and hosted by the German government. This introduction is relevant for the readers 
to understand the detailed discussions made within the context of Syrian Arab and 
Kurdish refugees, their experiences and opinions. 
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In contemporary European economics and politics, Germany is the largest economy, 
and second most populous country with more than 80 million residents, after Russia. 
Germany, one of the leading countries in political decisions and contributing the most 
to the economic budget of the European Union, has been a safe country for 
immigrants and refugees for more than half a century (see Schoeller, 2019). 
Germany has economically and politically assumed the utmost responsibilities 
among the EU countries in answer to the Syrian refugee crisis, and also has been 
one of the major final destination countries for Syrian refugees, particularly after 
Syria’s neighbouring countries. Germany has experienced the largest migration 
among the western European countries, especially during and after the end of the 
WW2 with more than 12 million Germans returning from neighbouring countries, 
particularly from eastern Europe (Connor, 2007).  
After the division of Germany into West and East, West Germany faced a labour 
shortage and began to seek additional workers from other countries. Between 1955 
and 1977, more than 14 million guest workers were recruited by the German 
government (Schmidt, 1997)58. There have been many different worker recruitment 
agreements between the German authorities and several countries, mainly 
European, such as with Italy since 1955, Greece since 1960, Turkey since 1961, 
Portugal since 1964, Tunisia since 1965 (Blackshire-Belay, 1991; 4). In this sense, 
Germany is familiar with immigration and immigrants in its recent history. Despite 
this, major parts of these immigration influxes were under the control of the German 
authorities, even if many of the temporarily recruited labourers did not repatriate to 
their home countries after the expiry of their German government employment 
contracts (Martin, 1981). 
For several decades, especially after the 1960s, Germany has played the role of a 
pull factor in migration destinations for hundreds of thousands of migrants and 
refugees (Joppke, 1999). However, particularly after 2015, Germany’s refugee 
policies have changed the main migration routes of Syrian refugees, particularly from 
the neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. As I elaborated 
on Syrian refugees in ‘The Reactions and Roles of the Conducted Field Research 
 
58 http://www.ghs-mh.de/migration/projects/timeline/tl_ge_7.htm last accessed on 31.05.2021 
181 
 
Countries to the Syrian Refugee Crisis’ section, the approach of the German 
government towards the refugee crisis has been operative and effective after 2015. 
At the commencement of this process, the image of a drowned 3-year-old Kurdish 
boy, Aylan Kurdi, who strived to illegally migrate to Greece from Turkey with his 
family, which became to be viral on a global scale, has played a very influential role, 
which also was mentioned at the beginning of the research. 
In the first nine months of 2015, more than 487,000 people, mainly undocumented 
refugees and illegal refugees and immigrants, arrived on the Mediterranean coasts 
of European countries (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke, 2015), which was almost 
double the numbers of 2014. The largest part of these arrivals consisted of Syrian 
refugees. Representing the highest number in the Syrian refugee crisis, more than 
429,000 Syrian refugees have applied for asylum in different European countries 
(UNCHR, 2015; Holmes and Castaneda, 2015; 12). Since then, Germany hosts 
more than 600,000 Syrian refugees as the largest number in the European 
continent59 (Kaya and Orchard, 2020). In this research, Germany as a major and 
well-known migration destination in Europe for decades plays a vital role when 
mapping Syrian refugees’ migration.   
5.2) A Brief Introduction to Fieldwork and Integration Programs in Germany  
“… You have to be careful about choosing specific terms for your research. I checked your 
application for permission to enter refugee accommodations, but there is one thing that you 
need to change on your paper; we do not have any refugee camps in Germany. The term 
‘camp’ is not used here any longer. We are very careful about the use of this term because 
it can remind people of horrible times. When you say refugee camp, people might think of 
something else, especially if we consider that there is an example like Auschwitz a little 
further from here...” [Field notes, Press Office Representative of State Office for Refugee 
Affairs, Berlin, 02.04.2019] 
The above quote belongs to one of the high-ranking officials from whom I have 
obtained the necessary permissions to conduct my fieldwork in Berlin. The official’s 
words give a lot of clues about the sensitivity of the German government not only 
about the camps but also about the refugees, which I elaborate on in the following 
sections. All the refugee protection centres, shelters, houses were under the 
 




authority of the German government, more specifically the State Office for Refugee 
Affairs [Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten]. After obtaining the necessary 
permits, I visited 5 different refugee shelters with different capacities and concepts 
to accommodate refugees. For instance, Tempelhof-Schoneberg refugee 
accommodation consisted mainly of Syrian refugees with other refugees from Iraq, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and Libya. Refugee resettlement was managed 
according to the ethnic and religious background of the refugees. They were 
allocated different rooms, floors or even buildings. I inquired as to what the main 
reasons for this ethnic distribution were as far as I could interpret. I then confirmed 
this with the State Office for Refugee Affairs officer in our second meeting, as her 
words indicated below. The reasons addressed were mainly to create a linguistically 
heterogeneous environment to encourage refugees to use German more as a 
common language among themselves. In addition, dividing, spreading, and 
separating refugees from the same ethnic and national background to place them in 
different settlements, it was stated with the conscious policy of the German 
government, it was to prevent the formation of a possible new diaspora.  
“Our government could not predict very well what the implications and consequences of their 
policies about immigrants, labour forces would be back in time. However, we are very sure 
now that we do not want any other diasporas here, rather we want more integrated, and 
adapted communities, including Syrian refugees. This is one of the main reasons to answer 
your question about why we separate Syrian refugees from each other. Because we do not 
want to have a Syrian diaspora, like Turkish one or any other!” [Field notes, Press Office 
Representative of State Office for Refugee Affairs, Berlin, 05.04.2019] 
The words of this officer at the Refugee Affair department explain the main 
motivation for the German government’s implemented integration programs, which 
is that they do not want any new diasporic community. In this sense, it is important 
to elaborate on the integration programs that the German government performed to 
prevent the formation of any diasporic community. Although I was not allowed to stay 
in the refugee centres which I regularly visited in Berlin, I obtained fundamental 
observations about the integration programs from the visits I made during the day. I 
present this integration program under three different headings, which are 
documentation, accommodation, and language. These headings explain to the 
reader the programs Germany has implemented to prevent the formation of a new 
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diasporic community, as well as the fundamental complaints and disappointments of 
the Syrian refugees, which I will discuss in the following sections.  
5.3) The German Integration Process: Documentation, Accommodation and 
Language 
The first stage of the German integration process was documentation which can be 
articulated as the German government’s recognition of refugees in their registration 
system. Second, the placement of refugees in official accommodation which was 
funded and organised by the German government. The final stage was the start of 
language training with high priority as soon as possible. Nevertheless, as far as I 
observed and comprehended from the interviewees’ words, the implementation of 
this integration process operated as a complementary circle. For instance, while 
documentation of refugees was taking place, they could learn the German language, 
or while being placed in their chosen accommodation, their documentation could be 
followed. The following interviewees’ answers are given to demonstrate the 
registration and operation process of refugees, specifically in Berlin, as different 
regions might differ from each other.  
“When we arrived at the border, we were taken by the security forces to a building for basic 
documents and records, the place is called BAMF [Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees]. With all my children, after such a long journey, 
we were taken into a small building and given a small room. Two days after staying in the 
place, we were asked to participate in German language classes. It took me more than 2 
years to get rid of these courses. Imagine, I am a basic truck driver, and this is what I needed 
to go through, I cannot even imagine students, God help them!” [Interview 39, 34 years old, 
father of 7, Berlin, 03.04.2019] 
“When I arrived in Linz [in Austria], my brother-in-law came to pick me and my children up 
to take us to Munich where he was living. Then we went to an official place to register as a 
refugee but they [German officers] said that I had to go to Berlin because in Munich there 
wasn’t a quota for newcomers at the time. I was sent to Berlin, I was given a room in a 
building with other refugees, and a few days later I was taken to the German language 
classes, which I am still taking.” [Interview 42, 28 years old, mother of 3, widow, Berlin, 
06.04.2019] 
German-language education was mandatory for all refugees, including Syrians, until 
a stage at which the refugees wanted to continue or not. However, at the level where 
lessons were no longer compulsory, it depended on what the refugee wanted to do 
with the language certificate they obtained. For instance, if a refugee wants to get a 
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job with experience, soft skills, and talent, such as a cook, waitress, security, social 
worker, or public service officer, then B1 [level three on the scale of six] would be a 
sufficient level of language to leave education in order to apply for a job if the refugee 
in question has a work permit as well. On the other hand, if a refugee wants to 
continue her/his education at university, again B1 is the minimum standard required, 
but B2 and C1 [levels 4-5 out of 6] is the expected level.  However, in most cases, 
proficiency was expected at an advanced level, depending on the degree one wishes 
to study. 
In Berlin alone, there were more than 90 different accommodation locations for 
refugees, including Syrians which could host more than 30,000 people with full 
capacity60. As I mentioned briefly above, I realised that in order to strengthen 
integration and encourage them to speak German as a common language, the 
German government attaches great importance to distributing and resettling 
refugees of the same ethnic origin in different living spaces. In the same building, 
there could be 3 to 5 rooms varying on any floor, for example, this was the case in 
the Tempelhof-Schoneberg protection centre. These rooms usually had capacities 
ranging from 1 to 5 people, and generally, refugees from varying nationalities were 
brought together in these rooms. For example, in one of the rooms I visited, an Iraqi, 
an Afghan, and a Nigerian refugee were staying together. This system was carried 
according to an intentional policy. Refugees stated that they could request to change 
the rooms they stayed in, but the refugees’ backgrounds in the rooms where they 
were to be relocated were important. In addition, gender or age distribution was used 
as another strategy to bring together refugees from different backgrounds. For 
example, the Wilmersdorf protection centre was only for women and non-adult 
refugees. The only criterion for grouping these refugees was whether they were 
women or adults, which naturally brought together many different ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds. 
In all my interviews in Berlin, each of the interviewees emphasized that the German 
bureaucracy and the documentation process is one of the most difficult and coercive 
 
60 https://www.berlin.de/laf/wohnen/allgemeine-informationen/ueberblick-
fluechtlingsunterkuenfte/artikel.629241.php last accessed on 31.05.2021 
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processes they had to go through. It has been stated that there are many different 
types of documents that refugees have to deal with, such as registration, asylum, 
equivalence, as well as to be carried out in accordance with their individual 
preferences and requests. For instance, asylum documents and processes; 
residence permit documents; work permit documents; social benefits and services; 
accommodation; an ID or passport registration; language courses; obtaining 
equivalence of diplomas, driving licenses, social skills training, certificates; monthly 
payments; childcare benefits; children’s education and other similar documents. 
The main point that the reader should interpret from this section is that after arrival 
in Germany, there were necessary integration programs and stages that the 
refugees had to deal with and go through for long periods, usually years. More 
detailed information about these processes will be given in the following sections. In 





5.4) Growing Diasporic or Integrated Community: Syrian Arab Refugees in 
Berlin 
5.4.1) Reality Check of the Perception: Satisfied Expectations vs 
Disappointments of Syrian Arabs in Berlin  
This chapter answers one of the four key research themes of my doctoral research, 
concerning refugees’ perceptions of the other, the West and Europe. As a 
continuation of the fieldwork conducted in Turkey and Greece, the investigation of 
the thoughts and perceptions of Syrian Arab refugees who left Turkey with the 
intention of migrating to Germany as a desired country, is a very crucial in this phase. 
Let’s briefly recall the answers of interviewees in Turkey and Greece regarding the 
same theme: Arab refugees staying in the KTPC in Turkey had stated their opinions 
about Western countries completely positive, as an object of desire, and as the 
country that they wanted to reach. Interviewees defined these emphases with terms 
such as of ‘modern, developed, better life, or civilized’. On the other hand, Arab 
refugees staying in the Sounio camp in Greece started to be critical and to complain 
about Western and European countries due to reasons such as the camp standards, 
not being able to socialize with the local people and ultimately not thinking about 
remaining in Greece but being stuck in limbo. However, they still maintained their 
hopeful, high expectations and positive images and thoughts about the destination 
countries they wanted to reach. In this sense, Syrian Arab refugees’ perceptions, 
thoughts, and experiences regarding Germany play a vital role in mapping out the 
entire migration route as a complementary part of the fieldwork. In addition, the 
fieldwork conducted in Germany and the opinions of the interviewees are of vital 
importance for the justification of the discussion concerning the West or Europe in 
this study, of the thoughts and perceptions of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Greece. 
I present the analysis which shows that refugees build up pictures of the West and 
of Germany which are based on media, social media, and all sorts of idealised 
perceptions on the internet. However, at the end of the migration journey, the 
perceptions of refugees entailed a significant degree of satisfaction in their 
expectation as well as disappointments. I address these satisfied expectations and 
disappointments based on two main dynamics. Satisfied expectations are mainly 
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related to the possession of economic and everyday necessities and the living 
standards that refugees were provided with and helped to obtain. To begin with 
satisfied expectations, as I will elaborate in the section where I discuss Syrian 
refugees’ socio-economic and cultural capital, all the interviewees stated that they 
have a certain standard of living and that the governmental support and aid meets 
their needs at a minimum level, particularly in economic terms. Syrian refugees in 
Turkey and Greece have experienced tangible economic difficulties due to the 
insufficient economic support of these states and the weakness of their social 
welfare systems. However, in a country like Germany, which has one of the best 
economic standards in the world, the economic opportunities and high social welfare 
services offered by the state have minimally responded to the daily economic needs 
of Syrian refugees. The two interviewees’ words indicated below explain the satisfied 
expectations argument. 
“Germany is a very rich country and supports those living within its borders. They support 
us in such as accommodation, a certain amount of money per month, free transportation 
pass cards. This helps me a lot until I adapt here.” [Interview 37, 25 years old, single, 
31.03.2019] 
“Although we do not work here, the state regularly provides economic support to us. We do 
not get rich with the money the state gives, but we can meet our basic needs. They also pay 
separately for our children… These supports have not been done in other countries; I 
appreciate that a lot.” [Interview 38, 43 years old, father of 3, construction worker, Berlin, 
02.04.2019] 
There were many other interviewees who intersected with the words of these two 
interviewees and expressed their satisfaction with the help and services offered by 
the German state. Many of them emphasized the powerful, developed, modern and 
liberal terms for Germany. In this sense, we can state that the positive opinions about 
the West or Germany previously stated are valid and verified particularly for 
economic aspects. 
When considering the disappointments and unsatisfied expectations of Syrian Arab 
refugees, I also examine them through two different aspects. The first aspect is 
mainly about the lengthy bureaucratic and documentation processes they were 
involved in or exposed to while striving to settle down and adapt, and the challenges 
these processes create. The second aspect is more related to the fundamentally 
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incompatible social characters and sociability of Syrians and German societies. In 
other words, this aspect designates other factors such as unsatisfaction occurring in 
Syrian refugees’ social relations, socialization, difficulties experienced in the 
adaptation process, and cultural differences between theirs and German society. In 
order to understand and analyse the first aspect in more detail, we can explore a 
single 21-year-old interviewee’s answer to the questions I asked about what they 
thought before they arrived in Germany and what they think after their arrival. 
“I thought I come here, I will be happy, go to university, earn money, have a better life. At 
least, the way we saw or heard before coming here... I was thinking to learn some dances, 
travel other countries, and go to parties, enjoy life, you know what I mean. None of them 
have come true! I am still here [means the protection centre]. Germany is a free country if 
you obey all their rules… But the reality of living here is very difficult because life is different, 
and we don’t know it. We have to learn their language, culture, system, and all these things. 
I feel like a child, as if I know nothing and need to learn all!” [Interview 41, Berlin, 04.04.2019]  
With great hope and expectations, Syrian refugees had very severe disappointments 
and difficulties in their self-positionalities, adaptation and integration after their arrival 
in Germany, mainly due to following factors: A long process of documentation and 
official records, long term compulsory German language classes, German society’s 
reactions, attitudes, and perceptions towards refugees, long stays in refugee 
accommodation, shelters, or protection centres, difficulty finding an apartment or 
house to move in, and the most importantly the images and high expectations which 
did not meet with the reality of the country and life.  
The catchword emphasized by the interviewee that “We have to learn their language, 
culture, system, and all these things,” actually summarizes the factors I have given 
as disappointments and difficulties. It is also one of the arguments that we should 
dwell on the interviewee’s words “I feel like a child as if I know nothing”. Although 
not with the same words in the answers of other interviewees, I realized that the 
attempts of the state to direct, control, educate and adapt refugees generated the 
feeling and thought of ‘as if they did not have any life experiences’ on refugees. 
Although the main factors that come to the fore and can be observed are 
disappointment, confusion and dissatisfaction as I have put in words above; I 
interpret these difficulties and disappointments of Syrian refugee participants in 
Germany as the conflict of individual and collective social norms and values. This is 
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an encounter between the Syrian and German societies, which also emerges in 
social characters and socialities. 
The points that I correlated between the individual and collective societal features 
and Syrian refugee participants in Germany are, when expressed from a sociological 
perspective, the following: In Western societies, such as Germany, individuality is 
dominant, and social, bureaucratic, and economic relations are organized on the 
basis of the individual and the life limits of the individual (see Hofstede, 1984; 
Simmel, 2011). In eastern societies, such as Syrian, where the sense of collective 
society is dominant, the individual’s social and economic boundaries are more 
intensely organized within the boundaries of the ethnic, religious, cultural, and 
familial groups of which the Syrian refugees are members (see Cohen, Wu, and 
Miller, 2016; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997).  
Based on my ethnography, Syrian refugees, who are from a society dominated by 
collective social relations, witnessing and learning about a life dominated by 
individuality in images, thoughts and representations shaped in their perceptions 
regarding Germany or the West in general. However, until the point that a Syrian 
refugee individual does not participate in these relationships and cannot experience 
the life that creates a desire and is attractive to her/him in her/his personal 
perception, the images and thoughts in their perceptions continue to be positive. This 
difference in social structure between Germany and Syria is an obvious dilemma 
that refugee individuals experience, although they cannot identify precisely during 
their adaptation and integration process. The points emphasized by the interviewee, 
quoted below, give insights into the difficulties in adaptation and integration created 
by the difference in an individual and collective social structure.  
“I was so focused on just coming here, was so excited about the life here but I forgot to think 
about whether the lifestyle that excited me was really what I wanted, the life that suits me... 
I will give you an example: I have some of my acquaintances living here. We gathered a few 
times when I arrived. We are in the same city, probably half an hour far from here. For 
example, if I call them now and ask for a meeting, they will tell me, we can meet a day next 
week at a certain time. I know… I want to express that here people live alone in their own 
world. Life is like this here, but do I want to live like this, absolutely not. But now I am forced 
to live a lifestyle I don’t want. We were not like that in Syria, but we lived with our neighbours, 
relatives and friends.” [Interview 51, 46 years old, father of 5, Berlin, 20.04.2019] 
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The fact that this interviewee feels compelled to live the dominant lifestyle around 
him is related to the forms of socialisation and relationship in collective societies as 
he defines it. Therefore, the sociability experienced by a Syrian refugee in Germany 
is also directly related to individual life and social norms and values generated by it. 
To summarize, on the one hand, Syrian Arab participants stated that the positive 
images and thoughts formed in their perceptions about the West were met and 
satisfied and happy with in terms of the economic aspects. Within these economic 
standards, on the other, they were unsatisfied and unhappy with the socialities and 
social structure with which they were associated and dominated. 
In other words, this is the conflict situation that arises as a result of the encounter 
between the social experiences and relations generated by two different societal 
cultures. When pondering this situation within the context of power relations, we can 
argue that the way images of Germany are perceived and represented by refugees, 
especially the economic aspects of life, corresponds to the refugees’ opinions. In this 
sense, characteristics of Germany and German society such as developed 
economy, modern state, social welfare were verified by Syrian refugees’ reality 
checks after their arrivals. However, although Syrian refugees were economically 
satisfied and happy in Germany, they were in a very disappointed and unsatisfied 
state due to the fact that they were not able to live as they imagined, the challenges 
they faced, and the different cultural values and societies. In other words, Syrian 
refugees neglected to question whether, when they reach Germany, they could live 
and experience the life that appeared in their digital habitus in the forms of media 
representations and images they saw. Even if these representations and images 
about Germany are correct, there is an uneasiness, dissatisfaction and 
disappointment caused by the inability to have this lifestyle and social relations. 
5.4.2) Media Usage of Syrian Arabs in Berlin: “I deleted my old social 
media accounts, opened new accounts!” 
Media and internet usage of Syrian refugees in Germany has crucial importance for 
contemplating the presented sections on media and on the internet usage in the 
Turkey and Greece chapters. The concept of content often highlighted in the digital 
habitus discussions and this content as having an impressive and shaping effect on 
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refugees’ perceptions can be endorsed with the content that Syrian refugees who 
arrived in Germany have reproduced and created. Most participants in Berlin 
expressed the following: ‘We are happy and comfortable to be in Germany’. These 
statements were not the statements of Syrian refugees either in Turkey or Greece 
particularly to indicate how they feel to be in these countries. In other words, the 
statements, views, online posts, which a refugee in Germany stated about being 
happy and comfortable can be considered as indications about the way many other 
Syrian refugees have formed the concept of better concerning European countries. 
When a Syrian refugee in Germany expresses his happiness and comfort with 
positive connotations and content in his posts about himself and his life, this content 
potentially becomes an object of desire, a pull factor, or perceptions in the concept 
of better for other refugees who are not satisfied or happy in the places where they 
live. Therefore, it is more important to focus on media contents rather than media 
usage in the field case of Germany. 
In the internet usage and media relations of Syrian Arab participants in Berlin, I 
recognised there were two main tendencies in general: First, there are those 
refugees who were engaged with less internet and who have considerably 
decreased social media, communication, and internet usage in order to integrate 
and adapt to more social life. The second is the refugees who, after coming to 
Germany and settling in, continued their intensive and regular interaction in social 
media and internet usage especially due to the interest that was shown in their social 
media content through positive feedback (see Ghaisani et al. 2017) from Syrian 
refugees in other countries. In this sense, the daily social media and internet usage 
of the participants who met the first criterion was around 3 hours a day. They stated 
that they usually spent time on social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Instagram. These refugees peculiarly stated that their internet and social media use 
was reasonably high within the time period of migration from Turkey to Germany. 
They stated that the reason for the decline of these uses in Germany is that they do 
not need to be in touch anymore, learn something new, communicate with someone 
else in this regard. On the other hand, other refugees, whose internet usage was 
over 4-5 hours a day, stated that they continue their intense internet usage due to 
the interests, communication and demands of other refugees. As an internet user, 
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those refugees mentioned that the main reason for their intense use of social media 
was due to other refugees’ direct engagements such as direct messages, questions, 
calls or indirect engagements with their social media posts through likes, retweets, 
or comments. The words of the interviewees below help us understand both 
tendencies.  
“… Soon after I came to Berlin, when I posted a photo on Facebook or Instagram, I realized 
that more people comment and like it than before. I like it too, so I shared more photos than 
before. There were also people who asked questions, and I shared information with them. 
Now I have more than 4000 followers on Instagram, mostly Syrians...” [Interview 37, 25 
years old, male, single, 31.03.2019] 
“… I've had over 2000 friends on Facebook. Honestly, I didn’t know maybe 90% of them. 
Most of them were other refugees who I met in this or that country, heard from someone, I 
was only friends with to get information while migrating here. When I got here, I didn’t want 
to use social media anymore. I didn't need any more. That’s why I deleted my old social 
media accounts, opened new ones, just to stay in touch with my family and close friends…” 
[Interview 52, 33 years old, single, bachelor’s degree, 21.04.2019] 
These two interviewees clarify two main different approaches of Syrian Arab 
refugees’ engagement with social media and the internet in general. In addition to 
these stated reasons, as far as I observed during the times I visited refugee centres, 
the spatial limitations of the refugee camps, future uncertainty and lack of integration 
in social life in Turkey and Greece made Syrian refugees spend more time on the 
internet. This was not the case for the Syrian Arab refugees in Germany. The reason 
for this is that the refugee centres were not restrictive and located in the city, social 
activities and language education places were outside the refugee centres, 
therefore, Syrian Arab interviewees were more involved in social life. Therefore, the 
time they spent on the internet was getting less. In addition, other factors such as 
the average age of social media users and the usage trends of different generations 
should be taken into account (Duggan and Brenner, 2013; Perrin, 2015). In other 
words, the social media and internet usage of young interviewees, below 30 years 
old, was noticed to be obviously more, especially when compared to interviewees 




5.4.3) Expansion of Digital Habitus and Exploring Digital Content: “After 
years I feel like I am breathing!” 
The fieldwork in Turkey and Greece demonstrated that Syrian refugees have very 
affirmative images and ideas about the West, principally using terms like ‘better life, 
better conditions, better economy, better state services, better education’, though, 
rarely giving details of these ‘better’ standards.  The concept of better regarding 
Europe, as a common expression of interviewees in all fieldwork fields, finds a 
response in the identity, lifestyle or countries represented by especially the images 
and other content forms represented by media means. That is why Baudrillard’s 
formulation that signs and symbols as substitutions of the reality as Simulation, can 
be understood through the comparison of the images in the perception of refugees 
who migrated to Germany with the life they actually experienced. In addition, even if 
s/he is a refugee living in Germany, the information s/he produced and shared about 
Germany with her/his own camera, phone and social media images can become 
content to simulate the better for another refugee. 
To better comprehend this argument and obtain data, I conducted an ethnography 
about the way interviewees use their social media accounts, what they share, and 
who comments or interacts. All Syrian Arab interviewees had at least two different 
social media accounts. I paid more attention to the common Facebook and 
Instagram platforms. The notes I got from my observations are as follows: Each 
interviewee was actively using these social media accounts for at least one hour 
daily. They were actively sharing content such as photos, articles, videos, and news 
links. We can classify these contents into two basic categories. These were visual 
content such as photographs and videos about their own lives, and especially 
content related to Syria in other forms of content such as reports or news links. 
If I elaborate on the first of these categories of content, namely visual content about 
their lives: this content, which I encoded as positive content, was a pull factor for 
other refugees who were considering migrating to Germany, and these contents 
included daily life images they shared about their lives, which could potentially 
become a desire in the perceptions of others. For example, these were images of 
their personal lives, such as selfies while eating, or sitting in the park, using the city 
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image as a background, as well as images depicting the city structure and 
architecture, such as buildings, streets, parks. Although the basic indicators that 
allow these images to be perceived positively are in the form of images, the 
presentation of the images can be very decisive as well. For example, the posts that 
two different interviewees wrote to the photos they shared on Facebook were:  
“After years I feel like I’m breathing ...” 
“I remembered what it means to live like a human. May God help our people that remained 
behind, to help them to see the light of day.” 
“My car which I bought with my monthly salary!”61 
Notably, the content that provided positive indicators, such as these posts described 
above, were the most commented and liked posts of the users. Most of the 
comments or likes were made by Syrians. As far as the interviewees clarified, the 
posts were liked or commented on by refugees living in other countries instead of 
refugees in Germany. In relation to these observations, the answers they gave to the 
questions I asked the interviewees indicated below demonstrate the potency of this 
content: 
‘Do you know many people who want to come to Germany? What do you say when they ask 
you your opinion on this matter?’ 
“I think if the borders are open, all other Syrians will come here. Because they are not happy 
where they stay. Although we are not very happy either, we left our home, our country... For 
example, when I post something on Facebook, they send me messages and ask me 
something. Then I usually advise them to come here, life is better here.” [Interview 38, 43 
years old, Berlin, 02.04.2019] 
“Yes, my many friends and relatives want to come. They ask me how much money I spent 
the most until I got here, which ways I came from... They don’t ask me anything about 
specifically here because they know life here better than me. I know this from myself 
because I read, watched and saw a lot of things on the internet until I was able to arrive 
here. Everyone is sharing something, after all. Now I share, hundreds and thousands of 
people see.” [Interview 40, 24 years old, single, male, Berlin, 04.04.2019] 
The points highlighted by these two interviewees are the comments and interactions 
made by other refugees regarding their internet shares. At the same time, when I 
asked to whichever of the interviewees the question “Do you know many people who 
 
61 All the posts of the interviewees were in Arabic. These posts were translated into English by the interpreter. 
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want to come to Germany?”, all interviewees mentioned that they have relatives, 
friends, or family members that want to come. 
Besides these, another of my ethnographic observations was as follow: In all field 
research countries, all interviewees were encouraged to use social media and other 
digital platforms such as emails, by government officials, institutions such as NGOs 
and UNCHR, especially for being updated about announcements made by them. For 
example, the interviewees staying in KTPC in Turkey stated that the Turkish officials 
advised them to use social media platforms to be aware of any announcements, aid, 
support, and also to perform any transactions or official applications through e-
government62 database channels, websites, applications. It was also stated that 
every refugee who arrives in Germany is asked about their emails, phone numbers, 
whether they have social media accounts, and they are asked to open an email 
account. It is recommended to use digital platforms over the internet, such as the 
bank accounts given to them or in order to be able to follow an official application 
made. 
When linking these observations and notes to the digital habitus discussion, 
refugees who previously had limited relations with the internet and media tools have 
also started to develop these mandatory digital relationships that are advised to them 
by the officials. Although digital habitus is a part of life mostly through individual 
participation and interests, internet-based services of states or institutions also 
increase the scope and formation of digital habitus in individuals’ lives. Rather than 
being an encouragement and suggestion that only advises internet usage, this 
situation has also enabled digital habitus to associate and develop with different 








5.4.4) Subjectivity Discussion through Capital Forms and Differing 
Cultural Capital Roles: “I am a lawyer but now I work as a waitress!” 
This section presents the economic, social, and cultural capital of Syrian Arab 
refugees in Berlin as a continuation of the subjectivity discussions that I have 
discussed in the Turkey and Greece chapters. To briefly recall, while Syrian Arab 
refugees staying in KTPC in Turkey were economically poor, poorly educated, and 
culturally less capitalized, the fieldwork in the Sounio camp in Greece displayed that 
the economic, social, and cultural capital of Syrian Arab were refugees relatively 
better. However, the field study findings generated and obtained in Berlin with Syrian 
Arab refugees did not depict an overall profile as in Turkey and Greece. It rather 
drew a profile that interviewees’ capital was diverse in all forms in Berlin.  
To give basic background information about the demographics of the interviewees: 
I conducted face-to-face interviews with 8 Syrian Arab refugees in total. There were 
4 female and 4 male interviewees, which consisted of 2 single refugees, 2 widows, 
and 4 married refugees with 1 to 5 children. Their educational status was as follows: 
2 secondary and 3 high schools graduates and 3 bachelor’s degrees. To describe 
their economic conditions, there were interviewees of varying backgrounds.  Some 
stated, for instance that they were very poor or that they were very rich and owned 
a market chain in Syria. The main reason for this is that hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian refugees migrated in large masses in a very short time, especially in the 
period of 2014-15. One of the common features that can be found in mass migrations 
is that it consists of individuals from widely different backgrounds (White, 2016). In 
this case, the cross-border or international migration I have presented earlier as a 
costly movement becomes an exception or this argument is more applicable to the 
smaller scale, individual immigration or mass migration movements consisting of the 
same ethnic, national groups. 
Based on my observations of Syrian Arab interviewees with these demographic 
features and capitals, I can draw the following inferences: There were two different 
attributes among the interviewees. The first one was more widespread among the 
interviewees who stated that they were economically from lower and middle class, 
with poorer cultural capital, that is, their education was lower. With this capital, they 
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were a social group of Syrian refugees who were very happy with the economic 
benefits that the government was providing them and were happy to work and earn 
more money on whatever jobs they found [e.g., cleaner, waitress, delivery]. This 
social group had a common peculiarity in that they were faster to adapt and integrate, 
complained less, and aimed at increasing their economic incomes. The statements 
emphasized by the following interviewees support this observation and inference: 
“… It has been about 7 years since we were displaced from our home and country. We were 
in Turkey for years and then a long time spent on the road. God bless, we are better here. 
We have an income. Usually, those who have a job here are not hungry, they have enough 
money for a living... Hopefully, soon we'll get out of here [centre] and find a house and settle 
down better…” [Interview 38, 43 years old, construction worker, Berlin, 02.04.2019] 
“… It is not easy to take care of my 3 children alone, but still, thank be to God, we can meet 
our needs. I go to house cleaning 3-days a week. The state also has a pension for me and 
my children. When the children grow up a little bit more, hopefully, we will find an apartment 
and our conditions will improve...” [Interview 42, 28 years old, Widow, High school, 
06.04.2019] 
The education, economic and social status of both interviewees [one was a seasonal 
worker, and the other was a housewife in Syria] were lower compared to the other 
interviewees. Despite this, both interviewees stated that they were satisfied with their 
situation, the money they earned was sufficient, and they would not have any 
problems if they left the refugee centre and settled in a house. As their words show, 
they were more hopeful, grateful, and positive about the future. These interviewees’ 
economic capital forms were more proportional to their correlations of satisfaction, 
adaptation, and integration when considering the other social group. 
The other social group of Syrian Arab interviewees had more capital, particularly in 
social and cultural forms. That is, they were more prioritizing going to college, 
continuing to practice their profession, getting the qualifications’ equivalence 
certificates, in order to build their own future. However, refugee policies, integration 
and reception programs in Germany were much more challenging, especially for 
refugees with these characters and priorities. For instance, they had to get high 
scores in German language exams to go to university or continue. Obtaining the 
equivalence certificates of their qualifications required them to go through long-term 
processes such as bureaucracy, paperwork, work permits. Therefore, their 
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adaptation, integration and relatedly satisfaction and happiness were also very 
difficult and worrying, especially for refugees with high social and cultural capital. 
The statements of interviewees quoted below, both of whom have a bachelor’s 
degree, one is single and the other is widow, support these arguments.  
“... I obtained an economy degree in Turkey. I came here 2 years ago. Then I realized my 
diplomas, work experience, certificates, qualifications have no value and benefit here... They 
[means the state] say that if you want to study, you can go to university free of charge, but I 
have to pass language exams and other exams. I have been going to a German course for 
two years, but I still have not passed the exams they wanted... I understood that they do not 
want qualified refugees here, they want refugees to do more simple work and daily work and 
they have better jobs for themselves. How can I integrate if I cannot do my own profession?” 
[Interview 43, 26 years old, delivery worker, Berlin, 07.04.2019]  
“… Life and adaptation here are very good and comfortable, especially for refugees who are 
poor, uneducated and doing whatever jobs. Because these people were already living and 
working in difficult conditions. Here at least they earn money when they work, the conditions 
are better. But there are also refugees like me on the other side of the coin. I am a lawyer 
but now I work as a waitress. Our economy was good in Syria, but now I am staying here in 
the refugee centre... I understood that if I want to work as a lawyer here, I have to go to 
university again. That is, starting over everything from zero! Then they ask me if I adapt 
here…” [Interview 46, 31 years old, mother of one, Berlin, 12.04.2019] 
The points that the two interviewees jointly emphasize is that the integration and 
adaptation processes are difficult and long for refugees with good social and cultural 
backgrounds. Another point is that the obstacles to qualified and educated refugees 
practicing their own profession reduce socio-cultural capital to the same level as 
other refugees who have fewer qualifications and less capital. If we compare the 
statements of these two different social groups of Syrian Arab refugees, we can 
reach the following conclusion: Social and cultural capital can be considered as a 
criterion for the integration and adaptation process among refugees in Germany. 
While refugees with low cultural capital started to work in different jobs and integrate 
with social life faster, for those refugees who want to continue their education and 
practice their own profession the integration period takes longer. Therefore, 
uneasiness, complaints and disappointments arise due to the long integration 
process. 
Another noteworthy finding in economic terms is that interviewees stated that they 
had the support of their families before; however, the support of families was cut 
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after reaching Germany. They stated that the reason for this was that their families 
thought they could live with the minimum financial support provided by the German 
state and left them alone. In addition, the financial support provided by the German 
state is not sufficient for refugees to rent a house and live. Therefore, the refugees 
staying in the refugee centres were in a way forced to stay in the centre until they 
obtained a work permit and found a job and earned their own income in order to 
move out and rent an apartment for themselves. In other words, refugees from the 
middle or upper classes in their own societies were dependent on state support in 
Germany. So to speak, they were forced to stay in the centre and eventually turned 
into members of the lower-class. 
If we consider these arguments within the scope of the subjectivity debate: The 
readers can interpret that the capital forms that I discussed in the context of 
Bourdieu’s concepts and that the arguments of enabled or empowered subjectivity, 
are deconstructed in the case of socio-culturally qualified Syrian refugees due to 
bureaucracy, documentation, and legal restrictions in Germany. In other words, the 
difficulties, legal obligations, and exams faced by refugees with higher education 
levels and stronger social capital disempower them.  
According to the statistics, 80% of Syrian refugees arriving in Germany have their 
education level below the bachelor’s degree; and around one-third of the 1 million 
migrants and refugees who arrived in Germany as of 2015 were under the age of 
2563. According to the statistics of the Institute for Employment Research, refugee 
unemployment (including Syrian) has dropped abruptly from 50.5% to 40.5% in mid-
201864. Within the scope of these two basic statistical data, the interviews, and 
ethnography, I can argue that the inclusion of the refugee individual in the economic 
life occurs in the professions that do not require qualifications and high cultural 
capital, so to speak, those requiring body forces. To paraphrase this, Syrian refugees 
who are young and have low educational status correspond to the workforce sought 
for such jobs. However, for refugees with more educational, cultural, and social 
capital, migrating to Germany and making their own professions is more difficult and 
 
63 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-
million-in-2015/ last accessed on 31.05.2021 
64 https://borgenproject.org/syrian-refugees-living-conditions-in-germany/ last accessed on 31.05.2021 
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complex. In this sense, we can argue that while the refugee policies of the German 
government economically encourage and support Syrian refugees, that is, 
empowering subjectivity in economic terms, at the same time, it disempowers 
refugees with strong and high social and cultural capital. 
However, considering these statistics and the integration and refugee policies of the 
German government, that compel refugees with strong social and cultural capital, it 
can be argued that this is a pre-considered and planned system. In this case, it 
justifies the interviewee who expressed the above statement: “I understood that they 
do not want qualified refugees here, they want refugees to do more simple work and 
daily work and they have better jobs for themselves!” Since generalizing this 
interviewee’s words would be a oversimplify, it would be more accurate to make the 
following inferences. The long-standing bureaucracy, documents, equivalence of 
degrees and qualifications, and compulsory language training processes of the 
German government have created a great deal of frustration for refugees. Because 
the statuses, education degrees, qualifications, and experiences refugees have 
already built are not reciprocated and recognised, forcing them to start living almost 
from scratch, that is another reason for such frustrations. 
In the next section, I present the gender transformation and subjectivity discussion 
within the scope of Syrian female Arab participants. 
5.4.5) Gender Transformation and Empowerment of Syrian Arab Women 
in Berlin: “Now I am both a mother and a father…” 
Three of the four key focal points of fieldwork, which are Syrian refugees’ perceptions 
about others, their internet and media use, and capital forms in relation to their 
subjectivities, have been presented in accordance with three field countries. As the 
fourth subject of the research, I explicated the Syrian female refugees’ gender 
transformation and empowerments in relation to the subjectivity discussions in the 
Turkey and Greece chapters. In this section, I discuss the gender transformation and 
change of Syrian Arab women refugees in the context of their experiences after their 
arrival in Germany. In doing so, I provide analysis based on mainly field observations 
and findings. The first one was the transformation and empowerment generated by 
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a decrease in the collective community/group pressure and strengthening 
individuality that I examined in the Greece fieldwork chapter. Another one is the 
‘enhanced gender awareness, their visibility in public, taking roles and 
responsibilities’, which were strengthened by women-focused educational, and 
social events for legal support. 
A total of 4 interviews was conducted with Syrian Arab female refugees in Berlin. 
The average age of these interviewees was 26. Two of the interviewees were single, 
the other two were widows, one of which had 1 child while the other had 3 children. 
Two interviewees were high school graduates and the other two had bachelor’s 
degrees. The main common feature of the female refugees with these demographic 
characteristics was that they were all alone. In other words, they had to deal with 
and struggle with all their responsibilities and needs in life by themselves without 
their husbands and other family members especially after arriving in Germany. My 
basic understanding of this change is that it is more about re-regulated power 
dynamics in the social living of these refugees, especially when compared to 
previous field research places. From social relations that started to dissolve, and 
segregate emerged individual responsibilities and these new power dynamics. This 
refers to the subject of changes and transformations that strengthen subjectivity, 
such as public visibility and taking responsibility that occurs with these power 
dynamics. The words of the two interviewees below, who shared their experiences 
and encounters as women after their arrival in Germany, help us to understand the 
arguments I have stated above.  
“… Among the experiences I have lived here, the most challenging but empowering part is 
the economic support provided by the state for me and my children. The difficult part is about 
to get by with this money, to pay attention to our expenses, to save to make our future. 
These are very difficult things for me because my husband always took responsibility and 
dealt with before, but now I am both a mother and a father… But dealing with these 
difficulties makes me stronger at the same time. I feel stronger when I go out, when I go to 
work, when talking to other people...” [Interview 42, 28 years old, mother of 3, house cleaner, 
Berlin, 06.04.2019] 
“…Until arriving in Germany, I was with my family [in Turkey and Greece]. My father and 
brother decided and did everything in the family. In Greece, when my brothers got arrested 
and deported back to Turkey, I had to fight against life by myself, and at that time I had to 
take real responsibilities... Now here, I work and study and take care of my family [sends 
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money to her family]. My mom always warns me to be careful about men, she means not to 
become fully a European woman… I am standing on my feet and taking care of myself. Also, 
seeing and studying with women here taught me a lot about myself.” [Interview 43, 23 years 
old, waitress, studying bachelor’s, Berlin, 07.04.2019] 
Both interviewees touched on common points through a comparison of their current 
and previous experiences. The responsibility that they needed to take both 
economically and socially, standing and struggling alone, their migration and work 
experiences all reflected a very positive transformation and empowerment regarding 
gender identity. Especially the empowerment and self-confidence that the 
responsibilities and experiences brought about by the economic income that the two 
interviewers underlined – either work or state aid – is remarkable. The fact that both 
interviewees realise the roles of men in their lives – as a husband, father, or brother 
– and emphasize being alone in their lives in Germany, and taking responsibilities 
attributed to men in social terms are decisive for these empowerments. In addition 
to the roles played by the economy as an empowering dynamic in the lives of the 
interviewees, the freedom, autonomy, social interactions, encounters and 
experiences it provides have been very effective and socially illuminating. The words 
of the interviewers below explain how they make inferences that strengthen their 
subjectivities when they compare their gender and social values with roles which 
they experience in social life.  
“When I see all the German women around us, how they dress, how they talk, how they are 
self-confident and comfortable, my self-confidence increases. Because in our society, 
actually women constantly empathize with each other, try to understand and support each 
other. Realizing that women are strong here also gives me strength. If they can work, I can 
work too. If they can walk home alone at night, I can too.” [Interview 46, 31 years old, mother 
of 1, Bachelor’s in law, Berlin, 12.04.2019] 
“One evening when I was returning to camp, three young men were standing in the corner 
on my way. They said something while passing by them, I didn’t understand very much. 
When I walked, they kept talking behind me, I was scared, of course, I could not say 
anything. I am familiar with such things; I encountered many times in Syria and Turkey. But 
a woman who was walking towards me saw the situation and the fear on my face. She yelled 
at all the men in such a way that they had to leave before they could say anything... After 
that day I feel stronger. It didn’t happen to me later anything similar but even if I experience 




My analysis of the words of these interviewees as follows: Subjectivity with 
empowered gender perception is more concerning refugee women’s learning about 
gender roles by experiencing them in social life, witnessing, and starting to change 
or transform conservative or traditional gender norms. The interactions, 
observations, and representation of other women in the social lives of refugee 
women play a very important role in this change and transformation. In addition, all 
interviewees emphasized the seminars, events, and their increased gender 
awareness through legal and social support. This training, awareness-raising and 
legal backup, run by the German state or non-governmental organizations, have 
found a positive response in the lives of the interviewees, particularly in social and 
economic terms. Therefore, I observed that the continuation of these pro-gender 
activities that refugee women participated in in the Sounio camp in Greece had an 
impact on refugee women’s gender awareness and empowerment. At the same 
time, the decreasing social pressure, collective whole and increasing 
individualization processes also played a role in strengthening the subjectivity of 





5.5) Enhanced Socio-Political Community Identity: Syrian Kurdish Refugees in 
Berlin 
5.5.1) Syrian Kurds’ Perceptions about the West and Germany: Dengê 
defê ji dûr ve xweş e! 
Being a refugee is not just about being able to move to another safe country and 
live-in security. Refugee as an identity and status presents the main difficulties in 
integration and adaptation to the system, and there are barriers and expectations 
that are difficult to anticipate since they are not experienced yet. After the Syrian 
refugees reached Germany, the security and minimum financial conditions provided 
by the state met the basic needs in the process of adaptation into life. However, 
although they have already obtained security and a certain status in a second 
country, Syrian refugees, still who migrated to another country for better conditions 
and the expectations and desires to be realized, were not satisfied with just the 
security and financial assistance provided to them. Therefore, Germany is the phase 
in this research where the perception of Syrian refugees reveals its foundations and 
formation process thanks to their expectations and realised experiences.  
Like the Syrian Arab interviewees, Syrian Kurdish interviewees in Berlin also 
indicated their positive opinions and realised experiences after arriving and settling 
in Germany as well as the disappointments and unrealised dreams and 
expectations. As the Syrian Arab refugees emphasized, so too Syrian Kurdish 
interviewees stated that they have sustainable and minimum welfare living 
standards, especially due to the economic support and social services of the German 
state. In addition, they stated that Germany has a developed infrastructure and 
modern development level, and Germany has strong and satisfying economic 
standards, and having these conditions makes them satisfied and happy. However, 
the gleaming and attractive lifestyle appearing on the digital devices’ screens of 
refugees that becomes the desire and motivation to migrate to Germany is a life that 
is difficult to reach and realize and is a complex and unfamiliar life to refugees. The 
main reason for this, as I discussed and argued in the Syrian Arab case, is the 
difference in cultural and societal life that causes conflicts and uneasiness when it 
comes to performing and being part of it. 
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Another reason that causes these conflicts and uneasiness is the long and difficult 
process of providing refugee documents and rights that can make it easier for 
refugees to become part of life bureaucratically and functionally. However, almost 
all Syrian Kurdish interviewees stated that they had no prior knowledge that this 
process would be so difficult, complex, and long. This situation is also related to the 
lack of content that affects the perceptions of Syrian refugees in their digital habitus 
which portrays more dominantly positive and attractive aspects of life. The two young 
Kurdish interviewees’ words that I quoted below avail to understand this argument 
better:  
“Before coming here, I thought as if everything will improve at once when I get to Germany. 
Then, I thought I will be able to reach the life and the conditions I had in mind. You know, 
we have a phrase like, ‘Dengê defê ji dûr ve xweş e’ [equivalent to the idiom in English: the 
grass is always greener on the other side of the fence]. Therefore, for 3 years, I still have 
not met the required full criteria for properly continuing to university. No one had told me that 
this process would take that long. It is obvious that I have not researched in detail either.” 
[Interview 41, 21 years old, single, male, Berlin, 04.04.2019] 
“I had met the comrades here on social media before I came, I asked them about many 
things. For some reason, nobody gave me very detailed information. When I arrived, I had 
to learn everything from the very beginning by experiencing it on my own, I guess this is my 
best method, right? Whereas in Germany I thought that I would visit historical places, go 
camping, have fun, travel because I saw and heard it that way. So, there are those who do 
what I want to do, Germans for instance. But they are not refugees, I am not German either. 
I could not think if I could do these things that I wanted to do, I thought as if getting up here 
would be enough for everything to be fine. Dreams and realities...” [Interview 50, 21 years 
old, female, bachelor’s student, Berlin, 19.04.2019] 
The main points that the readers need to analyse in the words of these interviewees 
are that what they imagined and thought before coming to Germany and what they 
experienced after coming to Germany do not correspond with each other. Both 
interviewees state that they thought that it would be enough just to succeed in 
migrating to Germany, for realising and reaching the ideas and plans they desired 
and imagined. However, they associated their inability to realize these dreams or 
plans with the long duration of processes such as integration, language education, 
documentation, which we can basically call external causes. In addition, the two 
interviewees emphasized that they had friends, comrades, and families with whom 
they communicated via social media or the internet before coming to Germany. Like 
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these two interviewees, many other interviewees stated that the people they knew 
before they arrived in Germany did not give them sufficient or accurate. The images 
and information about others they encounter or the shared, provided information and 
images to them by others in their digital habitus have been the determinant in the 
perceptions of these interviewees regarding the images and information. In the case 
of Syrian refugee interviewees, it can be argued that the formation and foundations 
of perception about the other take place in this way. To exemplify the potential others 
in the frame of context, Germany as a country, life in European countries, lifestyle or 
socialisation of these societies can be counted as others. In addition to these causes 
for the disappointment or unsatisfaction, refugees’ positionality, subjectivity and 
actions are also decisive. The words of the interviewees below, which can be 
interpreted as self-criticism, explain better their inexperience and passivity during 
this process of integration and living in Germany.  
“For me, the main reason why I have difficulty adapting here is the endless process of being 
a refugee. But of course, I also have shortcomings, for example, I did not know what to do 
and how. More importantly, I could not be sure what I wanted to do, what I liked, what I 
wanted to deal with… When I came here, the state took care of me, thought about 
everything, guided me so that whenever someone did not tell me to do this, I didn't know 
what to do. I felt like a child.” [Interview 45, 33 years old, female, single, director, 10.04.2019] 
“… For years I fought for my people. I didn’t turn to myself one day to wonder what I 
personally wanted because there were always people I ran and fought to help them. Then I 
came here and this time the state took care of me, gave me money, taught the language, 
gave me accommodation, gave me seminars, even clothes, food... I mean, I found myself 
here in a life where others take care of me, and I do not have to do anything or to be active. 
Then they asked me, now you can do whatever you want to do as an individual. But I realized 
that as an individual I did not know who I was because I learned better who my society was.” 
[Interview 48, 28 years old, single, male, 15.04.2019] 
As one Syrian Arab interviewee emphasized, these interviewees particularly used 
the metaphor of ‘feeling like a child or being treated as a child’. The situation with 
which they associated these metaphors is that they do not actively engage with life 
practices rather become more passive. Also, the German state’s support and 
assistance, which can be hyper-attentive and redundant, seem to trigger passivity 
for refugees. Thus, we can state that while the German state responds to the needs 
of refugees, guides them, acts sensitively, at the same time, these engagements 
and treatments cause Syrian refugees to weaken their agencies as individuals. As I 
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will reconsider in the subjectivity discussions, in the case of Syrian refugee 
participants, dynamic engagement or effective activism is the act of the refugee 
individual in line with his own wishes and thoughts, but more than adequate 
attention, services, assistances or over-control can trigger unexpected negative 
consequences. The individual and collective societal characters and cultures which 
I have detailed and discussed in the Syrian Arab interviewees’ sections regarding 
the conflicts, dissatisfaction, and disappointments they expressed, should also be 
addressed in the case of Syrian Kurdish refugees in Germany. 
The last interviewee’s words I mentioned above pointed out that collective group 
belongingness as a societal character and cultural way of living is also valid as a 
political struggle. “I didn’t turn to myself one day to wonder what I personally wanted 
because there were always people I ran and fought to help them”, this statement can 
be interpreted as an external cause that can override the individuality and interests 
of the Kurdish individual who is involved in a collective struggle. This Syrian Kurdish 
individual exemplifies the argument for individuality vs collective societal conflict 
when he is left alone in a country such as Germany where individuality, individual 
responsibility, freedom, and the liberal lifestyle predominate. Regarding this 
argument, I argue that as an alternative subject of research and a hypothesis that 
should be investigated: In the conflict that emerges in the confrontation of individual 
and collective cultural norms and lifestyles as well as the inability to participate in 
social relations, if there is a diaspora formed earlier in the place where the refugees 
go, these newcomer refugees are likely to be involved in these diasporic 
relationships. To verify that, all Syrian Kurdish interviewees were aware that there 
was a large Kurdish diaspora existing in Berlin. All interviewees stated that they are 
engaged in this diaspora and are involved in demonstrations, protests, solidarity, 
and cooperation that take place from time to time. Kurdish political and armed 
movements and entities, such as PKK, were especially discussed in the context of 
my research in the Lavrion camp, I also noticed its unifying and formative effect 
among Syrian Kurdish refugees and the Kurdish diaspora living in Berlin. 
In the next section, I discuss my ethnographic observations and interviews on the 
internet and the social media use of Syrian Kurdish interviewees. 
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5.5.2) Solidarity and Imagined Community among Kurds: “I am a Syrian 
on the paper, but Kurdish in daily life.” 
As the largest nation with no proper state of their own as an independent in the world 
(King, 2013), the importance of Syrian Kurds and their political unity and identity 
have been stressed through the progress of their migration route in Turkey and 
Greece. In contrast, Syrian Arab refugees did not reflect and present such political 
association among themselves by relying on their ethnic background. The solidarity, 
cooperation and imagined community that Syrian Kurdish refugees established with 
Kurdish people from other countries were discussed in the previous sections. In 
addition to the previous discussions, it is necessary to express, in particular, that the 
legal recognition of refugees, the processes of registration in host countries, 
generally speaking, is evaluated by the status of the country from which they come 
as a national identity and recognition rather than by the refugees’ ethnic, religious or 
gender backgrounds. In short, even though there were many varied and separated 
opinions and positionalities amongst Syrian Arabs and Kurds, due to legal 
obligations and documentations, they are all classified only by their nation, that is, 
as Syrians. Nonetheless, I did not observe any complaints from Syrian Arab or other 
ethnic origins, such as Turkman, Druze, or refugees, about being Syrian. However, 
this was an obvious political and social issue among Syrian Kurdish refugees. To put 
it more simply, the Syrian Kurdish interviewees preferred to present themselves as 
Kurdish rather than Syrian. Despite this, they were still officially registered as 
Syrians. 
During the fieldwork in Turkey and Greece, this fact was discussed and detailed, and 
in Germany, it was once again verified. On the documents and paperwork made by 
the German authorities, both Syrian Arabs and Kurds were recognized as Syrians, 
with no attention paid to ethnic nuances. Despite this, Syrian Kurdish refugees in 
their daily lives strongly distinguished themselves by clarifying their ethnicity or 
identity that ‘we are not Syrian by meaning not Arab’. On the contrary, for Syrian 
Arabs, there was no single specific clarification by any of the interviewees regarding 
their ethnic background, but just saying that ‘we are from Syria’ or ‘we are Syrians’. 
However, when Syrian Kurds left Syria and then Turkey, the main and strongest 
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identity of Syrian Kurds became only Kurdish. Especially in Turkey, the interviewees 
were hesitant to express this for political reasons. 
The togetherness of Kurdish refugees and the solidarity argument, which I discussed 
in the previous chapters both within the framework of the imagined community 
concept and within the scope of ideological doctrines in the Lavrion camp, also 
appeared in Berlin. The definition of Kurdish refugees not on their ethnic identity but 
on the basis of the national, i.e., the dominant identity of the countries from which 
they came, has turned into a legal instrument that is strategically used by Kurdish 
refugees. Thus, Kurds from different countries used the non-recognition of their 
ethnic background and being recognized as Syrian, Iraqi, Irani or Turkish, to request 
to stay together with other Kurds from different countries. This was the case I 
encountered in one of the protection centres, namely in the Tempelhof-Schoneberg 
refugee centre where in one room, 3 Kurdish refugees cohabited the same place. 
They were all Kurds though one was from Syria, and the others were from Iraq and 
Iran. The following words of interviewee indicate the gap in the policy of the German 
government and show the solidarity and togetherness in the identity of Kurds 
amongst each other. 
“… I have been here [Germany] for more than 3 years and I am still staying in the camps 
because there is a real issue in finding an apartment in Berlin to move out into. But here, I 
am happy that I am staying with my people [means Kurdish people]. You know, the 
administration here pay extra attention to which countries we are coming from, and they do 
not want to put us together with others from the same country. This is because they want to 
make us speak the German as the common language between all migrants. But on the 
system, I am Syrian, my friends [in the room] are from Iraq and Iran. If they don’t recognize 
us the way we see ourselves, we can play their game against them [smiles].” [Interview 40, 
24 years old, single, male, Berlin, 04.04.2019] 
In the words of this interviewee, the main point that the reader should pay attention 
to is the imagined community sense established by the Kurdish people among 
themselves and the effort they make that serve for the political and social community 
identity. Furthermore, as far as I observed, Syrian Kurdish and Arabs were usually 
not socializing together, the language which Syrian Kurdish refugees were speaking 
among each other was Kurdish. They specially paid attention to not speak Arabic. 
They stated that this is a political attitude to pay respect and attention to their mother 
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tongue since they are not obliged to speak the national language of the countries 
they came from. More importantly, this research presents to readers the argument 
that the solidarity that Syrian Arabs and Kurds experienced in Turkey and Greece, 
by sharing the same identity as refugees, seemingly ceased to exist on their arrival 
Germany. Also, one of the other observations that indicate the political togetherness 
of Kurdish refugees was that in the room where the interview took place with this 
interviewee mentioned above, there was only one flag representing the Kurdish 
political movement. When I asked about the flag, the following answer was given: 
“This flag is our flag to be united around. I never accepted the Syrian flag as mine and never 
felt it represents me. It’s the same reason for my comrades, they said the same thing for the 
Iraqi and Iranian flags... I am a Syrian on the paper, but Kurdish in daily life” [Interview 40, 
Berlin, 04.04.2019] 
Many answers given by Syrian Kurdish people throughout the fieldwork sites were 
political and emphasized the political identity of Kurds by, for instance, only speaking 
Kurdish amongst each other, explaining that they were not Arab but Kurdish. 
However, Syrian Arabs did not refer to their ethnic background, the importance of 
their language, or social cooperation with other Arabs from different countries. These 
distinctions show that the social and political identity and construction of Kurds were 
relatively different from the construction of Syrian Arabs. 
In the next section, I discuss the media and internet use of Syrian Kurdish refugees 
in Berlin within the framework of digital habitus, especially in a comparison between 
the dreams they want to realize after arriving in Germany and the realities they 
experience. 
5.5.3) The Moment of Truth, Imagination vs Realities: “It was just the 
heaven I created and wanted to believe!” 
The conceptualization of simulation and simulacra [as the plural version of 
simulacrum] has been discussed in previous chapters. What I mean by these 
theoretical concepts becomes better understood in the discussion presented in the 
Germany sections. To recall the words of Baudrillard (1998; 4): “Simulation is no 
longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by 
models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal... It is no longer a question of 
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imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs 
of the real for the real”. 
Both satisfied expectations and disappointments discussed in the Syrian Arab 
interviewees, here in relation to media discussions can be thought of within the 
framework of the simulation concept. The perceptions and expectations of Syrian 
refugees about a place, culture and country [Germany in this case] that they have 
never visited and experienced before shaped and formed especially through media 
representations, and the disappointing realities they experienced after arriving in 
Germany can be evaluated as an example for the simulation which substituted 
reality. 
Although most of the Kurdish refugees interviewed within the scope of this research 
had a critical view for the concepts of the West or Europe, they ultimately pointed to 
European countries as the place they wanted to go and settle in. Nevertheless, the 
development and evolution of the thinking expressed by the Syrian Kurdish 
interviewees in Berlin about Germany provide a basis for an up-to-date discussion 
of the simulation debate. After their arrival, they encountered the reality in and of 
Germany, which can be considered as the verification of the created simulation 
through the models, representations, substitutions, and signs that shaped the 
perception about the reality in their minds. Most Kurdish interviewees particularly 
indicated that the picture and perception they had in their mind regarding Germany 
was rather their own imagined reality mainly based on the media representations. 
They also specified as a self-critique that this imagined reality at the end did not 
match with the experience they have been going through in Germany. On a practical 
scale, what this argument refers to can be interpreted better with the following words 
of interviewee.  
“I had a kind of depression when I was in Lavrion. I tried 7 times to pass to Italy, Germany 
or France; 7 times! Once I asked myself, what is the purpose of these efforts; why don’t I 
just stay in Greece or just give up? I could not answer this question… Do you know the 
concept of heaven? In heaven concept, there are no negative things about it, at all. So, when 
you are on the way to heaven, you forget everything and focus on only your time in heaven… 
But when I arrived the heaven, I realized it was not heaven at all, it was just the heaven I 
created and wanted to believe. Otherwise, how could I spend almost 2 years on the way to 
reach here?” [Interview 45, 33 years old, single, female, Berlin, 10.04.2019] 
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If we analyse the expressions of this interviewee with the concept of simulation, the 
statement that “it was just the heaven I created and wanted to believe”, is 
noteworthy. This statement expresses: Individual or mass subjectivity in relation to 
the simulation is to create an unreal image, a thought, a place, and insisting on a 
migration that can take years in order to realise this created image. The elements 
and nourishment of this created image, as emphasized many times, are formed with 
what media devices and content manifest. That is, it is to subjectively deconstruct 
what the media representations and images point to and create the simulation that 
you want to believe. 
I conducted digital ethnography with Syrian Arab interviewees to analyse the timeline 
of other users regarding their shares and their engagements in social media 
accounts. I also did this with Syrian Kurdish interviewees. As I discussed in the 
Expansion of Digital Habitus and Exploring Digital Content, section 5.4.3 on Syrian 
Arab interviewees, the digital ethnography on the social media content of Syrian 
Kurdish interviewees can also be handled in two different categories. The first 
commonly included personal sharing of photos, videos, posts, and content about 
their lives. Videos or photographs of everyday life interactions in the city (i.e., in the 
subway, in the park, on the street, in restaurants), selfies with the image of the city 
as a background, photographs from everyday life [i.e., dining, walking in the park, 
meeting with others] were images that were more widely shared. As I have 
emphasized in the Syrian Arab interviewees’ sections, the vast majority of these 
personal images are the most commented, liked, and interacted with content. Stories 
and images featuring the personal life of the users who share this content have a 
more positive foundation due to the function and way of using social media platforms. 
Therefore, it is possible for readers to reach such a formulation: For example, if a 
Syrian refugee sharing a photo on Facebook is expressing a happy or positive 
expression, even though it does not directly emphasize where it is, other users can 
interpret it as follows: ‘This person is happy because he is in Germany!’ 
The second is the sharing of political, military, and social problems that Kurdish 
people experienced. These posts included protest images, news content about 
Kurds, and images and information about actions and political activities. The notable 
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part here is that while Syrian Arab interviewees were mostly engaging with media 
content about Syria, for the Syrian Kurdish interviewees, the common subject was 
more about Rojava. The reader can conclude from this comparison: that the 
imagined community perception among Kurdish people also finds a response in the 
digital habitus of Kurdish refugees. 
Another important point that should be stressed is that among the images and news 
about the countries to be migrated to for the refugees who previously stayed in the 
Lavrion camp, political and ideological content such as being able to protest freely 
and express their opinions was attractive. I had marked this content as a pull factor. 
In this sense, Kurdish politics and identity-focused content shared by Syrian Kurdish 
interviewees in Berlin from their social media accounts have a positive indicator, pull 
factor and desired place connotation for Syrian Kurdish refugees in Greece or other 
countries. 
This situation, that is, social media sharing concerning Kurdishness, Kurdish identity 
and politics in the digital habitus of Kurdish refugees, draws an external and indirect 
picture of life in Germany. This picture builds a profile with freedom of speech or 
expression, as ‘Germany is a free country’ and ‘Kurdish people can act freely and 
openly’. This profile of Germany, although not intentionally and purposely aimed, 
reconstructs the political representation of Germany, that is, its influence and 
representation in terms of power relations and actors. From this example, we can 
better understand the relationship between digital habitus and power relations. 
In the next section, I discuss the Syrian Kurdish refugees’ subjectivity in accordance 
with their capital forms. 
5.5.4) Political and Social Subjectivity Discussion with Capital Forms: “I 
won’t be able to cross the road from one side to other, if that voice in the traffic 
lights, ‘now you can cross’ does not instruct me.” 
In this section, I explain the correlation of Syrian Kurdish interviewees between their 
capital forms and their life in Berlin by linking them with political and social 
subjectivity discussions. In doing so, first, I present the demographic information of 
the interviewees to the reader. Then, I remind the readers again of the explanations 
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with which I conceptualised and approached these concepts in the political and 
social subjectivity chapter. Then I analyse what the interviewees express by relating 
to these explanations. 
The average age of the 8 interviewees I examined face to face was 25. I interviewed 
4 women and 4 men in total. Apart from one interviewee who graduated with a 
secondary school degree, all the rest were bachelor’s degree holders or were 
continuing a bachelor’s program. 3 of the participants were married and had children 
ranging from 1 to 3, and 5 were single. Half of the interviewees stated that their 
economic capital was middle level, and the remaining that it was low. In the light of 
these demographics, the social capital of these interviewees was relatively higher 
than Syrian Arab interviewees due to their high education degrees, having different 
occupational groups [i.e., medical doctor, engineer, student, elderly care staff, sports 
coach, translator]. This demographic information provides a basis for the subjectivity 
discussion. 
Sadeq Rahimi associates the political aspects with subjectivity and writes: “The 
notion of political subjectivity dramatically widens the scope of politicality to 
understand the subject itself as a political event… Politicality, in this sense, is not an 
added aspect of the subject, but indeed the mode of being of the subject, that is, 
precisely what the subject is” (2015; 8). Based on this definition, being a refugee as 
an identity and status is the foundation of politicality in subjectivity discussions. The 
point where this identity and status corresponds in the life of Syrian individuals is as 
follows: It is a matter that the social and cultural capital they have as individuals 
cannot be practised and performed due to the restriction of the identity entitled to 
them. In addition, the fact that the given refugee identity and status are legal 
boundaries that ignore and reduce the capital of these individuals, is another 
sanction of the political subjectivity of being a refugee. The statements of the two 
interviewees I cite below, one from a medical doctor and the other from a director, 
are explanatory for the political subjectivity discussion: 
“… Ever since we were forcibly displaced from our country, the most constraining and 
depressing issue for me when I think of is this: Think about it, after years of education, I 
come to a position, status and gain recognition and respect. Then I lost everything because 
of a war started by others, whatever the reason. I do not just mean I lost what I had 
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economically, but also my profession, status, respect and recognition… I fully understood 
this situation when receiving the refugee ID card that the government gave me, which 
determined what I could do after I came here, settled, and get organized my life. This ID 
card says ‘you are a refugee, and you are not the former you anymore. That’s why you 
cannot do what former you could do anymore…’” [Interview 45, 33 years old, single, Berlin, 
10.04.2019] 
“… It is really difficult to get rid of the thought of being a refugee. I am a doctor, someone 
who specialises in the anatomy of the human. The phenomena we define as illness are 
objective situations that are independent of ethnic identity, race, or religion. My profession 
is to develop solutions against some of these illnesses and to help people with these issues. 
But I am no longer a doctor, I am a refugee. Being a refugee means that everything I have 
acquired and owned is ignored and reduced to the same category as all other refugees.” 
[Interview 49, 42 years old, mother of 2, Berlin, 17.04.2019] 
What the two interviewees expressed is fairly to describe the political subjectivity 
discussion with different words by relating it to the refugees. In other words, the 
interviewees point to the problem of reducing their social identities such as 
uniqueness, status, profession, and personal identities such as gender, age, 
ethnicity, and race to a certain status only after they become a refugee. The reason 
why I associate these expressions with political subjectivity is due to the fact that we 
realise ourselves through the legally and politically constructed identities in order to 
represent ourselves in the social relations we live in as individuals. I argue that the 
limitation of these individual representations by the identity and status of the refugee 
form a societal and social hierarchy. 
This hierarchy can be explained, for example, by comparing what an individual who 
is a citizen of a country and an individual who is a refugee can reach, can do, and 
represent, that is, by their subjectivities. In other words, while a German citizen and 
a Syrian refugee represent themselves in different aspects of the bureaucratic, 
political, professional, educational, and social senses, they do not have the same 
statuses, eligibilities, and accessibilities. The conflict and problematic issues 
emerging from this (un)ordinary situation as a hierarchy are related to the political 
subjectivities of refugees. As a continuation of these legal and political statuses and 
the identities that cause problematic issues, we can make it more understandable 
when revising another representation problem faced by Syrian refugees within the 
scope of social subjectivity. 
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Regarding social subjectivity what I wrote before was that ‘it is the subjectivity 
created by displaying performance in accordance with the anticipations of other 
people that have been shaped or reappeared by the social traditions, roles, norms 
of people in a particular race, religion, or region’. The interviewees, whose words I 
have mentioned below, will help us understand this concept better. 
“Here [Germany] we are treated like children. We are approached as if we have never lived 
on our own before, they try to teach us everything. After a while one gets stunned. I feel like 
I won’t be able to cross the road from one side to other, if that voice in the traffic lights does 
not instruct me, saying ‘now you can cross’65. I mean, the extreme sensitivity they exhibited 
in order to help us to overcome our difficulties, I, who can easily deal with even if the traffic 
is very dense, now became a sensitive refugee who is depended on the instructions.” 
[Interview 41, 21 years old, student in programming, Berlin, 04.04.2019] 
“This country considers everything that the individuals may need. For example, clothes, 
goods, language education, social rights, social services are all free, they also give monthly 
money. Now even having such economically minimal conditions provide me 
comfortableness, but I don’t know what to do anymore, that’s the real problem. My family, 
my friends are not here, so there is no life that I know and become familiar with here... Life 
is fine when you look at it on the phone, but when it comes to living, it’s harder. Besides, 
especially when other people tell or instruct me what to do also makes life difficult to live that 
I dream of when I come here. I don’t know exactly how to explain... but now I have a hard 
time between being a refugee and being myself.” [Interview 44, 29 years old, married, 
bachelor’s in literature, Berlin, 09.04.2019] 
The common emphases of the interviewees intersect in two main points, which are: 
First, the state’s attention and services to them, even if with good intention and 
sensitivity, remind them that they are a refugee. Second, being a refugee draws the 
limits of a life-potency that makes the performativity and representation of the 
refugees difficult to realise, which also unable the reflection of the uniqueness of an 
individual. Moreover, the analysis of individual and collective societal differences I 
emphasized in the context of Syrian Arab interviewees is also valid for Syrian 
Kurdish interviewees. Especially, after having a minimum standard of living, the 
social life and the dominant culture that Syrian Kurdish refugees endeavoured to 
adapt, triggered the confrontation between what the refugee individual wanted to do 
and being able to do what they wanted.  
 
65 The interview with this interviewee was mostly done in Kurmanji, and partly in English. The interviewee 
said the phrase ‘now you can cross’ in English. 
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The statement of the second interviewee, “Life is fine when you look at it on the 
phone, but when it comes to living, it’s harder,” is related to their digital habitus. This 
is related to the digital habitus, which I have discussed in the context of the media 
content of Syrian refugees affecting and shaping their perceptions of Germany and 
the life they want to live. As I mentioned in the section on Syrian Kurdish 
interviewees’ perceptions and thoughts about Germany, desiring to have a life(style) 
that has not been experienced before is a situation where visual media and digital 
socialisation are very influential and shaping. In the context of Syrian refugees, their 
contentment and satisfaction or their disappointments and unsatisfied expectations 
with their life in Germany support this argument. However, this is the point where I 
connect the subjectivity debate with the forms of capital they have. Syrians are not 
any more Syrian citizens – essentially – rather they are Syrian refugees and living in 
Germany with this identity.  
As well as the subjectivity discussion concerning the capital forms, in the next 
section, I approach and demonstrate the subjectivities of Syrian Kurdish women 
interviewees through their gender transformations. 
5.5.5) Transformation of Gender Roles and Tracing Women’s 
Empowerment: “Everyone lives their own life.” 
In this section, I discuss the gender transformation of women refugees by presenting 
my field notes and interview data on Syrian Kurdish female refugees in Berlin. As I 
organised the discussion concerning the Syrian Arab female refugees in Germany 
through two dynamics by relating to the fieldwork in Greece, I also explain this 
section by establishing a relationship with the fieldwork in Greece and Germany. In 
my fieldwork in Greece, I had manifested pro-gender ideological doctrines and 
empowerment of politicization as the central determining factor within the scope of 
Syrian Kurdish refugee women. As a secondary factor, I had argued to consider the 
increased public visibility, responsibility, and social empowerment, as a 
consequence of the pro-gendered ideology that was taught and introduced in 
seminars, courses and events. As the predominant factors in relation to gender 
debates in interviews and ethnography in Germany, I consider the visibility of women 
in stronger social relationships, their work experiences, economic support of the 
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German state and gender-focused workshops and instructions. Thus, in this section, 
I bring into question the Syrian Kurdish female participants gender transformation 
and empowerment within the scope of these dynamics. 
I interviewed 4 Kurdish refugee women in total. The average age of these 
interviewers was 31. Two of the interviewees were single and the other two were 
married, and one had two children. 3 of the interviewees had a bachelor’s degree 
and one was studying for her bachelor’s. Transformation and changes in gender 
roles and norms of Kurdish female refugees, who have these demographic features, 
have been highly determinant in the strengthening of their subjectivity as women. 
Kurdish female refugees, while they experienced male-dominated or oriented 
cultural and social relations in Syria even though encouraged by pro-gender political 
doctrines and supports, they have felt a relatively more liberal and secular culture 
and social relations in Turkey. However, the pro-gender ideology and doctrines, 
taking responsibilities in social organization and public roles they experienced in 
Lavrion camp in Greece have been the determining dynamics in the background of 
their gender transformations. In Germany, on the other hand, in addition to these 
background dynamics, social changes and transformations such as individualization 
tendencies, economic independence that they have begun to experience are the 
subjects of discussion. The interviewees’ experiences especially in these three 
countries, whose words I have quoted below, are brief pictures of the development 
of this process.  
“My family is very strongly political that’s why they always supported me. There is a specific 
support for women in Kurdish communities, they usually act upon positive discrimination for 
women. But still countries like Syria or Turkey are very man dominated, even though feminist 
movements are getting stronger. We can see the gender roles in daily life, for example, 
women cook, take care of babies; and men work, and become macho… Regarding in 
Greece or Germany, as far as I observe visibility of women in the public is more, gender 
roles in the family and mentality of states are different, not very man dominated. Actually, 
here in Germany, I participated many events that support women and teach their rights… 
[Interview 45, 33 years old, single, director, Berlin, 10.04.2019] 
“… In Turkey, life for women is not very easy, because of religious motives, patriarchal 
culture, and the state's very conservative policies that do not care about women... We 
haven’t stayed long in Greece, so I don't know the situation of women there very much. But 
Greece is a European Union country after all, so its laws must be good for women... Women 
in Germany are stronger, they do every job, everyone respects each other. However, family 
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and social relations are not very strong here. Everyone lives their own life... My experience 
here is very good because the conditions are actually better for female refugees. For 
example, there are refugee centres only for women but not for men. Or, while there are 
seminars and events that teach and strengthen women’s rights for women, men are exposed 
to the opposite. That is, they teach culture lessons saying men that they cannot do that, 
cannot do this, cannot treat women like that and so on. I know from my husband…” 
[Interview 49, 42 years old, mother of 2, Berlin, 17.04.2019] 
The emphases of these two interviewees concerning the gender subjectivity and 
roles in Turkey, Greece and Germany address similar points and support each other. 
If we paraphrase these emphases, they describe that woman are supported in the 
Kurdish communities due to political/ideological doctrines; Turkey has socially and 
politically conservative policies and a man-dominated culture towards women; the 
visibility and participation of women in social and economic life in Germany are much 
better, while comments and observations about women in Greece do not go deeper 
because interviewees did not get involved in life there. The experiences and 
observations of other female interviewees were in line with these statements. A 
notable issue in the observations and experiences of the interviewees is that their 
practicality, visibility, and empowerment of their gender subjectivity has gradually 
increased. In addition, especially the second interviewee’s emphasized statement: 
“Everyone lives their own life”, can be considered as the character of individuality. 
The transition to a more individual social form from the collective societal form can 
be evaluated with this statement of the interviewee. This is a process that is not only 
women-specific, but one that male interviewees also experience and go through, as 
I discussed in other sections, for instance, particularly regarding the unfulfillable and 
unsatisfied expectations and experiences about life in Germany.  
I argue that the transition from this collective societal form to individuality has a 
positive response, especially for female refugees concerning gender roles and 
empowerment of their subjectivities. This is because, in the collective societal life, 
the social pressure faced by women, the reproduction of the surveillance and 
patriarchal gender roles transform into more liberalisation of women visibility and 
decreasing social pressure with the transition to individualization. The practical 
equivalent of this process is as follows: Women who do not work due to gender 
codes and lifestyle in their societies, cannot continue their education, are watched, 
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now can be included in public representation, and working life with pro-gender 
support, particularly as a result of the reduction of external social pressure. That is 
gender empowerment and strong subjectivity. In this regard, each interviewee stated 
that they manage to stand on their own feet, control their economic income, make 
their own future plans, and act with their own wishes and thoughts. This is the 
practical equivalent of this gender transformation process. Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that the second interviewee made a comparison between herself and her husband 
and emphasized that while women were supported, men were disempowered. The 
integration and cultural education programs of the German state on supporting 
women in the integration programs and the holding down of men’s masculinity 
backup the arguments I have presented above. 
In the next section, I present a comparison of the similarities and differences 





5.6) Comparison of the Results Relating to Syrian Arab and Kurdish 
Participants in Germany 
Although all the countries where the field studies were conducted have their own 
unique geopolitical and social aspects concerning Syrian refugees’ migration, the 
findings and the generated data in the fieldwork conducted in Germany have 
particular importance. The main reason for this is that Germany is the country where 
the inferences and hypothesis about the statements of interviewed Syrian refugees 
in Turkey and Greece can be tested. Therefore, the relations, similarities and 
differences of the discussions made separately within the scope of Syrian Arab and 
Kurdish refugees in the above sections are of vital importance for us to comprehend 
the arguments of this research as a whole. 
In the following sections, there are comparative findings and results that I have 
organized and presented according to four research focuses. First, I discuss the 
changes in Syrian refugees' perceptions and opinions before and after their arrival 
in Germany, through common intersections and distinctive aspects. 
5.6.1) A Comparison of Participants’ Perceptions and Experiences of the 
Other 
As one of the most central focal points in this research, learning Syrian refugees’ 
perceptions and thoughts, especially of European societies and countries, serves to 
show us the motivations and aims for, so to speak, their migration that has a risk of 
death. The satisfaction, challenges and faced realities experienced by Syrian Arab 
and Kurdish refugees who arrived in Berlin and stayed in different refugee centres 
are considerably similar. The satisfaction, complaints and disappointments of both 
groups intersect at certain points. I explain these points by considering two 
categories: First, the contentment and met expectations are discussed in both 
groups regarding the economic aid, social services, and accommodation facilities 
that the German state provides to refugees on a regular basis. This is because the 
long migration journey that Syrian refugees went through after being forcibly 
displaced from their homes had created an economic burden for all interviewees. In 
other words, the expenses they made to meet their own needs, especially during the 
illegal migration process, economically had put many interviewees in a difficult 
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position. However, their arrival in Germany essentially eliminated the possibility of 
further migration. This has prevented the fact that the interviewees might have to 
make more economic expenditure for any possible migration. In addition, the 
financial support of the state, social services and assistance satisfied the 
expectations of the refugees in the first phase, albeit for a short time. Based on this 
contentment, it can be argued that the better life, better conditions, and better 
services, which are the reasons why the interviewees migrated to Germany, have 
been verified. Relatedly, the interviewees made positive comments stating that 
Germany is an economically developed, modern, strong, and a welfare state. That 
is, as a kind of pull factor, the economic development of Germany has met with the 
expectations of the interviewers. These arguments have been made by both Syrian 
Arab and Kurdish refugees. 
Secondly, other aspects that do not correspond to their expectations, triggered 
disappointments and dissatisfactions that are more complicated. We can explain 
these aspects by considering them in two different categories: First, there are 
reasons such as the long duration of the integration process, the complexity and 
lengthy documentation and bureaucracy procedures, the necessity of German 
language education, and the continuation of staying in the refugee centres. The fact 
that these reasons do not match the positive images in the perceptions of the 
interviewees about Germany and the unfulfillment of their dreams to be 
accomplished can be stated as the most basic disappointments. The second set of 
disappointments related to the problem of adaptation and integration faced by 
refugees due to the mismatch between social characteristics, socialization, and 
experiences between German and Syrian societies, which can be considered the 
cause of other disappointments. This problem is particularly essential to our 
understanding of expected the lifestyle, standard and sociality that Syrian 
interviewees imagined and desired, and the experiences they underwent. Both 
Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees’ societal form that they had in their habitus was 
collective, the German society on the contrary is highly individualistic. 
If I express this in a different frame, although Syrian refugees were in a safe country 
in Turkey, they could not reach the life experiences they expected after a long 
migration to Germany for a better life and aspirations. I argue that the origins of these 
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unpredictable differences in social life they desired are laid on these refugees’ digital 
habitus with which they were constantly and intensely involved while they were in 
Turkey and Greece. As has been clarified and exemplified several times, the digital 
content in the form of information and images that these refugees learned or were 
exposed to in their digital habitus eventually generated a false or distorted 
perception. In particular, the fact that the perception created by this digital content, 
which is composed of fragmentary pieces of individual internet users’ lives and does 
not create a full picture but generates a very positive opinion and a desire, is a fact 
that refugees cannot realize without experiencing it.  
The research finding showing another intersection between these Syrian Arab and 
Kurdish refugees is that the interviewees stated that the German state is hyper-
attentive and has a controlling, instructing approach while striving to integrate them. 
The metaphoric analogy that points to this finding, which was discussed before, is 
‘feeling like a child’, or ‘being treated as a child’. This approach of the German state, 
which has been shown to cause the interviewees to not being able to take part in the 
social life and to tend to be passive, was also indirectly the grounds for 
disappointment and dissatisfaction of the interviewees. 
The primary research finding that distinguishes Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees 
was, as previously detailed in the Turkey and Greece chapters, the imagined 
community perception and created solidarity among Kurdish refugees were 
observed in the fieldwork in Berlin as well. The official recognition of Syrian refugees 
by the German state was a recognition of their national identity rather than their 
ethnic recognition. Therefore, the basic identity and status at registration were 
refugees from Syria, as Syrian refugees. The legal restriction on the preferred 
Kurdish identity that this official recognition has created for Kurdish refugees, has 
been used as a reversed strategy for the coexistence of Kurdish refugees from 
different countries. Kurdish refugees registered with different national identities, for 
example, Iranian, Iraqi, or Syrian, used the German government’s policy of not 
staying together with refugees from the same country in refugee centres to their 
advantage. Kurdish refugees, who can stay together as a result of this strategic 
approach, can be perceived as a reaffirmation of the political unity and imagined 
community perception of the refugees who previously stayed in the Lavrion camp. 
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On the other hand, although there was no significant association or community 
sense among Syrian Arab refugees, I observed that they spend time together in their 
daily life until they learn German, socialize with local people, or fully settle. Also, 
Syrian Arab interviewees stated that they had friends or acquaintances with whom 
they come together sometimes in Berlin. Therefore, the strong bond among Syrian 
Arab refugees was a social unity rather than a political unity and solidarity. 
5.6.2) A Comparison of Media and Internet Usage of Participants 
As the findings of the fieldwork in Berlin illustrate, the media and internet interaction 
of the interviewees were similar in both times spent and usage. Both Syrian Arab 
and Kurdish refugees emphasized that their internet and phone usage, which they 
stated was very intense before they arrived in Germany, decreased significantly after 
they arrived in Germany. Even though less often when compared with interviewees’ 
usage and interaction with the media and internet in Turkey and Greece, the 
interaction of the interviewees with these tools in Berlin exposes two different trends 
in itself. The first of that was that interviewees who stated that they use the phone 
and the internet for 3-4 hours a day, engage with these tools to communicate with 
people, in addition to the continued use of social media. These uses mostly 
corresponded to their socializing on well-known social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Instagram or YouTube. In my digital ethnography about the use of social 
media of these interviewees, they commonly used two main types of media content, 
primarily personal expressions such as photography, video, opinion, and then social 
and political news such as media content related to the Syrian war or the Kurdish 
struggle.  
The second usage trend was about interviewees who stated they use their phone 
and internet more around 4-5 hours a day, particularly due to the interest and positive 
feedback from other users in social media after their arrival in Germany. The social 
media content of the interviewees was similar to those of the previous users. In 
addition to the visual and opinion-based content related to their personal life, social 
content concerning political and social contexts related to Syrian refugees, the 
Syrian war and being a refugee, were also predominant in their media content. In 
particular, the social media engagements of these interviewees provide the reader 
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with subtext information so that the tendencies of other Syrian refugees who wish to 
migrate to Germany or other European countries can be understood. Readers now 
can better comprehend the perceptions and desires of the Syrian refugees about 
European countries who particularly aspire to migrate these countries, which I 
theoretically discussed within the scope of the concept of Simulation as the 
perception created and affected by media content. Besides, the simulation 
conceptualization serves to support an understanding of the unsatisfied expectation, 
disappointments, and dissatisfaction that the interviewees in Berlin experienced in 
comparison with what they imagined and expected. 
As I mentioned, the interviewees shared images and opinions from their own lives in 
their media posts as social media users. I do not make any analysis as to the 
accuracy of the meaning of this media content. Rather, I draw the attention of 
readers to the fact that this content usually reflects certain aspects of life and that 
the desires and attractions created by these aspects are difficult to reach by others. 
I argue that the observations and analyses I have made regarding the difficulty of 
this situation arise mostly from the differences between the societal structures and 
characters of the Syrian refugees and the societies of countries they wish to go to.  
When I formulate it differently: Refugee media users – a potential influencer due to 
the nature of media – who express that they are satisfied, have better standards and 
are happy as an expression on their social media content, trigger the desire to be 
happy, satisfied and better in other users who are associated with this content. 
However, other refugee users who want to realize these desires as a result of this 
interaction, perceive this content as an association with the country, culture and 
standards of the user live in rather than a perception concerning individual user’s 
life. Therefore, when a Syrian refugee who has begun living in Germany shares 
content stating that s/he is happy, the other refugee users who interact with this 
content can potentially think they can be happy if they go to Germany. 
I analyse the main problem here as follows: There are conceivably inabilities to adapt 
a new life and struggles that can potentially be caused by abstract phenomena that 
are difficult to foresee but understandable when experienced, for instance, cultures, 
lifestyle, and societal features. This inability to adapt and conflict also brings 
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disappointments and dissatisfaction. This situation appeared in the Syrian refugees 
as follows: The differences in individual and collective social structures and the 
restrictions created by being a refugee that hinder the imaginations and desires they 
want to realize when they arrive in Germany are the issues. Therefore, the 
conceptualization of digital habitus gains more importance for a better understanding 
of the formation of desires and imaginations of refugees regarding the countries they 
wish to migrate. Although the influence of media on perceptions and desires is not a 
new subject, ‘the creation and development of digital habitus are fairly new 
phenomena’ because of the emergence of instantly applicable instruments such as 
social media, the ability of everyone to be a content user, producer and consumer, 
and the more roles and functions of digital means that replace the practicality of life. 
5.6.3) A Comparison of Capital Forms and Subjectivities 
In my interviews with both Arab and Kurdish refugees in Berlin, there were more 
complex and varying capital forms, rather than the similar capital of interviewees that 
we encountered in previous fieldwork countries. The main reason for this is the mass 
migration of more than half a million Syrian refugees by the end of 2015 consisted 
of socio-economically and culturally more heterogeneous individuals from different 
classes and capital forms. Therefore, the interviews were made up of Syrian Arab 
and Kurdish refugees who had varying capital forms from different economic classes 
and occupational groups. Thus, Syrian Arab and Kurdish interviewees have more 
similar and common aspects with each other than dissimilar features. 
All interviewees from both groups emphasized that they had standards that could 
meet their needs economically, and relatedly expressed a certain level of 
satisfaction, fulfilment, and positive opinions. The main reason for this was the 
minimum level of economic prosperity created by the regular economic aids, social 
services and accommodation services provided by the German state to the refugees. 
Besides, the importance of economic capital, which was the most emphasized form 
of capital in the previous fieldwork countries, has lost its importance to a certain 
extent for interviewees who have reached at least minimum living standards in 
Berlin. Because the situations for whom economic capital was basically determinant 
came to the fore as migrating other countries or moving out from camps to rent an 
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apartment in the cities. However, the interviewees in Berlin did not consider 
migrating to different countries. In addition, state aid minimally relieved the welfare 
level of the interlocutors in economic terms. 
In addition, these common and similar aspects of interviewees were more prominent, 
especially with regard to interviewees’ cultural and social forms of capital. 
Interviewees stated that they had more complaints and disappointment about their 
social and cultural capital, which claimed to be unqualified and ignored by the 
German state’s policies and the refugee status. These complaints and 
disappointments were also closely related to the arguments of not being able to 
accomplish their subjectivities in their life in Berlin. So, ‘what are the common 
arguments in the expressions of the interviewees from these two groups, in terms of 
their social and cultural capital?’ 
In a condition where economic worries have decreased, then social and cultural 
capital have become more important for refugees. What I mean by social and cultural 
capital is simply the educational status of the interviewees, their professions, their 
social status and relationships in relation to their qualifications. The problem of these 
capital forms for interviewees concerns the official paperwork process that they 
needed to go through, for instance, to receive the equivalent of their qualifications, 
such as diplomas and certifications. This can be thought of as the first obstacle and 
difficulty. Even if they were willing to complete this paperwork process, another 
difficult process such as language training that refugees must achieve presents a 
secondary obstacle. 
In addition, the main situation that made them submerged in this process was being 
a refugee. Being a refugee simply means no longer having opportunities and access 
as citizens of their home countries where they used to live, which is the fundamental 
base of the sense of security. The basic disappointment caused by this reality is that 
refugees whose social and economic capital are high and accomplished are ignored 
and treated as a kind of unqualified. As I mentioned in the sections where I discuss 
the capital forms of the interviewees, usually the subjectivities of the refugees are 
supported by these forms of capital. However, especially the approach of integration 
and adaptation programs to refugees, treating them ‘as a child or as if they have 
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never lived on their own’ before, indirectly caused them to feel more passive and 
dependent, as the interviewees emphasized. 
5.6.4) A Comparison of Transformation of Gender Norms and 
Empowerment of Subjectivities 
Many studies focusing on Refugee women draw attention to the challenges of ‘being 
a woman refugee’ (Asaf, 2017; 5). These studies approach the issue of being a 
woman refugee from many fields such as health, cultural encounters, gender roles, 
integration, and other fields. In this research, while Syrian refugee interviewees 
position themselves, endeavour to survive and experience migration in several 
countries until reaching their destination countries, they observe that these 
experiences indirectly empowered them and the relationship of their subjectivities 
with gender roles and norms. In order to generate these findings, I applied field study 
data obtained through ethnography and approximately 25 face-to-face interviews 
with Syrian refugee women. However, it would be incomplete to make the following 
inference by generalizing the research findings and the subjective experiences of 
the interviewees: ‘Women refugees who experience forced displacement and illegal 
migration are indirectly empowered and relatedly their subjectivities are 
strengthened.’ On the contrary, many studies have shown that women’s experiences 
of illegal migration (Asaf, ibid; Gerard and Pickering, 2016), being a refugee (Baird, 
2012), and remaining in camps (Pittaway and Bartolomei, 2001) are challenging and 
difficult, particularly due to their genders. Despite this, I circumstantially emphasize 
the empowerment and the subjectivity of a small sample group of Syrian refugee 
women in accordance with the change of cultural and societal characters in the 
process of migration as well as challenging and difficult experiences they faced. 
In the interviews with 8 different women interviewees in Berlin, the similarities 
between the experiences of Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugee women stood out more 
than the issues that differentiated them from each other. The main common 
characteristics of the women in the two groups were that they were segregated from 
the collective groups they had previously lived with and were mostly alone. I deal 
with this situation by referring to the section where I discussed the collective and 
individual societal structure characters. For the women interviewees, being alone 
229 
 
prompted the disappearance of the ‘third eye’ that the interviewees had stated they 
felt checking, managing, and controlling them in society while staying in collective 
groups, and which we encountered in the previous chapters. On the other hand, 
being alone also meant an increase in the responsibilities they had to assume. 
Before arriving in Germany, the economic and social responsibilities that were 
undertaken by family members, such as fathers, brothers, or husbands, turned into 
responsibilities that both singles and married or widow interviewees had to assume. 
On the one hand, although they stated that they had difficulties due to increased 
individual, economic or social responsibilities in their daily lives, all interviewees 
affirmed that these responsibilities strengthened them and increased their 
confidence to stand on their own feet. This empowerment occurred especially by 
being more visible in the public sphere, by working, socializing, being included in 
women’s support programs or thoroughly dealing with the responsibilities of their 
children by themselves. Especially being more visible in the public sphere, that is, 
their work, socialization, involvement in social life, at the same time enabled the 
interviewees to observe the roles, norms, and gender relations of women from 
different cultures, ethnicities or identities as friends, co-workers, officials and in other 
positions. In the interviews, the interviewees brought attention to the positive effects 
of these observations on their lives in various aspects, which I name the 
empowerment and strengthening subjectivities of the refugee women. 
Another common feature emerging in relation to the Syrian Arab and Kurdish female 
interviewees is the pro-women support training, seminars and workshops aimed at 
empowering women they are involved in in Germany or in previous countries they 
had been. It has been emphasized by the interviewees that these social, legal or 
gender focused programs are highly influential in the change and transformation of 
the interviewees’ own gender roles, perceptions, and norms. For example, programs 
that aim to empower and strengthen women interviewees such as increasing their 
awareness of legal rights, being given priority in business or social support and 
assistance programs, and through awareness raising in gender perspective, have 
yielded very positive results. In the statements in which the interviewees gradually 
evaluated Syria, Turkey, Greece, and Germany from the gender perspective, such 
a mapping of gender roles and norms emerged. While it was specified that Syria and 
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Turkey have dominantly patriarchal and religious doctrines that oppress women 
rights and their visibilities in public; particular regarding Germany, it was emphasized 
that the role of women in working life, their public visibility and social roles, the 
support of the German state for women, and women’s economic independence are 
much better than in other countries. However, while statements regarding Greece 
remained obscure, especially due to the interviewees’ lack of experiences and 
observations in social life, but they assumed that women’s rights in Greece were 
good since Greece was an EU member. In addition to these findings, there was a 
specific difference between Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees, as emphasized in 
previous fieldwork discussions, where political and ideological gender awareness 
among the Kurds interviewed was more prominent and supported than Arab 
interviewers. The reason for this can be related, in addition to the political, social, 
economic, and military accomplishments of women, especially in Kurdish societies 
and regions, to the pro-gender political movements’ support for women. 
In the next chapter, I tentatively offer a theoretical conceptualization as a proposal 
for a new macro-perspective system that combines and interweaves the theoretical 
discussions presented in the literature review and the data and findings reviewed in 





6) CHAPTER 6 
FROM FIELDWORK TO THE THEORETICAL FORMATION OF THE THESIS: 
SEMI-AUTONOMOUS COLONIALISM  
Until now, I have reviewed the key thoughts and concepts relevant to the research 
findings and analysis, as well as fieldwork chapters in detail. In doing so, I 
elementarily benefited from Grounded theory, which suggests the methodological 
approach ‘from fieldwork to theoretical formation’. Therefore, I have situated the 
primary concepts of power relations, digital habitus, and subjectivity in a theoretical 
framework on the basis of the data generated and obtained during the field study. I 
additionally discussed the effects of these concepts with(in) the daily life practices, 
thoughts, and desires of Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees in the context of the 
fieldwork chapters.  
Still, power relations and subjectivity studies are topics that are already covered in 
disciplines such as sociology, political science, and economics as theoretical 
approaches and concepts, which are profoundly elaborated on. However, unlike 
these two concepts, Digital Habitus is one of the pillar findings of this research as a 
newly coined theoretical framework. Within the scope of this chapter, I first focus on 
the concept of Digital Habitus and then emphasise its function and formation as a 
complementary and interface structure between power relations and subjectivity. 
Then, I point out that the concept of Digital Habitus, operated with power relations 
and subjectivity, is the fundamental character of a macro system and order, both 
functionally and structurally. Finally, I consider the way these three 
conceptualisations operate together to form an alternative system and a proposal for 
a macro approach. I call this system ‘Semi-Autonomous Colonialism’. Finally, I 
defend the Semi-Autonomous Colonialism theoretical concept utilising Digital 
Habitus as the mechanism that functions as the central bond and interface of a 
contemporary comprehensive system. 
6.1) As a Pillar Finding of the Research: Digital Habitus 
We live in a digital age, and accordingly, we live in a nascent habitus that we 
consistently shape and develop concerning our relationalities and interactions. The 
continuity and intensity of these relationalities have hit the peak level, particularly 
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with the portable devices we can continuously carry with ourselves physically and 
continually use in every moment of life for altering purposes. The principal devices 
that allow this new digital media era to expand and function can be listed as 
smartphones, tablets, laptops, smartwatches, and other portable electronic devices. 
These devices enable us to establish permanent connections regardless of location 
and time. This era that we physically cannot touch upon, but which we live in, 
provides the groundwork for the digital habitus. In other words, this enormously 
broad-ranged and expanded new digital life with its set of rules, services, 
interactions, systems, morals, and values are the stages that make up the steps of 
digital habitus. Therefore, digital habitus has become the essential element of the 
new living way of modern man. To define it more precisely, ‘digital habitus is a virtual 
system that feeds on reality and has interaction through the transference and 
emergence of social, emotional, political, economic, and financial lifestyle factors on 
online and internet-based digital platforms’. The main character that makes this 
argument and hypothesis unconventional and significant is that the concept and 
formation of digital habitus reveals a facet of technological life that has not been well 
and thoroughly explored by other researchers. 
The configuration of digital habitus has started as ‘an extension of man’s central 
nervous system’ (McLuhan, 1994) in the form of alternative life purposes such as 
facilitating core life services in bureaucracy, education, administration, health, and 
transportation; and creating new social domains for communication, and 
entertainment in telecommunication and media. Every single one of these sectors, 
platforms and applications develops their e-fields, that is in Bourdieusian sense, the 
foundation of habitus (Bourdieu, 2005; 30). With the definition and formation of 
varying and developing (e)-fields, (digital) habitus begins to exist, and it turns into a 
form of managing the (e)-fields. This new order that we adapt with meteoric speed 
inevitably enforces people to participate in it. 
Although we adapt this order with a meteoric speed, on the other hand, as users and 
consumers, we desire the latest models and updated versions of systems and 
devices that potential capitalist markets and manufacturers offer us. However, this 
is not a new rise or disposition, especially when considering the historical spreads 
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of media-based companies and media relations that have developed in the last 
century and are today's most extensive capitalist area. 
Before ascertaining its relation to the semi-autonomous colonial system, I consider 
it will be helpful to discuss what digital habitus corresponds to in the context of Syrian 
refugees as the research’s subjects in this study. Understanding digital habitus in 
the context of Syrian refugees will be more understandable when it relates to the 
macro system, colonialism, as a more general hypothesis. The emphasis on the 
relationship between Syrian refugees and digital habitus turns out to be, in fact, 
generalisable, especially when acknowledging the function and structure of digital 
habitus as an interface mechanism between power relations and subjectivity. 
Therefore, within the scope of the next section, I evaluate digital habitus structurally 
and functionally within the scope of Syrian refugees. While doing this, I associate it 
with power relations and subjectivity discussions so that what the digital habitus 
corresponds to as an interface can be understood more clearly. 
6.2) Digital Habitus as an Interface Mechanism in between Power 
Relations and Subjectivity 
Habitus in the Bourdieusian sense is carved out through time, upbringing, education, 
and disposition (Reay, 2004). The habitus is formed through and by the accumulated 
experiences and occurrences of people in different fields (Bourdieu, 1990). In this 
research, the emergence of digital habitus has become especially evident in refugee 
camps. Refugee camps are like limbo. In the period until refugees reach the camps, 
the habitus they have built or been subjected to so far is damaged. The structural 
deterioration of their habitus and the construction process of the new one starts in 
camps. Creating a new habitual base in these limbos is directly related to formation 
of digital habitus in this research. Therefore, as an example, e-fields on digital 
networks, where refugee children are associated with an indispensable need from 
an early age, is a new experience that replaces education in the classic sense. Or, 
in camp conditions, the intense and dominant upbringings, concept and conception 
of time cause the deconstruction of the elements that built the former habitus, 
building a new habitus. Digital habitus is an area that builds habits and needs, which 
is most dominant and determinant in this new habitus, clearly observable in camp 
conditions. Despite this, I realised that digital habitus is more applicable and valid to 
234 
 
everyone who has at least association with digital networks rather than being a 
phenomenon that is unique to refugees or camp conditions. I came to the conclusion 
that digital habitus is a current phenomenon that includes almost all of us, not just 
refugees in the camps, principally after acknowledging and noting the e-fields 
engagements and dispositions of people in various fields such as education, finance, 
entertainment, economy, bureaucracy, social media. Therefore, the observable 
effects of daily habits and digital relationships on refugees’ perception in camp areas, 
demonstrated in a more intense and accelerated version, were the first triggering 
causes of the digital habitus theory. 
I observed and developed the concept of digital habitus among Syrian refugees as 
communication means, personal internet explorations, social interactions with 
others, as well as the effects of intensified digital relations on their perceptions and 
desires. I focused primarily on the relations and effects of digital habitus among and 
on those Syrian refugees who managed to migrate to Turkey, Greece, and Germany. 
Many studies show that social media and internet use are the dominant and 
determinant new element among refugees (Dekker et al. 2018; Kutscher and Kreß, 
2018; Alencar, 2018; Gintova, 2019). These studies investigate through more micro 
perspectives how these new elements correspond to refugees’ lives in migration, 
integration, adaptation, and communication research areas. As Dekker et al. stated 
in their study on the use of social media by Syrian refugees in the Netherlands: “The 
use of a smartphone was essential to a refugee to stay in contact with family and 
friends in Syria, to receive advice from his brother who was already living in Sweden, 
and to communicate with others whom he met on his journey to Europe while 
crossing 10 borders” (2018; 1).  
After discussing what potentially digital habitus and its limits correspond to in a 
structural sense, it is crucial to explain operationally what role it plays between power 
relations and subjectivity. Refugees re-remember and re-acknowledge almost every 
day that the reasons for staying in the camps are the transcendental power 
relationships that exceed their individual power and authority limits. The limited camp 
conditions, host countries’ policies and practices concerning refugees, international 
aid and assistance, security and official forces assisting them, manifest in their lives 
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as power relations and actors, which are basic illustrations of varying determinant 
power groups. The common feature of all these actors is that they are more dominant 
and significantly formative and influential than refugees’ individual or collective 
strengths, mobilities, legal, and possible practices. On the other hand, the 
subjectivity of the refugees is limited by the determinant drivers such as the strength 
of their capital forms, their genders, and education. They put into practice the 
dreams, plans, decisions and actions they want to realise within the limits of what 
these drivers allow and make possible.  
The effect and operation of digital habitus find a response and capacity between 
these two determining areas, power relations and subjectivity. For example, Syrian 
refugees in Turkey cannot legally leave Turkey unless certain conditions are met. 
This is an example of power relations as restricting and determining external forces. 
These refugees cannot go to other countries they want to migrate to legally. 
Nevertheless, they can realise this action illegally, especially if their economic 
capitals can decisively meet these potential costs and conditions of migration. Most 
of the refugees we come across from news or different media content are refugees 
who carry out such illegal migrations. For these refugees, digital habitus appears in 
the following areas, especially among refugees who can perform this economically 
costly migration: It appears as a field that affects their perceptions, desires and 
thoughts about where and how they can go, what they can do when they go, and 
with whom they can communicate, as well as for personal interests, hobbies, 
professions and other reasons. In other words, digital habitus is a new field 
consisting of invisible networks that provide information when needed, enable 
communication, and offer possible alternative applications. This field corresponds to 
a new habitus that creates striking and observable effects in the daily lives of 
individuals, determines movement and disposition, and can change the level of 
education or culture. 
Although digital habitus has a neutral nature structurally and functionally, it has a 
very influential role on perceptions and thoughts. This influence on refugees 
particularly can be observed because the use of digital habitus primarily generates 
the consent of its users and triggers desires regarding the places where they may 
wish to migrate. The fundamental elements that enable the manufacturing of 
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individual consent are the content that can be effective on perceptions in the forms 
of information about the places they want to migrate, or images, individual or public 
posts, and other form digital contents. In other words, for instance when a refugee 
living in a camp encounters content that advocates the proposition that  ‘Germany is 
one of the world’s best countries for quality of life’, this directly triggers the 
individual’s desire to realise or reach that. Relatedly, to be able to accomplish this, 
the consent is fundamentally needed. This is because such mobilities as migration 
or crossing borders illegally necessitate actions within the possibility of capitals of 
whoever wish to realise that.  
In this research, I demonstrate the long-term movements and narratives of refugees 
who committed such actions. And especially the migration routes are towards 
western countries where a colonial rule is observed, such as England or Germany. 
However, semi-autonomous coloniality takes place predominantly in the national 
territory of these countries, rather than administering cross-border lands and people. 
In other words, people first migrate to the colonialist countries with their will and 
decisions, and then the colonial approaches of the states can be observed. 
Accordingly, the full functionality of contemporary colonial countries is based on 
generating the consent of individuals that they can rule, exploit, and control within 
their borders with the colonial administration. The generation of this consent primarily 
occurs when individuals begin to think and desire that they will have better standards 
and conditions elsewhere. Migration of individuals or masses with their consent 
refers to the action as a result of these consents.  
One of the conceptual discussions that should be emphasised and criticised here is 
the association of modernity with Western countries, especially Europe, as a life 
model, level of welfare and standard. In the interviews I conducted, one of the central 
concepts that the interviewees expressed when comparing the eastern and western 
societies was that Europe was defined by modern and eastern countries by 
backwardness and non-modern. This evaluation made within the context of east-
west contrast has, in fact, been one of the main focal points of different studies in 
recent history (Schmidt, 2006; Thompson, 1995; Ichijo, 2011; Bhambra, 2007). This 
is because, in the process of constructing the portrayal of Europe and modernity as 
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unified or coherent entities, alternative narratives are not only excluded but not fully 
acknowledged (Mussell, 2007; 801). 
In this sense, the lifestyle, social relations, welfare level, secular or liberal life 
relations defined as modernity by the interviewees is substantially a dichotomy that 
European countries, societies embraced and reflected it as if it is ‘the life that how 
should be’. For instance, concerning this discussion, Gurminder Bhambra’s (2007) 
book deals with the concept of modernity. By deconstructing modernity from a 
sociological perspective through re-evaluation and reviving the colonialism, 
postcolonialism, Eurocentrism, and modernisation debates, she argues that possible 
modern life is formed by shared history and sociological formations (Bhambra, 2007; 
Mussell, 2007; 800). However, modernity has commonly been identified and 
presented especially with Europe and later with European colonies such as the US, 
Australia, Canada, which has appeared as a concept that corresponds to a desired 
and demanded life among Syrian refugees as well. I argue that the main reason for 
this is that they consider the lifestyle, gender relations, consumption habits 
concerning the media content that they encounter in their digital habitus, which 
commonly has very high popularity because they are western and well-promoted, 
advertised and presented in the movies, clips, promotions, brands, for example. 
Then the images and ideas they relate to the West become similar to those countries 
they wish to migrate to. 
Bhambra (2007) argues that we should remember global and collective sociology, 
which has a long history and interaction, and which has greatly expanded and 
increased even before the French Revolution or the Enlightenment, which is widely 
regarded as a cornerstone in the development of modernity. She emphasizes that 
the thoughts, practices and lifestyles that are thought to build and nurture modernity 
should be embraced as a broader cultural heritage rather than being confined to 
specific geography, meaning Europe. In this sense, considering the existence of 
multiple modernities, instead of addressing only one modernity, both prevents a 
hierarchical social formation and enables us to re-engage with and think about the 
concept of better. Refugees’ desire to migrate to Europe because they think it is 
better causes them to think about the social norms, values and life they come from 
in a negative hierarchical stratification scale. 
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In the presence of Syrian refugees as a narrow sample group, I have shown the 
operation and function of digital habitus as an interface through its influence and 
determinant elements. As two various fields involving almost all people, power 
relations and subjectivity merge into a new field with digital habitus and turn into a 
powerful and designing system. This system’s power of gaining surplus-value and 
long-term benefits resembles an order with colonialism, which was previously 
operative and visible in different areas of life such as economic profit, political-social 
prestige, privilege, and identity. Therefore, I call this system semi-autonomous 
colonialism. The feature that makes this system colonial is that it is characterised by 
the production of the consent of individuals, which enables individuals to have 
stronger subjectivities than subjugation to it.  
6.3) Why Semi-Autonomous Colonialism? 
Colonialism is not a modern phenomenon, nor is it limited to a particular time or 
place. Just simply reviewing world history, it is replete instances of one society 
gradually expanding and growing by essentially comprising adjacent neighbouring 
territory and ruling its land and people by the use of military, politics, religion or other 
methods. As a few well-known examples from colonial history, the ancient Greeks 
established colonies as the Romans, the Ottomans, the British and French did and 
exploited, benefited, and ruled in varying aspects, mainly economic66. In the last 
century, the debates, perspectives and morphing titles related to colonialism have 
attained their places in literature, such as settler colonialism, neo-colonialism, post-
colonialism, modern colonialism, internal colonialism, etc. As with numerous theories 
in related disciplines’ literature, the limits and functionality of the term ‘colonialism’ 
have been described by various scholars in distinct approaches and not always 
harmoniously (Fieldhouse, 1981; Césaire, 2001; Samson, 2020). Yet, ‘Colonialism’, 
as a term commonly noted as ‘… is a practice of domination, which involves the 
subjugation of one people to another’ (Kohn and Reddy, 2006; 1; Zalta, 2014). 
Colonialism discussions correspond to a wide spectrum of disciplines and fields. 
Despite this, its limits and framework in this research are limited to migration as a 
 
66 With these examples I particularly emphasize historically known expanded and grown empires. 
Otherwise, I am aware of the difference between imperialism and colonialism, it is just matter of 
similar methods used. 
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form of mobility parameters in relation to the desires and perceptions of individuals 
as a current socio-political and economic phenomenon in the case of Syrian 
refugees. Even so within these parameters, studies associated with colonialism have 
a considerable weight in the literature (Emmer, 2012; Jafri, 2013; Bhambra, 2017; 
Mayblin, 2017). Many scholars from different perspectives and disciplines have dealt 
with refugees, migration, and asylum subjects by associating them with colonialism 
(Mayblin, 2017; Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2018; Chimni, 2009). However, in most of 
these studies, the decisions, orientations and migration movements taken by 
individuals and masses of their own free will are not seen as a solid basis within the 
scope of subjectivity discussions. The semi-side of semi-autonomous colonialism is 
based precisely on the will and actions of individuals themselves. While doing this, 
semi- refers to the fact that individuals migrate within the scope of their capital and 
opportunities to countries with colonial history and still have an ongoing colonial 
administration and system, even if most refugees are forcibly displaced from their 
home country. Therefore, the most decisive aspect that distinguishes contemporary 
colonialism from the other models and perspectives is about individuals’ perceptions, 
decisions,  and actions as a political subjectivity and agency. 
With Syrian refugees’ urgent need of humanitarian assistance and becoming the 
largest refugee population, the socio-political subjects of refugee, immigration, 
nation-state borders remain hot on the agenda of particularly highly emigrated 
European countries such as France, Germany, England, Greece, Turkey and others. 
Gurminder K. Bhambra (2017) discusses the refugee crisis relating to European 
countries and asserted universal human rights, cosmopolitanism, and policies, and 
she turns the reality of cosmopolitanism down. Bhambra in fact reminds us how the 
colonial mentality and administration still overrule these countries and that they do 
not take any responsibility towards the refugees because asserted universal human 
rights are not applicable for the others. Bhambra, however, takes the matter 
differently and writes:  “Extending the concept of the state and its associated political 
community to be congruent with imperial boundaries would change the way in which 
those we label as ‘migrant’ or ‘other’ are treated. For example, Habermas associates 
the phenomenon of multiculturalism with what he calls ‘postcolonial immigrant 
societies’, that is, with those ‘others’ who are seen to migrate to Europe” (Bhambra, 
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2017; 396). To back up the argument of Bhambra, it is of great importance to 
remember the following statistical facts: Europe is the most prosperous continent on 
the planet yet accommodates the smallest portion of the world’s refugees. The 
statistics regarding the ‘Refugee Crisis’ debate, the total opposite of one of the most 
severely used arguments in far-right, conservative, and nationalist politics in 
European countries, are in fact striking and surprising: Developing countries host 
more than 80% of the world’s refugees, while European countries receive 6% in total 
(UNCHR, 2017). This striking reality and statistics in fact show us how the countries 
-as examples to power relations and actors- turn into a political argument to describe 
the other embodied in refugee, migrant or asylum personas. I argue that the reason 
for this is the colonial understanding and system that could not be completely 
overcome. This understanding and systems often reveal themselves in the 
immigration, border, nation discourses and policies of the countries, in which they 
portray the boundaries of the others. For example, Nadine El-Enany, in her book 
'(B)ordering Britain' (2020), reveals the continuing colonialism by investigating the 
British immigration system and its complex way of operating. While doing so, El-
Enany details the historic and contemporary migration to Britain through the lens of 
race and empire. The axiom of her book argues that Britain is a white supremacist 
society, even as it defends and asserts human rights and equality under its 
constitutional laws and regulations. In addition, British colonialism proceeds to exist 
within its subtle law and politics and maintains as a "racial power regime" maintained 
by the remnants of the empire (Ginsburg, 2021; 150). In other words, El-Enany 
simply indicates that it is de facto that nonwhite migrants, residents of Britain, that 
is, mainly non-Europeans, but those from colonised or undeveloped countries, are 
less secure with their residency and rights, even if they hold legal citizenship. Hence, 
the British immigration policy forms and distinguishes British society into essentially 
white legal citizens and nonwhite third-country nationals as others, such as migrant 
workers, refugees, asylum seekers and other precarious residents (El-Enany, 2020; 
Davies, 2020, Ginsburg, 2021). Furthermore, the book of Lucy Mayblin (2017) also 
analyses Great Britain’s border, immigration, refugee policies through post-colonial 
and de-colonial lenses. Mayblin sociologically reveals that Great Britain’s 
immigration and border control system and administration began to tighten and 
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restrict the entries of those others after the 1990s and it became discriminative, 
exclusionary, and exploitative. Mayblin in her book defines the refugee as “the 
embodiment of the darker side of modernity and of the global fallout of colonialism” 
(2017; 3). Mayblin’s book also exhibits how the UK government stopped people from 
migrating, working, or living in the cities they choose.  
Similarly, Germany’s ‘prevention of new diasporic communities’ policies, which I 
illustrated in my fieldwork in Germany, have a colonial rule in this sense. Attempt to 
bring together people of different ethnicities and nationalities in refugee protection 
centres and make German a compulsory common language among them; also, 
approaches towards refugees who have been distributed to many cities of Germany 
and forced into compulsory integration in a sense are colonial. These policies and 
practices towards refugees and immigrants are not just in Great Britain or Germany, 
but rather a general approach of the European Union (EU). In other words, the 
securitisation of the EU’s external borders and authoritarian immigration policies, 
with Foucault's perspective, bio-politically dominate and restrain the refugees and 
immigrants (Pfeifer, 2018; 459). Most of these debates and arguments are structural 
and bureaucratic, so to speak, related to states' political, social or economic policies. 
In other words, these discussions are included in the power relations and actors 
mechanism of semi-autonomous colonialism. 
Especially the policies and approaches of European countries with a colonial history 
against non-European bodies are colonialist. The stressed arguments by Bhambra 
(2017), El-Enany (2020) and Mayblin (2017) within the scope of the UK, and in my 
research, the practices and policies of Germany are colonialist. In a sense, that 
instead of invading and subordinating the territory of the Other, there is a 
phenomenon of colonial rule within the territory of the colonialist country itself. This 
colonial rule manifests itself through the colonial order in the pragmatist selection of 
refugees or migrants, the economic exploitation of immigrants and refugees, or the 
cultural colonisation of Others through assimilationist integration policies. However, 
there is a new factor that changes perspective, which is the digital habitus. Digital 
habitus in this phase serves as a platform that conveys particular images, 
representations, information about colonial countries, images created both by 
subaltern as well as colonial subjects. Within the scope of these data, refugees or 
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subalterns can exercise their political subjectivity and agency. Highlighting the digital 
habitus and subjectivity as connected mechanisms which extent the working system 
of semi-autonomous colonialism differentiates from other colonialism discussions 
and perspectives.  
Therefore, considering and taking into account the reality of digital habitus as a new 
phenomenon and powerful mechanism in global politics and economy, the migration, 
disposition and actions of individuals or masses in the modern era require a new 
system evaluation. Because although it is vital to reveal the approaches of these 
countries, which I consider as power relations, and to label them as colonialist, it is 
also relevant to indicate that these countries do not have a militarist, authoritarian, 
coercive colonial approach as they were. Instead, their laws, regulations, and 
practices are visible and valid within their national borders, which we name colonial. 
At this very point, I argue that we need to revive the argument, which has become 
Spivak’s manifesto, “Can Subaltern Speak?” (2003) discussions and think in terms 
of perception-action-migration and coloniality equation, especially considering 
current communication and transportation technologies. Therefore, I propose a new 
system structure with semi-autonomous colonialism operating with three 
mechanisms in which one of the primary components is built on the subjectivity of 
subaltern refugees. 
The colonial literature, which has adopted subjectivity studies, in particular, has a 
wide scope. The subjectivity of those subjected subjects in and among coloniser and 
colonised (Memmi, 2013), the legacy of coloniser among colonised people (De 
L'Estoile, 2008), the postcolonial authoritarianism in colonies (Schneider, 2006), 
subjected words as an impulse of coloniality in the language of colonised (Irvine, 
2008), psychoanalysis of colonialism (Frosh, 2013) and many other studies 
conducted with a particularly micro perspective are noteworthy. Despite this, political 
subjectivity framework differs from these studies, especially concerning the cross-
border migration and practices in targeted countries in immigration.  
In this study, migration as a form of physical mobility and the individual decisions, 
actions, capitals and preferences of those who carry out this action has been the 
primary criteria for determining the limits of the subjectivity framework. Therefore, 
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although the fact that countries with a colonialist history, operation, administration 
and understanding are colonialist stands aside, the subjectivity of those who want to 
immigrate to these countries is almost the primary determinant and complementary 
part of this colonialism. The subjectivity of these people is also very decisive for 
strengthening the subaltern's position by amplifying their actions and comprehending 
the authenticity of contemporary colonialism with its changing borders and form. In 
other words, if people do not migrate to these countries by becoming aware of the 
coloniality of such countries, the colonialism cannot act within their border limitations. 
 
6.4) A Brief Analysis of the Establishment Stages of Classical and Semi-
Autonomous Colonialism 
As with numerous theories in global politics, the limits and functionality of the term 
‘colonialism’ have been described by various scholars in distinct approaches and not 
always harmoniously (Fieldhouse, 1981; Césaire, 2001; Samson, 2020). The 
element I bring attention to in this section is to explicate the novelty of semi-
autonomous colonialism.  
The implicit and manipulative strategies used by classical colonialism in the 
establishment, expansion, and utility processes bear a resemblance to the 
development and growth processes of semi-autonomous colonialism. These 
similarities can be discussed especially when considering these strategies 
implemented during the expansion of colonial powers across political, economic, and 
social dimensions and relations in the colonisation periods. Although still the effects 
of various forms of colonialism, including the classical, are on the agenda of many 
disciplines such as postcolonialism or decolonisation (Butt, 2013; Ziltener and 
Künzler, 2013), I rather draw more attention to the transformation that has appeared 
and differentiated in the expansion and control of this new system.  
As far as I analyse, I address colonialism that has evolved as an economic and social 
industry and was indirectly driven by particularly media-based technological 
developments, and whose functionality still serves certain developed countries, 
including the former colonial countries. To put it more clearly, even though 
colonisation has operated through the domination of one side over another for 
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certain power centres and goals throughout history, today the operation of these 
goals is maintained by the decisions and practices of individuals and masses with(in) 
the influence of external power forces. Semi-autonomous colonialism is a system in 
which both sides, potential coloniser and colonised, play a role, and the consent of 
both sides is required. To be able to deepen the argument, in following sections, I 
examine the similarities and differences that cross over certain characteristics 
attributed to classical colonialism in comparison with semi-autonomous colonialism. 
These characters are ‘political and legal domination over an alien society, economic 
relations and political dependence, exploitation relations, and cultural and ethnic or 
racial inequalities’. As a result of the following brief comparisons, I discuss the 
transformation in the instruments used by the classic colonial system and illustrate 
the differences and similarities between the two systems. 
6.4.1) Political and Legal Domination 
In the history of colonialism, one of the most prominent features at the beginning of 
the relations between the two sides is the political and legal encounters. This is the 
establishment of the colonisers’ domination over the exploited ones at the beginning 
of the long-term process. This process usually ensues primarily with political and 
economic quests and initiatives between two or more parties. The political 
encounters and initiatives here can be observed as cultural, religious, economic, or 
social approaches. The forms in which these encounters and initiatives take shape 
appear more as wars, conflicts, power expansions, occupations, and then as 
economic and political conclusions. The domination process begins after these 
encounters, and the character that makes this domination legitimate, acceptable, 
and more importantly sustainable is to gain a statutory legitimacy. With the 
accomplishment of statutory legitimacy, it paves the way for the emergence of 
continuity and more specific objectives, which were often directed towards ‘economic 
benefits’, which is the actual target intended. The main point is that it was the 
dominance of a certain mentality and objective that ensured that these colonial 
relations were controlled and serve certain purposes that will warrant continuity.  
On the other hand, in semi-autonomous colonialism, these encountering relations 
are no longer based on wars, visible and traceable dominations, but rather 
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particularly digitalised media forms where the mechanisms of influence and control 
over people’s perceptions are developed. This new formation of colonialism, in which 
perceptions can be influenced and manipulated through more apparatuses such as 
media, laws, human rights, or desires, continues through a new system. The main 
operation of this system creates an impact on the people’s perceptions even in 
distanced geographies, on their lifestyles and standards they wish to possess, and 
on their desires and dreams about the future. Since these effects, manipulation and 
control mechanisms are not in a direct and observable form, there is no longer a 
need for political and legal legitimacy in between parties in this new process. Political 
and legal legitimacy change their form and methods. 
The main reason why wars, occupations and dominations are not visible anymore in 
current systems is the potentially to be effective in control and management from 
farther distances. The physical visibility of the colonial process was substituted by 
soft powers throughout the control and management of the perceptions of individuals 
and societies wherever they live, rather than physical control and political domination 
in actuality. Thus, to illustrate hypothetically, as one of new superpowers and largest 
economies today, Germany67 does not have to occupy Syria in order to reach the 
necessary masses, as Syrians, for economic growth, scientific progress, 
technological development and other potential improvements. On the contrary, its 
state identity construction as anti-militarist, liberal, egalitarian, prosperous, and 
lawful, and the desires and demands that these identities will potentially create are 
metaphorically new attempts at occupation. The circulation of these identities, 
especially in the digital habitus, will be sufficient for Germany to acquire individuals 
with human power, intellectual and qualified personalities to conduct scientific, 
technological, and academic studies.  
Although there were two sides such as Germany and Syria, just as an example, in 
the classical colonial process, the economic benefits and developments, human 
power, intellectual and qualified people that Germany potentially need, necessarily 
required physical encounters. In other words, physical encounters such as war, 
 
67 I emphasize Germany in this example because it is already overemphasized in the context of the research, 
and the reader is familiar with it. Otherwise, this equation is just an example, and instead of Germany, other 
countries such as England, France, United States, Canada, Australia can also be highlighted. 
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occupation and domination were the most fundamental feature, especially for 
building the first stage of colonisation, which is political and legal domination. I define 
such studies and developments as the central locomotive powers of current colonial 
relationships, which is to develop better and grow stronger.  
6.4.2) Economic Relations and Political Dependence 
Another essential stage built after political and legal domination during the 
colonisation process is the long-term economic relations and political dependence 
of the colonised parties (see Memmi, 2013; Ocheni and Nwankwo, 2012). The 
formation and creation of the economic relations and political dependence process 
enable the colonial powers to settle in their colonies and make plans in the long-term 
(see Veracini, 2010). Commonly, political dependency and economic relations, 
which commenced after political and legal domination, were the stage in which the 
most fundamental objective of the colonisation process were built. That was the 
‘economic exploitation’ of the colonies and the key foundation of benefiting from it. 
This stage mattered not only for economic exploitation but also for the basis for the 
operability of policies in line with the cultural, social, and political goals of the 
colonising powers. At the stage of establishment of economic relations and political 
dependency, the foremost determining element was power elites. Such power elites, 
which could be in the form of empire, kingdom, state, army, company, aimed to build 
economic relations, political continuity, and dependency in factually occupied 
colonies. This stage also was very necessary and crucial particularly to secure the 
continuity of these relations within the framework of the colonisers’ objectives and 
programs (Frankema and Buelens, 2013). These objectives and programs were 
usually the stages in which long-term relationships were established that were in 
favour of the colonizer powers and that made their further actions and policies 
acceptable through instituted dependencies. In other words, it was the process in 
which the colonizer power groups are institutionalised by means of economy, 
politics, and social policies, especially after war, occupation and domination 
(Césaire, 1972). Again, as in the first stage, these initiatives and established policies 
have responsible, visible and traceable parties. 
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Nonetheless, the determination of economic relations and political dependence in 
the encounters with two-sided parties in semi-autonomous colonialism are more 
about generating the individual and then collective consent. This is to spread new 
world views, alternative ideologies, desires, and policies that can direct societal 
demands, and in the last instance, people’s perceptions. Therefore, the economic 
relations and political dependencies, that is, the economic and political operability of 
digital habitus is the main determining function. Institutions and establishments built 
in the classical colonial process have now been replaced by overseas companies, 
digital marketing, and global relations. To illustrate that, the companies that the 
British Empire ruled for economic and political purposes (see Tharoor, 2016), 
previously known as the East India Company (EIC) or later the British East India 
Company (BEIC), have now evolved into online overseas companies. The 
advertisements and marketing programs of these overseas companies, which was 
previously represented by the EIC in the name of the British Empire, nowadays 
represent Great Britain digitally. One of the main reasons that prompt digital habitus 
to expand, spread and become necessary is the digitalisation of these political and 
economic relations after colonialism.  
In addition, the encounters and relations that took place in classical colonialism 
among the parties of the colonisation process were mainly based on manufacturing 
social consent with military and political domination. Consent generated through 
these political and military dominations was the legitimacy of prolonged colonial 
relations in the occupied lands. To illustrate that, global political forces and entities 
such as the UN, the bindingness of international treaties and conventions such as 
the Geneva Convention and IMF, universal standards based on human rights and 
essential laws, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
other binding agreements and consensus. These new instruments due to the nature 
of comprehensive bindingness restricted the applicability of the means used by 
classical colonialism at the present time, as well as the economic and political 
expansions. Therefore, as a result, the strategies of generating social consent used 
by states to obtain certain economic, political, military, and social benefits have 
begun to change. In order to establish and expand economic relations and political 
dependence, the foremost new instruments used in the semi-autonomous 
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colonialism are depended more on the creation of demands, consent and desires. 
To be able to create such grounds for particularly economic, political and social 
relations, so to speak, advertising, campaigning, influencing, manipulating and 
controlling people’s perceptions and demands are the new methods. Even though 
these methods are not specifically very recent, as an advanced interface, digital 
habitus has changed all dynamics.  
The prevalence and acceptance of these new strategies and methods have already 
been on the agenda of various disciplines. For instance, manipulation of the 
perception and manufacturing the consent via media instruments find wide coverage 
in media studies, political science, and sociology. Moreover, the development of 
international trade, trans-national companies (TNCs), the expansion of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), marketing and advertisement strategies, greater trade in goods 
and services and other related necessary policies have been reviewed in the 
literature of economics, law, and political science. In this sense, nowadays, such 
large capitalist monopolies, transnational corporations and other institutions and 
companies present their policies and strategies as inevitable and most needed tools 
of modern times. To legitimize these policies and strategies they present, they 
construct a new system of semi-autonomous functioning that gives individuals more 
choice and scope for action. To build this argument on solid ground, all but one of 
the top 10 companies in the list of the most valuable publicly traded companies in 
the world, all of them are ‘media, entertainment, social network, software 
development, and e-commerce companies’68. In other words, as a capitalist sector, 
internet services and telecommunications companies are today’s fastest growing 
and richest business monopolies through rapidly growing companies such as 
Facebook, Google, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft. This is a new capitalism since 
colonial goals cannot be viewed separately from economic growth and capitalism. 
6.4.3) Exploitation Relations 
As the third stage, theoretically a very controversial subject on colonisation, ‘the main 
purpose of the colonisation’, and ‘the main goal to be achieved’ is the stage in which 
 
68 https://fxssi.com/top-10-most-valuable-companies-in-the-world last access on 05.06.2021 
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I evaluate as exploitation of the colonised in various aspects. I demonstrate the 
colonization process by schematizing it thus: Suppose there are two parties to the 
colonisation, A and B. The first stage, political and legal domination, relates to the 
process designating the encounter between A and B. The second stage, economic 
relations and political dependence, concerns the establishment of control and 
domination of A over B through economic and political relations that were sought to 
be legitimised. The exploitation of the colonised in various forms describes the 
original purpose and intention for the first two stages that occurred between A and 
B. We can make comprehensible the origination of this purpose, that is, the process 
that starts with the attempt of A and leads it to the encounter with B. The main 
intention and goal of, for instance, a state, a business, a university (technically 
referring to current universities where economic relations are involved and decisive), 
or even a family as a social form that reflects greater relationships, is ‘growth’ and 
‘evolution’. Conceptually, growth and evolution are natural phenomena. These 
phenomena can be handled within the life stage of living creatures. As Ibn Khaldun, 
an Arab scholar of Islam and social scientist pointed out in his analogy between 
states and humans: “... states, dynasties, nations, and civilizations are like humans 
in that they are born, grow, mature, and die” (Khaldun, 2015; Önder and Ulaşan, 
2018; 234). As emphasized by Khaldun, this natural process is unique to living 
things, and has begun to be attributed to structural and institutional functions as a 
social phenomenon and process. Therefore, as a social phenomenon that becomes 
a purpose to succeed, growth and evolution not only occur in territorial form, but also 
in political, social and, in my opinion most importantly, economic form. This growth 
and evolution can be analysed through horizontal, which may be territorial and 
economic, and vertical, which may be social, cultural, scientific, and political, 
dimensions. Eventually, both horizontal and vertical growth and evolution have 
operated in connection with each other.  
When considering historical progress, the growth and expansion of colonisation has 
radically been territorial and economic. Arguments such as geographical 
discoveries, missionary, bringing improvement and service are a few of attention-
grabbing and justifying arguments as the main stems for the emergence of 
colonialism (see Schneider, 2017; Wariboko, 2018; Kohn and Reddy, 2006). But 
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simply, the credited formulation recorded in academic and social sources for the core 
understanding of colonialism is the territorial expansion and economic gain 
arguments (see Manning, 2004; Samson, 2003, 2013). In other words, in the 
formulation I have schematized, as the main impulse of the stages of economic and 
political dependencies as well as the built relationships after the encounter between 
A and B, we can say that A originally aims to achieve more growth and expansion 
by exploiting B in various forms. In the colonisation process, exploitation in various 
forms can be explained as the economic aims of colonisers in conquering a foreign 
society and country to benefit from its human force as labour and its natural 
resources and materials as economic capital. From the definition of exploitation in 
various forms, I indicate the root cause of the colonial mentality and system. These 
forms were principally visible in economic exploitation and then in human forces 
through slavery, social, cultural and intellectual exploitation. 
On the other hand, to comprehend the exploitation relations in semi-autonomous 
colonialism, we must consider the economic operation of the digital habitus, its 
profits and which countries, powers, and understandings profit from such exploitation 
relationships. If I formulate the schema in the current colonial system: A refers to the 
colonisers and B to the colonised, we need to consider C as a new element where 
the encountering field of A and B take place. C largely operates through digital 
habitus. Although it is a digital form, we need to consider all the relationships 
included by digital habitus as e-territory/online territory, e-commerce, e-social and e-
political fields. All these e-fields are structures that enable the formation of a semi-
autonomous colonialism. So, ‘what kind of exploitation relations does C as a new 
element create in these new colonial relationships?’ 
We live in an exclusively capitalist, modern, and technological age. In this age rules 
based on human rights and freedoms are determinative. Fast and instantaneous 
communication networks are already established, and more importantly, intellectual, 
and mental power is more valuable than the body forces of the human. Considering 
the exploitation relations in horizontal and vertical dimensions as mentioned in 
classic colonialism, it can now be considered as the growth and evolution process 
on e-territory, e-commerce, and other e-fields. What does this mean?  
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When considering the area and size of digital fields as a new e-territory, I argue that 
the powers that occupy and cover the most space on this e-territory and obtain 
income and benefit are especially the actors of classical colonialism, such as 
England or France, and of the new colonial system, such as the United States. For 
instance, online pursuing of presidential elections taking place in the United States 
of America all over the world, the news in the media of almost all countries are just 
one example of the power relations in this new e-territory. Or it is the socio-political 
equivalent that an attack in the UK to instantly find a place in global news, media 
contents and posts. Or, any social catastrophe in France, such as Notre Dame 
Cathedral’s burning, is being displayed as a common value of the whole world, and 
its wide coverage in media content can be considered as social growth and evolution 
in the e-territory. Moreover, a brief analysis conducted in 2020 stated that 25.9% of 
the media content on the internet was in English69. As an expanding e-territory, a 
parallel analogy can be considered between English being the common language of 
media content on e-territories and the English language of the colonies occupied in 
the colonial period. The point I want to emphasize on these random examples is that 
if digital habitus can be structurally identified with a territory, the new exploitation 
relations over this territory find their counterparts in different forms by growth and 
evolvement in these territories. The economic, social, cultural, and intellectual 
equivalents of these examples can also be augmentable. 
In addition to all these, relating to my research subject, the technological and 
transportation facilities provided by the age we live in and especially the increasing 
social and economic mobilities, such as immigration, fed by the widespread contents 
of the digital habitus are the subjects of discussion. According to the International 
Organization Migration (IOM) 2020 report, there are more than ‘270 million 
immigrants’ in the world and this number is increasing day by day70. In other words, 
according to current data, approximately 3.5 to 4% of the world population migrate 
due to different reasons, which is a rapid increase in comparison with the rate of 
2.8% in 200071. This 4% population consists of brain drain from all over the world, 
 
69 https://www.statista.com/statistics/262946/share-of-the-most-common-languages-on-the-internet/ last 
access on 28.05.2021 
70 https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1052331 last accessed on 31.05.2021 
71 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf last accessed on 31.05.2021 
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skilled labourers, qualified individuals as well as the other migrants, whose number 
increases with each passing day. The striking point here is that the vast majority of 
these populations migrate or wish to migrate to the economies in the world with the 
best economies, such as Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom, 
which are best known politically and socially and have relatively better standards. 
These countries, which contain the best brains, skilled and qualified people of the 
world, logically and naturally develop their systems to be better, stronger, and more 
profitable.  
As a new field, digital habitus evolves with content that enables individuals to easily 
compare their conditions with the living standards and conditions elsewhere. In other 
words, the standards and conditions implied by the information, content, and images 
of country A now have a potential that an individual living in the country B can desire 
and migrate to achieve. The possibility of reflecting the bias, deficiencies and 
especially the positive aspects of the information about country A is much higher. 
Even though digital habitus has the capacity to contain all aspects in terms of 
content, the usage of fields in digital habitus is more prone to showing positive 
content to users. In this sense, it is very reasonable that we may ask the following 
questions: 
- Should country A be held responsible for the desires and perceptions indirectly 
created by its representations and content in digital fields? 
- Who should be held responsible for the perception of individuals living in country B 
whose perception is affected and desire is formed by the content and information 
they encounter in digital habitus?  
- Is the individual himself responsible for taking the action? 
- Or is it country B because of the standards that the country’s insufficient conditions 
cannot meet with the expectations of the individual?  
Exploitation relationships continue to heterogeneously re-exist in contemporary 
colonialism through different tools and strategies. The character that I have 
emphasised with semi-autonomous colonialism is that these exploitation relations 
continue to occur not only within the boundaries determined by the dominant side-
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the colonisers, but also through the initiatives, decisions, desires and actions of 
individuals. While these relationships take place, individuals can find a certain extent 
of satisfaction and contentment as a result of their own decisions and actions, which 
for instance, can be immigration as an action or decision. However, this does not 
alter the fact that these individuals continue to benefit certain power elites, capitalist 
and colonial institutions, states, and subjects. Consequently, the functioning of the 
semi-autonomous colonial system is enacted by the parties of this system and within 
their responsibilities. This explains why the system is referred to as semi-
autonomous. 
 
6.4.4) Cultural and Ethnic or Racial Inequalities 
The stage that I discuss and present to the attention of the reader in this section are 
inequalities, discriminations, injustice, and hierarchical stratifications, which 
emerged as an almost inevitable consequence in the establishment phase of the 
colonisation process. The most obvious of these structural and social injustices and 
inequalities are races, cultures, religions, and languages. The cultural and racial 
inequalities that originated as a result of the colonisation and exploitation process 
can be interpreted as the last stage of classical colonialism. The establishment of 
colonisation naturally confronted two different parties. In this confrontation, the 
strong party’s dominance of the weak and its rule has revealed the inequalities and 
discriminations between the powerful and the weak in social terms. As stated in one 
of the core ideas of the growth and evolution hypothesis, the strong party’s race, 
culture, language, and religion survive longer by eliminating the weak party. I 
consider this last stage of colonisation and such inequality and discrimination as 
almost inevitable consequences. 
The rights, legal reforms and developments experienced over the past century have 
drastically changed injustices, inequalities, and discrimination, especially of race, 
ethnicity, religion, or language. As I mentioned very briefly before, we live in an era 
dominated by universal values and legal rights. However, this does not mean that 
we no longer face injustice and discrimination. On the contrary, in classic 
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colonialism, clearly and observable discrimination and inequalities are experienced 
in different forms in contemporary colonialism. The visibility or severity of the 
discrimination of the inequality experienced worldwide is no longer limited only to the 
societies or geographies where these experiences take place. For example, against 
a problem that takes place on the other side of the world, worldwide solidarity and 
cooperation make inequality or parties of the problem more visible and accountable. 
Digital habitus is the primary platform that enables this established solidarity and 
cooperation to be visible and permits the involvement of actors on the other side of 
the world. Digital habitus not only enables the establishment of solidarity and the 
ability to struggle together but also helps to carry the problem of experienced 
discrimination and inequality to political, social, and economic agendas. At the same 
time, the remembering and circulating human rights on a global scale to prevent 
these problems become potentially evident thanks to digital habitus.  
The principal and noticeable difference between classic colonialism and semi-
autonomous colonialism, regarding cultural and racial inequalities, can be expressed 
as follows: In the practices of historical colonialism, racial and cultural discrimination, 
inequality and humiliation policies, which colonial powers did not need to hide, have 
gained an official dimension and took part in official records. However, today, 
inequalities based on races or cultures cannot be implemented anymore and cannot 
be recorded in official records due to the laws that have international binding and 
sanctions that all people claim to enjoy equal and equivalent rights. Instead, 
inequalities such as the oppression of the oppositions created by collective identities, 
which are mainly formed at individual and social levels, on each other, as well as 
discrimination, exclusion, and conflict, are more visible. This situation again consists 
of the productions of individual and societal consent, the ability to influence and 
manipulate perceptions and then to be organised collectively against the others. 
Additionally, the development of digital habitus as the primary determining and 
differentiating element in the new colonial system draws attention once again. Digital 
habitus, which has a strengthening function such as increased awareness regarding 
the problems experienced in different parts of the world, involvement and taking 
action in accordance with the sensitivity of the problems, creating solidarity 
regardless of the distances, come to the fore today. However, although there are 
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decreasing racism and discrimination, and polarisation, on the other hand, are 
increasing on digital habitus. As a result, more abstract hierarchical structures such 
as identities, citizenships, nationalities, living standards, and lifestyles come into 
question. To put it very simply, being American, English, French, and German are 
the new identities that are today’s privileges, desired to reach, and be owned. These 
identities are now in a form that is free of historical determinants such as gender, 
religion, and race. However, the living standards, economic and social statuses, 
legal and political privileges that these identities correspond to are the fundamental 
grounds of the formed hierarchies. Although media tools have been in people’s lives 
for almost a century, in the last two decades, internet-based media that individual 
users can access and produce the content they prefer are the stages constituting 
these grounds. 
Being informed and aware of the problems caused by the period and system we live 
in also brings to the agenda how we should take a position, decision, and action 
against these problems as individuals. For example, being aware of the problems in 
countries with inadequate economic and social conditions in Africa and knowing 
almost all the details influences how we play a role in solving these problems and 
how we stand politically and socially. Hypothetically, increasing the level of sensitivity 
demonstrated to countries with these economic and social problems means taking 
steps to solve these problems potentially. Although digital habitus increases the 
perception and awareness of individuals functionally and structurally, it strengthens 
or weakens the individuals’ subjectivity in line with their actions, positions, and 
decisions. Therefore, the function and influence of digital habitus as an interface 
between power relations and subjectivities, highlighted in the first three stages 
discussed in the comparison of classic and semi-autonomous colonialism, also has 
a decisive role, especially at the ethnic, cultural, and racial inequalities stage. 
6.5) Semi-Autonomous System in the Case of Syrian Refugees 
I start this section by delivering a lengthy quotation from a 30-year-old Kurdish 
woman, a very good-humoured mother of two, a former English teacher, who lost 
her husband in the war. This interviewee details her regular daily life by touching 
upon the conflicts that refugees usually face, their hopes, dreams, images, and 
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wishes about the future. The long quotation from this interviewee perfectly identifies 
the importance of the economy, social status, and gender, as the different forms of 
capital in parallel to Bourdieu’s formulations of the notion of capital. Besides, this 
interviewee’s daily routine illuminates the interwoven cogs of power relations, digital 
habitus and their subjectivities concerning the everyday experiences of refugees. 
Afterwards, through the analysis of the interviewee’s words, the reader can establish 
the link between the interrelations and cooperation of these three mechanisms as a 
system corresponding to refugees’ lives. 
“The days pass like the same, sometimes too slow, sometimes too fast. I usually 
start the day early. Although the kids also have a significant influence on this, I got 
used to it. I usually play a bit with the kids when I wake up. I loved to listen to their 
dreams, but now when I get up, I see them playing games or watching videos on the 
phone or tablet; they do not remember their dreams anymore [smiles]. 
I also check my phone to see if there is a call or message. To see whether there is 
a new development, the world has come to an end [smiles]. Then I prepare 
breakfast, and we eat something together. The children go out, and I stay in the room 
because there is not much to do. I return to my phone. I browse the Internet, check 
the news in my country, see what those insatiable politicians, wealthy capitalists say, 
what they do, how they continue to influence our lives. 
I use Facebook in general, sometimes for calls, messages, and sometimes just for 
spending time. I learn the news about or from these politicians, wealthy, famous 
people on Facebook. If children are back in between, or if I have a task in the camp, 
I go out. Otherwise, I prefer to stay in the room. Because when I leave the room, 
wherever I look around, I see other versions of myself in the camp. That is not a 
pleasant sight, because some friends have been staying at the camp for almost three 
years. This situation always makes me question what we will be; whether we will 
stay here too long, what will happen to my children, what will happen to me? The 
days pass with these questions and worries in my mind. 
… I sometimes think, if I were a man, then everything would be different, or if my 
husband were alive and with us. The difficulties and limitations of being a woman 
are definitely much tighter and determinant than other things. What I mean is not to 
be a man, but to have the convenience and conditions of being a man. We need 
money as well, no need to stress it even. That is the main reason we are still here, 
not having enough money to go farther. 
… Then it is evening, the children are on the corners, the phones in their hands. 
They watch the photographs and videos shared by relatives in Europe. Then they 
start to ask, ‘mother, when we will go there?’ For them, Germany, France, England, 
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Sweden [their relatives live in these countries] are like heaven. They think that 
everything will be good there. I also think so. At least it will be better than here, and 
we will have a life. We only live here, it is like we live but do not have a life... Children 
are not wrong either; everything about these countries on the Internet is always 
better. They watch celebrities, movies, video clips on the Internet. Well, there are 
always rich lives and lives of other people. Then kids think we will be very rich when 
we go there, we will have everything... We turn off the lights and sleep slowly under 
the light of the phone screens; we wait to hear some news and then to get out of 
here and go somewhere [smiles].” [Interview 29, Lavrion/Greece, 18.11.2018] 
This lengthy passage concisely describes how the three mechanisms I have 
presented in detail correspond with their intersection and interactions in a refugee’s 
daily life. Based on the above statements of the interviewee, when I consider these 
three stages together, I come to the following conclusion: Power relations and actors 
cause the displacement of an individual as a result of the extreme violence and 
oppression this refugee is subjected to and is very determinant. Considering the 
circumstances of this refugee after her forcible displacement, her association with 
digital habitus occurs in the function of the media and the media content in building 
her future. Within this two-element equation, the legal, social, gender and economic 
realities, status, and capital of the refugee, namely the decisions she makes and the 
practices she implements, are determinative within the scope of its subjectivity.  
The embodiment of power relations and actors in the lives of refugees, particularly 
more vivid and observable in the camps, can be understood through the 
interviewee’s words: “… I browse the Internet, check the news in my country, see 
what those insatiable politicians, wealthy capitalists say, what they do, how they 
continue to influence our lives...” Also, the interviewee stated: “Children are on the 
corners, the phones in their hands. They watch the photographs and videos shared 
by relatives in Europe... They watch celebrities, movies, video clips on the Internet. 
Well, there are always rich lives and lives of other people...” Each character in these 
statements, such as politicians, capitalists, celebrities, and relatives in Europe, can 
simply be coded as power actors who can influence refugees, at least in the 
interviewee’s case. Therefore, the contents with great potentials, which I introduced 
as the representations of the major actors or power relations, create a circulation 
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among themselves. This cycle gains explicitly more attention when this content is 
responded to by others who state something notable and influential through them.  
I argue that it is a system that can reliably be considered in sign, signifier, and 
signified forms, as in the context of semiotics (See Saussure, 2011, and Barthes, 
1977). These three components are phases of the formation of meaning. As three 
different mechanisms of a system: Power relations have a function that can 
externally affect, shape and transform the lives of individuals. Subjectivity is the 
inherent and acquired characteristics that determine the capacity of individuals to 
realize their personal decisions and actions. Digital habitus is a new mechanism that 
enables these two different mechanisms to work in accordance. 
6.6) On the Potential Consequences of Semi-Autonomous Colonialism 
Historian Yuval Noah Harari, the author of Homo Sapiens, describes the historical 
development of world capitalism with its rapidly rising evolution with science that 
transformed into a world hegemony, and writes:  
“The global centre of power shifted to Europe only between 1750 and 1850, when 
Europeans humiliated the Asian powers in a series of wars and conquered large 
parts of Asia. By 1900 Europeans firmly controlled the world’s economy and most of 
its territory. In 1950 western Europe and the United States together accounted for 
more than half of global production, whereas China’s portion had been reduced to 5 
per cent. Under the European aegis, a new global order and global culture emerged. 
Today all humans are, to a much greater extent than they usually want to admit, 
European in dress, thought and taste. They may be fiercely anti-European in their 
rhetoric, but almost everyone on the planet views politics, medicine, war and 
economics through European eyes, and listens to music written in European modes 
with words in European languages. Even today’s burgeoning Chinese economy, 
which may soon regain its global primacy, is built on a European model of production 
and finance” (2014; 286).  
With the question ‘Why Europe?’ in a chapter in his book, Harari describes the West 
as geography and power as a result of intersecting relations of science, imperialism, 
industrialism and capitalist economy of the approximately last 150-200 years of world 
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history. In these intersecting relations of the recent world history, we can find the 
clues of the current political, social, cultural, and specifically economic world 
hegemony, which is capitalism in other words. The concept and role of capitalism, 
which I avoided discussing and mentioning in order not to expand the scope and 
content of the research, is actually the most basic foundation and element of semi-
autonomous colonialism. In this sense, the words of influential French thinker and 
historian, Fernand Braudel, on the development of capitalism are impressive: 
“Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the 
state” (1977; 64-65). Another French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, one of the leading 
and best-known theorists of the century, in his short article titled ‘Postscript on the 
Societies of Control’, provides a remarkable analysis of the form in which capitalism 
evolves. The part I cite below can be considered as a current analysis, considering 
the effect and role of media tools in an up-to-date form: 
“But in the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in the production, which 
it often relegates to the Third World, even for the complex forms of textiles, 
metallurgy, or oil production. It is a capitalism of higher-order production. It no-longer 
buys raw materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the finished 
products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services but what it wants to 
buy is stocks. This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which 
is to say, for being sold or marketed” (1992; 6). 
What Braudel and Deleuze say about the development, efficiency and 
transformation of capitalism is very important for us to evaluate current economic 
relations, especially from political and sociological perspectives. Semi-autonomous 
colonialism, which currently has a complex and embrangled history, necessitates a 
different study to analyse it from an economic perspective concerning capitalism. 
However, capitalism, about which we can argue whether it has transformed into a 
control society or a state form, is in a highly embedded and intertwined form within 
this new system. Among the power relations and actors, there are pure capitalist 
corporations and businesses, as well as the companies whose foundations are built 
for capitalist purposes to operate and develop digital habitus. Even though capitalism 
has not fully nationalized structurally, it develops in a highly institutionalized and 
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regulated process. Therefore, semi-autonomous colonialism, which I theoretically 
formulated as a system proposal in the light of fieldwork and findings, should be 
considered as a continuation and transformation of previous structural and 
institutional processes, not in relation to but within capitalism.  
I describe the framework and boundaries of this semi-autonomous functionality as 
an operational system, in which the majority of the world population somehow take 
part at various levels and conditions. The operation of this complex socio-political 
and economic system as a new colonial system can also be evaluated within the 
scope of ‘individual migration’. The number of people who seek a new home, safe 
refuge, better conditions, and life increase day by day. The routes of these people, 
their perceptions about the places they want to go, how these perceptions are 
formed, and their capacity to realise them can also be understood through this 
system analysis. The main consequence that this system will naturally lead to will be 
that the countries with the highest immigration will encounter more demand from 
collective or individual migrants. This consequence is about the equation of supply 
and demand where demand comes from people to migrate to certain countries, and 
supply refers to these countries’ responses to these demands. One of the current 
global policies stemming from precisely this reason is concerning the immigration, 
border control, work, residence permits and other related policies. Lately, this 
situation seems to serve in favour of the conservative and right-wing states that re-
produce xenophobia within their territories and governments. In short, I point out that 
the countries where the world’s very much qualified individuals – both intellectual 
and talented – and labour forces aim to migrate for various reasons will naturally 
cause complications due to the displaced masses’ migration and individual 
immigration that will tend to increase in the near future. To be able to make a 
judgment on the ethical, moral, and legal conceptions of the semi-autonomous 
colonial system, this research necessitates further research. 
6.7) Understanding Semi-Autonomous Colonialism through An 
Analogical Comparison 
I consider presenting these three mechanisms in an analogical form: Economic 
Equation: Product-Marketing-Demand.  In the economic system, this equation 
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means: The more successful the advertisement is when marketing a product, the 
higher the demand rate for that product.  
‘What does this economical equation mean in a socio-political process?’ We can 
formulate it as a Socio-Political Equation: Power Relations-Digital Habitus-
Subjectivity. Power relations can be considered as a product in the form of identity, 
lifestyle, goods, brands, ideas, countries, and other forms. Digital Habitus in this 
equation corresponds to marketing through the means of media, the internet, social 
media, advertisement, and other means. Lastly, subjectivity is the created demand 
after the marketing of the product, which can be thought of as the human force, 
immigrants, various forms of gained benefits, and created desires. 
In this formulation, there is movement and migration that emerged with the forced 
displacement of Syrian refugees. This also corresponds to a displacement of labour 
force. Let’s apply this system to these displaced Syrian refugees: There has been a 
population of nearly 1 million refugees and immigrants who migrated to Germany in 
the last years. Germany as a power actor can be considered the product in this 
analogical equation. The widespread perception about Germany, created by 
classical media in the recent past, corresponds to the marketing stage of the 
equation, through its worldwide respected economy and politics, its images in social 
media content, and its higher and better living standards. This is the digital habitus. 
The desire of immigrants and refugees, who started to see and learn Germany better 
in their digital habitus as a product, to go there, that is, the masses who demand this 
product and migrate to reach the product, corresponds to the subjectivity part. In the 
economic equation, no matter how good a product is, how well it is advertised, no 
benefit can be obtained from the product without the consumers demanding that 
product. This means the system would not operate in this case. In this research, 
individuals and masses that are formulated and discussed as subjectivity, are 
presented in an empowered form. This is because I want to portray individuals and 
masses as the real power and decisive segment in this equation. If I point to semi-
autonomous colonialism in this formulation: Syrian refugees who recently migrated 
to Germany and particularly the upcoming generation who will grow and will be better 
adapted to contribute to the country and provide benefits in many aspects. These 
benefits can be thought of both as services and as intellectual contributions. A good 
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example is that two scientists Uğur Şahin and Özlem Türeci72, who found one of the 
major vaccines against COVID-19, are originally from the immigrant family 
background. This is both a scientific, academic, and economic contribution to 
Germany both domestically and internationally. 
This system has started to become colonialist because the construction of this 
product-marketing-demand system is already operating over a more unbalanced 
and unfair history. I will show what I mean by this argument with a simple hypothetical 
comparison: Suppose there is a brand that has already been expanding for years 
and has gained the experience and profits in producing, marketing, and selling its 
product. On the other hand, there is a new brand that strives to market its product, 
find a market, and make a profit by competing with the previous brand. The historical 
and economic experiences between these two different brands are where this 
system is in imbalance. In the socio-political sense, in recent history, especially the 
imbalance and inequality between countries created by the colonial process is a 
matter of question. For example, there are consequences that come out of being 
more popular, more familiar, better in many domains. To exemplify this among 
economically and socially first-world countries, Britain, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, or the United States of America are much more well-known, 
recognised, and respected globally. In other words, the level of development, 
recognition and respect of these countries in economic and social terms is closely 
related to how these countries are represented and promoted in the media. 
Therefore, media users consciously or unconsciously know about these countries in 
some ways. This is the new growth and evolution in e-territories and is not 





72 https://biontech.de/our-dna/leadership last access on 05.06.2021 
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7) CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
“The virtuality and discontinuity of imperial sovereignty, 
however, do not minimise the effectiveness of its force; on the 
contrary, those very characteristics serve to reinforce its 
apparatus, demonstrating its effectiveness in the 
contemporary historical context and its legitimate force to 
resolve world problems in the final instance.” 
     Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire 
Migration is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, it is a phenomenon that humans 
have encountered in the economic, social, and political domains for millennia. The 
legal status of individuals, such as citizens, refugees, and stateless people, who 
migrate for different reasons, such as pulling or pushing forces, had started to be 
defined, particularly when the national borders of countries became more obvious 
and restrictive. Notably, after WW2, such definitions as a refugee, immigrant, and 
international protection were established under the leadership of the UN and were 
globally acknowledged. These terms have taken their place in the literature with 
institutionalisations and agreements that regulate the socio-political and economic 
relations concerning the mobilities of individuals. Therefore, in many different periods 
of recent history, vulnerabilities and disempowerments caused by sociological, 
political, economic, and environmental circumstances termed refugee crises are in 
question. 
This research explores the migration experiences and trajectories of those Syrian 
refugees who were forcibly displaced by the Syrian Civil War, which constitutes the 
largest refugee population from a single country in the world. In this axis, as one of 
the migration forms, the predispositions, and perceptions of forcibly displaced Syrian 
refugees regarding their movements are analysed through different focus points. 
Although there are thousands of studies focusing on Syrian refugees and reviewing 
their situation from varying perspectives, the contribution of this research to the 
relevant literature is to grasp more abstract phenomena such as perception, desire, 
thought, and tendencies of Syrian refugees and to set these at the core of the 
research. The reason for this is the effort to respond positively to Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s argument that ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ (2008). This effort is strengthened 
by the social, political, economic and individualities that put the subjectivity of the 
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individuals in the foreground as the main subject of the movements and 
transformations experienced by Syrian refugees. 
In the age we live in, the works in refugee and migration studies have increased 
considerably, in parallel to the development of academia, science, and research 
methods. Despite this, as an interdisciplinary researcher with sociology and political 
science backgrounds, I observe that the dominant approaches in these studies have 
a quantitative character and that studies with these methodological approaches are 
lacking in evaluating social experiences. In other words, I am of the opinion that 
analyses involving Syrian refugees, in general, disempower Syrian refugees’ 
subjectivities as research objects. Also, their experiences are reviewed through the 
external determinants within statistics and numbers, which remain incapable of 
explicating very individualistic social facts. Therefore, with this research, I assessed 
the results and findings of the conducted field studies by highlighting what and how 
Syrian refugees’ thoughts, feelings, desires, and perceptions were the main subjects 
of the research. In this context, I sought answers to the following primary and 
secondary research questions: 
- Considering the influences of new media relations on perceptions and 
desires, why do Syrian refugees migrate long distances, taking more risks 
and investing more time and money to reach Europe despite finding a safe 
refuge in neighbouring countries, and what is the relationship of these 
migration movements to colonialism? 
- When analysing the immigration of Syrian refugees to Europe as a structural 
benchmark, what novel and unique contemporary migration determinant 
elements are present in the specific case of Syrian refugees’ migration to 
Europe? How do these differ from other migration mobilities? 
- Are these determinant elements fundamental to the individual cases, or are 
they part of a wider systemic formulation, such as new forms of colonialism 




Hence, it is essential to emphasise the methodological approaches adopted in the 
research. The qualitative method was applied in particular due to the preferred 
research subject and the sample group’s circumstances. I adopted the qualitative 
method because conducting the qualitative method in this research is about 
discovering and generating data that reveals the research phenomenon’s 
motivations and dispositions, rather than verifying the predetermined research 
hypotheses. Therefore, essentially Syrian refugees’ daily life practices, subjectivity, 
actions, and social relations in camp setting places were explored through in-depth 
interviews and ethnographic research methods. 
Epistemologically, theoretical abstraction has been used in order to interpret the 
dynamics of the field study in light of the information generated and obtained in the 
field. In this context, the determining systematic method applied in the field study 
has been Grounded Theory due both to its methodological and epistemological 
scope. This systematic methodology argues that a theoretical presupposition may 
pose a barrier in the field, particularly concerning potential research themes that may 
arise in the field and their implications and contributions in research. Therefore, 
Grounded Theory is formulated on the comparative analysis, categorisation, coding, 
and classification of data obtained from the field, and accordingly, the research 
theory should be derived from field data. Grounded Theory also argues that instead 
of basing research on the theoretical debates already made on the studied subjects, 
it is necessary for the researcher to focus on the emerging themes in which the 
theory should be derived from the field.  Power Relations, Digital Habitus and 
Subjectivity, as the primary theoretical frameworks produced and adopted in this 
research, have been obtained as a result of the ‘doing fieldwork without theory and 
generating theory from the field’. Moreover, due to the categorisation and coding of 
the data obtained during fieldwork, priority was given to four main focal points, and 
these focal points shaped the field study discussions. These four focal points, which 
were formulated by the theoretical discussions as Grounded Theory systematic 
suggests, are as follows:  
a) Understanding Syrian refugees’ perceptions, desires, and thoughts concerning 
migration destination places, countries, and societies;  
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b) Understanding of Syrian refugees’ use of internet-media tools and digital content; 
c)  Understanding the social, economic, and cultural capital of Syrian refugees;  
d) Understanding of transformation of Syrian women refugees’ gender roles and 
norms before and during migration. 
These research categories were formed through the obtained and generated field 
data over about 5 months in three different countries: Turkey, Greece, and Germany. 
I carried out the field studies in 6 different cities: Kahramanmaraş, Diyarbakır, Mardin 
in Turkey, Lavrion, Sounio in Greece, and Berlin in Germany, and in 8 different 
refugee camps and protection centres. More than 70 face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in total, and I used 52 of them in the research. All interviews were held 
with interviewees over the age of 18, and 27 of them were men and 25 were women. 
Since the research concept aims to grasp abstract phenomena, I mainly conducted 
ethnography and interviews with Syrian Arab and Syrian Kurdish refugees to further 
enrich the research findings, as these are the two major ethnic and cultural groups 
in Syria. Consistently pursuing the research with these two ethnic groups in three 
different countries helped me to determine the differences and similarities through 
ethnic and cultural comparison of these sample groups and the gradual change and 
transformation of these groups within themselves. When evaluating the research 
findings according to migration routes and destination countries, the findings and 
conclusions are as follows: 
Syrian Arab refugees staying at the Kahramanmaraş Temporary Protection Center 
(KTPC) particularly used expressions with highly positive connotations regarding the 
notion of the West, mainly referring to Western European countries with terms such 
as civilised, developed, better life and standards. All interviewees stated that they 
desire to migrate to European countries if possible. However, these interviewees 
had to continue to stay in the camp because they did not have strong economic and 
other capital, which showed the decisiveness of the economic capital. Moreover, I 
observed that internet and media usage was considerably high due to the restrictive 
conditions of the camp and free time. Additionally, due to the isolation and the natural 
tendency and possibility of preserving the traditional roles within the spatial limits, I 
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noted that Syrian female Arab refugees in KTPC maintained strongly traditional and 
patriarchal gender personalities or they were subjected to such societal characters. 
Therefore, a cycle with knock-on effects, such as economic capital, spatial 
determinism, reproduction of gender roles, and European countries as a preference 
for potential new migration destinations for the future, has been identified among 
Syrian Arab refugees in Turkey. 
On the other hand, in the interviews held in the Kurdish cities of Diyarbakır and 
Mardin, the different economic or social capital forms of Syrian Kurdish refugees 
were relatively better than Arab refugees remaining in KTPC. Therefore, 
interviewees stayed at their own financed accommodations in the cities. Another 
reason for living in these pre-dominantly Kurdish cities was that Kurdish people have 
a sense of solidarity and imagined community among the Kurdish people as a 
connecting identity. I also easily noticed that all interviewees use social media and 
keep in close contact with relatives and friends who live in Europe via photos, posts, 
and other media content forms. While the politicised worldviews of these 
interviewees strikingly criticized the historical and political experiences of Europe, 
which they labelled as capitalist, consumerist, and individualist, they also had very 
affirmative perceptions about European countries in other aspects. The research 
findings also portrayed that they have the determination and desire to migrate to 
Europe. Although they have economic conditions to realise this, they stated that they 
fear to migrate due to political and ideological reasons. Both ethnography and 
interviews have confirmed that Syrian female Kurdish refugees have a highly 
progressive and ideologically pro-gender understanding. The reason for this is that 
women are politically supported, encouraged, and share in public responsibilities in 
Kurdish communities. The most obvious contrasts between Syrian Arab and Kurdish 
refugees in Turkey were that they had different capital forms and women had 
different gender awareness and norms. In addition to these, both sample groups’ 
perceptions of European countries were quite similar. Also, Syrian Arab refugees 
evidently tended to use more internet and social media, as they stayed in the camp 
and had more time. 
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The research findings in Turkey differ from the findings of fieldwork conducted with 
interviewees in Greece. Of almost all Syrian Arab refugees staying in the Souino 
camp,it was noted that their economic, social, and educational levels were moderate 
or above. A common research finding suggests that illegal migration from Turkey to 
Greece itself played a filter role to distinguish the economic capital of Syrian 
refugees. In other words, international migrations are economically an expensive 
social and physical movement. All Arabs interviewed stated that their views and 
opinions about European countries have begun to lose their positivity. They were 
more sceptical, but still kept their positive hopes for the destination countries to which 
they want to migrate. The reasons that caused them to lose their belief about Europe 
were mainly due to the poor conditions of refugee camps, insufficient services and 
facilities of the state, communication that cannot be performed with the local people, 
inadequate social life, and prolonged bureaucratic processes in Greece. In addition, 
one of the most fundamental changes observed in Sounio camp was the empowered 
performativity of Syrian female Arab refugees and their gender norms. The transition 
from collective social relations to more individual relationships, gender education, 
state support, and responsibilities given to women in the camp increased the public 
visibility and awareness of the female refugees, and relatedly supported their 
subjectivity. 
On the other hand, although Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lavrion camp displayed 
similarities with Syrian Arab refugees, their ideological and political involvement or 
indoctrinated training differed notably in gender and perception regarding the idea of 
Europe. All interviewees stated that they aimed to go to Western and Northern 
European countries, such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, but 
politically they emphasized that these countries are capitalist and hegemonic, using 
the terms negatively to mean consumerist and materialistic. Despite these political 
disagreements, they remained optimistic regarding the destination countries they 
had in mind to arrive, like the Arab refugees. I noted that European countries’ politics 
and approaches to the Kurdish identity and struggle became a prioritised criterion 
for Kurdish participants for further migration due to their ideological standpoints. 
Even though the economic capital of Kurdish refugees in the Lavrion camp was 
average, they stated that they were able to sustain themselves with the economic 
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support of family members, especially those who arrived and settled in Europe. 
Besides, due to the abolition of the official status of the Lavrion camp a few years 
ago and the ideologically pro-Kurdish control of the camp, pro-women seminars, 
ideological and political training, and roles could be discerned in the camp. This 
feature played a very encouraging role for women refugees. The practicality of co-
chair administration in the work to be done and the sharing of roles, the increase in 
public visibility, and their ideologically increased awareness have been decisive in 
this empowerment. In addition, the internet and social media usage of both sample 
groups were observed to be an average of over 6 hours a day. This time includes 
only social media use, such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and not the classical 
uses of media devices, such as TV. Social media use particularly constituted 
especially personal interests, entertainment, migration, laws, news-related content. 
Hence, the effect of media contents on perceptions, desires and thoughts has 
become easier to observe in daily life interactions. Since this research has focused 
on analysing Syrian refugees’ perceptions, future imaginations and migration 
tendencies, the conditions of refugees in different countries have enabled me to 
realise their gradually changing opinions. For instance, While the Syrian female 
interviewees staying in the KTPC had very traditional, patriarchal, and subjected 
gender roles, the Arab women in the Sounio camp painted a highly empowered, 
legally backed and educationally supported picture. At the same time, Kurdish 
refugees in Diyarbakır and Mardin refrained from expressing their opinions due to 
their political fear and hesitation about Turkey, but Kurdish refugees staying in the 
Lavrion camp criticized Turkey very openly and comfortably. 
After Turkey and Greece, the research conducted in Germany played an important 
role in our understanding of this gradual change and the factors causing changes. 
Thanks to the interviews and ethnography made in 5 different refugee 
accommodation centres in Berlin, it was revealed that both interviewee groups have 
thoughts polarizing in two areas about Germany. I primarily categorised them as 
disappointments and dissatisfaction, and to a minimum of met expectations and 
satisfactions. The satisfaction of Syrian Arab refugees with state aid, services and 
facilities was one of the first issues highlighted. This also validated the argument that 
European countries have higher and better standards and conditions. However, I 
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recorded that this minimum economic satisfaction revealed unforeseen uneasiness 
and conflicts in public and social relations, which were the ground for 
disappointments voiced by the interviewees. Moreover, I drew a conclusion that 
these disappointments and dissatisfaction stem especially from the fact that Syrian 
refugees have a collective social character, socialisation routines, and daily life 
habits. However, German society has very individualistic living standards and habits. 
The incompatibility of societal characters, socialization and living habits between 
these two societies has been explored as one of the invisible main drivers of 
impediments in integration, adaptation and orientation. 
Regarding media use, I observed that among several interviewees the intense use 
of the internet during the migration process decreased when arriving at the 
destination country. However, interactions such as gaining more social media fans 
and receiving more feedback, on the contrary, motivated and encouraged other 
interviewees to engage with social media more. Thanks to digital ethnography, I 
revealed that the interviewees had two main digital contents that they shared on their 
social media platforms. These were primarily constituted by their personal life 
moments such as socialising, using public facilities, and their interactions with the 
public space, such as transportation, parks, city space. I also noted that these 
contents were mainly nourished by positive steers. Syrian female Arab refugees after 
leaving Turkey had started to experience individualisation, reduced social worry, 
increased public visibility and responsibilities, as well as supportive pro-women 
training seminars and educations. In Berlin, all-female participants demonstrated 
and represented such confident and strong women awareness and roles. 
On the other hand, Syrian Kurdish refugees in Berlin also asserted similar complaints 
and uneasiness as well as similarly experienced satisfactions. It has been noted that 
the living standards and conditions of Germany are apparently strong in economic 
terms, and state aid and facilities are highly satisfactory. However, the most 
emphasized disappointments and dissatisfactions were about work, education and 
other legal permissions to obtain, alongside the long-term documentation, 
bureaucracy, language education, and gaining certifications. These challenges have 
created disappointments as all Syrian Arab refugees also emphasized. Although it 
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is argued that these services were applied by the German state for the rapid 
integration and adaptation of refugees, I noted that the long duration of these 
processes blocks and slows down the integration and adaptation of the interviewees. 
Besides, Syrian Kurdish refugees had relations with other Kurdish communities and 
diasporas in Berlin. This observation is parallel with the perception of solidarity and 
imagined community in previous field study countries, which means that Kurdish 
refugees and communities in Berlin had strong community relations and networks. 
Similarly, Syrian Kurdish refugees’ internet and social media usage periods and 
forms were very similar to those of Syrian Arab refugees. I witnessed that especially 
young refugees were more interested in and invested their time on social media. In 
addition to these, especially politically and ideologically, Syrian female Kurdish 
interviewees’ amplified gender awareness, increased social life roles and economic 
independence were the subjects of research findings. 
Three-steps of gradual investigation of firstly forced and then voluntary migration 
experiences of Syrian refugees provide readers with supporting arguments for the 
following conclusions: In addition to economic capital, social and cultural capital has 
decisive effects on migration and the capacity to practice this, especially in cases of 
cross-border migrations. For those who have the capacity to realise this 
economically costly migration, the migration route has a direction in which family, 
kinship and social environment relations are determinant in choices of destination 
countries. The influence of these social relationships on individuals' perceptions and 
desires may be directly through communication and experience sharing. Such 
influences also may appear indirectly through the new digital relationships that 
almost every individual has from a very young age in the contemporary world. The 
areas where these digital relationships are most visible can be specified as relatively 
recent internet-based fields, such as social media and communication platforms, and 
intensified internet content. These internet-based fields and content generate 
desires and attractions directly or indirectly, as well as generating consent for the 
fulfilment of desires and attractions. Desires generated by communication and 
interactions between individuals are a new phenomenon, which has been evolving 
for less than a decade in parallel with the advancement of industries concerning 
communication and the internet. Generation of desire as a new research theme has 
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been neglected by studies of the production of consent, manipulation, and media 
control. The production of desire is not only related to the material world and 
consumption anymore, but rather to non-tangible beings, for example lifestyles, 
being a part or member of an ideal society, possessing better life qualities and other 
abstract desirable phenomena. The observable effects of these fields on perceptions 
consist of their influence on desires and imagined futures. In this sense, migration 
movements such as individual immigration or forced displacements realised by 
people whose desires and future imaginations can be influenced and shaped, 
particularly take place towards Europe. 
To better recognise these findings, it should be remembered how the feelings and 
thoughts of the refugees have been formed. Being a refugee is simply to stay in limbo 
for a long time. Staying in limbo means not having feelings of confidence, protection, 
safe habitation, and certainty. This research displays the perceptions of Syrian 
refugees who experienced the long-term state of being in limbo, the movements 
between safe countries and their changing perceptions during these movements. 
Long-term and intense media interaction is the observable part of this changing 
perception process. However, the insecurity and the search for safe re-settlement 
places caused by being in limbo brings the perceptions, thoughts, and desires of the 
refugees to a more fragile and vulnerable position. For refugees who want to get out 
of limbo, ‘everything can be real and reliable’, so to speak.  
Additionally, ‘being a refugee’ is not an identity and status that is desired or achieved. 
Refugee-ness is a situation that is commonly triggered by external power relations 
and actors generally occurring against refugees’ own consent and will. Therefore, 
pushed and displaced individuals, that is, potential, refugees, seek new safe refuge 
places. During this search, they instinctively wish to go to places they think are better, 
within the limits of their capital and conditions. For example, Western European 
countries have better standards and conditions, which is a fact in many aspects, such 
as economy, social welfare, state aid, infrastructure, business opportunity and other 
aspects. The fact that these better standards and conditions quickly become 
information content, especially in the digital age, in the form of biased and incomplete 
content. However, perhaps the point to remember at this point is this: Those countries 
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with these better standards and conditions when establishing and developing such 
better standards and conditions, ‘what are the benefits and contributions of refugees 
or immigrants during the development of these standards?’ 
For instance, statistics on these countries which are among the world’s top five 
economies are remarkable: Immigrants consist of 14.1 per cent (9.5 million) of the 
United Kingdom population, 15.1 per cent (50.6 million) of the United States of 
America population, 15.7 per cent (13.1 million) of the population of Germany, and 
12.8 per cent (8.3 million) of the population of France. This information does not 
include those who have already acquired citizenship. To interpret the data and clarify 
the argument, we can draw the following conclusion: Millions of immigrants currently 
in these countries also have families, relatives, friends in their home countries. 
Millions of immigrants and refugees in these countries have a pulling force effect on 
potential immigrant and refugees. These pulling factors are formed very quickly and 
largely thanks to the content that can be spread over internet-based media tools 
today. These pulling force effects occur much faster but invisibly through interactions 
and communications between individuals, alongside the facts on social, political, and 
economic development levels of countries that play the pulling force role. 
Any potential refugee or immigrant is conceivably a labour force, skilled and qualified 
person and potentially people who can contribute to the countries they live in. There 
is a wide and general misconception and incomplete perception that refugees are the 
group that is perceived not to work at all and receive continued state support in a 
dependent manner. The refutation of these misconceptions and incomplete 
perceptions is a subject of the extensive literature that shows the contributions of the 
refugees to the host countries they are in, both in economic and social, academic, 
scientific, and artistic terms. The structures that ignore the contributions and services 
that these people will provide to the countries they are in soon and evaluate them 
with discriminating discourse and political arguments, instead of showing 
appreciation, should better understand the system they live in.  
As a conclusion of my research, I theoretically propose a system scheme within the 
scope of the subjectivity of Syrian refugees, digital habitus and power relations. The 
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system I have called ‘Semi-Autonomous Colonialism’ operates with these three 
mechanisms: Power relations as a determinant and formative order, the most 
intensified and interacted newly formed Digital Habitus, and empowered subjectivity. 
The reason I call this system a new formation of colonialism is essentially because it 
illustrates parallelism with the fundamental development of classic colonization. It 
appears that colonisation, as a system spreading through territorial growth and 
material exploitation, has started to decline recently. To evaluate from a metaphorical 
analogy, historically the colonization was huge machines that produced and took 
advantage of surplus-value. These machines operated with the growth of territories 
and exploitation of materials and expanded as they gained more functionality through 
the benefits of colonization. As it expanded, the surplus-value the colonization 
machine produced, that is, its economic and political gains, increased. However, at 
some point, the capacity and operation of these machines began to change towards 
intellect and knowledge-based expansion and processing, rather than material and 
territorial sources. The main reason for this was increased global awareness, and 
perhaps the pressure of global response and accountability to an ongoing 
colonisation process. The development of this global awareness has developed 
especially with worldwide media tools and networks. Thus, it started to transform from 
territorial growth and material exploitation to a machine that obtains more value from 
intelligence and knowledge-based services. This is a contemporary comprehensive 
system. If we remember the way Deleuze conceptualized the change in the system 
of capitalism: “It is a capitalism of higher-order production. It no-longer buys raw 
materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the finished products or 
assembles parts… (1992; 6).” The origin of the change was related to the facilitation 
of mobility between both people and knowledge. The long-distance movements and 
awareness about the others in many aspects, which have been facilitated more 
rapidly especially in the last few decades, have started to bring the operation of this 
intellect and knowledge-based machine to its pinnacle. The reason for this can be 
considered as a cycle, which this intellect and knowledge as a source in the form of 
human body and mind or digital data have started to come and work together much 
easier and faster in recent history. This coexistence has produced a new process. 
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I consider it to be very useful what Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt stated about the 
development and growth of ‘Empire’ as a large system depicted in their joint work, 
Empire (2001). Hardt and Negri’s later books, ‘Multitude’ (2004), ‘Commonwealth’ 
(2009) and ‘Declaration’ (2012) are also decisive for understanding Empire as a 
multi-layered system. However, although their emphases in other books are 
particularly decisive on the construction, the development of resistance 
mechanisms, and the probability of collective networks of the mass struggle 
concerning Empire, the Empire book provides a strong basis for understanding the 
Semi-Autonomous Colonialism system. They state: “Empire is emerging today as 
the centre that supports the globalisation of productive networks and casts its widely 
inclusive net to try to envelop all power relations within its world order — and yet at 
the same time it deploys a powerful police function against the new barbarians and 
the rebellious slaves who threaten its order” (2001; 20). Hardt and Negri detail their 
conceptions besetting constitutions, global war, and class and other dynamics. 
Consequently, in their depiction, Empire is formed by a monarchy (particularly by 
pointing to the United States and the G8, and international organisations as NATO, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
main difference between Empire and Semi-Autonomous Colonialism concerns 
individuals who directly or indirectly operate in the functioning of these systems. I 
describe a system in which consent is generated rather than forcibly gained, where 
individuals and masses are persuaded, encapsulated in every field, and where 
individuals are actively involved through advanced technological new tools such as 
manipulation and advertising. However, on the contrary, Empire considers the power 
and existence of individuals and masses structurally and functionally in the running 
of the system. Hence, so to speak, it has a de-subjectified approach. Semi-
autonomous colonialism continues to re-establish colonial exploitation relations with 
new relations in a contemporary format.  
Although I aim to engage with assertive and powerful arguments and theories and 
offer a proposal for a worldwide operating system, these arguments are open and 
needy for further discussions and studies. Alongside these, although I particularly 
have benefited from sociology and political science literature and theories, further 
studies are needed to explore the existing forms of exploitation and colonial relations 
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List of Interviewees 
Interviewees in KTCP, Diyarbakir and Batman in Turkey 
Interview 1) Female – 01.10.2018 – Kahramanmaraş KTPC- Arab 
Halep – 38 years old – Married, 3 children – Primary school – Housewife 
Interview 2) Female – 02.10.2018 – Kahramanmaraş KTPC - Arab 
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Interview 4) Female – 03.10.2018 – Kahramanmaraş KTPC - Arab 
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Interview 7) Male – 09.10.2018 – Kahramanmaraş KTPC - Arab 
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Halep – 20 years old – Single – Bachelor’s student in economics  
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Cizire – 25 years old – Single – Bachelor’s student in engineering – NGO worker 
Interview 10) Male – 20.10.2018 – Diyarbakır – Kurdish 
Qamishli – 26 years old – Single – Master’s in History – Building worker 
Interview 11) Male – 23.10.2018 – Diyarbakır – Kurdish 
Kobane – 26 years old – Single – Bachelor’s student in Sociology – Building worker 
Interview 12) Female – 25.10.2018 – Diyarbakir – Kurdish  
Cizire – 20 years old – Single – Bachelor’s Student in law – Lifeguard  
Interview 13) Male – 26.10.2018 – Diyarbakır - Kurdish 
Damascus – 22 years old – Single – High school – Building worker 
Interview 14) Female – 27.10.2018 – Mardin - Kurdish 
Qamishli – 32 years old – Single – Bachelor’s in law – Translator and teacher 
Interview 15: Female, 28.10.2018 – Mardin - Kurdish 
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Interview 16: Female, 28.10.2018 – Mardin - Kurdish 
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Kobane - 33 years old, single, Master’s in art (design), artist (painter)  
Interview 18: Male, 31.10.2018 – Kahramanmaraş - Arab 
Homs - 29 years old, Bachelor, married, 2 kids, security guard,  
Interview 19: Female, 31.10.2018 – Kahramanmaraş - Arab 
38 years old, married, 4 children, secondary school, Housewife,  
 
Interviewees in Lavrion and Sounio in Greece 
Interview 20) Male – 06.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish  
Afrin – 26 years old – Single – Bachelor’s in Economy – Teacher  
Interview 21) Female – 06.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Qamishli – 35 years old – Married, 2 children – Secondary School – Cashier  
Interview 22) Female – 07.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Qamishli – 25 years old – Married, 2 children – Bachelor’s in education – Teacher 
Interview 23) Male – 07.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Kobane – 23 years old – Married, 2 children – Primary school – Body shop worker 
Interview 24) Male – 14.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Afrin – 26 years old – Married, 1 child – Student in law – building worker 
Interview 25) Male – 14.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Deir ez-Zor – 50 years old – Married, 3 children – Bachelor’s in Engineering – 
Mechanic worker 
Interview 26) Male – 15.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Damascus – 22 years old – Single – Student in law  
Interview 27) Male – 15.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Afrin – 31 years old – Married, 3 children – Student in law – Artists and building 
worker 
Interview 28) Female – 17.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Afrin – 24 years old – Married, 1 child – Secondary school – Yezidi – housewife 
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Interview 29) Female – 18.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Qamishli – 30 years old – Married, 2 children – Bachelor’s in English – Cashier  
Interview 30) Female – 19.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Raqqa – 25 Years old – Married, no child – Secondary school – House wife 
Interview 31) Male – 20.11.2018 – Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Afrin – 34 Years old – Married, 3 children – Primary school – worker and farmer 
Interview 32: Female, 22.11.2018 - Lavrion Camp – Kurdish 
Afrin - 19 years old, single, high school 
Interview 33: Female, 23.11.2018 - Sounio Camp - Arab 
Raqqa - 28 years old - mother of 2 children, Divorced, Bachelor’s in engineering 
Interview 34: Male, 23.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Dear el zor - 39 years old, high school, married, 2 children, business 
Interview 35:  Female - 24.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Homs- 20 years old, high school, married, 1 kid, housewife 
Interview 36: Male, 25.11.2018 – Sounio Camp - Arab 
Raqqa - 34 years old, Bachelor’s degree, married, no kids, business  
 
Interviewees in Berlin -Germany 
Interview 37) Male- 31.03.2019 – Berlin Tempelhof-Schoeneberg - Arab 
Haseke – 25 years old – Single - 2 years university graduate – Anesthesia 
Technician  
Interview 38) Male – 02.04.2019 – Berlin Tempelhof-Schoeneberg - Arab 
Damascus – 43 years old – Married, 3 children - Secondary school - Construction 
worker  
Interview 39) Male – 03.04.2019 – Berlin Tempelhof-Schoeneberg - Arab 
Halep - 34 years old – Married, 7 children – High school – Truck driver 
Interview 40) Male – 04.04.2019 – Berlin- Tempelhof-Schoeneberg - Kurdish 
Afrin – 24 years old – Single – Bachelor’s degree – Engineering 
Interview 41) Male – 04.04.2019 – Berlin - Tempelhof-Schoeneberg - Kurdish 
Derik – 21 Years old – Single – Bachelor’s degree – Informatic/programming 
Interview 42) Female – 06.04.2019 – Berlin - Neukölln - Arab 
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Raqqa – 28 years old – Widow, 3 children – High school – Housewife/ now cleaner 
Interview 43) (Female) – 07.04.2019 – Berlin - Neukölln - Arab 
Homs – 23 years old – Single – Bachelor’s degree – Finance/ now waitress 
Interview 44) (Female) - 09.04.2019 – Berlin - Neukölln - Kurdish 
Qamishli – 29 years old – Married – Bachelor’s degree – Literature – Teacher 
Interview 45) (Female) – 10.04.2019 – Berlin - Zehlendorf - Kurdish 
Kobane – 33 years old - Single – Bachelor’s degree – Cinema/director 
Interview 46) (Female) – 12.04.2019 – Berlin - Zehlendorf - Arab 
Dear el zor – 31 years old – Widow, 1 child - Bachelor’s in Law – Assistant 
Interview 47) Male – 14.04.2019 – Berlin - Zehlendorf - Kurdish 
Qamishli – 29 years old – Married, 1 child – high school in Syria, Bachelor’s in old 
care in Germany – Technician. 
Interview 48) Male – 15.04.2019 – Berlin - Schoeneberg -Kurdish 
Kobane – 28 years old – Single – Secondary school – Sport coach for children 
Interview 49) Female – 17.04.2019 – Berlin - Schoeneberg -Kurdish 
Haseke – 42 years old – Married, 2 children – Bachelor’s in medicine – Doctor in 
Syria, translator  
Interview 50) Female - 19.04.2019 – Berlin Wilmersdorf - Kurdish 
Aziziye – 21 years old – Single – High school in Syria, bachelor’s in programing in 
Germany – student 
Interview 51) Male – 20.04.2019 – Berlin Wilmersdorf- Arab 
46 years old – Married, 5 children – Primary school – Owner of shops chain in Syria 
(cosmetics) – Taxi driver 
Interview 52) - Female - 21.04.2019 – Berlin Neukolln - Arab 
Damascus - 33 years old - single-– Bachelor’s in politics 
 
 
 
 
 
